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THE

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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE VARIOUS READINGS OF 1 TIMOTHY III. 16.

BY REV. WILLIAM H. WARD, UTICA, N. Y.

Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον· Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι, ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις, ἐκηρύχθη ἐν ἔθνεσιν, ἐπιστεύθη ἐν κόσμῳ, ἀνελήφθη ἐν δόξῃ.

Instead of Θεός in this passage many editors read ὅς, and some writers have defended ὅ. The latter reading may at once be dismissed as untenable, not being supported by any such authority as either of the others, and being plainly a grammatical variation, introduced for the purpose of relieving an apparent impropriety in the gender of ὅς. The question then rests between ὅς and Θεός. Having endeavored carefully to investigate all the authorities for either reading, as far as they are accessible to us, we propose to give the result of this labor in such a form that the reader can easily decide for himself between the two readings.

While Θεός in this passage supports the divinity of Christ, this is not a doctrine which rests on any single text. If the result of criticism could be proved adverse to this reading, it would not affect our general faith. God does not leave such an important doctrine as the Trinity to depend on so few and feeble arguments that a single proof-text more or less makes any appreciable difference in our belief.

We have perfect confidence in the principles of our faith, and look with no feelings of concern upon investigations of the purity of the scripture text. Even with the reading ὅς, some of the early Fathers, as will be seen, deduced from this passage the divinity of Christ, and Dr. S. Clarke truly says of this passsge, that "the same is evident; that that person was manifest in the flesh, whom John in the beginning of his gospel styles Θεός, God."[1]

I. Manuscripts.

The authority of this source of evidence in identifying the original text is paramount to all others. Although they are not, of course, accessible in this country, yet accurate copies of all the older MSS. have been published, and in the case of doubtful readings they have been carefully and repeatedly examined by the most competent critics. A collection of their researches will be as satisfactory as any personal examination, especially as we have in the case of the older MSS. (ℵ and D excepted) the advantage of good facsimiles, or even photographs, of this passage.

The *Codex Sinaiticus*, distinguished as ℵ, and belonging to the fourth century, clearly reads ὅς *a prima manu*. Tischendorf says: "*A prima* ὅς ἐφανερώθη. Another corrector, the latest of all who have altered this MS., of nearly the twelfth century, has substituted Θεός, but so carefully has he done it, that he has left the more ancient writing untouched."[2] This seems to leave the reading of this most ancient MS. in no kind of doubt. Would that we could say as much for some of the others.

The *Alexandrian* MS., which is marked as Codex A, and belongs probably to the fifth century, has been referred to as authority by the advocates of either reading. The form $\overline{\text{ΘC}}$, as it now appears, is the ordinary contraction for Θεός, but it has evidently been altered or retouched at quite a

[1] Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, by Samuel Clarke, D.D. (3d ed., 1732), p. 89.

[2] Not. Codicis Sinaitici, p. 20.

late period.[1] The heavy black line above the letters and the point within the Ο are palpably modern, and at present there is no trace visible of either line as drawn by the original scribe, if such were the case. It is true that the superior line is so heavy that it would conceal any earlier one, but the mark within the Ο consists of a simple dot within the circle, instead of a diametral line extending across the Θ; and it might be supposed that if a transverse line were originally present, some faint remains of it might yet be discovered on either side of the central point; but such is not the case. It is said, however, that this line, if originally present, might now be completely worn away, although faintly seen a century or two ago. Indeed, the passage has been so repeatedly examined that this page has become somewhat defaced.[2] It has accordingly been the practice of the defenders of the reading Θεός to refer the whole question to the authority of the earlier critics who have examined our text. But even they speak of the old line as being exceedingly faint, although most of them assert that traces of it were visible. It is to be noted, however, that neither Patricius Junius nor Mr. Huish who collated this MS. for Walton's Polyglot makes any definite assertion in reference to this passage. In fact Huish, whose negative authority has been much relied on, in no case notices the reading of the original scribe where it differs from that of the corrector.

The earliest distinct notice which we find of the reading of A is by Mill, who says, in his critical edition, published A.D. 1707, "This transverse line of which I speak is so faint and evanescent, that at first sight I did not doubt that it was written ὅς, which I therefore had placed among the

[1] Perhaps by Patricius Junius, curator of the royal library in the time of Charles I. See Wetstein's Nov. Test., Vol. I., Proleg. pp. 20, 21, also Wotton's Clement, Cap. 6, pp. 26, 27.

[2] Griesb. Symbol. Crit., Vol. I. p. x. Others say that the passage itself has not been defaced, only that part of the page being affected where the hand has rested while holding the microscope. The facsimile given by Porter seems to confirm the statement.

various readings, but afterwards, having more carefully examined the passage (*perlustrato attentius loco*), I found some marks and remains sufficiently distinct (*satis certa*) of the line which at first had escaped my examination, especially towards the left side, where it touches the circumference of the letter."[1]

Next after Mill we find that the passage was examined by Wetstein, in the year 1716 or 1717,[2] in order to discover what Mill had supposed himself to see, "*perlustrato attentius loco*," but he failed to find any traces of the more ancient lines. In 1718 Henry Wotton seems to have found the transverse line quite plain compared with the previous experience of Mill and Wetstein. He says: "In this MS., without doubt, was always read Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη, as will readily be discovered by any one who inspects it quite carefully [*accuratioribus oculis*]."[3]

About twenty years later, Rev. J. Berriman made a careful examination of this passage, with several of his friends; the result of which was published in 1741. He says: "I have several times carefully examined this manuscript myself, and though I could never perceive any part of the old transverse line by the naked eye (nor others who were with me, whose eyes were better than mine), yet by the aid of a glass and the advantage of the sun shining on the book, I could see some part of the old line toward the left hand of the new stroke within the circle of the Θ, and the same was seen by two gentlemen who viewed it at the same time; one of whom also could discern some remainder of the old line towards the right hand, as well as the other towards the left."[4]

It will be seen that the transverse stroke was so faint that it could be only seen on the most minute examination, and then only with a microscope, the leaf being held in the sun-

[1] Mill's Nov. Test., in 1 Tim. iii. 16.
[2] Wetstein's Nov. Test., Proleg. p. xx.
[3] Epistles of Clement, p. 27 (Oxford, 1718).
[4] Berriman's Works, Vol. V. pp. 155, 156.

light. It was left for Wetstein, in the year 1746, to explain the faint appearance of this line. His discovery may best be given in his own words. He says: "I asked an old friend to take me into the Royal Library, and when he had done it, and carefully examined this passage in the Alexandrian MS., not only with the naked eye, but with various kinds of glasses, he pronounced that it had originally been written in no other way than OC; but when I sought towards the left for the line of Mill and Berriman, I found it indeed, but when I wished to show it to my friend, I could not, because it had vanished; and when the line alternately appeared and again disappeared, and I was not a little perplexed by the phantasm, my friend, with his peculiar penetration, immediately suggested the cause, and showed that the line was not written on the page where it is read ὃς ἐφανερώθη, but on the other side of the leaf, where is written κατ' εὐσεβείαν (1 Tim. vi. 3), and that it formed a part of the first letter Ε of the word εὐσεβείαν. For when the book was laid on the table, as often as the leaf which we were considering was so placed on the following leaves that it should touch and cover the whole of the next leaf, the line could not be seen, because the parchment was opaque; but as soon as the leaf was so raised and separated from the following leaves that both sides should be shone upon, not only was this line seen through the translucent parchment, but even whole letters and words."[1] This explanation of Wetstein, that the supposed faint transverse line was only the sagitta of the Ε seen through the thin vellum, is probably the true one. Woide, the learned editor of this Codex, endeavored in his Prolegomena to throw discredit upon it; but it has been defended by Tischendorf,[2] Porter,[3] Tregelles,[4] and more lately by Ellicott,[5] so satisfactorily that there seems but little room to doubt its correctness.

[1] Wetstein's Nov. Test., Vol. I., Proleg. p. xxii.
[2] Cod. Rescr. (ed. Tischendorf), p. xlii.
[3] Principles of Text. Critic., p. 487.
[4] Printed Text of Griesb. Nov. Test., p. 228.
[5] Commentary on 1 Tim. iii. 16; also note on p. 100. This note seems

It is astonishing how many errors Dr. Henderson has compressed into the single page which he devotes to the Alexandrian MS. He says: "This proof (of its reading Θεός) is furnished by the unimpeachable testimony of Junius, Huish, Mill, Wotton, Croyk, Berriman, Ridley, Hewitt, and Pilkington, who carefully and minutely inspected the passage before it became illegible, and found the genuine transverse line in the Θ. To these names may be added those of Walton, Tell, Bentley, and Grabe, all of whom had access to this MS. at an earlier period, and who concur in its exhibiting ΘC and not OC. The evidence thus elicited was attempted to be set aside by Wetstein, who on first examining the MS. was able to discover no stroke, and conjectured that what Mill had taken for it was merely the line of an E in the word ЄΥCEBEIAN on the opposite side of the leaf, which made its appearance through the vellum; but on inspecting the Θ more minutely afterwards, he found that the fine stroke which was originally in the body of the letter was discoverable at each end of the fuller stroke, with which some corrector had retouched it."[1]

most satisfactory, especially as coming from so sound a critic. His experiment consists of having the leaf held in the light, so that the edge of an instrument held on the obverse side of the leaf, exactly over the sagitta of the O, can be seen through the leaf by an observer looking at the suspected letter. In opposition to Woide, he finds that this sagitta exactly corresponds with the supposed transverse line of the Θ. Scrivener asserts, however, in his Introduction to the Criticism of the New Test. (1859), p. 453, that Ellicott's experiment is too delicate to be reliable. It is remarkable that neither Tregelles, nor Scrivener, who has examined this passage "twenty times within as many years" (p. 453), has noticed Prof. Porter's statement that a pinhole, made by some one at the extremity of the sagitta, falls exactly upon the supposed transverse line. One could hardly suppose that a pinhole sufficiently distinct to be pointed out, as Prof. Porter says, to Sir F. Madden, keeper of the MSS. in the Museum, could have become *worn out* by the lapse of time. We may add that Prof. Porson spent two days examining this passage, and was satisfied that the original reading of A was ὅς. See Porson's Tracts, p. 290.

As an offset to the suspicion of Woide that some critics, like Wetstein, may have failed to see the transverse line because they did not wish to do so, may be placed the testimony of Hempelius, who affirmed that the reading was certainly ὅς, although, as he informed Woide, he had expected and desired to read Θεός. Vide Spohr's Woide's Proleg., p. 181.

[1] Biblical Repository, Vol. II. p. 82.

Here are almost as many errors as assertions. We will examine his statements in order.

1. *Junius* nowhere makes the slightest reference to this passage.

2. The same is true of *Huish*. The only foundation for this statement is that Huish collated this Codex for Walton's Polyglot, and failed to notice any various reading in this passage. The word had been previously altered or retouched, and he does not notice the fact.

3. *Mill* found the "genuine transverse line" so faint that at first in his Various Readings he referred to this MS. as authority for ὅς.

4. *Wotton* certainly defends the reading Θεός, but even he says it can only be seen by examining the letter *accuratioribus oculis*.

5. *Croyk* is he who informed Berriman that he remembered having plainly seen the transverse line "twenty-five years ago,"[1] about the year 1716. This is the only authority which we have been able to discover that it was ever at all distinct, and we shall be obliged to throw discredit upon it, as it was about the time of Wetstein's first examination, and long after that of Mill.

6. *Berriman* distinctly asserts that he "could never perceive any part of the old transverse line by the naked eye," although able by the help of a glass to "perceive some part" of it when the leaf was held in the full sunshine.

7. *Ridley, Gibson, Hewitt, and Pilkington* were the four gentlemen who examined the passage with Berriman;[2] all of whom were indebted to the combined advantages of a microscope and the bright sunlight for their discovery.

8. *Walton, Tell, Bentley, and Grabe* did *not* have "access to this MS. at an earlier period" than some before mentioned. In fact, Junius took charge of it when first presented to Charles I.

9. *Walton* never, as far as is known, examined this pas-

[1] Berriman's Diss., p. 154, also Woide's Proleg. to Alex. MS., p. 31.

[2] Nolan's Greek Vulgate, p. 285, note; also Woide's Proleg., p. xxx.

sage, but confided the collation of this MS. to Huish. Is it possible that Henderson refers to Wotton, whose name has been Latinized into Waltonus by Wetstein,[1] and perhaps others?

10. Dean *Tell*, afterwards Bishop of Oxford, published an edition of the Greek Testament in 1765; his name, however, being suppressed. His collation of this MS. was drawn chiefly from Junius and Huish. He says nothing of the reading in this passage.

11. *Bentley*, as far as we can learn, nowhere speaks of the reading of this MS. as Θεός; certainly not in his Essay on Freethinking, nor in the Notes for his projected edition, which have been published.

12. *Grabe* edited the Old Testament portion of the Alexandrian Codex, and in his MS. of the New Testament portion, preserved in the Bodleian, is this note:[2] "Some modern pen, I know not whose, has heavily retouched the line within the Θ, and also the stroke drawn over the word, lest otherwise it should be read ὅς." Grabe says nothing of the distinctness of the "genuine" lines.

13. The statement of Henderson in reference to Wetstein's subsequent discovery of the nearly obliterated transverse line is incorrect in almost every particular. It may be true that, when first in England, he supposed on one occasion while examining this MS., that he saw the old line, and so told Berriman's anonymous correspondent; but, if so, this was twenty-five years *before* he found that the phantasm of the line was due to the stroke on the other side of the leaf; so that the last statement of Henderson is utterly incorrect. Had he appended references to his statements, their correctness could have been more easily verified.

The Vatican MS., B, does not contain this Epistle.

Codex C, or *Ephraemi Syri*, is a MS., probably of the fifth century, over which has been written a part of the works of Ephraem Syrus. The ancient text has been chem-

[1] Prolegom., p. xxii.

[2] Quoted by Woide, pp. xxx and 76, or Spohr's Leipsic ed., p. 421.

ically restored, and has been published by Tischendorf, who has also given us a beautiful facsimile of this passage. This MS. had been regarded as authority for Θεός till Wetstein questioned its reading. He says: "C, I think, has ὅς; for the slender line which converts *O* into Θ is not apparent,[1] and the other line, drawn over the letters Θ*C* as a sign of contraction for Θεός, and which elsewhere is drawn evenly over them, is so made, with a more heavy and unskilful stroke, that it seems to betray a different hand."[2] This supposed inelegance, other critics, as Woide and Less, failed to discover; but Griesbach, in his notice of this MS.,[3] ably and satisfactorily defends the opinion of Wetstein. Since the ancient text has been restored, and the transverse stroke of the Θ brought to light, Tischendorf has found fresh reason to believe that the relative was the original reading. His facsimile seems to confirm this opinion. He even goes so far as to assign the change to his second corrector, relying on the character of the strokes and the color of the ink.[4] Tregelles confirms the reading of Tischendorf.[5]

Codex D, or *Claromontanus*, dates from the seventh or eighth century, and was written by a Latin *librarius*. It contains the Greek and Latin texts in parallel columns. At present it reads Θεός, but it has been conclusively proved by Griesbach,[6] and is now generally admitted, that the original reading was ὅ. The change was made by erasing enough of the original *O* to convert it into *C* and then prefixing a Θ, which could be readily done, as the word happens to begin the line.[7] The Θ will then, of course,

[1] The transverse line was not visible till the writing had been chemically restored.

[2] Wetstein's Nov. Test. in 1 Tim. iii. 16.

[3] Symbol. Crit., Vol. I. pp. viii–xxv.

[4] Codex Reser. (ed. Tischendorf), p. xli.

[5] Printed Text of Griesb. Nov. Test., p. 228.

[6] Symbol. Crit., Vol. II. pp. xliv, lvi–lxxvii.

[7] The same explanation of this alteration is given by Le Clerc in his Epist. de Ed. Nov. Test. Millii, prefixed to Küster's edition of Mill (1708).

protrude beyond the regular commencement of the line, while in shape it is more circular than the same letter as drawn by the original scribe, and the *C* has the general outlines of the *O* out of which it was made. This MS., is the only one known which has *ὅ*, and a reading so unique is no doubt referable to the Latin scribe, who accommodated the relative to his Latin text, which has *quod*. Tischendorf has also edited this MS. and says: "It is most certain that the first hand wrote *O*, and the third *ΘC*."[1]

The MSS., designated as F and G, *Augiensis* and *Boernerianus*, of about the ninth century, agree in reading *ὅς*. They closely resemble each other, and seem to be copies of the same exemplar. Scrivener has given, in his edition of F, a photograph of this passage, which shows that he is right in saying, "*ὅς* most expressly."[2] A facsimile of this passage as found in G is given by Matthaei.[3]

J and K, Moscow MSS. of the ninth or tenth century, have *Θεός*.

All the cursive MSS. agree in reading *Θεός*, with the exception of 17 (33 of the Gospels, called sometimes "the Queen of the Cursives"), 73, and 181.

Reviewing the testimony of the MSS., we find that all which are older than the ninth century, either probably or certainly, have a relative, and that relative, with one exception, *ὅς*, while all of a later date, but three, read *Θεός*. In point of antiquity, the great preponderance is for *ὅς*, in point of numbers, for *Θεός*.

II. Ancient Versions.

Next in value to the MSS. as a means of determining the true state of the sacred text, stand the Ancient Versions. With remarkable unanimity all which possess any critical value reject the reading *Θεός*. The only question is, which relative do they favor, *ὅς* or *ὅ*? The difference between them is so slight as not to affect the sense, if the mystery

[1] p. 584. [2] p. 282.
[3] Nov. Test. (ed. Matthaei), Vol I. p. 286.

be referred personally to Christ, as the passage was understood by many of the early Fathers. It may be translated indifferently, as in the versions: "Great is the Mystery of Godliness," i.e. "Christ, *who* or *which* was manifested in the flesh."

The *Old Latin* Version gives us: *Et manifeste magnum est pietatis sacramentum, quod manifestatum est in carne, justificatum est in spiritu.* Many have held here that *quod* implies necessarily the neuter relative ὅ. But we see no valid reason why ὅς may not have been translated by the neuter *quod*, in more strict grammatical conformity with its supposed antecedent, since μυστήριον and *sacramentum* were understood by the translator to be a title of Christ. At any rate, on such a minute point we must refer back to the MSS. which strongly oppose ὅ. Versions are hardly competent witnesses for the distinction of gender.

Jerome, in his revised version, retains the exact words of the Old Latin just quoted. Henderson refuses to receive the reading of the Vulgate as any authority for that of Jerome, notwithstanding he also reads *Qui manifestatus est* in his Commentary on Isaiah, till it can be proved that his revision extended to this part of the Old Version.[1] In answer we would say that there are in this very verse two variations between the Vulgate and the Old Latin as published by Labatier. Jerome's version, in more strict accordance with the Greek, omits *hoc* before *mundo*, and reads *assumptus* for *absumptus*.

Nearly or quite equal in value to the Latin Versions are the *Syriac*. The old *Peschito* translates this passage, ܘܒܪܝܫ ܓܕܫ ܕܐܝܬ ܒܗ ܪܙܐ ܕܐܠܗܘܬܐ ܕܐܬܓܠܝ ܒܒܣܪܐ ܘܐܬܙܟܝ ܒܪܘܚܐ, "And truly great is the mystery of godliness, *which* [or *who*] was manifested in the flesh, and was manifested in the Spirit." Here the relative ܕ refers to ܪܙܐ. Henderson endeavors to show that ? may be a conjunction, and the

1 Henderson's Defence of the Mystery of Godliness, p. 29, or Biblical Repository, Vol. II. p. 17.

passage be translated, "Great is the mystery of godliness, that he," i.e. *God*, referring to the clause "house of God" in the fifteenth verse, was manifested in the flesh,"[2] a most improbable supposition.

The *Philoxenian* Version, made A.D. 508, is generally remarkable for its servile adherence to the Greek. Its translation reads: ܘܐܦ ܒܠܐ ܦܠܓܐ ܕܬܘܕܥܬܐ ܕܐܠܗܐ ܕܫܪܝܪܐ ; ܕܐܬܓܠܝ ܒܒܣܪܐ. "And confessedly great is the mystery of the *good fear of God*, *who* [or *which*] was manifested in the flesh." The only question which can be raised here is whether "the good fear of God" is to be regarded as a compound expression equivalent to εὐσέβεια. White, who edited this version, so regards it, and translates the whole clause simply by *pietatis*. It is remarkable, however, that this is the only case in which εὐσέβεια is translated by ܕܐܠܗܐ ܕܫܟܝܢܐ ܕܚܣܝܢܐ, *good fear of God;* its usual equivalent being simply ܕܫܟܝܢܐ ܕܚܣܝܢܐ, *good fear*. The addition of ܐܠܗܐ, *God*, seems then to favor Θεός, while the use of the relative ? favors ὅς. In 1 Tim. ii. 10, the same full form, *good fear of God*, occurs as the translation of θεοσέβεια, and it would seem probable that the translator either found that reading in the present passage, or, which is more probable, was aware that both ὅς and Θεός were current, and endeavored to combine them both in his translation. Mar Xenayas, under whose auspices this version was made, was one of the leaders in the Monophysite controversy, and no doubt acquainted with the charge made against Macedonius of corrupting this passage.

In the margin of this version is added ܐ, *ille*, which White thinks was meant to be inserted before ?ܕܐܬܓܠܝ, as a fuller form of the relative, but without rendering its gender any clearer.[1] But this seems too trivial an alteration even for the Philoxenian Version, and we conjecture that it

[1] White's Philox. Version, 1 Tim. iii. 16; also note, p. 338.

was intended to take the place of ⲑⲉⲟⲥ, *God*, in which case the margin would favor ὅς. If we are not mistaken, no reliance can be placed on this version in support of either reading.

The *Aethiopic* Version belongs probably to the fourth or fifth century. As printed in the London Polyglot, the passage reads: ኧስኮ ፡ ሀቢይ ፡ ዘዖሎኑ ፡ ሙስጢር ፡ ለጽድቅ ፡ ዘኧስተርኧየ ፡ ሰሠጋ ፡ ሰብኧ ፡ "Since great is the mystery of truth, *which* [or *who*] appeared in the flesh of man." The word here used to translate *μυστήριον* is of the masculine gender, so that nothing can be gathered from this version to decide between ὅς and ὅ. Lawrence asserts that both the Peshito and the Aethiopic indisputably favor ὅ, and not ὅς. He says: "If ὅς be the reading, it is evident that the following clauses of the verse cannot be grammatically connected by a copulative, but that the passage must be translated as the Unitarians translate it. 'He who was manifested in the flesh was justified,' etc., but in all the versions alluded to the subsequent clauses are grammatically connected by a copulative."[1] It does not seem to have occurred to Lawrence that it might be translated, the mystery of godliness *who*, or *he who*, was manifested in the flesh, [*and who*] was justified, etc. Augustine[2] and many others, quoting this passage, refer the mystery personally to Christ.

In Platt's edition of the Aethiopic Version we have the remarkable variation, ሀቢይ ፡ ዝኬ ፡ ዘኧስተርኧየ ፡ ሰሠጋ ፡ ሰብኧ "Great is he *who* was seen in the flesh of man." We can hardly help believing that this is a variation peculiar to the single MS. which Mr. Platt used in editing the epistles. It certainly is not founded on the Greek. But the variation serves, at least, to discredit Henderson's statement, that the relative ዘ may be regarded as a conjunction, like ? in

[1] Remarks on Griesb. Classif., p. 79. [2] Sermon 204.

the Syriac, and *quod* in the Latin, for in this shorter form of the verse, ⲏ is preceded only by the demonstrative ⲫⲏ.

The *Coptic* or *Memphitic* Version, which has been referred to the third century, as edited by both Wilkins and Boetticher, translates τὸ μυστήριον by *ΠΙ ΜΤϹΤΗΡΙΟΝ*, and for the relative gives us *ΦΗ ΕΤ*, i.e. *ille qui*.

In the *Thebaic* Version, which is perhaps even more ancient, the form is almost identical with the Memphitic. Both certainly have the relative, but do not distinguish its gender.

The *Gothic* Version, of the fourth century, translates μυστήριον by the feminine substantive *runa*, and connects with it the *masculine* relative *saci*, which seems to require ὅς rather than ὅ. The adjective *mikils*, *great*, is also masculine, though connected with the feminine *runa*, the mystery being referred personally to Christ, and the gender of *mikils* being determined by the idea rather than the grammatical form of the noun with which it is connected.

The *Armenian* Version, belonging to the fifth century, plainly has a relative.

The various *Arabic* Versions are all too modern to possess any critical authority, unless an exception be made in favor of a MS. version preserved in the Vatican. With the exception of the Arabic of the Polyglot they all have a relative.

The *Slavonic* and *Georgian*, which are of even less weight than the Arabic, are said to favor θεός.

It will, then, be seen that all the versions made previous to the sixth century have the relative, and that, with the apparent exception of the Gothic, they leave its gender in doubt, a point which can be decided only by the Greek MSS. As these afford but very slight support to ὅ,—only a single copy having this reading, and then probably arising from grammatical accommodation to the Latin which is written beside it,—the versions may confidently be adduced as unanimously supporting ὅς.

III. Authority of the Fathers.

Our third source of evidence is the authority of the Fathers. All their citations which have any bearing upon our text we will endeavor to give from minute personal examination of the original authorities, omitting, however, those Latin Fathers who did not also use the Greek, and who are therefore authority only for the Old Latin or the Vulgate Version. It is to be premised that it is difficult always to discover the original text of the Fathers, especially in quotations of scripture, because scribes, and too often editors, have altered these quotations so as to make them correspond with their own copies of the scriptures. Accordingly we may rely with more confidence on the comments connected with our text than on the words in which we now find it quoted. The mere citation of this passage with the reading Θεός is no sure sign that such was the real reading of an author, for the temptation to change ὅς to Θεός has been very strong, while, as all the later MSS. have Θεός, and this also seems the more orthodox reading, there has been since the sixth century no such tendency to alter Θεός to ὅς. This being the case, a citation of this passage with the reading ὅς almost certainly has not been altered, while with the reading Θεός it may have suffered corruption. This principle may be expressed in more general terms: when of two earlier readings one has at a later period become universal, the writings of the early Fathers may in all honesty of intention be so altered as to accord with the received reading, but not with the obsolete one. In accordance with this rule, a citation with the reading ὅς has more probably not been altered than with the reading Θεός.

Again, the passage may be alluded to in such a way as to indicate what was the author's reading, although not formally quoted. If we read that "the mystery of godliness was manifested in the flesh," we may be sure that the writer's copy of the scriptures contained only a relative

between *μυστήριον* and *ἐφανερώθη*. On the other hand, if an author frequently allude to this passage, persistently connecting *Θεός* with some form of *φανερόω*, we may be sure that he read this passage as in the Textus Receptus, while if he generally connects *ἐφανερώθη* with such subjects as *κύριος*, *υἱός*, *Χριστός*, and *σωτήρ*, instead of *Θεός*, it is a probable proof that *Θεός* was not in his copy, although the presumption is much weakened if such subjects are connected with the subsequent predicates. Thus, little can be gathered from Origen's remark: "My Saviour is said to have been received up into glory."

It may be added of Latin translations of Greek Fathers that they are especially worthy of confidence, as correctly expressing the original, in cases where they show a variation from the Vulgate.

The following Fathers *clearly* support *ὅς*: —

1. *Epiphanius.* A.D. 368. *Ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι.*[1] This passage is found in a long quotation from the Ancoratus of Epiphanius, taken by him into his Panarium. The two passages have been generally quoted as independent authorities, and correctly so, as Epiphanius himself transferred these sections from one work to the other. In the Ancoratus, as we now have it, *ὅς* is omitted,[2] a remarkable omission if the reading had been *Θεός*.

2. *Theodorus of Mopsuestia.* A.D. 407.

a. Ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνέυματι· δεδικαιῶσθαι ἐν πνέυματι λέγων ἀυτὸν εἴτε ὡς, κ. τ. λ.[3] "Who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit; saying that he was justified in the spirit either because, etc."

b. Consonantia et apostolus dicit, et manifeste magnum est

[1] Panarium, Tom. I. p. 894 (Coloniae, 1682). A single MS. of little note is said to read *ὁς* for *ὅς*, viz. the Cod. Rhedig. of the fifteenth century, noted by Oehler in his edition of the Panarium, Vol. I. Part I. p. 157.

[2] Ancor. 69, Tom. I. p. 894.

[3] De Incarn. ap. Leont. Hieros. Fragm. 21. Maii Script. Vet. Vat. Coll., Tom. VI. p. 303. The same passage translated into Latin by Fr. Turrianus may be found in Basnage's Thesaurus, Tom. I. p. 588.

pictatis mysterium, qui manifestatus est in carne, justificatus in spiritu.[1] "And agreeably with this the apostle says: 'And without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness, who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit.'" Note here, that this old translation from the Greek varies from the Vulgate in having *mysterium* for *sacramentum*, and *qui manifestatus* instead of the neuter form, and therefore no doubt correctly represents the original of Theodorus.

Less decisive in its present form is the following:

c. Christum justificatum et immaculatum factum virtute Sancti Spiritus, sicut beatus Paulus modo quidem dicit quod justificatus est in spiritu.[2] "Christ was justified and made spotless by the agency of the Holy Spirit, as Paul says, in one place, that he was justified by the spirit," etc.

d. In another place Theodorus speaks of Christ as not needing to be "justified by the Spirit," if the proper Godhead dwelt in him;[3] a comment hardly appropriate had he read Θεὸς.... ἐδικαιώθη ἐν.

3. *Cyril of Alexandria.* A.D. 412. This author has been quoted at times as favoring Θεός, but it may be abundantly proved that his real reading is ὅς. He several times quotes this passage.

a. Πλανᾶσθε μὴ εἰδότες τὰς γραφάς, μήτε μὴν τῆς εὐσεβείας τὸ μέγα μυστήριον, τουτ' ἐστι Χριστόν, ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη, κ. τ. λ. Εἴη γὰρ ἂν οὐχ ἕτερον οἶμαι τι τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον, ἢ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν ὁ ἐκ Θεοῦ πατρὸς λόγος, ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί. Bis.[1] "Ye err, not knowing the scriptures, nor indeed the great mystery of godliness, that is, Christ, who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, etc.; for the mystery of godliness could be nothing else, I think, than the Word of God the Father sent to us, who was mani-

[1] De Incarn., Lib. XIII., ap. Concil. Constant. II., Mansi, Tom. IX. col. 221. Henderson calls both Theodorus and Epiphanius Diaconus "Latin Fathers," pp. 35, 64.

[2] Ad Baptizandos, Mansi, Tom. IX. col. 218.

[3] Ibid., col. 206.

[4] De Incarn. Unig. Dial. VIII. (ed. Aubert), Tom. V. Part I. pp. 680, 681; also, in nearly the same words, De Recta Fide, Tom. V. Part. II. p. 6.

fested in the flesh." This explanation necessarily requires the reading ὅς, for if Θεός takes its place, the *mystery* is evidently the great *doctrine* of redemption through the God-man, and not the *person* of the Word of God.

b. Ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι· κατ' οὐδένα γὰρ τρόπον ταῖς ἡμετέραις ἀσθενείαις ἥλω.[1] "Who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit; for in no way was he overcome by our infirmities." The same passage exists in a Latin translation by Marius Mercator, A.D. 418, in the following form: Divinus Paulus magnum quidem sit esse Mysterium pietatis, et vere res ita se habet. Manifestatus est enim in carne, cum sit Deus Verbum; justificatus est autem in spiritu, nullo enim modo nostris videtur infirmitatibus contineri."[2] This quotation of the Greek form by Oecumenius has been universally but erroneously supposed to refer to the citation quoted below from the Twelve Anathematisms; but Oecumenius distinctly states that it was taken from the twelfth chapter of the Scholia;[3] the very place where we find it in Mercator's translation.

c. Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον, Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ.[4] Here Θεός has been foisted into the text, as is shown by the comment upon the passage. Cyril is engaged in upholding the divinity of Christ, and without dwelling on the word Θεός, as he indubitably would, if he had employed that reading, he adds, Εἰ Θεὸς ὢν ὁ λόγος ἐνανθρωπῆσαι λέγοιτο (notice that ὁ λόγος, and not Θεός, is made the subject). "If the Word, being God,[5] be said to have become incarnate, and this without dropping his

[1] Schol. de Incarn. Unig., Cap. 12, ap. Oecum. Comm. in 1 Tim. iii. 16 (Par., 1631), Tom. II. p. 227.

[2] Cyril, Tom. V. Part I. p. 785, also Mar. Merc. (ed. Migne), col. 1013.

[3] Oecumenius introduces the quotation with the words Ὁ ἐν ἁγίοις Κύριλλος ἐν τῷ δωδεκάτῳ κεφαλαίῳ τῶν Σχολίων φησίν· ὅς ἐφανερώθη, κ. τ. λ. This is frequently quoted in the margin of MSS.

[4] De Recta Fide, Tom. V. Part II. p. 153.

[5] This expression, Θεὸς ὢν ὁ λόγος, is quite common with Cyril; cf. Id. pp. 72 A, 94 D.

divinity, but continuing the same that he ever had been, then great, and confessedly great, is the mystery of godliness." The argument for Christ's divinity is drawn from the fact that the mystery is called *great*, and not from the word Θεός. "But," he adds, "if Christ be regarded as a common man, how has he been manifested in the flesh? or rather, is it not evident that all men are in the flesh, and cannot be seen in any other way?" This Father thus goes on to draw his argument from the predicates ἐφανερώθη, ὤφθη, etc., and bases not the slightest proof on the word Θεός. "And how was he seen of the holy angels? Do not the angels see us? and what is there strange or mysterious if, being no different from us, some of the angels saw him? And how was he preached to the Gentiles?" And so Cyril proceeds to comment on the remaining clauses of the verse, from each of which he concludes that Christ must have been God. He then closes with these words: "Great, then, is the mystery of godliness, πεφανέρωται γὰρ ἐν σαρκὶ Θεὸς ὢν καὶ ὁ λόγος, for the Word has been manifested in the flesh, being also God; he was also justified in the spirit; was also seen of angels; was preached also to the Gentiles; and is believed on by the inhabitants of the world, as in truth the Son of God and the Father, and he who appeared in the flesh." Is not the context clear that Cyril did not recognize Θεός?

d. Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως, κ. τ. λ., Θεὸς ἐφαν., κ. τ. λ.[1] In this place also the text of Cyril has been tampered with, as the context shows; for he asks: Τίς ὁ ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθείς; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι πάντητε καὶ πάντως ὁ ἐκ Θεοῦ πατρὸς λόγος οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται μέγα τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον [Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί],[2] ὤφθη δὲ ἀγγέλοις ἀναβαίνων εἰς οὐρανούς. "Who is it that was manifested in the flesh? Is it not evident that

[1] De Recta Fide, p. 124 C.

[2] The words enclosed in brackets are omitted by Euthymius Zigadenus in his citation of this passage from Cyril (vid. Matthaei's Greek Test., Vol. II., Pref. to Cath. Epp., also Max. Biblioth., Tom. XIX. p. 165 D); they are not translated in Aubert's Latin Version, nor are they necessary for the sense. They are, no doubt, spurious. Cf. Griesb. Symbol. Crit., Tom. I. p. lii.

it was most certainly the Word which is from God the Father? for so will the mystery of godliness be great. He was seen also of angels as he ascended into heaven; was preached unto the Gentiles by the holy apostles; was believed on in the world. By no means can we then say that he was a mere man, like us; but as God he was made in the flesh, even as we are." This passage taken as a whole, like the one previously quoted, shows that Cyril read ὅς, for it were most strange that with the word Θεός before him, he should have omitted to speak of it when so much to his purpose, and should have endeavored to prove that ὁ φανερωθείς was divine by the use of the word μυστήριον, the mystery not being "confessedly great" unless the man Christ Jesus is also God. Can we believe that he would have felt obliged to fortify his proof of the divinity of him who was manifested in the flesh, by showing that the further statements in regard to him, "was seen of angels, was preached to the Gentiles," etc., are inconsistent with his mere humanity, if this very text had called Christ *God?* Is it possible that so keen a champion of orthodoxy as Cyril would, in professedly quoting a passage to prove the divinity of Christ, have withheld all reference to the most important word in it, and expended his strength in drawing comparatively feeble deductions? Would he have been content with throwing sand when he might have hurled a cannon ball at the heretics? He did not certainly set the same value upon Θεός, if he had it, as do some later critics. If any one is inclined to doubt that Cyril here read ὅς, let him compare with these passages the same Father's comment on Col. i. 26, "the mystery which has been hidden from ages," etc., and see how similarly the argument is there drawn from the word *mystery.* "For the mystery would not be great, nor worth speaking of, unless we regard Christ as God," etc.[1]

e. Ὁ θεσπέσιος γράφει Παῦλος, ... ὁμολογουμένως, κ. τ. λ., Θεὸς ἐφαν., κ. τ. λ. Τί οὖν ἔστι τὸ Ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί; τοῦτ'

[1] De Recta Fide, p. 72 A.

ἔστι, γέγονε σὰρξ ὁ ἐκ θεοῦ πατρὸς λόγος,[1] κ.τ.λ. "St. Paul writes: Without controversy great is the mystery of godliness: God [as now edited] was manifested in the flesh, etc.' What then is the meaning of this, 'He was manifested in the flesh'? It means that the Word, who is from God the Father, became flesh, not that his nature was transmitted into flesh by any conversion or change, etc." Does not the context here render it probable that θεός is a corruption of ὅς? In separately quoting this clause, Cyril omits the θεός, a fact which casts much suspicion upon it. Griesbach and others loosely assert that MSS. read ὅς in this passage, but we can find no particular MS. specified which preserves this reading. No doubt these assertions rest on Wetstein's statement that "MSS., and those who made catenae from them, read ὅς." Those who made the catenae referred to must have found the reading ὅς in Cyril's Scholia de Incarn., cap. 12, or rather in Oecumenius's quotation from it; but there is no proof that Wetstein ever found ὅς in any MS. of the Twelve Anathematisms.

Other allusions are less decisive; as,—

f. Ὁ Μονογενὴς ἐπέφανεν ἡμῖν, ὤφθη γὰρ ἐπὶ γῆς.[2] "The only-begotten appeared to us, for he was seen on the earth."

g. Τὸν ἐν σαρκὶ πεφηνότα.[3] "Him who has appeared in the flesh."

In two passages Cyril might seem to favor θεος:

h. Ὁ γε μὴν ἐνανθρωπήσας θεός, καίτοι νομισθεὶς οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι πλὴν ὅτι μόνον ἄνθρωπος, αὐτὸ δὲ τουτὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον, ἐκηρύχθη ἐν ἔθνεσιν, ἐπιστεύθη ἐν κόσμῳ.[4] "God, indeed, having become man, although in no other respect human except in what was visible, was preached unto the Gentiles, was believed on in the world." Here θεός is made the subject of the later predicates, but not of ἐφανερώθη.

[1] Explan., Cap. XII. Anath. II., Tom. VI. p. 148.
[2] De Recta Fide, p. 20 E.
[3] De Recta Fide, p. 7 C. Cf. Adv. Nest., Tom. VI. p. 61.
[4] De Recta Fide, p. 170 D.

i. Καὶ ταῦτα .... ὁ ἀποστόλος ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξε λέγων, Ὁμολογουμένως, κ. τ. λ., Θεὸς ἐφαν., κ. τ. λ. Καὶ τὴν μὲν φανέρωσιν συνέζευξε τῇ σαρκί, τὴν δὲ δικαίωσιν κατὰ τὴν τῶν αἱρετικῶν ἀβελτηρίαν ἐδικαιώθη δὲ τῇ συνεργείᾳ τοῦ πνεύματος. Ἆρα τὸ δικαιῶσαν πνεῦμα κρεῖττον τοῦ δικαιωθέντος υἱοῦ; ἀλλ' οὐκέτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστι· τὸ γὰρ ἡμέτερον ἐδικαιώθη διὰ τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ φανερωθέντος Θεοῦ, ὃς ἀχωρίστως αὐτῷ συνημμένος, κ. τ. λ.[1] "And this .... the apostle teaches us, saying: 'And without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness. God was manifested in the flesh,' etc. He connects not only the manifestation with the flesh, but, according to the absurdity of the heretics, the justification also; but he was justified by the co-operation of the Spirit. Was then the justifying Spirit superior to the justified Son? By no means; for our Saviour was justified through the God manifested in him, who was joined inseparably with him, etc." This comment seems rather to favor Θεός, but is by no means conclusive. We have found no other reference in Cyril so favorable to the received text. It has not before been collated.

It will be seen from these quotations that Cyril certainly read ὅς. He has formally cited this passage seven times. In three of these cases ὅς is still retained; in the others it has suffered corruption. The only wonder is, that in any case it has escaped. In three of the four cases where we now read Θεός, the context demands ὅς.

The negative evidence is nearly as strong as the positive. Why has Cyril on no occasion, while proving Christ's divinity, relied on this Θεός? He evidently does not regard it as a proof-text of the first class, or why did he not quote this passage in the thirty-second chapter of his Thesaurus, in which, with the scriptures evidently before him, he collects *seriatim* the passages which seem to him to prove that "the Son is by his nature God, and if so, not made, nor created."[2] He selects no less than five texts from 1 Tim.;

[1] Cap. de Incarn. Dom., Script. Vet. Vat. Coll. (ed. Mai), Tom. VIII. Part II. p. 97, or Mai's Script. Nov. Biblioth., Tom. II. p. 68.

[2] Tom. V. Part I. p. 267.

and it is unaccountable that he should have overlooked this passage, had he read Θεός.

It is no less significant that this Father fails to adduce our text in opposition to Julian, who asserted that "neither Paul nor Matthew nor Luke dared to call Jesus God,"[1] although he does refer to such passages as Rom. ix. 5, in which Christ is called "God over all," 1 Cor. ii. 8, in which he is called "the Lord of glory," and Rom. viii. 9, in which the "Spirit of Christ" is also called "the Spirit of God." I have dwelt at greater length on the reading of Cyril, as it has been made the subject of so much controversy. He may now be most confidently cited as favoring ὅς.

4. *Gelasius.* Scr. A.D. 476. His history of the Council of Nice is not perfectly reliable, and we do not therefore give his account of the proceedings as an authority for the reading of the Council, but solely for that of Gelasius, although he claims to have drawn his facts from Eusebius, Rufinus, and others, and especially from old MSS. of a certain John Presbyter.

a. The philosopher Phaedo asks: "How was he seen on earth, and associated as a man with men, if he was the unchangeable God? Answer of the holy fathers, by Macarius, bishop of Jerusalem: *Κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ Θεσπεσίου Παύλου, Μέγα ἐστὶ τ. τ. ε. μ., ὃς ἐφ. ἐ. σ., τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός. Τότε αὐτὸς ὤφθη καὶ ἀγγέλοις, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀγγέλοις ἢ ἀρχαγγέλοις ἤ τισι τῶν ἐπουρανίων δυνάμενον Θεατὸς ὁ Μονογενής, ἐπείπερ Θεὸν οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε πώποτε.*[2] "According to the words of St. Paul, 'Great is the mystery of godliness, who was manifested in the flesh, that is, the Son of God. Then was he seen also of angels, since neither to angels nor archangels, nor any of the heavenly hosts, is the Only-begotten visible, for 'no one hath seen God at any time.'" In the editions is printed ὅ, but, at least four MSS., including those from which Gelasius was first printed, read ὅς.[3]

[1] Cont. Jul., Tom. VI. p. 327 A.

[2] Lib. 2, Cap. 23, Coll. Concil. Mansi, Tom. II. col. 871.

[3] Berriman's Diss., p. 180.

b. Ἰησοῦ ὃς μετὰ τὴν τῆς ἐνσάρκου αὐτοῦ παρουσίας οἰκονομίαν, τὸ μέγα ἀληθῶς τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον, καθὼς γέγραπται φανερωθεὶς ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ ἀγγέλοις, ὀφθείς, κ. τ. λ.[1] "Of Jesus, who after the dispensation of his presence in the flesh, the great mystery of godliness, as it is written, having been manifested in the flesh and seen of angels," etc.

5. *Cyril Scythopolitanus.* A.D. 555.

a. Τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν Ἱερουσαλήμ, ἐν ᾗ τὸ μέγα τῆς εὐσεβείας ἐφανερώθη μυστήριον.[1] "The holy city Jerusalem, in which the great mystery of godliness was manifested.

b. Ἐν ᾗ τὸ μέγα τῆς εὐσεβείας ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου σωτηρίας φανερωθὲν καὶ τελειωθέν, κ. τ. λ.[2] In which [i.e. in Jerusalem] the great mystery of godliness, having been manifested and completed for the salvation of the world, etc." In both of these passages, the fact that the *mystery* is said to have been manifested, is sufficient proof that the author did not read that "*God* was manifested." If this latter reference be taken from a genuine letter of Theodorus and Sabas, it will carry back its date nearly a century.

The following writers probably read ὅς.

1. *Origen.* A.D. 230. "Ne forte is qui verbum caro factus apparuit positus in carne, sicut apostolus dicit: 'quia [read *qui*] manifestatus est in carne, justificatus in Spiritu, apparuit angelis,' hoc quod apparuit angelis, non eis absque evangelio, sicut ne nobis quidem hominibus."[3] "Nor perhaps did he who, as the Word made flesh, appeared placed in the flesh, as the apostle says, 'who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, seen of angels,' when seen of angels appear to them without a gospel, any more than to us men." We have only the Latin version of Rufinus, who certainly omits θεός, and, if we read *qui* for *quia*, also gives us the equivalent for ὅς. Two other trivial allusions are made to our passage by Origen.

[1] Gelas. Praef., Mansi, Tom. II. col. 761.
[2] Vita Sabae, Sect. 52. Wetstein erroneously has Sect. 50.
[3] Vita Sabae, Sect. 5, 7, Ep. ad Anast. Imp.
[4] Comm. in Rom. i. 2 (ed. De la Rue), Tom. IV. p. 465.

Ἐὰν δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς Ἰησοῦς ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι ἐν δόξῃ λέγηται.[1] "If my Jesus be said to be received up into glory."

Οἱ ἄγγελοι οἷς ὤφθη.[2] "The angels by whom he was seen," referring to Ἰησοῦς, not Θεός.

2. *Apollinaris.* A.D. 370. Εἶτα ἐπάγει τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὅτι τὸ μυστήριον ἐν σαρκὶ ἐφανερώθη.[3] "Then he [i.e. Apollinaris] adds to what he has said that 'the mystery was manifested in the flesh.'" This would seem of itself quite conclusive that Apollinaris did not read Θεός; but the quotation of his words here made by Gregory is very brief, and perhaps not exact.

Καὶ ἔστι Θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ὁ ἄσαρκος ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθεὶς, τέλειος τῇ ἀληθινῇ καὶ θείᾳ τελειότητι.[4] "And he who without flesh was manifested in the flesh is truly God, complete in true and divine perfection." The reading of this passage found by Franc. Turrianus is perhaps preferable: "He who without flesh was *manifested* in the flesh is truly *one*," etc,[5] especially as the writer immediately adds, "not two persons, nor two natures." Wetstein, however, quotes this passage with Θεός, "*apud Photium, cod.* 280."

3. *Jerome.* A.D. 378. Not only did this Father retain the relative in his version, but he quotes this passage: "Qui apparuit in carne, justificatus in spiritu,"[6] more literally translated than in his version.

4. *Chrysostom.* A.D. 386. We were at first inclined to class this Father among those whose reading is quite doubtful; but a more careful examination of facts not before collected, inclines us to the belief that he probably read ὅς. Although his homilies have suffered from frequent transcription more

[1] Cont. Cels., Lib. III., Tom. I. p. 467 C.

[2] Comm. in Matth. xix. 14, Tom. III. p. 660 C.

[3] App. Greg. Nyss. Antirrhet. (ed. Zacagn.), p. 138.

[4] Script. Vet. Vat. Coll. (ed. Mai), pp. 147, 174. The work here quoted was generally ascribed to Gregory Thaumaturgus, but Leontius Byzantinus, in his Fraud. Apollinist., says it is falsely ascribed by heretics to this Father, being really a production of Apollinaris.

[5] Ap. Leontius Byzant., Fraud. Apollinist. Basn. Thes. Tom. I. p. 609.

[6] Comment. in Isa. liii. 11 (ed. Martiani, Par., 1704), Tom. III. col. 387.

than the writings of any other Father, and the reading Θεός is now found in three passages in his works, yet in two of these cases there are important various readings which contradict his printed text.

a. Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως, φησί, μέγα ἐστὶν τ. τ. ε. μ., Θεὸς ἐφ. ε. σ., ε. ε. πν., τουτέστιν, ἡ οἰκονομία ἡ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.[1] "And without controversy, it is written, great is the mystery of godliness; God was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit, that is, the dispensation over us." Here the text of scripture has Θεός, but, as has been abundantly proved in the case of Cyril, little reliance can be placed on this fact. Let us compare the context. Chrysostom proceeds: "Tell me no more of [the old dispensation, of] bells, nor of the holy of holies, nor of the high priest." Εἰς ἕτερον ἀνάγει τὸ πρᾶγμα λέγων, Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, τουτέστιν, δημιουργὸς ὤφθη, φησίν, ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι. "To another [High priest] he leads the subject, saying: 'God was manifested in the flesh,' that is, the Demiurge was, he says, seen in the flesh, justified in the spirit. Wherefore he says it is without controversy great, for it is really true; for God became man, and man God. A *man* was seen without sin, a *man* was received up, was preached unto the world." Taking this passage as it now stands, does it not seem probable that it has suffered corruption? If Chrysostom had written Θεός, would he have felt it necessary to elucidate so very plain a word by the explanatory clause τουτέστιν δημιουργός? Would he thus have emphasized the humanity of Christ, "a *man* was seen without sin, a *man* was received up, was preached unto the world," if the passage just quoted had possessed Θεός as the subject of these very verbs? But we have external evidence that the words of Chrysostom have been tampered with. Cramer gives another form taken from a catena in which ὅτι takes the place of Θεός, thus; εἰς ἕτερον ἀνάγει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὅτι ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ δημιουργὸς ὤν.[2] "To another High priest he leads the subject, that he

[1] Comm. in 1 Tim. iii. 16, Tom. XI. pp. 605, 606.
[2] Cramer's Catena on 1 Tim. iii. 16, p. 31.

was manifested in the flesh, being the Creator." This reading finds strong confirmation in a Latin translation which reads: "Ad altiora profecto nos subvehit, quod scilicet in carne manifestatus est Conditor."[1] This translation made directly from an old MS. agrees with the Greek given by Cramer, which is in all probability the more correct reading, as the alteration would be more naturally made for the purpose of conforming to the supposed words of scripture than the contrary.

b. Having spoken of Christ as invisible, because the image of the invisible God, Chrysostom adds, according to our printed editions: *Εἰ δὲ ἀλλαχοῦ φησί, Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· ὅτι ἡ φανέρωσις διὰ τῆς σαρκός, οὐ μὴν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν γέγονεν. Ἐπεὶ ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἀόρατος οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄνω δυνάμεσι ὁ Παῦλος, εἰπὼν γὰρ ὅτι ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐπήγαγε ὅτι ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις.*[2] "But if it is elsewhere said, God was manifested in the flesh, wonder not at it; for the manifestation had regard to the flesh, and not the invisible essence. For Paul shows that he is invisible, not only to men but to the higher intelligences; for having said that he was manifested in the flesh, he adds that he was seen of angels." The context here does not especially confirm or oppose the reading Θεός, as here quoted in the text; but some MSS. here have ὅς for Θεός. Instead of *Εἰ δὲ ἀλλαχοῦ φησί, κ. τ. λ.* Savil gives in his edition the various reading. *Διὰ τοῦτό φησιν, ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἡ γὰρ φανέρωσις διὰ τῆς σαρκός, κ. τ. λ.*[3] "Therefore," i.e. because Christ is in his nature invisible, "it is said, 'Who was manifested in the flesh,' for the manifestation had refer-

[1] This translation we find in Chrysost. Enarr. in Pauli Epp. (Antwerp, 1544), Vol. II. fol. 36, p. 1; "incerto interprete," very likely Bergundio Pisanus of the twelfth century. It is also found in the Frankfort reprint (1697–98) of Fronto Ducaeus's Paris edition of Chrysostom.

[2] In Joan. Hom. XV., Tom. VIII. pp. 85, 86.

[3] Etonae (1612), Tom. II. p. 613, l. 27. For the facts in reference to this passage in Chrysostom, as also for the quotations from Theodorus Studites, and for much other valuable assistance, we are indebted to the combined kindness and learning of Mr. Ezra Abbott, of Cambridge, Mass.

ence to the flesh, etc." This reading gives an equally good sense, and bears internal marks of genuineness. In confirmation of it, compare the Latin translation made from a MS. in the fifteenth century by Francesco Accolti of Arezzo [Franciscus Aretinus.] It reads in the most exact conformity with the variation given by Savil: "Propterea inquit 'Qui manifestatus in carne,' manifestatio autem per carnem non est secundum substantiam."[1]

In the Benedictine edition of this Father, after having noted a comparatively unimportant various reading but three lines before our text, Montfaucon adds, in apparent reference to this passage, *Et in sequentibus quoque, verbo tenus variant.*[2] Would that he had given us the exact authority for what he implies is so unimportant a "verbal variation."

c. "But that, when he was God, he should be willing to become man, etc., here is ground for astonishment and awe, and in wonder at this St. Paul said, 'And without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness,' *ποῖον μέγα*; *Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί*, in what respect is it great? God was manifested in the flesh."[3] This would seem to require *Θεός* as the true reading, if Chrysostom had not, with characteristic freedom of quotation, in the same sentence coupled *Θεός* with a direct quotation from Heb. ii. 16: *Οὐ γὰρ ἀγγέλων ἐπιλαμβάνεται ὁ Θεός*. "For *God* took not on himself the form of angels."

5. *Nestorius.* A.D. 428. *Κατὰ δικαιοσύνην τὸ πλασθὲν ἀνέπλασεν, Ἐφανερώθη, γάρ φησιν, ἐν σαρκὶ, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι.*[4] "According to justice he [i.e. the Spirit] filled[5] that which had been made, [i.e. the humanity of Christ], for it is said, 'he was manifested in the flesh, justified in the

[1] Found in the same Frankfort edition just referred to.

[2] Tom. VIII. p. 85 E.

[3] Homil. de Philog., Tom. I. p. 497 D; published also as a scholium by Matthaei, Pref. to Cath. Epp.

[4] Apud Cyr. Adv. Nest, Tom. VI. p. 103 E.

[5] Reading *ἀνεπλήσεν* for *ἀνέπλασεν*, in accordance with *repleverit* in Cassian and *replevit* in Arnobius, though Mar. Merc. has *reformavit.*

spirit.'" Not only is so striking a word as Θεός here omitted, but the insertion of ὅς would make the citation peculiarly apposite, being translated "He who appeared in the flesh, i.e. τὸ πλασθέν, was made just by the spirit," i.e. κατὰ δικαιοσύνην ἀνέπλασεν. No relative, however, is preserved by Marius Mercator in his translation of this sermon of Nestorius,[1] nor by Arnobius[2] or Cassian,[3] although the latter uses the masculine form *justificatus* to translate ἐδικαιώθη.

6. *Eutherius Syanensis.* A.D. 431. "To be united to flesh is not to be converted into flesh, wherefore it is said, ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ οὐκ ἐφανερώθη ἡ σάρξ, he was manifested in the flesh, not that the flesh was manifested."[4]

7. *Pseudo-Chrysostom.* Ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ε. τ. τ. ε. μ. ὃ ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ.[5] The present form exhibits ὅ, which favors ὅς rather than Θεός.

Πῶς οὖν γνωστὸν τὸ μυστήριον; ἐφανερώθη, φησίν, ἐν σαρκί.[6] "How then was the mystery known? He was manifested, it is said, in the flesh." These citations are probably by different writers.

Pseudo-Epiphanius. Ἓξ μεγάλα μυστήρια ἐποίησεν ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς, ὡς λέγει Παῦλος, ἐφανερώθη[7] ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ.[8] "Six great mysteries did our Lord Jesus Christ perform, as Paul says: "He was manifested in the flesh, etc."

9. *Pope Martin.* A.D. 649. Ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ε. τ. τ. ε. μ. ὡς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ.[9] This peculiar reading of ὡς

[1] Serm. 3, Tom. II. p. 11, (ed. Garn., Par., 1673). Migne's Patr. Lat., Vol. XLVIII. col. 767.

[2] Conflict. cum Serap., Lib. XXI.

[3] De Incarn. Dom., Lib. VII. cap. XVI.

[4] Confut. quar. Prop. ap. Athan., Tom. II. p. 564 B. This is attributed to Theodoret by Photius.

[5] Homil. de Incarn. Dom., Chrysost. Opp., Tom. VIII. Part. II. p. 214.

[6] Tom. X. p. 763; cf. p. 764.

[7] This word is printed ἐπληρώθη; an evident error in transcription.

[8] De Num. Myst., ap. Opp. Epiph., Tom. II. p. 307.

[9] Concil. Lateran. I., Ep. 5; Mansi, Tom. X. col. 813. The Acts of this Council were composed in Greek as well as Latin.

for ὅς is probably due to the first editor; cf. the alteration suffered by Liberatus.

10. *Oecumenius.* Flourished between A.D. 800 and 990. *Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ε. τ. τ. ε. μ., Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη, κ. τ. λ.* After commenting on the first clause, he adds: *Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί· εἶτα λέγει τὸ μυστήριον· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ὁ ἐν σαρκὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις φανερωθεὶς, οὗτος οὐ παρὰ ἀνθρωπίνοις ὀφθαλμοῖς δίκαιος ἐκρίθη, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦ πνεύματος ὀφθαλμοῖς τοῖς ἐρευνῶσι καὶ τὰ βάθη τοῦ Θεοῦ. Τὸ δέ, Ἐδικαιώθη, διὰ τὴν σάρκα, καθὸ γάρ ἐστι Θεὸς οὐ δικαιοῦται, ἀλλὰ δικαιοῖ.*[1] "'God was manifested in the flesh;' here he tells the mystery, for he who was manifested in the flesh to men was not judged just by human eyes, but by the eyes of the Spirit, which search even the deep things of God. The phrase 'was justified,' refers to his humanity, for as God he is not justified, but justifies." This comment renders it almost certain that Oecumenius read ὅς. With this reading it is natural to say that the mystery consists in the way in which "he who was manifested in the flesh was justified," while with the reading Θεός, the mystery *must* consist in the *fact* of the manifestation of *God* in the *flesh*. The manner in which this writer speaks immediately after of Cyril's comment on this passage,[2] confirms us in the belief that he read ὅς, for he does not quote Cyril, as has generally been understood by scholiasts, for the purpose of giving a various reading, but simply for the sake of his comment attached to the text.

We have a negative argument for including *Athanasius*, A.D. 326, among those whose reading was probably ὅς. Our text occurs in no part of his genuine writings, a most remarkable fact if this great defender of Christ's divinity read Θεός. How happens it that on almost every page of these discussions we have references to John i. 14: "The Word was made flesh," and yet throughout all his writings not one clear reference to 1 Tim. iii. 16. "God was mani-

[1] Comm. in 1 Tim. iii. 16, Tom. II. p. 227 (Paris, 1631).

[2] Vide supra, p. 21.

fested in the flesh?" It is to be accounted for only on the supposition that he read ὅς.

This text is found in our editions of Athanasius: *Ἔχουσι γὰρ καὶ τὸν ἀπόστολον συγγνώμην αὐτοῖς νέμοντα, καὶ οἱονεὶ χεῖρα αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἐκτείνοντα, ὅτι. Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μέγα, ε. τ. τ. ε. μ., Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.*[1] For they have the apostle also extending pardon to them, and, as it were, stretching out his hand to them, with the words: "Without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness; God was manifested in the flesh." This passage is probably spurious. The Benedictine editors found it in but a single MS., and accordingly enclosed it in brackets. Yet Henderson, who must have known these facts, quotes it without a hint at its more than dubious authenticity.[2]

The following Fathers clearly read Θεός.

1. *Gregory of Nyssa.* A.D. 370.

a. Ὃς οὐ μόνον Θεὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγαν Θεόν, καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων Θεὸν, ὀνομάζεται τὸν κύριον..... Τιμοθέῳ δὲ διαῤῥήδην βοᾷ ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι.[3] "Who [Paul] not only calls our Lord, God, but also 'the great God,' and 'God over all' [here he quotes Rom. ix. 5, 'God over all,' and Tit. iii. 13, 'great God and our Saviour,' and then proceeds to add]; and to Timothy he boldly cries that 'God was manifested in the flesh, was justified in the spirit.'" Gregory had already cited from other sacred writers various passages in which Christ is called *God*, and then gives 1 Tim. iii. 16 as another proof that Paul gives Jesus the title of God. Nothing could be more express and unquestionable than his reading. His other citations of this text, though not so definite, are yet in strict unison with this one.

b. Ἀλλὰ πεισθέντες ὅτι ἀληθῶς Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί,

[1] Adv. Serap., Epist. xv. Cap. iv. (ed. Bened.), Tom. I. p. 706.

[2] Another quotation sometimes referred to the same Father will be found under the name *Pseud.-Athanasius.*

[3] Contra Eunom., Orat. iv. (Paris, 1638), Tom. II. p. 693.

ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἀληθινὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον εἶναι πιστεύσωμεν.[1] "But being persuaded that truly God was manifested in the flesh, let us believe this to be the true mystery of godliness."

c. Διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ τὸν λόγον κηρύσσοντες, ἐν τούτῳ τὸ θαῦμα τοῦ μυστηρίου καταμηνύουσιν, ὅτι θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, ὅτι ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.[2] "Wherefore also, all who preach the word, point out in this the wonder of the mystery, that God was manifested in the flesh, that the Word was made flesh."

d. Ὁ θεὸς φανερούμενος.[3] "God who was manifested."

e. Πῶς οὖν ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ ὁ θεός;[4] How then was God manifested in the flesh?"

f. Ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ φανεροῦται, ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἡ τὸν θεὸν ἐν ἑαυτῇ δείξασα, ... εἰς ἐκεῖνο μετατεθεῖσα καὶ ἀλλαγεῖσα, ὅπερ ἦν ὁ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ σαρκὶ ἑαυτὸν φανερώσας, κ. τ. λ.[5] "But God indeed is manifested in the flesh, and the flesh which exhibited God in itself, ... having been transformed and changed into that which he was, who manifested himself in the flesh, etc."

g. Δι' ὧν μανθάνομεν οτι οὐτ' ἂν σαρκί, ὁ θεὸς ἐφανερώθη, εἰ μὴ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο[6] "By which we learn that God would not have been manifested in the flesh unless the Word was made flesh."

h. Ὁ κατὰ σάρκα ἄνθρωπος ἐν ᾧ ὁ θεὸς ἐφανερώθη, ... ἄνθρωπος ἐν ᾧ ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς ἐφανερώθη .... διὰ τῆς δουλικῆς ταύτης κτίσεως ἐν σαρκὶ ἐφανερώθη.[7] "The bodily man, in whom God was manifested; .... man in whom God was manifested; .... through this servile creature [i.e. the body] he was manifested in the flesh."

i. Ἐπειδὴ τὸ φὼς καί ἡ ζωὴ καὶ ὁ θεὸς καί ὁ λόγος ἐν σαρκὶ

[1] Contra Eunom., Orat. II. (Paris, 1638), Tom. II. p. 430.
[2] Orat. V., Tom. II. p. 581.
[3] Orat. II., Tom. II. p. 445.
[4] Orat. IV., Tom. II. p. 536.
[5] Orat. VI., Tom. II. p. 594.
[6] Orat. VI., Tom. II. p. 595.
[7] De Fide, ad Simplic., Tom. III. p. 39.

ἐφανερώθη.[1] "Since the Light and the Life and God and the Word was manifested in the flesh."

j. Ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.[2] "God was manifested in the flesh."

This passage is again quoted without the article;

k. Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.[3] "God was manifested in the flesh."

l. Οὗτοσὶ δέ φησιν οὐ Θεὸν ἐν σαρκὶ πεφανεροῦσθαι.[4] "But this [Apollinaris] says that God was not manifested in the flesh."

m. Καθ' ἣν ἐν σαρκὶ Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη.[5] "According to which, God was manifested in the flesh."

n. Δείξατο τὸν εἰρηκότα μὴ Θεὸν ἐν σαρκὶ πεφανεροῦσθαι.[6] "Let him show any one who says that God was not manifested in the flesh."

o. Ὁ φανερωθεὶς ἡμῖν ἐν σαρκὶ Θεός.[7] "God, who was manifested to us in the flesh."

p. Ἐν ᾗ ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη.[8] "In which God was manifested."

q. Ἐν σαρκὶ πεφηνέναι τὸν Θεόν.[9] "That God appeared in the flesh."

r. Θεὸν διὰ σαρκὸς ἔμψυχον πεφανεροῦσθαι.[10] "That God was manifested through the flesh, with a human soul.

s. Εἰ.... Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.[11] "If.... God was manifested in the flesh."

t. Τὸν ἐν σαρκὶ πεφανερωθέντα Θεόν.[12] "God, who was manifested in the flesh."

u. Ἐπειδὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.[13] "Since God was manifested in the flesh."

v. Τὸν δὲ Θεὸν ἐν σαρκὶ πεφανερώσθαι ἡμῖν ὁ τὰς ἀποδείξεις

[1] Contra Eunom., Orat. VI., Tom. II. p. 715.
[2] Antirrhet. adv. Apolin. (ed. Zacagni, 1698), p. 126.
[3] Ibid., p. 149. [4] Ibid., p. 126. [5] Ibid., p. 129.
[6] Ibid., p. 131. [7] Ibid., p. 163. [8] Ibid., p. 207.
[9] Ibid., p. 183. [10] Ibid., p. 239. [11] Ibid., p. 246.
[12] Ibid., p. 258. [13] Ibid., p. 270.

ἐπιζητῶν.[1] "He who seeks proofs that God was manifested to us in the flesh."

In all these cases now given we find Θεός used in connection with an allusion to this passage, or a quotation of it. In the following allusions to this text Θεός does not occur:

a. Τῷ τὸ μέγα φανεροῦντι τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον.[2] "To him who manifests the great mystery of godliness."

b. Τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγον ἐν σαρκὶ πεφανερῶσθαι λέγει.[3] "He says, that in the beginning the Word was manifested in the flesh."

It will be seen from the extracts now given, that Gregory not only unequivocally asserts that in this passage Christ is called God, but also that out of twenty-three other quotations of this text, or allusions to it, which we have been able to find, in twenty-one cases he connects Θεός with some form of the verb *φανερόω*. He uses the text much as Athanasius employs John i. 14. There can be no doubt whatever that he reads Θεός. These facts cannot be explained away, as Davidson endeavors to do, by throwing suspicion on the fidelity of copyists, who never could have made such systematic corruptions, and by adducing as counter evidence his *quotation from Apollinaris*, as if it had been in the words of Gregory.

2. *Didymus.* A.D. 370.

a. Καὶ Τιμοθεῷ δὲ γράψας, εἰς ἄκρον ἐθεολόγησεν περὶ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν τῶν λέξεων τὸ μὴ εἶναι κατὰ θεότητα παρὰ φύσιν τὴν πατρικὴν ἐδίδαξεν. Εἶπεν γὰρ τοιῶσδε· Ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ε. τ. τ. ε. μ., Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ.[4] "And, writing to Timothy, he most distinctly speaks of him as God, and from both passages [i.e. Col. ii. 9 and 1 Tim. iii. 16] he teaches that he does not differ in the nature of his divinity from the Father, for he says: 'Without controversy, great

[1] Orat. Catechet., Cap. XII., Opp., Tom. III. p. 67 A.
[2] In Psalm., Lib. II. Cap. X., Tom. I. p. 322.
[3] Contra Eunom., Orat. VI., Tom. II. p. 588.
[4] De Trinitate, Lib. I. (ed. Mingarel.), p. 83.

is the mystery of godliness; God was manifested in the flesh, etc.'" This seems so clear as to leave no room to doubt the reading of Didymus. With what show of justice can Davidson say, "No importance can be attached to the reading of Didymus, a blind man."[1] But Didymus was one of the lights of the Alexandrian school, and certainly accustomed to hear the scriptures read; and we see no reason why his blindness should, as Davidson insinuates, invalidate his testimony. Less reliable is the following citation from a Latin translation; "Secundum quod dictum est, manifestatus in carne."[2]

3. *Epiphanius Diaconus.* A.D. 787.

Ἄκουσον τοιγαροῦν τοῦ Παύλου μεγαλοφώνως ἐμβοῶντος, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τούτοις ἐπισφραγίζαντος· Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ. Θεός, φησί, ἐφανερώθη.[3] "Hear, then, Paul crying with a loud voice, and confirming to them the truth: 'God was manifested in the flesh, etc.' 'God, he says, was manifested.'"

4. *Theodorus Studites.* A.D. 815.

a. Καὶ βεβόηκεν ὁ ἱερὸς ἀπόστολος· Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ. ὡς οὖν θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ.[4] "And the holy apostle cries, 'God was manifested in the flesh, etc.' As, then, God was manifested in the flesh, etc."

b. Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι .... ὅ φησιν ὁ μέγας ἀπόστολος· Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί· καὶ ἔστιν εἷς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν δυσὶ φύσεσι, τέλειος θεὸς καὶ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος.[5] "For this is .... what the great apostle says: 'God was manifested in the flesh'; and he is one and the same in two natures, perfect God and perfect man."

5. *Theophylact.* A.D. 1077.

Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί .... Ἐνταῦθα γὰρ θεὸς ἐφανερώθη·

[1] Biblical Criticism, Vol. II. p. 394.
[2] Comm. in 1 John iv. 2, 3.
[3] Concil. Nic. II. Paneg., Mansi, Tom. XIII. col. 446.
[4] Lib. II. Epist. XXXVI. (Venet., 1728), p. 349.
[5] Ibid., Epist. CLVI. p. 498.

πῶς; ἐν σαρκί, τῇ γὰρ θεότητι ἀόρατος.[1] "God was manifested in the flesh..... For here God was manifested; how? in the flesh; for in his godhead he is invisible."

6. *Pseudo-Athanasius.* Besides the interpolation in one of the writings of Athanasius already noticed, there is another quotation found among his spurious works.

Ὁ μακάριος ἀπόστολος Παῦλός φησι, Μέγα ἐστὶ τ. τ. ε. μ., θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ..... πεφανέρωται θεὸς ἐν σαρκί, ... εἰ μὴ, θεὸς ἐν σαρκὶ πιστεύοιτο εἶναι.[2] "The blessed apostle Paul, says, 'Great is the mystery of godliness, God was manifested in the flesh, etc.'.... God has been manifested in the flesh, ... unless God was believed to be in the flesh." This epistle, the author of which evidently read θεός, was not Athanasius, as it opposes the errors of the Nestorians. The Benedictine editors give as another reason for questioning its authenticity: "And if Athanasius had read the passage, θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, as here quoted, he would certainly have made use of it against the Arians, to prove the divinity of Christ. But he seems to have used copies which had ὃ ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί [or rather ὅς], as does the present Vulgate..... If he had read in the other way, Athanasius, a man so skilled in the scriptures, could never have passed by so remarkable a passage."[3]

The following Fathers probably read θεός:

1. *Theodoret.* A.D. 423. *a. Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μ. ε. τ. τ. ε. μ., Μυστήριον δὲ αὐτὸ καλεῖ ὡς ἄνωθεν μὲν προορισθέν, ὕστερον δὲ φανερωθέν. Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί. Θεὸς γὰρ ὤν, καὶ θεοῦ υἱὸς, καὶ ἀόρατον ἔχων τὴν φύσιν, δῆλος ἅπασιν ἐνανθρωπήσας ἐγένετο. Σαφῶς δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰς δύο φύσεις ἐδίδαξεν, ἐν σαρκὶ γὰρ τὴν θείαν ἔφη φανερωθήναι φύσιν.*[4] "'And without

[1] Comm. in 1 Tim. iii. 16 (Venet.), Tom. II. p. 569. This is also given by Matthaei as a scholium found by him, Praef. to Cath. Epp.

[2] Ep. de Incarn. Dei Verbi, Tom. II. pp. 33, 34.

[3] Athan. Opp., Tom. II. p. 33; cf. also Griesb. Symbol. Crit., Vol. I. p. xlii.

[4] Comm. in 1 Tim. iii. 16 (Paris, 1642). Quoted also by Matthaei, Praef. to Cath. Epp., from a scholium.

controversy, great is the mystery of godliness.' He calls it a mystery, as having been pre-ordained of old, but latterly manifested: 'God was manifested in the flesh.' For being God and the Son of God, and having an invisible nature, he became evident to all by his incarnation. Clearly, then, he teaches us the two natures; for 'in the flesh' he says, that the divine nature was manifested."[1]

b. Ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ε. τ. τ. ε. μ., Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη κ. τ. λ. Δῆλον, τοίνυν, ὡς ἀόρατος μὲν ἡ θεία φύσις, ὁρατὴ δὲ ἡ σάρξ. Ἁρμοδίως, τοίνυν, ὁ θεῖος ἀπόστολος εἶπε, Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.[2] "'Without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness; God was manifested in the flesh, etc.' It is evident, then, that the divine nature is invisible, but the flesh visible. Properly, then, did the divine Spirit say, 'God was manifested in the flesh.'" The context in these quotations shows Θεός was probably the reading of this Father. He draws from this text the doctrine of the two natures in Christ. The clauses, Θεὸς ὤν, καὶ θεοῦ υἱός, and ἡ θεία φύσις, seem to have reference to the reading Θεός. But it may be said, on the other hand, that these phrases are of such frequent occurrence in Theodoret's dialogues, that they do not here necessarily require this reading, and that the quality of Christ's nature might also be deduced with the reading ὅς. Besides this, Theodoret adds, to show that before our Saviour's advent the angels had never seen God, ὁ ἀπόστολος εἶπεν ὅτι φανερωθεὶς ἐν σαρκὶ ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις. "The apostle says that after he was manifested in the flesh he was seen of angels," a statement peculiarly consistent with the reading and construction: "He who was manifested in the flesh was seen of angels." A little further on he adds, in pursuance of the same thought: Μετὰ μέντοι τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν ὤφθη καὶ τοῖς ἀγγέλοις κατὰ τὸν θεῖον ἀπόστολον, ... Θεὸς

[1] There seems to be here an allusion to other passages, such as Rom. xvi. 25 and 1 Cor. ii. 7, otherwise it would be a strong evidence that Theodoret read ὅς as the *mystery*, and not *God*, is here spoken of as being made manifest.

[2] Eran. Dial. I., Tom. IV. pp. 13–15.

ἐφανερώθη, γάρ φησιν, ἐν σαρκί, ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνευματι, ὤφθη ἀγγέλοις, which with the reading ὅς would be translated: "Indeed, then, *after* the incarnation he was seen also of the angels, according to the holy apostle, 'He who was manifested in the flesh was justified in the spirit, was seen of angels.'" The fact that in his commentary Theodoret does not refer the mystery personally to Christ would accord with this construction, as well as with the reading Θεός.

2. *Severus, Patriarch of Antioch.* A.D. 513. Τὸν νομοθέτην, τὸν ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθέντα θεόν.[1] "The lawgiver, the God, manifested in the flesh." This is preserved only in a catena, but yet quite reliably indicates Θεός.

3. *Pseudo-Dionysius Alexandrinus.* Εἷς ἐστιν ὁ Χριστός, ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ πατρί, συναΐδιος λόγος· ἓν αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον, ἀόρατος θεὸς καὶ ὁρατὸς γενόμενος· θεὸς γὰρ ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικός, κ. τ. λ.[2] "Christ is one, the co-eternal Word existing in the Father; one in his person, God invisible and made visible; for God was manifested in the flesh, made of a woman, etc." This would seem to imply Θεός, although there is no direct quotation. Not only does this belong to a later age than that of Dionysius, but an old Latin translation of the first part of this work, which is still extant, contains, as Tregelles has mentioned,[3] no such reference to 1 Tim. iii. 16.[4]

4. *John of Damascus.* A.D. 730. The text of this author's commentary on 1 Tim, iii. 16,[5] reads Θεός. There is nothing in the comments, composed of excerpts from Chrysostom, to shed light on his reading. In another work he refers to this passage: Διὰ γὰρ τῶν θαυμάτων καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιφοιτήσεως τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἐφανερώθη καὶ ἐπιστώθη τῷ κόσμῳ ὅτι υἱός ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ.[6] "For by miracles, and

[1] Wolfe's Catena on Acts iii. 23, Tom. III. of his Anecdota Graeca, p. 138.
[2] Cont. Paul. Sam. (Rome, 1796), p. 211, or Mansi, Tom. I. col. 1044.
[3] Horne's Introduction (ed. Tregelles), Vol. IV. p. 339.
[4] Dionys. Opp., p. 300.
[5] Tom. II. p. 263 (ed. Le Quien, Paris, 1712).
[6] De Fide Orthodox., 91, or Lib. IV. Cap. XVIII., Tom. I. p. 287 E.

the resurrection, and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, was he manifested, and believed on in the world that he is the Son of God."

5. *Photius.* A.D. 858. *Καὶ ὁμολογουμένως μέγα ε. τ. τ. ε. μ., Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, κ. τ. λ.* This is quoted by Nolan[1] from a MS., but without the connection or comment; so that we cannot judge of its value. *Τὸν ἐν σαρκὶ φανέντα Θεόν.*[2] "God, who appeared in the flesh."

We subjoin a number of real or supposed references to this passage, from which, in our opinion, little or nothing can be gathered as to the early text; but as many of them have been before quoted on one side or the other, we add them for the sake of completeness.

1. *Epistle of Barnabas.* *Ἰδὲ πάλιν Ἰησοῦς οὐχ, ὁ υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ τύπῳ καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ φανερωθείς.*[3] "Behold again Jesus, not the Son of Man, but the Son of God, and in a figure manifested in the flesh." *Ἐν σαρκὶ οὖν αὐτοῦ μέλλοντος φανεροῦσθαι* [i.e. *κυρίου*]. "When the Lord was about to be manifested in the flesh." *Ἐλπίσατε ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν σαρκὶ μέλλοντα φανεροῦσθαι ὑμῖν Ἰησοῦν.* "Trust in Jesus, who is about to be manifested to you." "*Οτι ἔμελλεν ἐν σαρκὶ φανεροῦσθαι* [i.e. *κύριος*].[4] "Because the Lord was about to be manifested in the flesh."

2. *Ignatius.* A.D. 101. *Εἷς Ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός.*[5] "There is one Physician, both corporeal and spiritual, begotten and unbegotten, God made in the flesh." Here there is no certain allusion to this passage. *Πῶς οὖν ἐφανερώθη τοῖς αἰῶσιν;* "How then was he made manifest to the ages?[6] A star shone in heaven, etc." *Θεοῦ ἀνθρωπίνως*

[1] Nolan's Greek Vulgate, p. 290. Phot. comment. in 1 Tim. E. cod. MS. Cantab. n. 2430. 250.

[2] Basnage's Thesaurus, Tom. II. p. 436.

[3] Sect. 12.

[4] Sect. 6.

[5] Epist. ad Eph., Cap. VII.

[6] The reference is to Col. i. 26.

φανερομένου εἰς καινότητα ἀϊδίου ζωῆς,[1] "when God in a bodily form was manifested in the newness of an eternal life." But the Syriac here reads υἱοῦ for θεοῦ, ܒܪ ܐܢܫ.[2] The interpreted form of Ignatius reads in this place, θεοῦ ὡς ἀνθρώπου φαινομένου, καὶ ἀνθρώπου ὡς θεοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος.[3] "God appearing as man, and man working as God." Whatever may have been the original of Ignatius, there is no probable allusion to this text.

3. *Valentinus.* A.D. 120. "Intelligetis deum in corpore apparuisse ac spectatum esse."[4]

4. *Justin Martyr.* A.D. 140. Οὗ χάριν ἀπέστειλε Λόγον, ἵνα κόσμῳ φανῇ· ὃς ὑπὸ λαοῦ ἀτιμασθείς, διὰ ἀποστόλων κηρυχθείς, ὑπὸ ἐθνῶν ἐπιστεύθη.[5] "For which reason he sent the Word, that he might appear to the world; who, having been dishonored by the people, and preached by the apostles, was believed on by the Gentiles." The authenticity of this epistle has been questioned.

5. *Apostolic Constitutions.* Θεὸς κύριος, ὁ ἐπιφανεὶς ἡμῖν ἐν σαρκί.[6] "God the Lord, who appeared to us in the flesh."

6. *Clement of Alexandria.* A.D. 192. Ὦ μυστήριον· μεθ' ἡμῶν εἶδον οἱ ἄγγελοι τὸν Χριστόν, πρότερον οὐχ ὁρῶντες.[7] "O the mystery! with us the angels saw Christ, whom before they had not seen."

7. *Hippolytus.* A.D. 220. Οὗτος προελθὼν εἰς κόσμον θεὸς ἐν σώματι ἐφανερώθη, ἄνθρωπος τέλειος προελθών.[8]

[1] Epist. ad Eph., Cap. XIX.

[2] Cureton's Corpus Ignatianum, p. 287. [3] Ed. Dressel, p. 336.

[4] Apud Leontius Byzant. adv. Fraud. Apollinist., Basnage's Thesaurus, Tom. I. p. 603.

[5] Epist. ad Diogn. [6] 7. 26.

[7] Quoted by Oecumenius, in 1 Tim. iii. 16 (Paris, 1631), Tom. II. p. 228. Chrysostom, John of Damascus, and Theophylact read τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ instead of τὸν Χριστόν, though some manuscripts of the latter author have τὸ μυστήριον. Scholia of Codd. 19 and 20 have, according to Wetstein, Οἱ ἄγγελοι μεθ' ἡμῶν εἶδον τὸ μέγα τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον, a form which forbids θεός.

[8] Cont. Noet., Cap. XVII. A similar passage is quoted by Theodoret, Dial. 2, Tom. IV. p. 89, although professing to be taken from a commentary on the

"This God coming into the world was manifested in the body, coming as a perfect Man."

8. *Eudoxius of Constantinople.* A.D. 360. "There were not in Christ two natures, for he was not a complete man, but instead of a soul, God in the flesh," ἀλλ' ἀντὶ ψυχῆς Θεὸς ἐν σαρκί.[1]

9. *Basil.* A.D. 370. Αὐτὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί.[2] "He [i.e. κύριος] was manifested in the flesh." Κατέλιπεν δὲ ἡμῖν τοῦτο τὸ μέγα τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον.[3] "And he left us this great mystery of godliness."

10. *Euthalius.* A.D. 458. Περὶ Θείας σαρκώσεως.[4] "Concerning the divine incarnation." This title is given to the seventh Euthalian division of 1 Tim., which includes our text. Some have improperly quoted the MSS. which have these divisions, as if their reading was sanctioned by his authority.

11. *Pseudo-Gregory Thaumaturgus.* A.D. 475, or later. Οὐχ ἡμῶν γνῶναι τὸ πῶς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ γέγονεν ἄνθρωπος, τὸ γὰρ μυστήριον τοῦτο μέγα ἐστίν.[5] "It is not for us to know how the Son of God became man, for this is the great mystery."

12. *Hesychius.* Πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἤγγισε, τὸν ἐν

second Psalm: Οὗτος ὁ προελθὼν εἰς κόσμον Θεὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐφανερώθη. "He who came into the world was manifested as God and man."

[2] Ap. Anast. de Verb. Incarn. Script. Vet. Vat. Coll. (ed. Mai), Tom. VII. p. 17.

[3] Ep. 261 (ed. Bened.), Tom. III. p. 402 A. Tischendorf and Scholz, following Wetstein, refer to this as Ep. 65, although professing to use the Benedictine edition, which numbers the epistles differently from the Paris edition of 1638. They also misquote the words of Basil, or rather of Wetstein.

[4] Ep. 261, Tom. p. 673 B. The mystery here, however, has reference to the Lord's supper, rather than to Christ.

[5] Zacagni Collect., p. 689.

[5] Anath. Cap. XII., Basnage's Thesaurus, Tom. I. p. 33.

[6] In Zophon. 3. 2. Quoted from Wetstein. We have failed to discover and verify this quotation. It certainly is not found in Hesychius's Sticheron, Crit. Sac., Tom. VII. Part III. p. 26, the only work of Hesychius which Wetstein refers to in his Prolegomena. It may be a scholium found attached to some MS. of the Old Testament.

σαρκὶ φανέντα ἀυτῇ.[6] "She did not approach to her God, who appeared to her in the flesh."

13. *Leontius Hierosolymitanus.* A.D. Δόκησις δὲ ἦν ἡ φανέρωσις τῆς σαρκὸς τοῦ κυρίου;[1] "Was the manifestation of the Lord in the flesh a mere semblance?"

14. *Elias Cretensis.* A.D. 787. Εἰπόντος γὰρ τοῦ ἀποστόλου περὶ Χριστοῦ ὅτι ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, καὶ ὤφθη ἀνθρώποις.[2] "For when the apostle says of Christ that he was manifested in the flesh and was seen of men," etc.

It will be seen from a comparison of the citations which have now been given from the various Fathers that both readings were certainly current in the fourth century, and, what would seem unexpected, neither reading seems to be geographically provincial. It might have been supposed from the remarkable unison of the versions in defence of ὅς, that the other reading would prove in the early centuries to have been restricted to some small area, from which it had spread through the church. But instead of this, we find the reading Θεός not only in Constantinople and the East, but quoted by Didymus in Alexandria itself, nearly fifty years before the time of Cyril. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, except the assumption, resting on no proof, that Didymus has here been interpolated. On the other hand, the bishops of Constantinople, Chrysostom, and Nestorius seem to have ὅς, as well as Origen or Cyril.

A comparison with these citations will also satisfy any one how much credit is to be attached to the story told of Macedonius by Liberatus, and repeated by Hincmar. The former says: "At this time Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople, is said to have been banished by the emperor Anastasius for having falsified the gospels, and especially that saying of the apostle, 'Who appeared in the flesh, was justified in the spirit.' For he is said to have changed ὅς, a Greek monosyllable, by the alteration of *O* into *Θ*, and

[1] Cont. Theoph. Script. Vet. Vat. Coll. (ed. Mai), Tom. VII. p. 146.
[2] Quoted by Wetstein, who took it from a manuscript source.

thus made Θεός, so that it would read '*God* appeared in the flesh.' Being therefore accused as a Nestorian, he was expelled by the Monk Severus."[1] With this story, told by Liberatus not half a century after the occurrence recorded, must be compared the conflicting statement made a few years later by Victor Tununensis, in which he stigmatizes Anastasius as having himself tampered with the sacred text. "In the year 506, at the command of the emperor Anastasius, the holy gospels are revised and corrected, as if composed by ignorant evangelists."[2] The first version of this charge, laying the blame on Macedonius, is repeated by Hincmar, almost in the very words of Liberatus.[3]

There can be little doubt that there is some foundation for this story. At the same time Macedonius must be acquitted of any intention to corrupt the text; for we have shown that it was read with Θεός by Gregory of Nyssa, more than a century before. Very likely he may have innocently altered some MSS. from ὅς to Θεός, and this may have made

[1] Hoc tempore Macedonius Constantinopolitanus episcopus ab imperatore Anastasio dicitur expulsus tanquam evangelia falsasset, et maxime illud apostoli dictum : Quia [*lege* qui] apparuit in carne, justificatum est in Spiritu. Hunc enim mutasse ubi habet ὅς, id est qui, monosyllabum Graecum, litera mutata Ο in Θ vertisse, et fecisse Θεός id est, ut esset, Deus apparuit per carnem. Tanquam Nestorianus ergo culpatus expellitur per Severum Monachum. — Concil. Coll. (ed. Mansi), Tom. IX. col. 692. The printed editions read ὅς and ὡς, but the true reading is evident. Indeed, it has been said that the Greek letters were supplied by the first editor, because wanting in the MS. It will be seen that Hincmar has Θεός clearly, and not ὡς.

[2] Messalla V. C. Cos. Constantinopoli jubente Anastasio Imperatore, sancta evangelia, tanquam ab idiotis evangelistis composita, reprehenduntur et emendantur.

[3] Quidam nimirum ipsas scripturas verbis inlicitis imposturaverunt, sicut Macedonius Constantinopolitanus episcopus, qui ab Anastasio Imperatore ideo a civitate expulsus legitur, quoniam falsavit evangelia, et illum apostoli locum ubi dicit: Quod apparuit in carne, justificatum in Spiritu, per cognationem Graecarum literarum Ο et Θ, hoc modo mutando falsavit. Ubi enim habuit *qui*, hoc est, ΟC, monosyllabum Graecum, litera mutata Ο in Θ vertit et fecit ΟC, id est, ut esset, Deus apparuit per carnem ; qua propter tanquam Nestorianus fuit expulsus. — Opusc. XXXIII. Cap. XVIII. (ed. Sismond, Paris, 1645), Tom. II. p. 449. Similar statements are found, Cap. XXII. p. 465 ; also cf. Concil. Duziacense, I. Mansi, Tom. XVI. col. 595.

one of the charges against him preferred by Anastasius, who would have been glad to employ any plausible pretext for his deposition. It may have been the restoration of the readings altered by Macedonius which gave occasion to the charge made by Victor; for the corruptions of Anastasius are said to have taken place several years after the deposition of the bishop.

Some critics have said that the statement that Macedonius was therefore deposed, as being a *Nestorian*, throws discredit on the whole story. We cannot think so; for the reading Θεός seems peculiarly fitted to convey the notions of Nestorius. He taught the divinity of Christ as clearly as did Athanasius or Cyril. He differed from Cyril in asserting that only the human nature was born of Mary, in which the divine nature dwelt, as in a temple. For this reason he refused to call Mary the mother of God. He says: "The God-Word was not born of Mary, but abode in that which was born of her. He did not take his beginning from the Virgin, but became inseparably connected, for all time, with that which was slowly formed within her womb."[1] "The spirit formed a temple for the God-Word, which he should inhabit."[2] "The Word was made flesh, that is, took flesh, and dwelt with us, that is, put on our nature."[3] Such a text, then, as "*God* was manifested in the flesh," which seemed to distinguish clearly between the two natures, would seem to the followers of Nestorius particularly consonant with their opinions, and a good offset to the text "The Word was made flesh," so blindly urged against them by the Monophysites; for it must be remembered that in the early part of the sixth century, all who opposed the Eutychians were branded by them as Nestorians. There is no real reason to believe that Macedonius favored Nestorianism. He was, however, a zealous defender of the Council of Chalcedon, and for this reason incurred the displeasure

[1] Serm. III. in Mar. Mere. (ed. Migne), col. 769.
[2] Serm. I. col. 761. [3] Serm. III. col. 771.

of Anastasius, and of all who believed that Council to have distinguished too clearly between the human and divine natures as joined in Christ.

It is remarkable that those who have supposed it absurd that Macedonius should be accused of Nestorianism on account of his partiality for Θεός, have failed to notice the fact that Theodoret, a prominent Nestorian, relies on this text, with the reading Θεός apparently, to prove the quality of Christ's nature, while Cyril, the champion of orthodoxy, read ὅς. Probably both were aware of the variation in the text. There is nothing absurd, then, in the story of Liberatus, except in so far as it attributes too much importance to this charge. No other writer of that century refers to it.

The result of this examination of the external evidence may be summed up in a tabular form as given below. We shall include in the second column a few authorities for the neuter form of the relative.

For the Reading Θεὸς.	For the Reading ὅς.
Manuscripts.	*Manuscripts.*
J, K, and all cursive MSS. except three.	ℵ*, A* *probably*, C*, D* has ὅ, F, G, 17, 73, 181.
Versions.	*Versions.*
Arm. (of Polyglot), Slav., Georg.	Old Lat., Vulg., Pesch. Syr., Aeth. (both Rom. and Platt's), Copt., Theb., Goth., Arm., Arab. (of Erp. and of the Vatican). All of these, except Platt's Aeth. and the Gothic, may read ὅ as well as ὅς.

Wholly doubtful,

The Philox. Syr., both text and margin.

Fathers.	*Fathers.*
Greg. Nyss. [370], Didymus [370], Epiph. Diac. [787], Theod. Stud. [815], Theoph. [1077], Pseud.-Ath.	Epiph. [368], Theod. Mops. [407], Cyr. [412], Gelasius [476], Cyr. Scyth. [555].
Probably, Theodoret [423], Severus [513], Pseudo-Dion., John Dam. [730], Phot. [858].	*Probably*, Origen [230], Apollinarius [370], Jerome [378], Chrys. [386], Nest. [428], Euther. Syracen. [431], Pseudo-Chrysost., Pseudo-Epiph., Pope Martin [649], Oecu. [800-990]. With little doubt Athan. [326] may also be included here, though he nowhere quotes the text.

We next come to consider the internal evidence. In favor of Θεός may be adduced the improbability of its being a careless alteration from ὅς. If the original reading were ὅς, it would seem to require an intentional corruption of the text to produce Θεός. It is a good rule never to have recourse to the charge of intentional corruption to explain a various reading when it can be accounted for equally well without imputing bad motives to the coypists. Now the change from *OC* to $\overline{\text{ΘC}}$, requires the positive, intentional addition of two strokes, which were evidently not in the transcriber's exemplar. On the other hand, the change from $\overline{\text{ΘC}}$ to *OC* might be unintentionally made, simply by omitting two small strokes, which may have become effaced in the MS. copied, or been carelessly omitted by a sleepy scribe. It would be much like the failure to cross a *t* or to dot an *i*. It is not rare to find cases in old MSS. where Θ has failed to receive its transverse stroke at first, or lost it through age, and thus at present exhibits only the circular outline. It is true that the rule is often given, that of two forms the longer is the more suspicious; but this rule relates only to cases where one or more entire words may have inadvertently been admitted from the margin. In the case of kindred letters a stroke is more liable to be omitted than added. The addition implies intentional corruption, a charge which should, if possible, be avoided. In this view Θεός has the preference.

In favor of Θεός it has also been asserted that the form ὃς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκὶ ἐδικαιώθη ἐν πνεύματι is "not Greek." But this statement is founded on the assumed translation "*He who* was manifested in the flesh was justified in the spirit," making ὅς equivalent to *he who*, and including both the demonstrative and the relative. But it has been shown by Professor Stuart,[1] that this is by no means an unparalleled

[1] Biblical Repository, Vol. II. pp. 70–72. Matthaei, whom Henderson thinks the most learned man who ever edited the New Testament, says of the notion that τὸ φανερωθέν would be the only form grammatically allowable if we reject Θεός: "If we were speaking of a Greek author, I should have nothing to say

construction. Very few, however, of the defenders of the reading ὅς admit this translation. They regard the clause ὃς ἐφανερώθη not as the subject of the subsequent predicates, ἐδικαιώθη, ὤφθη, etc., but as co-ordinate with them. Their translation would be: "Great is the mystery of godliness; he who was manifested in the flesh, [he who] was justified in the spirit, [he who] was seen of angels, etc."

In favor of the reading ὅς is the fact that it requires but a single step to obtain from it the other readings θεός, ὅ, or ὡς. The addition of two short strokes converts ὃς into θεός. On the other hand, the omission of a single letter gives us ὅ, a form evidently derived from ὅς, and adopted merely as a supposed grammatical correction. If we suppose, however, that θεός was the original reading, we must first obtain ὅς from it, and then obtain ὅ by altering this alteration. *Caeteris paribus*, that form is to be preferred from which the others are most easily explained.

Again, ὅς is at first sight the more difficult reading, and as such has the preference. The form ὅς seems harsh, while θεός is very easy. Copyists are liable to alter a harsh form for an easier one. At the same time ὅς gives a good sense, even without resorting to the opinion defended by Conybeare and Howson, and by others, that Paul here quotes a fragment from a hymn of the early church, as in other places in his pastoral epistles. In accordance with this idea the verse would read: "And without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness.

> 'He who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the spirit,
> 'Seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles,
> 'Believed on in the world, received up into glory.'"

The omission of the article before θεός, although it is the subject of the sentence, is another suspicious circumstance mentioned by Professor Stuart. He found, out of two hun-

against it; but Paul wrote this, who in another passage, in immediate connection with τὸ μυστήριον τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον, has νυνὶ δὲ ἐφανερώθη, which is no sort of Greek." — Note on 1 Tim iii. 16.

dred and fifty-seven cases in the New Testament in which Θεός is used as the subject of the sentence, only *four* cases in which it fails to take the article, and so strong is the tendency to insert it, that in *three* of these cases, an examination of the authorities collected by Tischendorf will show that important MSS. exhibit the article. It is however noticeable that these four cases all occur, like our passage now under discussion, in the writings of Paul.

It is a further argument in favor of ὅς that Paul has in other cases similarly connected μυστήριον with some form of the verb φανερόω. In Coll. i. 26, 27, he has τὸ μυστήριον τὸ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν γενεῶν, νυνὶ δὲ ἐφανερώθη τοῖς ἁγίοις αὐτοῦ, οἷς ἠθέλησαν ὁ Θεὸς γνωρίσαι τίς ὁ πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης τοῦ μυστηρίου τούτου ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, ὅς ἐστι Χρίστος ἐν ὑμῖν, ἡ ἐλπὶς τῆς δόξης. Here μυστήριον is not only followed by ἐφανερώθη, but a little later τοῦ μυστήριου is followed by ὅς ἐστι Χρίστος, which shows that μυστήριον may be applied personally to Christ, and followed by the masculine relative, unless the gender is here due to attraction. In Rom. xvi. 25, 26, Paul again connects μυστήριον with φανερόω: κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου, φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν, κ. τ. λ.

In favor of ὅς, has sometimes been adduced the argument that Θεός seems to be an alteration made for the purpose of its use in polemic theology, as giving the orthodox an additional text to use against the Arians and other heretics. But there seems to have been no intentional corruption of this sort, for we cannot see that there was any distinction between the orthodox and the heretics in their use of the passage. Some defenders of the deity of Christ favor one, and some the other reading. Both Gregory of Nyssa in the East, and Didymus at Alexandria, simultaneously exhibit Θεός, the former using it as freely as if it were the universally received reading; while, on the other hand, the multifarious polemical writings of Athanasius, Gregory of Nazianzus, Basil, and Epiphanius nowhere contain this passage, except

that the latter quotes it to prove the divinity of the Holy Ghost. If we descend to a later period, we shall find that in the fifth and sixth century the reading Θεός would be likely to be looked on with suspicion as favoring the heresies of Nestorians. It would not be regarded as the orthodox reading, for it distinguishes most clearly between the divine and the human natures: *God* is not confounded with the *flesh*, but said to have been manifested *in it*. It was only after a long controversy that the Eastern and North African churches settled to a general opposition to the doctrine of the single nature of Christ. The conflict waged so bitterly by Cyril and his supporters against Nestorius and Theodoret had the effect of leading his successors into the opposite Monophysite heresy. For a season there was scarcely any middle ground allowed between the Nestorians and the Eutychians. All who opposed the blind and intolerant zeal of the Monophysites were branded by them as Nestorians. The whole Eastern church seemed falling into this extreme. At this time it will be seen that those who regarded themselves as the orthodox party, and the devoted followers of Cyril, would have looked with great suspicion on the reading "*God* was manifested *in* the flesh," a reading so apparently opposed to their Monophysite rendering of John's text: "The Word was *made* flesh.' Accordingly we find that Liberatus distinctly speaks of the reading with Θεός as Nestorian and heretical. If there had been at an earlier time a temptation to the orthodox to alter ὅς to Θεός, the temptation was now equally strong to change Θεός to ὅς.

Editors of the New Testament, have according to their different principles of criticism or means of information, varied in their reading of this passage. In favor of Θεός may be mentioned Stephens, Mill, Matthaei, Scholz, and others of less note; Griesbach, Lachman, Tischendorf, and Tregelles prefer ὅς, while Wetstein's choice seems to favor ὅ.

We do not propose to balance against each other the various arguments for either reading, with the purpose of defending

one or the other. It has been our aim simply to give a more complete, accurate, and impartial statement of the facts in the case than has heretofore been accessible, that each one who studies them may have all the materials necessary for the satisfaction of his own judgment, and that something may thus be done for perfecting the purity of the original text of the scriptures.

It is gratifying to discover that none of the early Christian writers, whether called orthodox or heritic by the general councils of the church, have ventured to tamper with the sacred text. Epiphanius, Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory Nazianzen, all active opponents of Arianism, either read ὅς distinctly, or else do not quote the passage, although it would seem that with the reading Θεός it might have been used with effect against their opponents. On the other hand, when, a century later, Θεός seemed the less orthodox reading, we find Theodorus and Nestorius, though treated as heretics, employing the relative. Again the tide has turned, and Θεός has been called the more orthodox reading, and the identical alteration for which the Constantinopolitan bishop was deposed as a heretic has of late years been charged upon the defenders of the doctrine of the Trinity as an orthodox trick. There is no proof on either side of any intentional corruption of the sacred text.

ARTICLE II.

THE SON OF MAN.

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THERE is something very remarkable about this name. Doubtless there is in it, also, some deep significance. It is the chosen, and, if we may so say, the favorite name of the Redeemer of mankind — the name by which he loves to designate himself, and by which he does call himself more frequently than any other. And yet, with the exception of a single instance, this name is never applied to him by any one but himself. The name occurs twenty-two times in the Gospel of Matthew, and, *besides* the *parallel passages* in the other Gospels, five times in Mark, twelve times in Luke, and eleven times in John — about eighty times in all, counting all the repetitions and parallel passages;[1] and in every instance of its use in the Gospels, it occurs in discourses or remarks made by our Lord himself, and is applied exclusively to himself.

It is also found once in the Acts (vii. 56), and there — a solitary exception to the otherwise unvarying usage of the New Testament — the expression is put into the mouth of the Martyr Stephen, who, "being full of the Holy Ghost, looked up steadfastly into heaven, and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God"; and (apparently because he saw him in *human form*, and manifestly full of human sympathy, *standing* as if he had risen up to sustain the first Christian martyr and to receive his spirit when he should resign it to his keeping), he said: "Behold I see the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God."

This name does not appear in any of the Epistles. The

[1] We take this number (80) on the authority of Cruden. Bloomfield states the number at 61; but that is certainly too small. We have not taken the trouble to verify the accuracy of Cruden.

evangelists ordinarily call him by the simple name of Jesus, which, as explained by the angel at whose bidding the name was given to him at his birth, expresses his most characteristic work, as "The Saviour of his people from their sins" (Matt. i. 21). The writers of the epistles usually call him the Lord, the Lord Jesus, or the Lord Jesus Christ, thus denoting him (as the evangelists also begin to call him after his resurrection) as their risen Lord, the anointed King of the spiritual Israel, and the divinely appointed Ruler as well as Saviour of men. He calls himself "*the Son of Man*" and "*the Son of God*," or simply "THE SON," thus signifying his peculiarly intimate and endearing relations to man on the one hand, and to God on the other. It is also a significant fact that, while neither name is absolutely peculiar to either of the Gospels, the Saviour calls himself "the Son of Man" more frequently in the first three Gospels, where his outward life is particularly narrated and his human nature and relations are emphasized, and "the Son of God" or "the Son" more frequently in the fourth Gospel, which reveals especially his inward being and asserts his divine nature in the face of unbelieving "Jews."

This name is, therefore, entirely peculiar to the language of our Lord; appropriated by himself, and applied, as a distinctive name, to himself alone. There is, however, in the language of the Old Testament a manifest, and doubtless intentional, preparation for our Saviour's peculiar application and appropriation of the name to himself. By an idiom somewhat peculiar to the language of the Hebrews and the Hellenists, or Greek-speaking Jews, though there are not wanting some analogous usages in our own and other languages, the phrase "son of" is very often used to express likeness to, or participation with, some person or thing, or the possession of some character or quality, as in the expressions, *sons of Belial*, *son of perdition*, *son of the devil*,[1] *son of hell*,[1] *sons of thunder*, *son of peace*, *sons of light*,[1] *son*

[1] Child in our English version, son in the Greek: *υἱὲ διαβόλου* (Acts xiii. 10); *υἱὸν γεέννης* (Mat. xxiii. 15); *υἱοὶ φωτός* (John. xii. 36).

of consolation, etc., meaning persons partaking of the nature, character, image, etc., of the devil, Belial, and hell on the one hand, or of light, peace, and consolation on the other. After the analogy of this idiom, *son of man* is another name for *child of humanity*, or, as we often say, *child of mortality*; that is, a human being, possessed of the attributes and characteristics of humanity. Accordingly it is very often used as a synonyme with man in the synonymous parallelisms of the Psalms and Prophets. Thus, in the book of Numbers, "God is not a *man* that he should lie, nor the *son of man* that he should repent"; in the book of Job: "How much less *man* that is a worm, and *the son of man* that is a worm"; and in the book of Psalms: "What is *man* that thou art mindful of him, or the *son of man* that thou visitest him." In these and many similar passages, *son of man* is obviously another name for one who is possessed of the attributes of humanity —any child of Adam who, like his father, is subject to human frailties and infirmities. And the name directs attention particularly to these characteristic attributes; it emphasizes them as the natural characteristics which distinguish the race, and to which every child of the race is born — is, as it were, a *son* and *heir*. By way of reminding him that, though now commissioned to speak in the name of God, he is still a frail, imperfect, dying man, like those to whom he is sent, the prophet Ezekiel, when God speaks to him, is constantly addressed by the title, son of man.[1] Still in all these passages no one person is singled out as exclusively, or even pre-eminently, *the* son of man. On the contrary, it is the very design of the phrase, either to comprise under one comprehensive and expressive name every child of Adam, or, if applied to an individual, as in the case of the prophet Ezekiel, not to distinguish him from other men, but rather to reduce him to just the same level with other mortals.

The nearest approach to our Lord's appropriation of this title to himself is in the prophecy of Daniel (vii. 13): "I saw in the night visions, and behold, one like the Son of

[1] Repeated some eighty-nine times.

Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him; and there was given him dominion," etc. This is manifestly a prophecy of Christ; yet it may be doubted whether by the expression "like the Son of Man" anything more is meant than that the Messiah, God's anointed King, was to come in the form and likeness of a *man*, though he came in the clouds of heaven, and came to receive a universal and everlasting kingdom. And in the Revelation (i. 13), when it is said that he who was seen in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks was "like unto the Son of Man," probably it is not intended to say that he looked like Jesus Christ, for this would be only saying that he looked like himself; but that he, Jesus Christ, still appeared in human form, though now clothed with superhuman power and glory.[1]

After all the analogies that we can discover, then, in the language of the Old Testament and in the Hebrew idiom, we cannot fail to observe the marked peculiarity of our Saviour's appropriation of this title to himself. He does not call himself *a* son of man, still less *a* son of *a* man. He does not call himself in general terms son of man; but "*the* Son of Man." He is not some indefinite son of some indefinite man. He is not some common son of our common humanity. He is not any ordinary common-place son of man. But he is emphatically, nay, as the exclusive language of Scripture shows, he is exclusively, "*the* Son of Man." He is in some peculiar sense *the* Son of *mankind*, the child of humanity, the son of the race; in the emphatic and unequivocal language of the original Greek, he is ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, in which designation the first article distinguishes him from all other *sons*, while the second, as every Greek scholar knows, generalizes *man*, and makes the word comprehensive of the race.[2]

[1] There is the same contrast between the exalted glory and the human form of Jesus as he is seen by the Martyr Stephen; and the explanation of that peculiar passage in the Acts, given on a former page, is confirmed by the analogy of the passages here cited.

[2] Just as in English, we say *the* ox, *the* horse, when we mean to denote the

Ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, *The Son of Man.* Let us analyze this peculiar expression; and, considering it at once in its own appropriate significance and in the light of scriptural usage, let us endeavor to ascertain its true meaning:

1. In the first place, it implies that Jesus was a *man*, a real and proper man, possessed of all the attributes and characteristics of our common humanity. This, as we have seen, is the primary import of the phrase "son of man," when interpreted according to the analogy of the Hebrew language. "Son of man," in the peculiar idiom of the Hebrews and the Greek-speaking Jews, is synonymous with man. It differs from man chiefly in that it *emphasizes* the idea of a human *origin* and human *characteristics*. It denotes emphatically one who is a man by birth and a man by nature; one who is *born* a man, and therefore possesses the characteristics of the race. There is no way in which the Redeemer could convey the idea of his real and proper humanity more clearly and forcibly to the minds of his immediate hearers, who were Jews, than by habitually calling himself "the Son of Man."

Moreover, aside from any peculiarities in the Hebrew idiom, this is the natural and appropriate signification of the word. A *son* partakes of the *nature* of his father. Christ was a man in origin and a man in nature; and, as if for the very purpose of emphasizing that fact and impressing it on the minds of men,— lest this fact should be forgotten in connection with his claim to be also something more than human, and under the overshadowing influence of his superhuman wisdom and power,— he takes pains to call himself "the Son of Man." He was the Redeemer of *men*, and he would have those whom he came to redeem understand, first of all, that their Redeemer was a *man*— a loving and sympathizing brother.[1] The atonement was to be made for

species; though by an idiom peculiar to the English, we generalize the word "man" by omitting the article.

[1] Dr. Robinson says in his Lexicon under ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: "It would seem to refer not so much to his human nature, as to the fact of his being the

man, and it must be made by man. "By man came death; by man came also the resurrection of the dead."[1]

In these days, when the humanity of Christ is seldom or never questioned, and the only question is in regard to his divinity, it is difficult for us to appreciate the necessity which existed in the primitive church of guarding so strenuously the proper humanity of the Redeemer. *Then*, be it remembered, his proper humanity was as strenuously denied by some (e.g. the Docetae) as his proper deity was by others (e.g. the Ebionites); indeed, at that time, his disciples seem to have found their chief difficulty in admitting and conceiving of his real humanity rather than his full divinity.[2] Hence the prominence given to his outward, human life in three of the Gospels. Hence the earnestness with which the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews insists that "it *behooved* him in *all* things to be made like unto his brethren." And hence, in part at least, we think, the frequency with which our Lord calls himself by that name which his disciples and Jewish hearers could not but understand as an emphatic assertion of his real humanity.

Christ was a man in his earthly origin, because he was born of a woman, and so born into the race. He was a man in nature, because he possessed a human body with all the limbs, features, appetites, and powers of a human body, and gave as good evidence as any other man that he possessed a human soul with all the faculties and susceptibilities of a human soul. The sacred writers, in the Gospels, in the Acts, and in the Epistles, before and after his resurrection and ascension, speak of him as a man, "the Man Christ

Messiah who is described as coming from heaven in a human form;" and he refers to some passages in proof that the words were understood as synonymous with "the Messiah," "the Christ," and even with "the Son of God." It was not, however, these words, but always something asserted of himself in the connection, that was understood to be a claim to be the Messiah and the Son of God; cf. John xii. 23–34; Luke xxii. 69, 70, etc. And it would be strange, indeed, if these words could have lost so entirely the meaning they so manifestly and uniformly had in the Old Testament.

[1] Cf. Heb. ii. 2.

[2] See Ellicott's Life of Christ.

Jesus" (1 Tim. ii. 5; compare John viii. 40; Acts ii. 22, etc). He was born, brought up, and educated like other men of his class. He was known through the community as "the carpenter's son," and seems to have followed, to some extent, the occupation of his father (Mark vi. 3). His mother and sisters and brothers were well known; and he grew up among them — very unlike them, it is true — in wisdom and piety; but yet so like them, in his birth and education, in his general appearance and manner of life, that, notwithstanding they marvelled at his extraordinary wisdom and supernatural power, his neighbors and early acquaintances were slow to believe that he was anything more than human — anything radically different from the rest of his family and other men around him. He ate and drank and slept like other men. He hungered and thirsted, sorrowed and rejoiced, was weary and refreshed, was pleased and displeased, like other men. Like other men, he loved his friends and wept over their graves; though unlike most men, he loved also all mankind, and wept over the sins and miseries of his bitterest enemies. Like other men he was angry; though it was only at sin: He "looked round about with anger" on the hypocrites who would fain have interposed their sanctimonious keeping of the Sabbath in the way of his healing many, "being grieved at the hardness of their hearts" (Mark iii. 5). It is never said in the scriptures that he hated anything; certainly he never hated any human being; yet we are told that he was "much displeased" with his disciples when they would have kept back those mothers who brought young children to him for his blessing; and he was doubtless very indignant at the hypocrisy and iniquity of the Scribes and Pharisees on whom he denounced such heavy woes. We have no record in the Gospels of his having laughed; but this is no proof that he never did laugh. There was a tradition in the early church that he never smiled; but this we cannot believe. We are sure he smiled benignantly on every kind word and good deed. We know that he was free from selfishness and sin. We

know too that all *men* are sinners; that every other man who has ever lived was more or less selfish. But selfishness is an excrescence on humanity, and not a part of man's nature as he was originally created. Sin is a disease which has sprung up and spread through the race, and belonged not to man in his normal and healthy state.

On the whole, "never man spake like this man;" never man lived like him; never man died like him. At the same time, he spake and lived and died *as* a man; sustaining all the essential relations of man; subject to all the infirmities, temptations, and trials of men, and those in the largest measure and the greatest variety of forms; exercising all the attributes of proper humanity, and those in their most emphatic manifestations; and we have no more conclusive evidence that Peter or Paul or John was a real and proper man than that Jesus of Nazareth was such a man.

2. He was not merely *a* man, but *the* Man, in the same emphatic sense in which he was "*the* Son of Man,"—the only MAN in the fullest and highest sense, as he was in the fullest and highest sense the only SON OF MAN, that has ever lived in our world. He was ὁ ἄνθρωπος, as the Greeks say, or, as we say, *Man*—man generic, man universal, man typical and ideal; the living type and realized ideal of humanity. He was not one man or one type of man only, but he combined in himself all that belongs to the idea of humanity; he was, if we may so speak, the whole human race, or the idea and essence of it, embodied in one person.[1] As God is, in the fullest and highest sense, the only Father of the human family, so Christ is, in the fullest and highest

[1] This idea, or one similar to it, is suggested by those passages of the Old Testament in which the phrase "the Son of Man" occurs. For example, "What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that thou visitest him." In this passage "the son of man" is not any individual man, but mankind in general; man as God made him and placed him in the world; man made a little lower than the angels, and placed in this lower world as God's image and the vicegerent of his government over inferior creatures; man in the rank and condition characteristic of humanity; or, as we might say, man according to the essential type and idea of his being.

sense, the only Son of the race; and as our fatherhood is only an imperfect type of the fatherhood of God, so our manhood is only a broken image and shattered fragment of the manhood of Christ. No other man ever was absolutely whole, complete, with no part wanting and no element in excess or defect. Most men are not only small patterns, but mere fragments of humanity. You must put a great many of them together to make a real man. To make up our *ideal* of man, we must unite all that is highest and best in the biography and history of mankind, written and unwritten, and refine it of all that is impure and unreal and abnormal, leaving only the pure gold. Such an ideal is realized in the humanity of Christ.

Christ had no individual idiosyncrasies. You cannot say he was more like Peter or Paul or James or John. You must have put together Peter and Paul and James and John, or all that was normal and good in them, and all that was right and good in all other men that have ever lived, to make up the human nature of Christ. There have been a few men in the history of the world who seem to understand all other men, to be able to reproduce men of all ages and nations, because they comprehend all men in their universal and comprehensive genius. To call Jesus of Nazareth by any of those epithets by which we distinguish Homer or Shakspeare, as the many-sided, the myriad-minded, and the like, were only to degrade our conceptions of him. And yet this class of men may serve as types and images of him whom we have styled the universal and ideal man. Only he was the *all*-sided, the *all*-minded, the all-hearted, the all-comprehending type of humanity — the antitype of all that is beautiful and good in the past history and character of man and the prototype of all that man is capable of becoming, all that a pure heart can wish or a holy imagination can conceive in the future progress of the race.[1]

[1] So naturalists tell us, man is the type and embodiment of all the inferior animals; and herein the religion of Christ shows itself to be analogous to the constitution and course of nature, or the substance of which nature is only the type and shadow.

Christ had none of the prejudices of the class to which he belonged or the section in which he was born and brought up. He was a poor man only in condition. He was just as much at home and at ease with the rich, provided only they were good. He was a Nazarene and a Galilean only in origin. He had none of the rusticity of an obscure village; none of the narrowness of a despised province. Country and city were alike to him. He taught with equal freedom and authority in a fisherman's boat on the Sea of Galilee, and in the temple at Jerusalem. He had no national peculiarities. He was born a Jew and brought up among Jews; but not a trace of Jewish prejudice, bigotry, or narrowness can be discovered in all his words and actions. His birth and education were in the East; but there is nothing peculiarly oriental in his ideas or instructions. He spoke the language of Judea; but he spoke to the hearts of *men* in all nations and ages. He was emphatically the Son of *Man*; not of one man nor another; not of one nation rather than another; not of one age to the exclusion of other ages,—but of man universal. We do not even conceive of the human nature and character of Christ as limited and narrowed by the distinction of sex. As the traditional face of Christ, which we see so often in paintings, combines the strength and dignity of one sex with the beauty and loveliness of the other, so his nature unites the susceptibilities, virtues, and graces of both. As in the Christian church, so in Christ himself, though in a different sense, there is neither Jew nor Greek, barbarian nor Scythian, bond or free, male or female; but all combined in one comprehensive, harmonious and perfect whole.

From this all-comprehending humanity, or complete and perfect manhood of Christ, it follows that he must be the model, the representative, and the friend of the human race. But these specific ideas, though involved in the general idea which we have just been considering, are so distinguishable from it and are so important in themselves, that we shall give each of them a separate examination. We remark, therefore, in the third place:

3. He was the model man. The universal man comprehends all of which man is capable. The ideal man exemplifies all that man should be. He must therefore be the model man. Many elements might be considered as entering into this comprehensive idea; such, for instance, as the balance of his mind, the normal operation of his mental faculties; perhaps also the fitting grace of his manners, and the sweet beauty, yet commanding dignity, of his person.[1] But the point which we now wish to single out and emphasize, is, that the Son of Man was the morally perfect, the sinless man. The scriptures distinguish him as the Holy One and the Just (Acts iii. 14). "In him is no sin" (1 John iii. 5). It is only the "*pura naturalia*," as the schoolmen say, only the original unfallen nature of man, that appears in him. How or why we cannot stay to ask. We are now concerned only with the fact. "The Son of Man" is son and heir to a perfect humanity — a humanity without sin. The all-embracing, all-comprehending man is, at the same time, the all-pure and the all-holy.

Christ, as man, exhibited the human virtues without imperfection or alloy; and man, when he becomes a Christian, is not expected or desired to de-humanize himself, but only to restore and perfect that portion of humanity which he has in him. And this can be accomplished only by being and doing just what Christ would be and do in like circumstances. We are not commanded to practise any superhuman virtues. Man has actually been and done all that we are commanded to be and do, and that, too, in circumstances essentially like our own. With a nature essentially like ours, and under temptations in all important respects like ours, he "knew no sin" (2 Cor. v. 21); "he did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth" (1 Pet. ii. 22). He was every human virtue embodied in a human form and

[1] Of which we see the evidence, perhaps, in the instantaneous obedience of the fishermen of Galilee to his call, and the falling backward on the ground of his enemies when he presented himself before them, saying, "I am he" (John xviii. 6).

exhibited in our fallen, sinful world. The patience of Job, the faith of Abraham, the prayer of Jacob, the obedience of David, the courage of Elijah, the fortitude of Daniel, the seraphic joy of Isaiah and the sympathetic tenderness of Jeremiah, the zeal of Peter and the love of John, the believing works of James and the working faith and heroism of Paul — all the active, aggressive, energetic, and heroic virtues of man; all the meek, gentle, loving, and suffering graces of woman; and all the humble, truthful, affectionate, and obedient spirit of the little child — all, and more than all, these virtues met in him, without any of the excesses into which they are prone to run, without any of the defects which attend them in other men, each so complete in itself, and all so tempered and combined, as to form a perfect whole. And yet, so far from dazzling and confounding us with the idea that this is superhuman excellence, which it is vain and almost impious for ordinary mortals to attempt to imitate, we feel all the while, that it is human virtue, the very excellence which we were made to aspire after, and, in kind, to reach; nay, more, that he exemplified all the virtues before our eyes for the very *purpose* of proving their practicability, and teaching and encouraging us, in his presence and in reliance on his aid, to practise them.

"The Son of Man" was a perfect pattern of what man should be in his relations to his fellow man, loving his neighbor as himself, doing unto others all things whatsoever he would that they should do unto him, and even going beyond the strict requirements of the golden rule in voluntary self-denial and self-sacrifice for the good of men. At the same time, he was a model man in his relations to God. The will of God was his will: "Not my will but thine be done," was his language under the most trying and afflictive circumstances. He did always those things which pleased his Father in heaven. The glory of God was, in his daily consciousness and his habitual choice, the end of his being. He lived in habitual communion with God; and even his personal union with the Father was the most per-

fect image of the true life of man, which *is* life in Christ and life in God. Man attains to the dignity and perfection of his nature only when, like Christ, he is not only the son of man, but the son of God also. Godliness is true manliness, and perfect manliness is godliness. Godliness and manliness in their perfection cannot be separated. They are seen together, seen in their perfection, and seen to be one, in the life and character of Christ.

4. He was the representative man. We do not say *a* representative man, but *the* representative man. He did not, like other representative men, represent an age or a nation, a class or a clan, but the whole human race. The son and heir is the proper representative of the family. Christ is "the Son of *Man*," and so the representative of the whole family of man.

That he is a *fit* representative is sufficiently evident from what we have already said of his person and character. He is a complete man and a perfect man. He *is* man personified. He is all human capabilities and all human virtues in one person. And he acted, as well he might, for the race. This is the point to which we here direct particular attention. He *acted* for the race. He was officially, as well as personally, its representative. He was born into the race that he might embody it, as it were, in his own person, live for it, reconcile it to God, redeem it, regenerate it, breathe his own life into it, and so raise it from the death into which it had fallen by sin. He lived, not for himself, but for mankind, forgetting himself, sacrificing himself for the good of others and for the redemption of the world. He suffered for the race, not for any sins of his own, but solely for the sins of others; sorrowing for *their* sins, sympathizing with their miseries, bearing their sicknesses and their iniquities continually on his head. He died for the race; for, not being a sinner, he did not deserve to die; he did not die as the penalty of any sin of his own, or in consequence of any necessity which lay upon himself, but as a voluntary sacrifice and atonement for the guilt of

mankind. His resurrection was the proof and pledge of the resurrection of all men; nay more, *his* resurrection was the *cause* and vital power of theirs. He *is* "the resurrection and the life." "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

In Christ, human history begins a new epoch, the human race, a new life. He is the second Adam, in whom humanity is again embodied, represented, and, as it were, created anew; from whom the stream of human existence starts afresh, as from a fountain, and that not like the first Adam, a fountain of sin and misery, of corruption and death, but a fountain of holiness and happiness, of regeneration and life. "For as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." He is "the new *man*," by putting on whom the Christian is renewed in the image of his Maker, and man, even on earth, will at length be restored to the likeness of God. By the union of Christ with the race, new vitality is imparted to society, government, civilization, literature, religion — the whole history of mankind. By the life of Christ in and for the race, the whole race will rise again to an immortal existence beyond the grave. By union to Christ, the individual Christian, in a still higher sense, begins a new life; he is born again; he is created anew; he lives a new life, as a new creature in a new world. For "if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things have passed away; behold all things have become new." Choosing Christ as his advocate and intercessor, the sinner obtains forgiveness for all his sins, and cleaving to him as his representative, following him as his exemplar, making him the ideal of his life, he becomes a new man, a *true* man, "a man in Christ." By faith in Christ and consequent vital union with him, every individual of the race may attain to spiritual and eternal life; a life with and like Christ, and so a

life with and like God. Christ overcame the world and the devil, not for himself only, but for the race of whom he was the representative; and he that overcometh, like him and through his grace, shall sit down with him in his throne, even as he also overcame and sat down with his Father in his throne. For as he "died for our sins and rose for our justification," so "he ever *liveth* at the right hand of God to make intercession *for us*," "head over all things *to the church*" — head over all things, in a subordinate sense for mankind; for "the head of every man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God." Man can attain to his full and proper manhood only in and through the humanity of Christ. "Man" is crowned with glory and honor, and exalted to full dominion over nature and the inferior creatures, only by the exaltation of "the Son of Man" to the throne of the universe.[1]

5. He was the friend of man. He was not only *a* philanthropist; he was *the* philanthropist,— *the* man of love to all mankind, the pattern and embodiment of philanthropy, the philanthropic man, in the same emphatic and peculiar sense in which he was the Son of Man. The word "philanthropy" has had another meaning since he came into the world to teach and to exemplify it.[2] The mission of Socrates, on which he expatiates with so much satisfaction in his defence before his judges, was confined to Athens. The mission of Christ embraced the world. His religion, for the first time in the world's history, was a religion for all mankind, and a religion of love to all. Alone, of all that have gone before him, and all that have come after him, he was the friend of *man as* man, without distinction of time or place, condition

[1] See that remarkable prophecy or anticipation in the eighth Psalm as interpreted in the Epistle to the Hebrews (ii. 6–9), and both further illustrated on a subsequent page.

[2] It is most instructive to observe how this word has been widened and elevated by Christianity from the low and narrow sense in which it is used in the heathen classics, where it is generally used in the sense of friendliness, kindness, fairness, and even to express that which is pleasing and plausible. See exordium of Demos. Philippic II.

or character. He felt a peculiar complacency, of course, in his disciples, and found some of them more congenial than others, because they were more entirely in unison with his character and cause; but he sympathized with all men, and pitied them more in proportion as they were more tried and afflicted — in proportion as they needed his compassion and were conscious of their necessities. He was emphatically the friend and the companion of sinners, and justified himself on that truly philanthropic ground: "The whole need not a physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance." He did not limit his charities to the bodily wants of men, like some very charitable persons now-a-days, nor, like others, labor only for the good of their souls. He healed all manner of sicknesses; he also forgave all manner of sins. He bore both the sicknesses and the sins of men always on his heart, till, at length, he expiated the one and dried up the fountain of the other by his atoning death on the cross. His life was one continual conflict with evil and the evil one; and every conflict, every triumph, was not for himself, not for his kindred or his disciples, not for his country or his age merely, but for mankind throughout all ages; and not for time only, but through eternity. In the expressive language of the Apostle Peter in his first sermon to the Gentiles — language wonderfully descriptive of the most comprehensive and enlightened philanthropy, — "he *went about* doing good and healing all that were oppressed of the *devil; for God was with him.*" While he was always ready to alleviate the sorrows and sufferings of men, he always struck at *sin* as the root of them,[1] and *satan* as their author, the great adversary and murderer of man from the beginning.[2] And if all who have labored for the good of others had been as impartial and comprehensive, as wise and profound as he; if all philanthropists had been Christian philanthropists, and all

[1] E.g., instead of saying to the sick of the palsy, Thy disease is cured, he says, Thy sins are forgiven (Mark ii. 5).

[2] Cf. John viii. 44: *ἐκεῖνος ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς.*

Christians had been charitable and philanthropic Christians, a large part of human wants and woes would long ere this have been dried up at the fountain. The religion of the cross was the remedy for "all the ills that flesh is heir to"; and no sooner was the atonement made for the sins of the world than he commissioned his disciples to "go into all the world and preach the gospel [publish the good news] to every creature," at the same time promising to be with them as an omnipresent spirit of love and power, "always, even to the end of the world." Yes, his was *philanthropy* that deserved the name — wide as the world, universal as the race, diversified as its wants and woes, enduring as its existence. The pattern philanthropist is found just where we should expect to find him — in the model man: the complete and universal philanthropist, in the complete and universal man. Of all men, he could appropriate the language of the Roman poet:

"Homo sum; nihil humani a me alienum puto."

"I am a man; nothing of all that pertains to man do I deem foreign to me." Nay, he calls himself by a name which expresses yet more tenderly his peculiarly near and endearing relationship to the race, and his wonderful love and sympathy for them. He delights to call himself the *Son* of Man, as if that most significant word alone could express his affectionate devotion to the well-being of the family. He repeats the name and dwells upon it, as if he would fain emphasize his filial and fraternal love. Hear him: "*The Son of Man* came to seek and to save that which was lost." "*The Son of Man* came not to destroy men's lives, but to save them." "*The Son of Man* hath power on earth to forgive sins." "*The Son of Man* hath not where to lay his head." "*The Son of Man* came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many." "Betrayest thou the *Son of Man* with a kiss?" "Except ye eat the flesh of *the Son of Man* and drink his blood ye have no life in you." "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood dwelleth in me and I in him." How touching!

Do you think it is merely accidental that he calls himself by this endearing name in these and so many similar passages? Or would he appeal to all that is tender and sympathetic, all that is *human*, in every human breast?

And in order to feel all the power and pathos of those words we must remember that "Son of Man" was not his original title; that originally he was more than human. "Son of God" was his rank and title in heaven, where all the angels of God worshipped him as very God; and it was love for mankind that brought him into our world in human nature — born of a woman, a babe in Bethlehem, a member of the great human family, the Son of Man among the children of men. "He was made a little lower than the angels [that is he became man] for the suffering of death, that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man." "Forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren." Prodigal sons they are, indeed, who have wandered away from their father's house, and fallen into the snare of the devil, who has set them to feeding swine, and lets them starve after all their despicable service. But he will go and tell them how their Father waits to receive them back; and many of them will return to their Father and his Father, to their God and his God; and that Father will run to meet them, and fall on their neck and kiss them, and will rejoice over his sons that were dead, made alive again, that were lost, found. And whosoever will hear his words, and do the will of his Father in heaven, the same he will own as his brother and sister and mother. And he will ever reward any kindness shown to them as shown to him, and resent any injury done to them as done to him. For even when the world shall have come to an end, and he shall have gathered all nations before him, he will pronounce sentence on them as the "Son of Man" (Matt. xxv. 31). "For the Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son, because he is the Son of Man" (John v. 22, 27) therefore especially qualified to judge men.

And "when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory," the test of character on which their final destiny will turn, will be their sympathy, or want of sympathy, with him in love and charity to their brethren, especially to the poor and needy, the sick and afflicted, of the children of men. "Inasmuch as ye did, or ye did it not, unto one of the least of these my brethren ye did, or ye did it not, unto me." Then woe to all the uncharitable and the misanthropic, the haters and oppressors of their race. Yea, woe to all who turn a deaf ear to the cry of the afflicted and the oppressed when he pleads, "Am I not a man and a brother"; but pleads in vain. But blessed are they who have visited the sick and the prisoners; who have knocked off the chains of the slave; who have given a cup of cold water to a brother of Jesus; who have been followers of him who was anointed to preach the gospel to the poor, to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised. The Son of Man will stretch out his hands towards them, in the sight of an assembled universe, and say: "Behold my family. Behold my mother and my brethren."

The person of Christ is a mine of wealth, in which the church has been digging ever since the opening of the Christian era, and yet she has only just begun to discover its treasures. The truths which are directly involved in this one title, the Son of Man, we cannot but see, are surpassingly rich. The lessons of practical wisdom suggested by our discussion are scarcely less precious. They are too numerous and copious to be developed in this Article; but we cannot refrain from a brief statement of a few of them.

1. The view which we have taken of Christ as the Son of Man may shed light on the interpretation of many passages of scripture, especially on the prophecies of the Old Testament as interpreted in the New. Not a few of the passages which are quoted in the Gospels and the Epistles as prophecies of Christ, when examined in their connection,

appear to have had quite another original meaning and application. Hence has arisen that anomaly in the interpretation of the scriptures, the doctrine of a double sense which has been carried to such extravagant lengths by many well-meaning commentators, and which has brought so much scandal on the sacred writings. Does not our view of Christ as the Son of Man establish a rational foundation for a twofold application of many scriptures which is not at all arbitrary, but grounded in the very nature of the case.

Take, for example, that earliest and most comprehensive of prophecies contained in the third chapter of Genesis "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." The enmity between the serpent and the whole race, who are the offspring of our first parents — in other words, between mankind and satan, who was a manslayer from the beginning — is the most obvious reference of this scripture. But Christ is still more truly and emphatically *the* seed of the woman, *the* "man from the Lord," to whom so many godly women, from Eve to the Virgin Mary, hoped to give birth; and in his conflict with and triumph over satan, the race wins its only real victory over its great adversary. In him, and him only, the seed of the woman effectually bruises the serpent's head.

So Christ was emphatically *the* seed of Abraham and *the* son of David — the noblest offspring of the patriarchs and kings of Israel; the richest product of the Jewish nation, in whom all other nations were indeed blessed, — nay, the embodiment, in one person, of all the truths and all the blessings which the posterity of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the offspring of David were designed to convey to mankind.

Again, look at the eighth Psalm, and its interpretation in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "When I consider thy heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained: What is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that thou visitest

him? For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honor. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands." Nothing can be more obvious than that the primary application of this Psalm is to the rank of man, that is, the human race, in the creation, and the Creator's intention that he should have dominion over the inferior creatures in this lower world; yet the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews applies the passage to Christ. And in the light of this discussion, and only in that light, we see that the application is not forced, not arbitrary. Christ is the Son of Man in the fullest sense. Christ is *man* in the largest sense — the representative of the race; nay, its impersonation and embodiment. The rank in which man was created — a little lower than the angels — involved the condition to which the Son of Man, the representative of the race, must needs humble himself, that he might bear their sins and be made in all respects like unto his brethren. On the other hand, the glory and honor with which Christ is crowned as the risen and ascended Saviour, is the exaltation of the race of which he is the natural and the official representative. And, what is perhaps the chief significance both of the Psalm and the Epistle, the human race can attain to its proper manhood, and its full dominion over the material creation, only in and through Christ. When, under the transforming power of the gospel of Christ, man is regenerated, redeemed, disenthralled, transfigured after his likeness, and earth is subdued, purified, beautified, glorified into an image of heaven, then, in the latter days, the glories of God's condescending love to the children of men will be seen as they never were before, and then that Psalm will be sung with some just understanding and appreciation of the opening and closing verse which constitutes its key-note: "O Lord, *our* Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth."

On the same principle, how natural and beautiful is the application to Christ of not a few scriptures of the Old Testament which originally had reference to David and Solo-

mon and the line of Jewish kings and captains, to the patriarchs, priests, and prophets, also, in their long succession.[1] In his very constitution as the Son of Man, as well as in his official relation to the race, Christ is patriarch, prophet, priest, and king of humanity; and all that is true and good in any of the great and good men, especially of the chosen people, is only a fragment, only a type and shadow, of perfect truth and goodness in him, the great antitype; all that is valuable and enduring in the history of mankind before the coming of Christ foreshadowed him, and he is the substance of all that is permanent and truly excellent in the history of the nations that have lived, or are yet to live, under the Christian era. Educated men, scientific men, should be the last to harbor a prejudice against types. The material world is full of them. The pre-Adamic earth foreshadows in every stratum of its rocky surface, *prophesies* on every page of its great volume, the coming of man to possess it and to rule over it. Every inferior animal that has ever lived on our globe contained in its bodily structure the type and prophecy of man. And human nature, human history, is all one great type, shadow, prophecy, promise of the Son of Man, who is at the same time the Son of God, and God's anointed king over the world. Why then should it be thought strange that the Bible and the spiritual world are full of types and prophecies of him who is the representative of humanity, and "head over all things to the church?"

2. Our subject suggests the inquiry whether we are not in danger of undervaluing and neglecting the human, or, which is only another form of the same word and another aspect of the same thing, the *humane* side of our religion. This side was made very prominent in the teaching of our Lord; and what is more, it was pre-eminently exemplified in

[1] For example, the promise (Deut. xviii. 18): "I will raise them up a prophet," etc., was fulfilled in Joshua first, then in the whole line of the prophets and leaders of Israel, but most emphatically fulfilled in the Great Prophet and Captain of our Salvation.

his life, and especially symbolized in his person. He distinctly declared in his first sermon, the sermon on the mount, that no service to God was acceptable in his sight, while the offerer was at enmity with any of his fellow men: "*First* go and be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift." And he repeated the lesson — a lesson taught also in the Old Testament, with all its pomp of outward ceremonials — over and over again, by his words and by his actions. "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice." "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath." *Man* is more sacred, more precious, than the Sabbath. "Therefore the *Son* of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath." With this agree also the writings of the Apostles: "Pure religion and undefiled before God and the Father," says James, "is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world." "If a man say I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar," says John; "for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen." And even Paul, the most strenuous advocate of justification by faith, declares that knowledge and faith without charity are nothing. That splendid eulogium on love as the chief of the graces is not from John, the apostle of love, but from Paul, the apostle of faith, and the logical and eloquent expounder of Christian theology.

While the word of God thus magnifies the duties of humanity and charity, he is now forcing the subject upon the attention of the people of this land by his fearful judgments and his wonder-working providence. The salvation of our country in this solemn crisis of American history is probably suspended on the question whether the American people, and even the American churches, are willing to recognize in every one of those lowly and oppressed human beings, who have been so long crying in vain for deliverance, a man and a brother. They *are* men. They *are* our brethren. They are the brethren of the Lord Jesus Christ. Will we as a nation, will we as Christian churches, own and treat

them as such? or will we let the spirit of aristocracy and caste, the spirit of pride and prejudice, nay, we must call it by the right name, the spirit of hatred to an oppressed race, prevail, and thrust them back into slavery, or thrust them down into a condition little better than slavery, when Christ is pleading, in almost bodily presence, for the rights and liberties of his brethren, and when God, as with an audible voice and the plagues of Egypt, is saying to us: "Let my people go." This is the vital question. All others are accidents and trifles, when compared with this. Oh how much we need a revival of the religion of charity, fraternity, and universal love; of the religion of Christ, as he taught it by his own lips and lived it in his own blessed life, through the length and breadth of our land, now tost as with a tempest and flowing with blood! "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," is the first and great commandment; but the second is like unto it: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "This ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone."

Closely allied to this is the question, whether we give due prominence to the human side of the character, the human nature in the person, of Christ. It was this side, as we have seen, which he himself made prominent, by calling himself so frequently and so emphatically "the Son of Man." And, as we review the ideas which are involved in that chosen appellation, we cannot but feel that there are in his human nature the elements of the greatest moral power. The power of sympathy with men of all classes; the power of universal genius and universal love; the power of example, perfect and yet human; the power of representative man; the power of world-wide philanthropy — these have always been the ruling and enduring powers in human history. What elements of moral power to move and win, to bless and save mankind, centre, then, in "the Son of Man" — in the human nature of him who is the perfect pattern of mankind, the representative of his race, and the embodiment of humanity. This is the moral power by which his teachings

and example *have* taken hold of men of all ranks and classes in every age and nation where his name is known, and through which his religion is advancing with steady and irresistible progress to be the religion of the world. And in these same elements of moral power, so wonderfully adapted to the nature and necessities of man, we see a pledge of the final and universal triumph of the religion of Christ. It is demonstrably a religion from God. But it is no less manifestly a religion for men — for *all* men of all ages and nations — and it will certainly prevail. Of course, we see in the progress of Christianity, and in the very perfection of the human nature of Christ, evidence of something supernatural and superhuman. But there is power, great power — power which has not been fully developed; power which has scarcely yet begun to be applied in the human elements themselves; and the perfection and the power of these human elements is the very channel through which the divine comes in contact with the hearts of men, touches their sympathies, moves their wills, and transforms their lives. This is one grand design, if it is not the chief purpose, of the incarnation; and to overlook it is to defeat the end of that "great mystery of godliness."

It may be that the Catholic church, and some of the Reformed churches, make too much of the human nature of Christ. Doubtless they misrepresent it in the doctrine of transubstantiation, and of the real presence of the very body and blood of Christ in the sacrament of the supper. We do not believe in the omnipresence or omnipotence of the human nature of Christ. We can hardly accept the doctrine of an "objective grace and power in the sacrament, independent of the moral and spiritual character of the communicant."[1] But there is in the humanity of Christ a kind of *moral* omnipresence and omnipotence which it is not

[1] See the very able Article on "The German Reformed Church," Bib. Sac., Jan. 1863. The doctrine of the Sacrament and of the Church in this Article we cannot but regard as extravagant and transcendental, too "mystical" to be embraced, or even comprehended, by the common mind. At the same time there

easy to exaggerate. Regeneration, sanctification, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting — all that deserves the name of life for the individual or the race, to the body or the soul, in time and in eternity — comes to men through the body and blood of Jesus Christ. Is not all this, and more than this, taught in those significant words of our Lord which we have already cited, but which we can hardly repeat too often; for the Master repeats them in various forms, and with all possible emphasis: "Verily, verily I say unto you, except ye eat of the flesh of the *Son of Man* and drink his blood, ye have *no life* in you. Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day. For my flesh is meat, indeed, and my blood is drink, indeed. He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me" (John vi. 53–57). These words are not to be limited to the sacrament of the supper. They doubtless have a far wider application—to the entire person and life of "the Son of Man." They are not to be taken in any material or even "mystical" sense; but, interpreted in their obvious *moral* and spiritual significance, "they are spirit and they are life. Life can come to men dead in trespasses and sins only through the life of Christ; manhood, only by union with his humanity, and thus with his divinity.

3. In conclusion, we cannot but be impressed with the sacredness of that common humanity which was assumed by our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, which was impersonated in the Son of Man, and is still represented by him, though he now sits on the throne of the universe. How dare we — how can any one who has any belief in the divine-human personality of Christ — have the hardihood to injure or neglect any human being, when every human being, however lowly

is important truth in that direction, which the ministers and churches of New England might well seek and discover without much danger of imbibing the Mercersburg philosophy.

or degraded, stands in such sacred relations to so exalted a personage! Enslave a *man!* Buy and sell a *man* as if he were no better than a sheep; beat him with a cruelty which you would not inflict upon an ox or an ass; hunt him down with bloodhounds and shoot him with as much indifference as you would a wild beast! Despise a *man* because he is poor, or of low caste, or has a skin not colored like your own! Neglect a *man* when he is in sorrow and suffering, and let him die neglected and uncared for when he is sick! It is neglect and contempt of the Son of Man; a denial of the fundamental truth of his religion; an indignity to his sacred person. Every blow thus struck at the meanest member of the human family falls, as it were, upon his own blessed body. And when you stand before him in judgment, he will remember and recompense every wrong done to his brethren as a wrong done to himself, saying: "*I* was hungry and ye gave me no meat; *I* was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink; *I* was a stranger and ye took me not in; naked and ye clothed me not; sick and in prison, and ye visited me not."

In Christ as the Son of Man we see what man was made to be, and what, by reconciliation and union with God, he is capable of becoming — the true nobility of man's unfallen nature, and the exalted dignity and glory of humanity, as it will be when it is redeemed and regenerated. Christ represents the unity of the race — its *solidarity*, as philosopers are fond of saying in their speculations; its universal brotherhood, as it is revealed in the scriptures and as the Christian believes it will actually exist in the latter days, when every man will see in every other man a brother, and do to others, in some measure, at least, as he would that they should do to him, and the golden rule shall be the law of individuals, families, and nations; in one word, its regenerated and perfected manhood, when the ideal of humanity, as it is exhibited in the person and the life of Jesus, shall be realized so far, at least, on earth that it shall be a pledge and earnest of a perfect realization in heaven. And as in the

divine beauty of Christ's humiliation we see an image of man's proper rank and intended character on earth — of man like God and earth like heaven, — so in the divine glory of his exaltation we see at once the means and the security for the ultimate accomplishment of that high destiny. The Son of Man — humanity personified — sits at the right hand of the Almighty Father, and all power in heaven and on earth is given into his hands. And he is crowned with glory and honor as a sign and pledge of the future glory and honor of his race — not indeed of every individual in it, for some, alas! persist in rejecting the Son as well as the Father — but, we must believe, a sign and seal, a pledge and earnest, of the future elevation and final salvation of the great majority of the entire human family. Let, then, all who love their species, rejoice in the Son of Man as their sympathizing and almighty Redeemer, and await with undoubting confidence the day of redemption; but let all the incorrigible enemies of God and man tremble; for he comes, the Son of Man and the Son of God, to avenge the wrongs done to both. And if there is anything more dreadful than the wrath of a holy God, it will be the righteous indignation of the neglected and despised Son of Man — neglected in his own person and despised in the person of his poorer brethren — when he comes in his own glory and in the glory of his Father to judge the assembled nations.

ARTICLE III.

MARKS OF THE SUPERNATURAL IN GOD'S PROMISE TO ABRAHAM.

BY SAMUEL HARRIS, D.D., PROFESSOR IN BANGOR THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE controversy of Rationalism is not with Christianity, but with Theism. The denial of the possibility of the miraculous is its essential doctrine and the source of its vitality and strength. But miracles are possible if there is a personal God. Positivism or Pantheism are the only positions in which the denier of the possibility of miracles can make a stand.

Christianity is essentially miraculous. It implies primarily a supernatural, divine action in the redemption of fallen man; and, secondarily, a supernatural revelation by that action. The whole conception involves the miraculous — the creation, the fall, the primitive promise, the call of Abraham, the covenant with the chosen people, the preparatory and prophetic dealings of God with that people, the coming of the Messiah, "the Word made flesh," his resurrection and ascension, the outpouring of the Spirit, the second coming of Christ, the final judgment. Whether true or false, this is Christianity. The denial of the supernatural is the denial of Christianity.

Christianity is willing to appear and submit her claims to decision in the court of reason. The question to be submitted is: Is this scheme of redemption an adequate solution of the great problem of human nature, history, and destiny? Is there in man a need of redemption and a demand for it? Is the scheme theoretically consistent and reasonable, and does it commend itself to the reason as adequate, if historically true, to solve the world-problem? Was it from the beginning so incorporated into human history, has it in its late influences so wrought itself into

human history, as to commend itself to reason as a historical verity?

But if this question is to be decided in the court of reason, it must be Christianity itself that appears before the tribunal, and not a makeshift bearing its name, but divested of all that constitutes its distinctive character, grandeur, vitality, and power. The denial of the possibility of miracles is the denial of the possibility of Christianity. It is giving judgment before the question is opened for argument. It is not arguing the question with Christianity in the court of reason; it is shutting Christianity out of court. Deny the miraculous and nothing is left in the Bible but the debris of myths and legends, and the fragments and crumbling ruins of a history which, even so far as it may be true, is no longer significant or important. Then the question is triumphantly propounded: Does this insignificant residuum solve the great problem of human history and destiny? What if it does not? It is not Christianity. The plea of Christianity has not even been heard.

The question of the truth of Christianity is debatable, then, only with a theist who admits the possibility of miracles. Then the conception of Christianity appears in all its grandeur, as a supernatural, redemptive action of God, traversing the history of man from his creation to the judgment; and the question is fairly before us: Does this conception adequately solve the problem of human history and destiny? Has it inwrought itself into history so as to prove its historical verity?

It is, therefore, fruitless to debate the evidences of Christianity with a rationalist who denies the possibility of miracles. Let him be shut up to his controversy with the theist; driven back to his legitimate position either in positivism or pantheism.

For similar reasons rationalism has no right to criticise or interpret the Bible. The denial of the possibility of miracles necessitates beforehand that criticism be destructive and interpretation false. The Bible is a record, whether

true or false, of a grand series of supernatural, divine actions in the redemption of fallen man. Though the work of many authors, in many centuries, this grand conception dominates in all, is steadily and consistently unfolded more and more clearly, and advanced by accompanying historical events to completeness, and gives to the series of books a unity which indicates the control of one superintending mind. The denial of the supernatural necessitates in criticism the assumption that the books are false in their substance. That denial makes a right interpretation impossible; for the Bible is a story of the supernatural; and its actual meaning, whether true or false, can be ascertained only by recognizing the supernatural. Deny it, and the meaning of every part of the book changes — the essential and vital significance is gone. The grand panorama of redemption vanishes. Nothing is left but a blinding drizzle of myth and legend over a dreary waste of uncertain and valueless stories in which float — "rari nantes in gurgite vasto" — a few fine moral sentiments, like those found in the literature of every nation. It is absurd to criticise or interpret the Bible from this point of a view. If a man enters St. Peter's church with the assumption that it is a private dwelling-house, his criticism must pronounce the plan and construction faulty, and his interpretation must miss the significance of every part. Not less absurd the attempt of Strauss to criticise and interpret the Bible on the assumption that the supernatural is impossible.

These principles are important in the interpretation of God's promise to Abraham. If a miracle is impossible, then God never made the promise, the account of it is peremptorily set aside as a myth, and the whole story at once takes its place among the obscure beginnings of history as a tradition respecting the origin of a nomadic tribe which afterwards established itself as an agricultural people in the small province of Palestine. When this position is frankly acknowledged and held with logical consistency, the scepticism is comparatively harmless. But rationalism extends

its poison beyond the circle of minds that accept its legitimate conclusions. The miasma debilitates many who are not prostrated with the plague. Many in the churches are reluctant to acknowledge in the covenant with Abraham more than the founding of a nation and the promise of secular advantages. Under the same influence they will not see in any scriptural event a reference to the spiritual, if it is possible to extract from it a meaning which refers it to the temporal. They find it difficult to discover in the Old Testament any Messiah or Messianic kingdom; and we have the strange contrast of Jews finding the Old Testament full of the Christ, and Christians who find it Christless. Rationalism and naturalism have swept over modern thought like a sandstorm of the desert, not only overwhelming those in the centre of its path, but blinding and bewildering those that are far off.

The difficulty arises from forgetting the unity of the scriptures as recording the grand series of divine actions in redemption. Every part of scripture is included under this unity and derives its significance from it. As a segment of the human body shows in its dissevered ligaments, fibres, and vessels its connection on every side with the body, and is utterly unintelligible except as this connection is recognized, every part of scripture shows its connection with the organic whole, and is meaningless aside from that connection. As the acorn can be understood only when it is known as the seed and therefore the prophecy of an oak; as the history of the oak can be understood only when the tree is known to have grown from an acorn; the Old Testament can be understood only when it is known to be the germ and prophecy of the New; and the history of the New Testament is intelligible only as we find its germ in the Old. And as the sight of the growing oak enlarges the knowledge of the acorn, even to those who had theoretically understood its nature as a germ, the coming of Christ must give a deeper and clearer understanding of the Old Testament, even to those who had understood its prophetic and pre-

paratory character. Overlooking this unity of redemption, the interpretation of single passages of scripture becomes impossible. The structure is crumbled into a shapeless heap, and the several parts become undistinguishable and meaningless rubbish. The denier of the supernatural, in attempting to interpret the Bible, necessarily acts over again the bookish want of common sense, which has been ridiculed from the beginning of literature, and shows a brick as a sample of the house.

When it is admitted that the scriptures have this unity in the work of redemption, it becomes natural, and even necessary, to interpret the promise to Abraham as referring to the blessings to come to mankind through redemption. On this supposition, it is evident that the Bible teaches that redemption was to be brought into human history by the agency of a chosen people, and that the Jews were that people. It is, then, the obvious and necessary interpretation of the call of Abraham that it was the call of that chosen people, and that the covenant with him had reference to their agency in the great scheme of redemption. On this supposition, the questions of criticism respecting the author and composition of Genesis become of minor consequence. If God was in Christ the Redeemer of the world by supernatural action, then it was through the line of Jewish history that the supernatural agency took its preparatory course; and in their very origin God must have destined the Jewish people to this service. On this supposition, even the facts of their history, which remain fixed under the most destructive criticism, could receive no other interpretation. If not so interpreted, the incarnation and redemption of Christ must be denied. Accordingly Colenso, who in his first book on the Pentateuch writes as if he were still retaining the supernatural in the New Testament, appears in his second part to have seen the impossibility of resolving the Old Testament into myths and holding the New Testament as history, and so abandons both.

And, further, if the supernatural work of redemption is admitted, the facts of the previous history of the race compel us to interpret this promise as referring to redemption; for then we must admit the fact of personal revelations of God in Eden, and, subsequently, the fall; the promise of deliverance through the agency of the woman's seed; the beginning of the fulfilment of that promise in the existence of a chosen people, in the line of Seth, Enoch, Noah, and Shem; and in God's personal revelations to them. These great facts Abraham must have known. In the light of these facts he must have understood his call, and the promise of blessing to all mankind through his seed, as a renewal, enlargement, and further definition of the primitive promise, and as a designation of his posterity as the chosen seed of the woman, through whose agency God was to bring redemption. Even if the promise had made no mention of the blessings of redemption, the mere fact that God had called Abraham's seed to be his peculiar people necessitates this significance. And the case is not altered, even if Abraham as yet had no knowledge of a personal Messiah, but only of redemption to be wrought by God through the agency of a chosen seed.

It should be added that the subsequent history of the Israelites necessitates the same interpretation. It assumes that they are God's covenant people. All their literature teaches the same. Their government is theocratic. Their prophets, with ever-increasing distinctness predict that the kingdom is to be perpetuated by the Anointed One, the Son of David, who is to make it a spiritual kingdom of righteousness and peace, and under whose reign the kingdom is to become universal, and the chosen people is to possess the world. The covenant with Abraham is the key to the entire history and literature of the Old Testament. If we had no historical record of it, we should be obliged to assume that at some time, in some form, God had chosen this people, and entered into covenant with them.

Whoever, therefore, admits the conception of a redemp-

tion supernaturally wrought is bound by all these reasons, and in accordance with the laws of interpretation, to explain the call of Abraham and the covenant with him as referring to it. With one who denies the supernatural it is idle to argue the question of interpretation; since he begins with the assumption that the fundamental conception which the Jewish history and literature develops is an absurdity.

But if the interpretation is correct which regards the call of Abraham as one in the series of actions by which God redeems men from sin, still we should expect that in the call and the promise, the coming of a people from his loins and the divine care of them as a people would be most conspicuous, and that provision would be promised for a country and a temporal career. While the very fact of calling a people to serve God and to be the depository of his revelations and the vehicle of conveying his redemptive energy implies a principal reference to redemption, we should expect that the explicit mention of this reference would be general and indefinite; because in our conception of God's supernatural work, it is primarily a divine action, and secondarily a divine revelation; and the revelation is made by the action. When, in its fitting time, God performs any act in the great series of redemptive actions, it is the act itself that reveals him. He performs the act, and leaves it to tell its own story, to make its own revelation. He does not stop to comment or explain. He unrolls the panorama, but gives no lecture on it. The great fact that God called Abraham, and entered into covenant with him to make his posterity God's chosen people, stands there, in its place in the world's history, a revelation of God. The subsequent history of Israel and the ultimate coming of Christ are the sufficient commentary.

We proceed to notice some of those characteristics of the promise to Abraham which evince its divine origin:

I. It is a promise of blessedness to man. The history of man, as given in the book of Genesis, opens with the

blessing of God pronounced on him. After man had fallen, in the midst of the condemnation, the divine blessing reappears in the promise of deliverance from the evils into which he had plunged himself, and of victory over the power that had ruined him. The same is implied in God's intercourse with those that served him before Abraham's day, which is sketched in the slightest manner, and may be regarded as prefatory to the principal history, beginning with the call of Abraham. In this call the blessing is distinctly reannounced. In the first record of the call we find, in the most condensed form, the call to Abraham to separate himself from all others to serve God, the promise that he should become a great people, the covenant that God would be the God of that people, and the promise that through him, as the father of this covenant people, all the families of the earth should be blessed (Gen. xii. 1–3). It was renewed both to Isaac and to Jacob. It was unfolded with increasing clearness in the Psalms: "The mountains shall bring peace to the people, and the little hills by righteousness. He shall come down like rain upon the mown grass, as showers that water the earth. In his days shall the righteous flourish, and abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth." By the prophets it is presented in stronger light; they linger on it with affectionate delight, and accumulate all the beautiful things of the earth to set forth its glory. In the New Testament, amid the songs of enraptured angels, it bursts like sunlight over all the earth; "good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people." The Bible, from beginning to end, is the development of this grand idea of blessing from God to sinful man through redemption. It lies here in the beginning of the history, in the promise to Abraham, the key to the entire Bible and to all God's action in man's redemption; the keynote of that divine harmony of many parts which sweeps through all human history, and swells triumphant in the music of heaven.

It is to be observed that the Old Testament does not

present this idea as a poetical fancy to be admired and forgotten, but as an end to be practically realized — an end that is dominant in God's action, and to the realization of which all whom he chooses as his servants are in that very election consecrated. In calling Abraham he elects the Israelitish people as the human agency which he will employ in realizing this end; as his own chosen people, set apart and consecrated to this service; a nation founded with the design to bless mankind — this is the very goal of its ambition, the highest glory held out to its founder, the grand motive inspiring the national life. Incorporated into the very charter and covenant of the national existence is the law of love. And the fact is pregnant with the meaning that whoever are chosen by God as his people are thereby consecrated to the work of securing to men the blessings of redemption. They are to accept this as the chief end of their lives, and devote their entire resources and energies to its realization.

This alone lifts the Old Testament above all heathen literature, and stamps it as divine. This conception of blessing to the world as the key to God's action and an end to which human life and endeavor are to be consecrated, is foreign to the heathen mind. The poetical fancies of a returning golden age, were fancies only, and did not even suggest the thought of an endeavor to realize them. If mythology fabled that a city or state was founded under the patronage of a god, the promise was only that it should conquer and possess other cities and states, never that it should bless them. Philosophy gave no definite statement of the great idea, and much more failed to propose it as an end to be realized by God's action and to command man's service, or to propose any scheme by which its realization is to be secured. Ackermann has an elaborate argument to prove that Plato had caught the idea of salvation for mankind; but his argument leaves the mind in doubt; while the very necessity of such an argument proves that, at the most, the most advanced minds of the heathen nations

had but a glimpse of the idea, and did not present it as a conception exerting a practical power.

The development of this idea in the Old Testament sets those writings apart from all heathen literature, and stamps them as divine. And the force of the argument is enhanced by the fact that the idea is gradually developed in, and incorporated into, the history and literature of the nation. Thus the evidence of divinity in it is raised above the niceties of criticism, and becomes as indubitable as the history and literature of the nation. The same argument is still more convincing when applied to the whole Bible, in which the New Testament appears as the complete development of the Old.

De Tocqueville notices, as a peculiarity of a democratic civilization, the prevalence and practical power of faith in human progress and perfectibility. The belief has been erroneous as to the nature of the perfection of human society, and the means of attaining it; just as the Jewish expectation of the Messiah had become erroneous; but, like that, there is in it a germ of divine truth. It is, at the root, a Christian idea. The promise, to which that expectation unconsciously looks, and by which it was originated in the life of humanity, came down from heaven. In the ages when human culture and history as yet gave elsewhere no suggestion of this quickening thought, it breathes through all the literature of the Israelites, and lives in all their history. There breathes, as a divine prophecy and promise, as a human expectation and hope, the idea which is the inspiration of modern thought, the life and power of modern progress.

II. The whole human family is to be the recipient of blessings through Abraham's posterity. "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed."

To the Greek and the Roman the largest object of love and service was his city, or, at the most, his country. He could be a patriot, but not a philanthropist. The idea of the human race as a whole had scarcely been formed in his

mind; it was not a force in the civilization of his times. He was a stranger to those mighty ideas — the one family of man; universal brotherhood; the welfare of that family definitely proposed to every mind, as an object to be accomplished; the divine power entering human history in redemption, and thus consecrating humanity; the universal obligation to consecrate life, in the spirit of self-sacrifice, to the service of God in the service of man — these great ideas are not in the literature of Greece and Rome. Nor can you find the derived thoughts, so familiar to the modern mind — the worth of man; the sacredness and universality of human rights; missions; reformations; human progress; the conversion of the world. Whatever of thought, or action, or institution, looks to the welfare of mankind as a whole, to the rights of man, as man (not as a subject or citizen), to the elevation and renovation of humanity, is wanting.

But in the opening of Genesis, the human race is presented as one family, and a foundation is thus laid for all the grand and quickening ideas which flow from this conception. The power of this unity of man as one family, having a common relation to God, their maker, is enhanced by their common fall, and their common participation in the ruin of sin, the condemnation of God, and the hope of deliverance through a human seed. What a unity of the human kind here, which makes even the wickedness of a man a reason of tenderness towards him from his fellow-men, who are also fellow-sinners, and comprehends even the enmities of men within its all-embracing community of interest. Why does this old book open with this grand conception to which heathen culture never attained?

For the full force of this argument, it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which the promise to Abraham was made. It was nineteen centuries before human cultivation began anywhere to look beyond the limits of national exclusiveness; it was when men were dispersing themselves through the world; when families

and clans held their little territories, or roamed nomadic over the unoccupied earth, the germs of nations that were to be; it was when history herself was not yet born,[1] and even Egypt is dimly seen as a centre of national life and unity. Then was announced this promise of a blessing for all mankind. It was announced as a prophecy to be fulfilled in the future; as the life-principle of a nation, and the object to be realized in its history; as the key to the plan of God's providence in all the history of the world. This great idea of the human family, one in origin, one in a common fall, and by a common redemption, fills the Bible. It is the Bible. Prophecies and doctrines, commands and promises, ritual and types, providential acts and miraculous interventions, are all the mighty growth of this one seed-thought.

III. The promise recognizes the idea of a universal religion.

Any explanation, which admits that the call of Abraham was supernatural, requires this admission; for then the essential conception of the call must be, that God selects Abraham's posterity as the depository of the knowledge of himself, and the agency through which he is to bring redemption to the world. The same is apparent in the various inspired records of this covenant.

To the minds of modern Christians the idea of a universal religion has lost its strangeness. They understand that religion must be the same to an American, or a Chinese, or a Hawaiian. But it was not familiar to the ancient mind; it was even rejected as impossible. It was urged as an argument against Christianity, that it claimed to be a universal religion. Says Celsus: "He must be a fool who can believe that Greeks and barbarians, in Asia, Europe, and Lybia — all nations to the end of the earth — can unite in one and the same religion."

The history of the Israelites exemplifies the difficulty felt by the ancients in receiving this idea, which the Bible has

[1] "History herself was born on that night when Moses led forth his countrymen from the land of Goshen." — Bunsen.

made so familiar to us. They were slow to believe that Jehovah was the one and only God. The idolatry into which they were continually falling, was not the renunciation of Jehovah, as a god, or as the god of their nation, but it was falling back to the common belief of the times, that he was only a god of that nation, and that other nations had gods as really divine as he. Hence the reiterated proclamation: "I am Jehovah; there is no God else. Thou shalt have no other Gods before me." It was not till the captivity that the lesson was thoroughly learned.

But this idea of a universal religion in the worship of one God, in the participation in a common redemption, is the ground of the possibility of a community of human interests, and of all efforts for man's spiritual salvation, or even for a universal and homogeneous social progress.

Polytheism is essentially divisive. Each nation has its peculiar gods, embittered against the gods of other nations with all the enmities of the nations themselves. The gods of the hills fight against the gods of the valleys. Thus there is no common ground of unity; no common and supreme God; no common and authoritative law of right and wrong; no common standard of appeal; no common idea of sin, or of salvation; no common faith, nor hope, nor spiritual experience. The cleavage which divides the nations, cuts down through the deepest foundations of common thought, feeling, and interest, and leaves them more hopelessly dissevered than ships driven asunder on the ocean; for it cleaves the ocean itself, and leaves no common element in which they separate.

This foundation of a universal religion and a common redemption must be laid in human thought before it is possible for men even to have the idea of a permanent community of interest among all nations. There may be temporary alliances, arising from a temporary coincidence of interest, to be changed to enmity when that temporary coincidence ceases; but there is no basis of common progress, character, interest, and hope, the same under all

outward changes. This foundation must be laid in human thought before it is possible even to have the idea of the conversion of the world, of missions, of philanthropy, of popular progress, of the education and improvement of mankind.

But this idea of a universal religion is implied in the promise to Abraham, and is declared with ever-increasing clearness in the Psalms and the Prophecies.

IV. This blessing to mankind through a common redemption and a universal religion is to be realized through the agency of a people chosen by God, and, by covenant, made his peculiar people.

Here is an apparent incongruity. The promise is of universal blessing; a universal religion; a redemption to bless mankind. But the promise is made to a single people; it includes within itself a call and a command to that people to separate themselves from all others, and a covenant of God with them which distinguishes them from all others as his own.

This incongruity becomes more conspicuous in the subsequent history. Moses established stringent and minute regulations to insure the separateness of the Israelites. They were forbidden to round the corners of their beards, and were required, by many similar rules extending to the minutiae of life, to make themselves unlike other people, and to prevent the contamination of associating with them. By bloody wars they took the land of Canaan, seeming to be the enemies, rather than the benefactors, of mankind. The spirit of exclusiveness grew into their national life, and became a Pharisaism.

On the other hand, all the literature of this people is vital with the promise of universal blessing — of a Redeemer and a religion for all mankind. In the thinking of all the leading minds of the nation this great idea grows broader and clearer as the actual separation of the people becomes more distinct. In the Psalms and the Prophecies it is uttered in language at once the most explicit and sublime: "The wilderness

and the solitary place shall be glad for them, and the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose: for as the earth bringeth forth her bud, and as the garden causeth the things which are sown in it to burst forth, so the Lord will cause righteousness and praise to spring forth before all nations. The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."

But this seeming contradiction is itself a proof of the divine origin of the promise and its development in the Israelitish writings.

1. It shows that there is nothing in the life and institutions of that people which can adequately account for it.

The literature of a people is the utterance of its inmost heart and life; but the institutions of the Jews were designed to separate them from other nations. They imbibed the spirit of their institutions, rather than the spirit of the universal promise; and exclusiveness penetrated and characterized the national life. How is it to be accounted for, that this promise appears at the beginning of their history, and breathes its broad, generous, hopeful spirit through all their literature? We have seen that the idea is wanting in heathen literature for two thousand years after the call of Abraham, and that it was difficult to be received, was even regarded as absurd, when definitely propounded by Christianity. Now we see that the outward institutions and history of the Jews themselves were in seeming antagonism to the idea, and could not originate it. How can its existence, under such circumstances, be accounted for, except as an inspiration from God.

Especially is this difficulty insuperable to those who accept the low views of the Israelitish character common to sceptics. For example, Goethe says the Israelites had never been good for much, as their own judges and prophets were always accusing them; that they had few virtues, and more faults than any other people. The single merit of toughness is all that he allows them.[1] But how, on any

[1] Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre, Book II. Chap. II.

naturalistic or rationalistic principles, can the production of such a literature from such a people be accounted for? How is it explained that the prophecy of blessings to all mankind, through a universal religion, is declared at the origin of the national existence, and is developed to greater distinctness in all its literature and history? It avails nothing to say that there was a higher life flowing within the Israelitish history, like blood within a body, and that the literature, which announces the universal blessing, is the utterance of this inward life. This is true, as the New Testament teaches: "They are not all Israel, which are of Israel; neither because they are the seed of Abraham, are they all children: for he is not a Jew which is one outwardly; but he is a Jew which is one inwardly." But this removes no difficulty for the sceptic; since it is only admitting that the Jewish people is in some sense an inspired people, and that the inmost heart of their history is the supernatural.

2. The seeming contradiction shows in the promise a reach of thought into the future which could not have been less than divine.

It implies a divine foresight. Nearly two thousand years were to pass before this great thought would become a working power in the civilization of the nations; yet it is boldly announced, not as a beautiful fancy, but as a prophecy and a promise of what God's action was to be. And during the long centuries following, when, over all the earth, no sign of its fulfilment appears, psalmists and prophets persistently announce the great idea and predict its sure fulfilment. When the farmer in autumn casts seed into his field, he buries it in entire isolation; but he does it with a knowledge of the vital powers of the seed, and with the foresight that it will lie protected in its hiding-place till the winter is over, and with the coming spring will shoot up and cover the field with verdure. So this seed-thought must have been deposited in the Jewish mind with the knowledge of its divine power, and the foresight that, protected during the wintry ages, it would in due time

come forth and bless the world. The very fact of burying the seed proves that he who buried it knew its vital power, and buried it that it might grow.

It evinces not only foresight of the fact, but also plan and preparation for its accomplishment. The Jewish nation is selected to preserve the truth on the earth, till the time when it should be given to all nations by Christ, as a light is enclosed in a lantern to protect it from the wind, till it can be safely uncovered within the house. The seed-thought is deposited in the roughness of Jewish institutions, as nature deposits a chestnut in a burr, to protect it until grown. The Israelites were a people dedicated to the future. Prophecy and promise breathed through all their writings. The expectation of the Messiah and of his kingdom at last penetrated all their thinking, and became the distinctive characteristic of their national and religious life.

3. The separation of the Israelites, as God's chosen people, from the world, is only the application, in a peculiar form, of a principle which is universal.

Christianity is a power of separation, as really as Judaism was. It proclaims: "Come out from among them, and be ye separate, saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will receive you, and will be a Father unto you, and ye shall be my sons and daughters, saith the Lord Almighty." It is even a power of antagonism: "I came not to send peace, but a sword." Allegiance to truth must separate from allegiance to error; allegiance to God must separate from ungodliness, and must often occasion sharp antagonism. Christianity is a power of division before it is a power of harmonizing or uniting. It divides, that it may unite. It becomes universal only by being separate. It separates, that it may be universal. God's chosen people is separated from the world to draw the world to itself, until mankind, yielding to the attraction, become God's people. The conception is not of mere universality, but of that which is distinctively Christian made universal.

Hence, in history, every special forth-putting of the divine

energy in redemption has been a notable power of separation. Not only did the call of Abraham separate him and his Israelitish posterity, but when the apostles preached Christianity the church of Christ became as really separate, though the separation differed in its outward form. The preaching of Luther separated the Protestant churches. The Puritans and the Methodists became a separate people. When a missionary preaches Christ to the heathen, the converts are by their conversion separated from the heathen mass. Religion can advance towards universal acceptance only by separation. The separation of the Israelites, therefore, is only the application, in a peculiar form, of a principle which is universal.

Accordingly God always carries on his cause by the agency of a chosen people. The use of such an agency belongs to every part of the administration of divine grace. It belongs to the fundamental conception of the spiritual kingdom growing without observation — in the world, but not of it.

The parallel may be carried even further. The Israelites were a race descended from Jacob, and as such, a nation. This conception is the more prominent in their history. Yet within the nation was always the spiritual seed — in the greatest corruption, seven thousand who had not bowed to Baal. It was this spiritual seed which constituted the true Israel; this, whose hidden life found utterance in the spiritual sentiments and expectations uttered in psalm and prophecy; this, which gave the true significance and value to the Israelitish history; this, the chit within the corn, embodying all the life of the kernel, and shooting up, while the rest of the kernel decayed, into a new and glorious life. On the other hand, in Christianity, the spiritual seed, existing as a spiritual church scattered among all nations, is first and prominent. Yet those nations are the most efficient in promoting human progress whose civilization is the most thoroughly penetrated and vitalized by this spiritual life and truth. The immense empires of China and

India are of no account in the history of human progress. We call them unhistorical. The English-speaking race, the most thoroughly Christianized of all races, is more efficient in promoting human progress than any other race. Even in discoveries in science and inventions in art, which are working such wonders for human welfare in modern times, it is the most thoroughly Christianized nations which have accomplished the most. Heathen and Mohammedan nations contribute nothing. It may be a fulfilment of the original promise that man should subdue and rule the earth. The promise to the human race, as such, was forfeited in the fall. It was renewed to God's covenant people. It is continually reiterated that they shall inherit the earth. Do we not see its fulfilment in this fact, that heathen and Mohammedan nations discover and invent nothing; that the more thoroughly Christianized a nation is, the more it contributes to the wonders of modern discovery and invention, by which the powers of nature are subdued to man's service, and man takes possession of the earth, and inherits it? Thus, while in Christianity the spiritual life and church are foremost in thought, the very nations and races in which this life is mighty become God's chosen agents in advancing human welfare; and in this sense God is carrying on his work, now as in ancient times, not by all nations, but by a chosen nation, or at most by a few chosen nations.

4. The Israelitish people was a church in covenant with God, to which was intrusted the preservation and propagation of the true religion. They were thus, like Christians, "stewards of the manifold grace of God." Missions to other nations were not enjoined; for the world was not yet ready for them. God did, however, scatter them among all nations, carrying with them the knowledge of Jehovah, and of the Messiah to come. And the principle of missionary labor was established in the beginning; that they who have the knowledge of God and redemption, have it intrusted to them as stewards to preserve and propagate it. Two methods of fulfilling this stewardship were especially en-

joined on the Israelites; the consecration of their children to God, followed by the sedulous and persevering education of them in the true faith, and the conversion to the faith, so far as practicable, of all foreigners with whom they came in contact. It should be observed that this method of preserving and propagating the faith by the consecration and training of children, is in all ages the principal reliance of the church for its own growth wherever Christianity has once been accepted by a people; and it is here declared as fundamental in the first formal institution of the church in the call of Abraham.

Thus the Israelites, though separated from other nations for the preservation of the true religion, were in advance of all contemporary nations as to the spirit and principles of a world-wide religion and philanthropy. In the ages when all other nations were shut up in national exclusiveness, and scarcely had the idea of a human race, much less of one God and one religion and one blessedness for all mankind, the Jews had this grand idea; it was in their literature as the promise and prophecy of God; it was seminal in their national life; it was vital in every generation in the lives of spiritual men and women;[1] and the expectation of its realization in the Messiah gradually became assured and universal, though accompanied with errors.

For all these reasons, the separation of the Israelites is not inconsistent with the universality of the promise, and, instead of invalidating, confirms the argument for its divine and supernatural origin.

[1] See Luke ii. 31, 32.

ARTICLE IV.

THE GIFT OF TONGUES.

BY REV. DAVID GREENE, FORMERLY SECRETARY OF A. B. C. F. M.

To the reader of the New Testament, who desires and aims to get clear and satisfactory views of all which is there recorded respecting the early history of Christianity, few matters probably, present themselves more indistinctly before him, or occasion more perplexity, than what is denominated, in both scriptural and common language, the Gift of Tongues. What was it? On whom and for what purpose was the gift bestowed? In what manner, in what circumstances, and under what limitations, was it exercised? These and many other similar inquiries arise in the mind of the thoughtful reader; and some of them, at least, are not readily answered, so as to put the mind at rest. To all such inquiries it is easy to answer generally, that this gift was an ability miraculously imparted to the apostles, and to some extent to others in the early Christian churches, to speak and teach in languages not vernacular to them, and of which they had not acquired a knowledge in any ordinary method. Perhaps most readers, and not a few who should be students, of the New Testament, are satisfied with such an answer as this; but as the subject is presented by the inspired writers in various aspects, in connection with predictions, narratives, precepts, exhortations, and rebukes, many points are suggested on which the inquiring mind asks for something more specific and definite.

As no important principle in the economy of redemption seems to be involved in this matter, and probably nothing that bears very directly on the duties of the Christian life, at least not in these later ages of the world, we must not expect to find all that light shed upon it, by which the fundamental doctrines and precepts of our religion are rendered luminous.

Still we may, perhaps, be able, and if so, it is desirable, to obtain such views as shall be in harmony with all the facts and statements which the New Testament presents in connection with the subject. Let us, at least, seek to have views as well-defined and consistent as the case admits.

Most commentators on the New Testament have written more or less fully respecting the gift of tongues, proposing various and inconsistent theories for harmonizing the statements and phenomena presented in the several passages relating to it; but as nearly or quite all our knowledge, and the grounds for forming opinions on the subject, must be derived from what the sacred writers have themselves recorded in these passages, and as the language employed presents no special difficulties, mere learning is of little avail for arriving at correct conclusions.

Writers on this subject may be arranged in two classes — those who assert, and those who deny, the miraculous nature of the gift. Among those of the latter class is the learned Eichorn, and others, almost numberless, of the rationalistic commentators of Germany, who, while uniting in rejecting everything supernatural in the phenomena as represented in Acts ii. and 1 Cor. xii. and xiv., disagree much in the hypotheses by which they attempt to account for these phenomena.

Among the writers of the first class, maintaining the miraculous character of the gift of tongues, are Storr, Kuinoel, and Olshausen, with orthodox Germans generally, including the historians Neander and Guericke, with nearly all evangelical commentators in England and the United States.

Before noticing the various and conflicting opinions which have been advocated — and it is not proposed to spend much time upon them — it seems proper to survey, briefly the several passages in the New Testament where this wonderful gift is mentioned, and learn in what aspects and relations the sacred writers present it. It is first spoken of in Mark xvi. 17. The risen Saviour, in his farewell address and commission to his disciples, tells them that

these confirmatory signs shall be witnessed in those who believe: "In my name they shall cast out devils; they *shall speak with new tongues;* they shall take up serpents; and if they shall drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover." Here the gift of tongues is predicted as one of the miraculous manifestations to be witnessed, not in the apostles only, but also in those who should believe their doctrines, and to be exhibited as proofs that those doctrines, divinely accredited, were heartily believed and submitted to. The exact purport and extent and object of this promised endowment should be borne in mind. It was simply a promise to the apostles that they who received their doctrines, and as proof that they had really received them, should be endued with these supernatural gifts. The possession of these gifts might be a sign to the apostles, as teachers, who would naturally look for evidence that their instructions had been effectual; and they might be a sign, also, to the new converts themselves, evincing that they had rightly and savingly believed the Christian doctrines; and still further, they might be a sign to the unbelieving multitudes, that those who embraced these doctrines were thereby brought into a new spiritual state; while to all, the exercise of these promised miraculous powers would evince that the doctrines were from God, and that the preaching and receiving of them were accompanied by a divine power and sanction.

At the same farewell meeting with his disciples, Christ commissioned them to go into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature; at the same time intimating that they were not prepared to enter immediately on this, their great life-work; and therefore bidding them tarry in Jerusalem till they should be "endued with power from on high" (Luke xxiv. 49), or as it is expressed, Acts i. 4, 5, till the fulfilment of the promise of the Father, that they should "be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence."

Taking along with us the predicted miraculous endow-

ments recorded, Mark xvi. 17, Luke xxiv. 49, and Acts i. 4, 5, let us proceed to the record made by the sacred writer respecting this gift of tongues in Acts ii. 4, and onward. But before entering upon the examination of this, a preliminary remark or two may be made.

That the disciples, up to the time of Christ's ascension, had no clear view (if, indeed, they had any notion at all) of their Lord's mission, as our atoning Saviour, or of the method of salvation through faith in him, or of the nature of the kingdom which he was about to set up in the world, and in which they, as founders and pillars, were to bear so prominent a part, seems too obvious to require proof. Their worldly and ambitious hopes, often expressed, and even at their last interview with him; their dulness of apprehension, and their misunderstanding of him when he alluded to his real character and work, and their perplexity in view of his arrest, crucifixion, and resurrection, all show deep, if not total, darkness on these points. And they probably received no additional light previously to the day of pentecost. And the reason, undoubtedly, why they were not bidden to go at once and preach the gospel — to reap in the fields white already to the harvest — was the best of all reasons, that they had not yet learned the message which they were to carry forth — did not themselves understand the doctrines which they were to preach. To be fully qualified for their work they must first take a lesson from the enlightening, sanctifying, inspiring Spirit. This brings us to the scene on the day of pentecost.

As the narrative is not explicit respecting the place, the order, and other particulars of the wonderful manifestations presented to us, conjecture must be resorted to, and all that can be hoped for, is to suggest what may seem probable, or at least possible. A question arises as to the place. It is hardly supposable that these followers of the recently crucified Jesus would have been permitted to occupy any large room of the temple; nor can we suppose this company of Christ's disciples to have been worshipping with the

Jews, the betrayers and murderers of their Lord, as the latter could have no sympathy or fellowship with the former in the deeply interesting matters to which their thoughts and prayers must have been mainly directed; and as spacious halls and addresses to great public assemblies were not as common in those days and in Jerusalem, as they are in our cities in this age, we must not suppose that the apostles and their company had procured a hall capacious enough to accommodate thousands of auditors. Nor would an apartment in the temple, or such a hall, have been sufficiently secluded and quiet for such humble and devout worshippers. This company of disciples were probably, on this day of the Spirit's descent, occupying the same room in which they had for days before been holding their meetings for prayer, and it probably was a room, or house, belonging to some one of their number, capable of accommodating a hundred and twenty persons. It is not necessary to suppose that all the speaking to the multitudes was done there, or that the three thousand or more whom Peter addressed were gathered into any one room. Most of the speaking was probably done in the courts or in the streets about the house, or elsewhere. This must suffice for preliminaries. Let us now look in upon this worshipping assembly.

Teachable and obedient, though sad and perplexed, the apostles and their companions, about a hundred and twenty in all, had been, agreeably to their Lord's command, waiting at Jerusalem for the fulfilment of his promise; in much darkness, no doubt, as to its purport, yet united in heart, and devoutly praying with reference to the great blessing about to be conferred, and the unknown scenes that were about to open upon them. Some presentiment they may have had that the anticipated blessing was drawing near; and perhaps they had continued all night in prayer; at least they were assembled at an early hour for a morning prayer-meeting. The first miraculous manifestations could not have been much later than the first hour of the day, or

sunrise, since we find the whole scene closed, and Peter delivering his address at the third hour, or about the usual time of the Jewish morning service.

At this point the narrative presents three phenomena, obviously all alike the result of miraculous interposition: 1. the sound as of a mighty rushing wind, *φερομένης πνοῆς βιαίας*; 2. the cloven tongues, like as of fire, *διαμεριζόμεναι γλῶσσαι*; 3. their beginning to speak with other tongues, *λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις*, consequent upon their being filled with the Holy Ghost, and proving that they were so. Admitting a miraculous interposition, as we must, if we admit the truth of the narrative, the first two of these manifestations occasion no more perplexity than opening the eyes of the blind, healing a leper, or any other miracle; but to set the facts connected with the third in such a light as to be consistent with each other, and at the same time to seem natural and truth-like, is not a little difficult. As the sacred writer does not stop to harmonize apparent incongruities, or to attempt to give an aspect of verisimilitude to the scene, we can, as already remarked, only conjecture what were the circumstances and what the order and relations of the events. The scene, we are told, opened upon the company suddenly. The unusual sound and the fiery symbol resting on the head of each of them convinced the disciples that the promised Spirit was really then present with them, and the new languages in which they found themselves, almost involuntarily, uttering praises and prayers strengthened this conviction. The Comforter was now, as Christ had promised them, bringing all things to their remembrance. As sudden as thought, all that their Lord had said to them of "the Son of Man being lifted up"; of "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world"; of his coming, "not to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved"; of the "good shepherd laying down his life for the sheep"; of his being "the way, the truth, and the life"; of his "kingdom being not of this world," and the like; also the meaning of the rites, ceremonies, and types, of the Old Testament

scriptures, and of the predictions relating to the Messiah, now suddenly burst upon their divinely illuminated minds with an almost bewildering effulgence. Up to this time even the teachings of their Lord on these subjects had rather perplexed and troubled, than instructed and comforted them; but now, from the Old Testament scriptures and the teaching of Christ, the whole plan of salvation by grace, through faith in his propitiatory death, flashed upon their minds with more than noonday clearness. All darkness and doubt are gone; and we may suppose them exclaiming, from the fulness of their hearts: "Oh the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" This sudden opening of the whole mystery of redemption, these thrilling views of the unspeakable mercy of God in giving his Son to die for sinners, and the compassion of their ascended Lord in yielding himself up to be slain as the Lamb of God to take away the sin of the world, put the whole company into ecstasy. Their emotions were too strong to be controlled, or expressed in any common manner; and under the impulse of the Holy Ghost, and with this new power of language with which they were endued, they gave utterance to their wonder, thankfulness, and joy; probably in the form of prayer, hymns of praise, and of devout ejaculations, extolling "the wonderful works of God," especially the great redemptive work — salvation through the propitiatory death of their divine Master.[1] Their excitement and joy were probably all the greater because that, in their "speaking with other tongues," according to the promise, they had a demonstration that the doctrines which they had been taught were divine, and that they had

[1] This we suppose to be the first time that the gospel method of salvation, through faith in Christ's atoning death, and the wonderful mercy of God in providing such a salvation for sinful and rebellious man, was clearly apprehended by any human mind. It is no wonder, then, that when this whole matter was at once opened, clear and fresh, to the minds of the apostles and their companions, by the illuminating power of the Holy Spirit, they were thrown into ecstasy, and out of their glowing and admiring hearts spake of the wonderful works of God!

themselves now rightly apprehended and savingly believed them. Their hearts, softened by the agency of the Spirit, swelled with the holy emotions which their new views were adapted to awaken, especially with adoring gratitude to the Saviour and compassionate love toward their fellow-men.

The rumor of what was going on in that retired room was soon spread through the city, and multitudes of the pilgrims from abroad, and others who might then have been on their way to their morning worship, were drawn by curiosity to the scene of these strange occurrences. Some entered the house, others gathered around it, while the disciples, full of enthusiasm and boldness, and uncontrollably eager to tell their friends and all whom they could reach the new truths and views and emotions with which their own souls were almost overwhelmed, hastened into the streets, addressing companies as they met them, proclaiming to each, in their own dialect,[1] the new views of scripture history, and prophecy, and rites, and of the marvellous grace of the gospel with which they had just now been inspired. Well might those dead formalists — those mercenary, ceremonial worshippers — be amazed at such religious fervor, such novel and startling truths! To the disciples so near and gracious did God seem to be, and so glorious his redeeming, saving love, that they could not refrain from singing praises, ejaculating their adoration and joy, and speaking of his wonderful works, even in the open street, and to all whom they met. Such strange things, coming

[1] As we cannot understand literally, in its full extent, the phrase "out of every nation under heaven," so we need not suppose that each one of the sixteen or seventeen different nationalities enumerated spake or heard in a language different from all the others. Probably in all the countries mentioned not more than five or six different languages were in common use. Nor need we suppose that each speaker gave utterance to his thoughts, emotions, and views in all these languages at the same time, nor that all the one hundred and twenty, or even all the apostles, one speaking in one language and another in another, spake in all these languages at the same time and in the same place. It would have occasioned a scene of disorder and confusion, which we cannot imagine could have occurred under the direction and agency of the Spirit of God.

from such unlearned and common men, yet spoken to each company in its own language, filled all Jerusalem with amazement. "What do these things mean?" asked the sober-minded. The scornful said: "These men are full of new wine!"

The feelings of the company in the prayer room and wherever the disciples went about the city were, without doubt, most excited and ecstatic, their mental state being too novel and abnormal to permit them so carefully to conform to the conventional proprieties of public assemblies as they might have done when more calm and self-possessed.

We now come to Peter's address to the wondering multitudes. Respecting the place where it was delivered we have no information. That it was in any hall or room capable of admitting the thousands of hearers who appear to have listened to him, is, as before remarked, altogether improbable. He may have spoken from the door or the low roof of the house where the prayer-meeting had been held, while the hearers stood around in the street or the court of the house; or it may have been at some other favorable place in the street or courts of the city, whither the multitudes had resorted. In this connection the only point important to be noticed is, that in vindicating himself and his company from the charge of drunkenness, Peter, for aught that appears in the narrative, used only the common language of Palestine; and yet seems to have been perfectly understood by all his hearers. This would seem to imply that the "devout men out of every nation under heaven then dwelling at Jerusalem," or from the numerous countries enumerated Acts ii. 9–11, were all of Jewish parentage, and had retained their own national tongue; while, at the same time, they understood the languages of the countries where they had severally been born or had sojourned. This supposition, not at all improbable, would reconcile the apparent discrepancy between their recognizing the several languages miraculously spoken at first, and their all intelligently listening to Peter's address afterwards. Nothing would indi-

cate that any wondered at the language and manner of his address, while they were cut to the heart by the pungency with which he pressed home upon their conscience their guilt in crucifying the Messiah, and opened to their minds the new doctrine of pardon and salvation through faith in his atoning death. We have, therefore, reason to believe that there was nothing unusual in this address, except the new, strange, and moving truths which he uttered, and the unwonted fervor, solemnity, and personal application with which they were urged home upon the hearers. As Peter proceeds he assures his hearers, alluding to the miraculous speaking with tongues to which they had been listening, that what they had witnessed was only the fulfilment of Joel's prediction (Joel ii. 28–30), which, to the mind of the speaker, was nearly synonymous with what Christ had foretold (Mark xvi. 17) should happen in the experience of those believing the Christian doctrines. But it is unnecessary to dwell longer on this instance of the gift of tongues, though more peculiar and more encompassed with difficulties than any other.

Let us now pass on to the next recorded manifestation of this gift (Acts x. 44). The scene is at the house of Cornelius, and in the presence of his assembled family and friends, to whom this same Peter had been divinely directed to go and tell them words whereby they might be saved. The company were probably mostly Gentiles. When they had heard from Peter the doctrine of remission of sins through faith in Christ, and their hearts had been opened to receive it, and the Holy Ghost was poured out upon them, they were heard to "speak with tongues and magnify God." Here was the sign predicted (Mark xvi. 17). This proved to Peter and the believing Jews who were with him that to these Gentiles the Holy Ghost was given, as well as to the Jews. When Peter, afterwards, before the fault-finding Jews, defended himself for consorting with and preaching to the Gentiles on this occasion, he states that, when, after having been so commanded by a special message

from God, he addressed them (the Gentiles of Cornelius's household), "the Holy Ghost fell on them as on us (Jews) at the beginning; doubtless referring their minds back to the day of pentecost, and the wonderful descent of the Spirit, and the consequent speaking with tongues on that memorable occasion.

The next instance mentioned of the gift of tongues is in Acts xix. 6, where we find Paul at Ephesus, in company with certain of John's disciples who had received only John's baptism, and had not so much as heard that there was any Holy Ghost. Paul unfolded to them the plan of salvation through the atonement, and also the promise of Christ that his followers should be baptized with the Holy Ghost; and upon their being baptized in the name of Jesus, by Paul's direction, "the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spake with tongues and prophesied." The gift of tongues and prophesying, in this instance, as in those preceding, seems to have been simply a miraculous gift bestowed upon those hearers who, by divine grace, had just been brought into a new and higher religious state, and bestowed simply as a proof to themselves and others that they had undergone this spiritual change.

Probably those converts on whom the apostles laid their hands and they received the Holy Ghost, mentioned Acts viii. 17, received this gift of tongues, though it is not expressly stated that such was the fact; and probably, too, the ability which Simon Magus coveted, and which he proposed to buy of the apostles with money, was the ability to produce similar wonderful manifestations in those on whom he should lay his hands.

We find no further mention of the gift of tongues by the New Testament writers till we come to 1 Cor. xii.; and as the phraseology used by Paul in the twelfth and fourteenth chapters of this Epistle is not uniformly the same in all passages when treating on this gift, it may be well to remark that λαλεῖν γλώσσῃ, λαλεῖν γλώσσαις, λαλεῖν καιναῖς γλώσσαις and λαλεῖν ἑτέραις γλώσσαις seem to be, without doubt,

interchangeable forms of expression, having all a common meaning. But as this gift, as brought before the readers of these chapters, is presented in some aspects that are new and widely different from those in which we have before seen it, the connected facts and circumstances should be looked at.

The whole drift of this first Epistle to the Corinthians shows that shameful disorders and immoral practices, with an ambitious, uncharitable, contentious spirit, prevailed in the Corinthian church. Jewish formalism, Grecian philosophy, and pagan sensuality, connected with errors and unchristian doctrines, seem to have become rampant there during Paul's absence from the city; and to instruct, reprove, and reform the church was obviously his object in writing the epistle. Among the evils which marred the purity, peace, and order of the church was the coveting of such spiritual gifts as attracted admiration, and exalted the possessor above his brethren in the public estimation, and especially this gift of tongues. These ambitious members desired rather to excite wonder, than to instruct; to draw admiration to themselves, than to edify the church; and to show that God had peculiarly honored them, rather than to honor God by a proper use of his gifts. In the course of the apostle's rebukes and exhortations, contained in these chapters, we find such remarks as these: "He that speaketh in an unknown tongue, speaketh not to men, but to God," "edifieth himself," while he who prophesieth, that is, being divinely inspired, instructs and exhorts, "speaketh to men," "edifieth the church." "Better," i.e. more honorable and useful, "is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues, except he interpret, that the church may be edified." "If I come to you speaking with tongues, what shall I profit you?" "And ye," if ye speak not in a language intelligible to your hearers, ye "shall speak into the air," i.e. to no purpose.[1] What, then, is the conclusion?

[1] This very plainly evinces that the gift of tongues, here treated of, was not designed or employed for teaching.

"I will pray in the Spirit" (τῷ πνεύματι), i.e. in such a foreign language as the Spirit may enable me, "and I will pray with my understanding" (τῷ νοΐ), i.e. intelligently and intelligibly, as a wise man, using appropriate means for accomplishing my object. "I will sing with the Spirit" (τῷ πνεύματι), i.e. in such an unknown tongue as the Spirit may enable me, and "I will sing with the understanding" (τῷ νοΐ), i.e. so as to be understood.

In a similar strain the apostle proceeds through the first twenty-one verses of the fourteenth chapter, and then brings out his conclusion: So then "tongues are for a sign" (using the very words of the Lord's prediction, Mark xvi. 17); not for the benefit of believers, but of them that believe not; or, as Robinson paraphrases it, are a miracle by which the presence and power of God were manifested, directly, or through the agency of those whom he sends, not intended for churches of believers, but for unbelieving heathen.

Interpreters have given various renderings to the formula τῷ νοΐ in the fifteenth verse: προσεύξομαι τῷ πνεύματι, προσεύξομαι δὲ καὶ τῷ νοΐ· ψαλλῶ τῷ πνεύματι, κ.τ.λ. These interpreters all educe substantially the same meaning from the formula, and that is the one which the apostle's course of thought and reasoning in the passage and context seem obviously to demand and sanction. The only difficulty is found in making τῷ νοΐ give the meaning which the argument requires. Some arrive at it by giving the adverbial clause τῷ νοΐ a passive, rather than an active, signification, translating it intelligibly, rather than intelligently; making the passage read, I will pray with the spirit, i.e. as influenced by the Spirit, or in a foreign language; and I will pray with my understanding, i.e. so as to be understood, or intelligibly. This interpretation is adopted by Bloomfield; but no passages in the New Testament, or in classic Greek, are referred to, which fully sustain this passive rendering of τῷ νοΐ. In the Septuagint some are found that seem to favor it. Storr, however, judges it to be too clearly con-

trary to the *usus loquendi*, to be admitted. He therefore prefers to meet the difficulty by interpreting νοος by *sapientia*, and τῷ νοΐ by *cum sapientiâ*, or *sapienter*. "A wise man," he remarks, "has regard to the results of what he is doing, and aims at that which is most profitable. The aim of speaking is to be understood, so that the hearers may be benefitted. But to speak to auditors in an unknown tongue is unwise and puerile, and might be esteemed folly or madness." Storr's translation of the passage would therefore be nearly as follows: I will, as miraculously enabled by the Spirit, pray in an unknown tongue; and I will also pray as a wise man, desirous and aiming to profit those who hear me, i.e. so as to be understood. I will also sing under the inspiration of the Spirit, and I will sing to the edification of my hearers.[1]

So in the nineteenth verse Paul writes, "Though I speak with tongues more than you all, yet in the church, I had rather speak five words, διὰ τοῦ νοός μου," (obviously of the same purport as τῷ νοΐ in the fifteenth) "than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue"; meaning that five words

[1] On the πνεῦμα and νοῦς, Cor. xiv. 14, Meyer remarks: "Πνεύματι is not to be understood of the objective Holy Ghost (against which see ver. 14), but of the higher spiritual nature of man, which is granted to the inspired by the Holy Ghost, such as, according to the different degrees of inspiration, can leave the intellectual activity (νοῦς, ver. 14) to its own agency, or can support it for the continuance of this degree of inspiration. The last is here meant; and πνεῦμ. λαλ. means, therefore, speaking through the activity of the higher supramundane consciousness, without the aid of the reflection of the understanding.

Practically it seems to be of little importance, in relation to the subject before us, whether πνεῦμα is to be understood objectively — the Holy Ghost, or subjectively — that higher condition of the human mind produced by the Holy Ghost acting in man.

Meyer, in vindication of his view just quoted, remarks: "It is entirely a mistaken opinion that the genitive relation in τὸ πνεῦμά μου is to be rendered other than in ὁ νοῦς μου, and that is to be explained by the Spirit of God, so far as it has possessed the man and spoken through him. ..... The Holy Ghost, though he is in men, is never called the spirit of man, and cannot be so called, because he is different from the spirit of man. Τὸ πνεῦμά μου is my own spirit — my individual higher life-principle. If I pray with tongues, then this higher life-principle in me is in activity, because it is replenished and excited by the Holy Ghost, as its receptive organ; but my understanding-reflection accomplishes nothing."

spoken wisely, intelligently, and so as to be understood, so as to benefit the hearers, are better than ten thousand words spoken in an unknown tongue, and not understood. Or, as Storr might translate the verse: In the church I had rather speak five words as a wise man, using appropriate means to accomplish my object, than ten thousand words in a language which my hearers would not understand.

One fact brought out by Paul in these chapters, while treating on this gift of tongues, deserves notice, as bearing upon and illustrating the nature and object of the gift. It is fully implied that the ability to *speak* in an unknown tongue, and the ability to *interpret* what was spoken, were separate gifts; and were not always, at least, imparted to the same person, leading us to infer that he who spake in an unknown tongue did not himself always know the meaning of the language which he uttered. We can hardly suppose that such an ability or gift as this would be a qualification for a teacher, or was employed by the apostles or others for such a purpose.

It may be asked if it is not probable that, while believers at home, in the bosom of the church, surrounded only by those who spake the same language as themselves, and therefore having little need for this gift, were thus ignorant of the meaning of what they uttered, others who travelled as evangelists into nations speaking other languages, were favored with the gift of tongues in a more perfect and more available form? But where in the New Testament, or elsewhere, is there any evidence that such a gift was possessed or used by the apostles, or other early propagators of Christianity? It is obvious that Paul and Barnabas did not understand the language of Lycaonia (Acts xiv. 1–18); or they would have known earlier, and would have protested against and prevented, the preparations which the priests of Jupiter were making to pay them divine honors.

Speaking of various spiritual gifts, in the twelfth chapter, as divinely bestowed on different individuals, and to be exercised by all for the general edification of the whole church,

Paul makes this distinction between the gift of *speaking* and the gift of *interpreting* those unknown languages miraculously spoken by believers; and in the fourteenth chapter, where he gives instructions respecting the use of these gifts, and imposes restrictions, he brings out this distinction still more fully. He bids him speaking in an unknown tongue to pray that he may interpret; and if there is no one in the assembly who can interpret, he bids him possessed of the gift of speaking to keep silence, rather than waste the time of the congregation by unintelligible talk. And again, while directing how an orderly meeting should be conducted, he bids those possessing this gift to speak, not more than two or three, and that in orderly succession, taking care that as they proceed, some one interpret, so that the assembly may be edified. Similar instructions Paul gives respecting their teachings and the revelations which may be made to any of them.

Having taken this survey of what the New Testament writers say respecting the gift of tongues, very brief notice will now be taken of some of the opinions entertained by commentators. These opinions are gleaned principally from Storr's dissertations on the subject, written in confutation of Eichorn and other anti-supernaturalists, and found in his Opuscula Academica; and from Kuinoel's commentary on the second chapter of the Acts.

1. Most of the early interpreters of the New Testament, and many in later times, entertained the opinion that the apostles, and others associated with them in preaching the gospel, were, on the day of pentecost, or whenever called into their work, by a special miraculous power enabled to understand and speak and write any language, though before unknown to them, which they might need to use in propagating the Christian doctrines. This was a part of their inspiration, and a special endowment for their work. This divinely imparted ability, these writers maintain, was permanently possessed by these early evangelists, enabling them to preach among the nations whither they went, to each in its own vernacular tongue, and thus superseding

the need of delay and labor required for learning unknown languages. Perhaps this is the prevailing opinion of the church at the present day. The arguments for and against this opinion, and others which may be noticed, it would require too much time and space to present, even in the briefest possible manner. It must suffice now to say that the writers of the New Testament nowhere assert or imply that such a gift was bestowed upon, or exercised by, the apostles or other early preachers of the gospel; neither can we find any early Christian father or historian referred to as asserting or implying any such thing; and to assume that such a miraculous power was bestowed, in the absence of all supporting evidence, inspired or uninspired, is surely unreasonable.

2. Other expositors, to avoid difficulties apparently involved in other theories, have supposed that the apostles and their companions on the day of pentecost, spake only their own vernacular language — the one prevalent in Judea, and that the miracle consisted, not in *their speaking* the many languages enumerated in the narrative, but in a work divinely performed on the hearers who were gathered from the several nations mentioned, causing them to hear, each one in his own native language, what was actually spoken in one language only, and that the language of Palestine — a miracle wrought not in the speaker, but in the hearer; not lingual, but auricular, in its nature.

3. Others, again, have supposed that the gift of tongues was bestowed only for a limited time, and occasionally, simply as a proof of the presence and power of God, and of the possessor's being under divine influence and guidance, and a proof, therefore, that the Christian religion, which they preached, was from God.

They who propose and defend the foregoing and similar theories, agree in recognizing the supernatural, miraculous, character of the gift. But other expositors, as already mentioned, maintain that no supernatural endowment of this nature was conferred, on the day of pentecost, or at any

other time; and that all the phenomena can be accounted for without resorting to miraculous interposition. Of these some maintain:

4. That the apostles and others at the feast of pentecost, used no other than the common language of Palestine; and that the wonder of the people was caused, not by their being addressed in languages diverse and before unknown to the speakers, but by their hearing the apostles and others pray, sing, praise, and exhort in the common language of Judea, the Syro-Chaldaic, or Aramaean, and not in the sacred Hebrew, in which, as these commentators assert, the temple and synagogue service, and the public worship of God on all occasions, was, according to pharisaical law and usage, uniformly conducted. They who take this view of the subject suppose that the multitudes assembled at Jerusalem at the feast, coming from the many nations enumerated by the sacred writer, consisted mainly of Jews sojourning in those nations for trade or other purposes, and were either born in Judea, or descended from Jewish parents who had longer resided abroad, but who had retained their native language, and trained their children in it; and thus the language of Judea was their vernacular, "the language in which they were born." When, therefore, these Jewish residents in foreign lands heard the apostles and their companions, borne away by a divinely inspired ardor and enthusiasm, break over the formalities and conventialisms of the synagogue, and perform their devotions and address their hearers in a language in which the truths which they uttered would be most intelligible and most impressive, that is, in the common language of the people, they were astonished, and indignantly exclaimed: How is it that we hear sacred things thus profaned, and the worship of Jehovah celebrated, not in the venerable Hebrew, but in the vulgar language in which we were born! Thus the apostles were regarded as speaking with other tongues than was appropriate for religious worship and instruction. This hypothesis, while it by no means satisfactorily accounts

for the phenomena presented in the pentecostal scene, affords no help in explaining other passages found in the Acts and in 1 Corinthians.

5. Other commentators maintain that all that was wonderful in the speaking of the apostles and their companions on the day of pentecost, consisted in their mental state and in their manner of speaking, and not at all in the language employed. They spake with a fervor, boldness, authoritativeness, and eloquence, which, in ignorant, obscure, unpractised men, like the apostles and their Galilean associates, were marvellous. Hence they were said to speak with *new* tongues, with *other* tongues, that is, in a manner unlike what had before been witnessed in them. This may, perhaps, have passed into a sort of proverbial saying, which has come down even to our day; and when one spake with fervor, eloquence, and power above what had been before known in him, it is said of him, that he speaks with a *new*, or with *another* tongue. This hypothesis, like the preceding one, while it utterly fails to explain some of the phenomena presented both in the pentecostal scene and in 1 Cor. xii. and xiv., furnishes but very inadequate help in explaining others. If the apostles were only speaking with remarkable eloquence and impressiveness, why did the multitudes exclaim with amazement: "How hear we, every man in our own tongue wherein we were born?" or, how could Paul tell the Corinthian Christians that their speaking with tongues was not to edification; or, that they should not speak in an unknown tongue unless some were present who could interpret?

6. Other writers have supposed that the speaking with tongues brought to view in Acts ii. and that treated of in 1 Cor. xiv., were essentially different; and that, while the former was the result of a truly divine inspiration or gift, designed and used to facilitate the work of the first propagators of Christianity, the latter was a fanatical, pretentious imitation of the truly divine gift bestowed upon and used by the apostles; and that it consisted of a frantic uttering of

unmeaning sounds — in truth no language at all — resembling, perhaps, what was exhibited thirty years ago in the Caledonian Chapel, London, among the followers of the late Edward Irving. But the serious manner in which Paul treats the subject precludes such a supposition.

Among more recent writers Meyer and also Bleek have each started the question whether γλώσσαις λαλεῖν means to speak in some language not vernacular, or to utter sounds which, strictly speaking, could not be called language, and could be rendered intelligible and instructive only by one who, under the influence of the Holy Ghost, possessed the χάρισμα of interpretation; and they both seem to have decided in favor of the latter view. That the speakers on the day of pentecost really spake in languages not vernacular to themselves, is evinced by the fact that the hearers, of various nationalities, heard them speak the wonderful works of God, each in his own language in which he was born. The narrative in Acts x. 44 would seem to imply that to Peter the speaking with tongues at the house of Cornelius appeared in this respect, as well as in others, like that on the day of pentecost.

On this point Olshausen very justly remarks: "According to my view the speech in higher poetic language is not the only characteristic of the γλώσσαις λαλεῖν; but, under certain restrictions, has the inner climax of the power produced through the Spirit from above risen so high in persons that they could speak foreign languages. Particularly was this the case in the first pentecost, and from prominent appearances of the charisma then, it retains the name also in less cultivated appearances." In other instances mentioned in the New Testament, we have not the same direct and positive evidence on this point. But the supposition that the speaking with tongues in the Corinthian church was a merely fanatical, unmeaning jargon — a merely ambitious, hypocritical pretension to an ability which was not possessed, is, if Paul is admitted to have been an honest man, divinely inspired to instruct and guide the

converts there, utterly incompatible with the language and manner in which he addresses them on the subject. If this γλώσσαις λαλεῖν was not the speaking in a real language, such as men employ to convey their thoughts and feelings, what could it have been?

Let us examine somewhat particularly what Paul says on the subject:

1. He asserts that this ability was the gift of God (1 Cor. xii. 28), including γένη γλωσσῶν among the special endowments which God had bestowed upon individual Christians for the edification of the whole body. Could he, as an honest man, speak of any fanatical jabber as a gift of God?

2. Paul places himself on the same level, so far as the reality and miraculous nature of the endowment are concerned, with the Corinthian converts, only claiming to have a larger measure of it, so that he spake with tongues more than they all. We cannot suppose that he uttered nonsense, and thanked God that he was able to do so, more than they all.

3. He bids them covet, or earnestly desire, spiritual gifts (1 Cor. xiv. 1), obviously alluding to those gifts enumerated, xii. 28, and singles out only one — that of inspiration to teach — as being superior to the ability to speak with tongues. He wishes that they all spake with tongues, and implies that when he who speaks with tongues interprets what he utters, so that the church may understand and be edified, he is equal to him who is divinely inspired to teach (1 Cor. xiv. 5). Could the apostle have so addressed a church in respect to any phrenzied, unmeaning use of the vocal organs?

4. Paul further writes that he who speaketh with a tongue, speaketh not to men, but to God (xiv. 2); and again, of one who, in the exercise of this gift of tongues, rendered thanks to God, he says: "Thou givest thanks well" (xiv. 17). What more arrant trifling; what more offensive mockery, could there be, than in addressing to God such fanatical gibberish, pretending it to be prayer or thanksgiving, and that it

was uttered, too, under the impulse of the Spirit of God (xiv. 2)!

Again, Paul writes that "he who speaketh with tongues edifieth himself" (xiv. 4). How could the venting of his fanaticism by the uttering of nonsense be to his edification?

Once more, Paul says, in closing up his instructions on this subject (xiv. 39): "Earnestly desire to prophesy, and forbid not to speak with tongues." Would the apostle thus have given his sanction to the existence and continuance of such fanatical, not to say profane and blasphemous, pretensions? Would he not rather have rebuked the ambitious triflers as sharply as he did the incestuous persons, and commanded the church to rid itself of those who so grossly marred the peace and order and fair fame of their Christian assemblies? By so doing only could his closing injunction be complied with: "Let all things be done decently and in order."

Having taken this brief and very imperfect survey of what the writers of the New Testament have said respecting the gift of tongues, and of some of the more noteworthy theories and opinions which have been advanced by theological writers, we close by stating some of the conclusions to which the survey leads us.

Before mentioning them, we would premise that the key to the whole subject seems to us to be found in the promissory prediction of Christ (Mark xvi. 17) already quoted. "These signs shall follow them that believe: In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues," etc. This predicted, promised sign was witnessed on the day of pentecost, when the apostles and their companions, filled with the Holy Ghost, for the first time fully understood and heartily received that fundamental doctrine of Christianity, salvation by grace, through faith in Christ and his atonement. The same predicted sign was witnessed when Peter unfolded the gospel plan of salvation to the household of Cornelius, and they heartily believed it (Acts x. 44); and again when, as Paul preached at Ephesus, and the

gospel was received by his hearers (Acts xix. 6). We learn more of this promised sign as it was witnessed in the church at Corinth. It was probably witnessed there when the first converts, under the renewing influence of the Holy Ghost, heartily believed the gospel of Christ as taught by Paul, and probably continued to be witnessed there for years, as the gospel continued to be preached, and new converts were gathered from that large population. Amidst the corruptions as to doctrine and morals, the rivalries and disorderly practices prevailing among that brilliant and luxurious people, the purity of this sign-gift was often marred, so much so that the apostle felt constrained to rebuke the church for their abuse of that which was, in a special manner, an endowment conferred by the Holy Ghost. It is very probable, though we have no direct testimony to that effect, that this gift followed the hearty belief and reception of the gospel in most, if not all, of the places where the apostles preached, as a sign to believers and others that the gospel was from God, and that his presence and power attended the preaching and reception of it.

The conclusions, then, to which we are led are:

1. That the gift of tongues was a supernatural endowment conferred by the special influence of the Holy Ghost, agreeably to Christ's promise, upon the apostles, and to some extent upon the other early Christian converts, as a sign or proof, to themselves and others, of the power and presence of God and of the truth of the Christian doctrines; and more especially a sign or proof that those possessing this gift had, in truth, received those doctrines and experienced the regenerating influences of the Holy Spirit. For this purpose the gift was promised, and for this purpose the sacred writers inform us that it was actually bestowed. And it does not seem to have been promised for any other purpose; and, so far as we have any scripture statements or history, or any just grounds for inference, the gift does not seem to have been bestowed or possessed or used for any other purpose.

To what extent the gift was bestowed; whether its exercise was witnessed in all the early churches, or only in some of them, when specially needed; how long it was continued; whether through the whole ministry of the apostles and even beyond, or limited to the church, as first planted, we have no means of determining. Like inspiration and the power to work miracles, this gift was doubtless as widely bestowed and as long continued among believers, as Infinite Wisdom saw that the exigences of the Christian cause demanded.

2. Another conclusion to which we are brought is, that the gift of tongues predicted and promised to believers (Mark xvi. 17), and that stated to have been actually conferred (Acts ii. 4; x. 44; and xix. 6), was the same as to origin, character, design, and use as that treated of 1 Cor. xii. and xiv. It is to be noted that Paul repeatedly speaks of this latter as a *sign;* the very term which Christ employed when he made the prediction and promise in Mark.

3. A further conclusion, though it may seem hardly more than repeating what has already been said, is, that the object of this gift was, as predicted by Christ in his farewell address, and earlier by the prophet Joel (ii. 28), a miraculous *sign* to the apostles themselves and their converts, and to unbelievers also, evincing that they who exercised this gift were under supernatural divine influence, and that consequently the Christian religion was true and from God. It was actually a *sign* of all this to the apostles and their companions at the pentecost; it was a *sign* to Peter and all with him in the family congregation at the house of Cornelius; and was so received by the believing Jews when Peter vindicated his conduct on that occasion. It was a *sign* to Paul that the Ephesian converts had cordially believed the gospel; and so he says it was a *sign* in the Corinthian church, "that God was in them of a truth." This gift, therefore, as a testimony to the truth of the Christian doctrines and a means of facilitating their propagation, held a place similar to that of any other miraculous power. So

it is by Christ in his promise, classed with the power to exorcise devils, to heal the sick, and to take up serpents and drink of deadly things without harm. This is all that was promised with regard to it.

4. The gift of tongues was not a permanent gift or endowment, to be brought into habitual or long-continued use; but was a *sign* confirmative of the divine authority of the Christian doctrines, especially designed for and adapted to the first proclamation of the gospel, and the initiation of Christian institutions in a community. And when it was coveted or exercised beyond this, as it seems to have been in the Corinthian church, the gift was, as Paul very plainly intimated, abused.

5. The gift of tongues was not designed as a means by which the apostles or others might preach the gospel to communities whose vernacular tongue was different from their own. It was not promised, nor does it ever seem to have been used, for such a purpose. Neither the New Testament nor history seems to furnish evidence to this effect. Although the first reapers in the great harvest-field of the world were few and feeble — a little band against the powers of earth and hell — while the work assigned them was so vast and urgent, and the opposition from both Jew and Gentile was so fierce and determined, yet their Master and Head left them no labor-saving machinery, no devices for facilitating their task. So far as this was concerned, all was to be accomplished in the ordinary way of hard work; and with the single exception, that the divine authority of the Christian doctrines was in the beginning testified to by miracles or other supernatural agency, these doctrines must during the first century of gospel propagation, have won their way to the minds and hearts of idolators and opposing unbelievers in precisely the same manner that they do now in the nineteenth.

As to how far it is necessary to presuppose the possession of this ability to address any people in their own native language in order to account for the rapidity and extent which were witnessed in the work of gospel propagation during

the age of the apostles, it may be observed that Paul, by his early studies and subsequent intercourse with men, doubtless became familiarly acquainted with and could readily use the Hebrew, the Syro-Chaldaic or Aramaean, the Greek, and the Latin languages, and adding to these the Arabic, a knowledge of which he may probably have acquired while in Arabia (Gal. i. 17), immediately after his conversion; and thus furnished, he could, from Italy to Persia, and in short in all the countries which he traversed as an evangelist, intelligibly preach the gospel of Christ to the mass of the people. If he ever went to Gaul or Spain, as we learn (Rom. xv. 24) that he intended to go to Spain, though it is very doubtful if he accomplished that purpose, he might have spent much time in preaching to the Latin and Greek-speaking portions of the people, while he was learning the vernacular of the countries. More probably he was providentially hindered from going thither, because he could otherwise spend the closing years of his ministry more profitably than in learning the languages which would qualify him to preach the word effectively to those barbarous tribes.

Where, or in what languages, the other apostles preached Christianity, we know very little with certainty. They could probably all use the Syro-Chaldaic and Hebrew; and as multitudes of Greeks and Romans, or Jews from Greece and Italy, were then residing at, or visiting Jerusalem and Judea, it is not improbable that most of the apostles could use the Greek and Latin languages more or less perfectly. If they went into other lands where these languages were not available as mediums of communication, they probably learned the vernacular as other missionaries have since done, the process being, perhaps, somewhat shortened by their peculiar zeal and laboriousness. However this may have been in fact, or whatever difficulties may seem to be involved in this view of the subject, it is, we think, contrary to the canons of scripture interpretation, and to sound reason to find a miracle where one is not expressly asserted, or forced upon us by unavoidable inference.

A practical remark or two, in closing, may not be improper. If the view here given of the nature and purpose of the gift of tongues is correct, neither the Christian missionary of modern times, nor the churches which send him forth, can, when they compare their movements with the apostolic missions, excuse their dilatoriness and want of success, by alleging that the apostles and their coadjutors possessed, in the gift of tongues, facilities for immediately and powerfully influencing the minds of men which are not granted to their successors in these later ages. The fact that they were called to preach to people with whose respective languages they were more or less fully acquainted, did, indeed, place them on high vantage ground; and perhaps the miracles which they wrought might sometimes have opened the way for the readier reception of the truths preached; though it is a noticeable fact, that often the very miracles wrought, so far from silencing opposition and operating as a favorable introduction for the truth, actually called forth the bitterest hate and the most unrelenting persecution (Acts iv. 1–7; v. 17, 18; vii; xiv. 3–5; xvi. 19–26). Whatever advantages the apostles possessed in laboring among people with whose languages they were previously acquainted, and in their power to work miracles in confirmation of the doctrines preached, there can be little doubt that these advantages are more than outweighed by the printing press and other kindred facilities for the rapid and wide promulgation of the truth, which are possessed by missionaries of our times.

While no excuse for our tardy manner of prosecuting the missionary work is to be found in any advantages which the apostles possessed superior to those enjoyed by the preachers of these times, just as little reason, it may be again remarked, is there for deferring to enter more energetically and hopefully on the work of giving the gospel to the whole world till some anticipated more favorable period; when, owing to more extended and powerful outpourings of spiritual influences, the conversion of the world to Christ will be rapidly and successfully carried forward, almost

without human agency, and the church will have little more to do than to stand by, wondering, rejoicing, and praising; or, when, in so far as the instrumentality of the church shall in any measure be required, it will be in some easy, convenient manner, without those self-denying, prolonged, exhausting labors which now seem indispensable to any degree of success. Such seems to be the common notion — not very fully spoken out — of millennial progress and triumph in the work of evangelizing the world. But if we read the Bible aright, no such time of simultaneous church inaction and church enlargement and triumph is promised. Both the Bible and history seem to say that the discipline of self-denying toil and conflict is essential to the spiritual life and purity, and consequently to the enlargement, of the church; and her Lord, out of loving care for his people, will, in his wise providence, doubtless see that they have what of these their spiritual thrift requires.

That more rapid and powerful progress of the gospel than what the world has ever yet seen is promised and held in reserve for this or a future age, may be firmly and thankfully believed; not, however, to be effected in such a manner as to supersede the necessity for labor and prayer on the part of God's people; but rather to be accomplished by their intenser struggles, to be rewarded by larger measures of divine influence shed down to insure more glorious success. If a nation is to be born in a day, it is because the prayer, the labor, the self-sacrifice of ages are, so to speak, to be condensed into one day. It is because the hour of Zion's real travail has come. If the windows of heaven are to be opened, and blessings poured out which there shall not be room to receive, it will be because all the tithes shall have been brought into the Lord's storehouse; not the tithes consisting of our agricultural and manufacturing and commercial gains and products; but of such agonizing prayer, such self-denial and sacrifice, such devotion of self and property, and such holy living as correspond to the great interests at stake.

ARTICLE V.

THE TEMPTATION.

BY REV. LEMUEL S. POTWIN, NORTH GREENWICH, CONN.

"THOU hast had much to say of Paradise lost," said Thomas Ellwood to Milton, "but what hast thou to say of Paradise found?" The poet soon found something to say. The title of his poem was "Paradise Regained," but his real theme was the Temptation of Christ.

> "I, who erewhile the happy garden sung
> By one man's disobedience lost, now sing
> Recovered paradise to all mankind,
> By one man's firm obedience, fully tried
> Through all temptation, and the tempter foiled
> In all his wiles, defeated and repulsed,
> And Eden raised in the waste wilderness." — Bk. I.

According to this poem the primary design of Satan was to ascertain whether Jesus was in a pre-eminent sense the Son of God:

> "Then hear, O Son of David, virgin-born, —
> For Son of God to me is yet in doubt:
> Of the Messiah I had heard, foretold
> By all the prophets; of thy birth, at length
> Announced by Gabriel, with the first I knew,
> And of the angelic song, in Bethlehem field,
> On thy birth-night, that sung thee Saviour born.
> From that time seldom have I ceased to eye
> Thy infancy, thy childhood, and thy youth,
> Thy manhood last, though yet in private bred;
> Till, at the ford of Jordan, whither all
> Flock to the Baptist, I, among the rest
> (Though not to be baptized), by voice from heaven,
> Heard thee pronounced the Son of God beloved.
> Thenceforth I thought thee worth my nearer view
> And narrower scrutiny, that I might learn
> In what degree or meaning thou art called
> The Son of God, which bears no single sense:

The Son of God I also am, or was;
And if I was, I am — relation stands:
All men are sons of God; yet thee I thought
In some respect far higher so declared;
Therefore I watched thy footsteps from that hour,
And followed thee still on to this waste wild." — Bk. IV.

To accomplish his object Satan subjects Jesus to a two-fold series of tests, the one designed to try his human virtue, the other to try his absolute divinity. In the first temptation, unable to learn his divinity (the miracle of turning stones to bread being declined), the tempter assails the *appetite* of Jesus with "pompous delicacies":

"Alas, how simple, to these cates compared,
Was that crude apple that diverted Eve!"

He then tempts him with the offer of riches:

"Get riches first, get wealth, and treasure heap;
Not difficult, if thou hearken to me."

Then he tries to awaken a love of glory:

"Think not so slight of glory; therein least
Resembling thy great Father."

Thus, in the view of the poet, the first temptation exhausted the power of Satan to lead Jesus into *self-indulgence.*

The second temptation (following the order of Luke) has regard to the future kingdom. Satan urges Jesus to commence to reign immediately:

"Think'st thou to regain
Thy right by sitting still, or thus retiring?"

Then, showing him all the kingdoms of the world, he advises him to attempt a martial kingdom, like the Parthians, commencing with an alliance with them:

"It shall be my task
To render thee the Parthian at dispose."

Then he recommends a kingdom of outward magnificence and luxury, and promises to secure to him the Roman throne.

Finally he recommends a life of study and and contemplation and special devotion to heathen lore, as fitting him for the highest kingdom:

> "These rules will render thee a king complete
> Within thyself, much more with empire joined."

The price at which Satan holds his assistance in establishing the kingdom is, that Jesus shall render him homage. The indignant rejection of his offer leaves him still in doubt as to Jesus's higher nature; but he has found him, by this and the previous trial,

> To the utmost of *mere man* both wise and good,—
> Not more."

The third trial was to settle the question of his divinity:

> "Therefore to know what more thou art than man
> Worth naming Son of God by voice from heaven,
> Another method I must now begin."

This method was to place Jesus on the highest pinnacle of the temple where he could not stand without a miracle:

> "Now show thy progeny; if not to stand,
> Cast thyself down; safely, if Son of God."

Jesus stood safely, and Satan, convinced of his divinity, abandons the temptation.

Had Jesus turned the stones into bread at the outset, it would seem that the temptation must then have ended; for the miracle which the poet imagines on the pinnacle of the temple was not more decisive. But it was the design of God that Jesus' absolute deity should not be at once revealed to the tempter, that he might be emboldened to try his utmost power, and thus experience a heavier defeat. Satan must be vanquished, not by a mere miracle, but first by moral forces — by the power of a perfect human character. Thus Jesus, in his entire nature, becomes the "Queller of Satan."

> "Hail, Son of the Most High! heir of both worlds!
> Queller of Satan! on thy glorious work
> Now enter, and begin to save mankind.

The theory of the temptation given by the great poet of theology, though we cannot justify its wanderings from the evangelic narrative, is worthy of high regard, from the sublime prominence which it gives, in the system of redemption, to the great trial of the Second Adam.

Let us present briefly a few other opinions, before we examine the narrative itself. In the enumeration of the temptations, the order of Matthew is observed, except in the quotation from Ellicott, who, with Milton, follows the order of Luke, and places the temptation of the "pinnacle" last.

Neander (in "Life of Christ") says on the first temptation and our Lord's answer: "The principle involved in the reply [Man shall not live by bread alone, etc.] was, that he had no wish to free himself from the sense of human weakness and dependence; that he would work no miracle for that purpose."

On the second he says: "These words [Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God] involve the principle that a miracle may not be wrought except for wise ends and with adequate motives; never with no other aim than to display the power of working wonders."

On the third: "Herein was the temptation, that the Messiah should not develop his kingdom gradually and in its pure spirituality from within, but should establish it at once as an outward dominion; and that, although this will not be accomplished without the use of an evil agency, the end would justify the means."

Of the temptation as a whole he says: "The whole temptation taken together presents us one idea; a contrast, namely, between the founding of God's kingdom as pure, spiritual, and tried by many forms of self-denial, in the slow development ordained for it by its head; and the sudden establishment of that kingdom before men as visible and earthly."

Olshausen characterizes each temptation thus: "The point of the first temptation is very justly regarded to lie in the thought of employing the higher powers bestowed upon him for satisfying his own wants."

"The point of the second temptation lies in the thought of *parading* the gift of working miracles."

"In this last temptation proud lust of dominion appears to be the point."

Ellicott finds in the three temptations "three spiritual assaults, directed against the three portions of our composite nature. To the *body* is presented the temptation of satisfying its wants by a display of power, which would have tacitly abjured its dependence on the Father and its perfect submission to his heavenly will. To the *soul*, the longing appetitive soul, was addressed the temptation of Messianic dominion over all the kingdoms of the world, and of accomplishing in a moment of time all for which the incense of the one sacrifice on Calvary is still rising up on the altar of God. To the *spirit*, the temptation of using that power which belonged to him as God to vindicate his own eternal nature, and to display by one dazzling miracle the true relation in which Jesus of Nazareth stood to men and to angels and to God."

If we add to the foregoing the remark of Alford on the second temptation, that it was "one not of ambition, but of *presumption*," we shall have before us the principal opinions as to the nature of our Lord's temptation.

It will be seen that the first opinion makes especially prominent the desire of Satan

> "To understand [his] adversary, who
> And what he is."

The second emphasizes the relation of the temptation to the future kingdom.

The others emphasize the effort to corrupt Jesus, by leading him to adopt wrong principles of action.

In other words, the prominent thought in Milton is the conflict itself with Satan; with Neander, it is the right development of God's kingdom; with the others, the rectitude of the Redeemer. With the poet it is a question of championship; with the church historian, a question of the principles of redemption; with the others, more a question of *personal* principles.

Without attempting to compare at length the above opinions with each other, or with the sacred narrative, let us now briefly investigate the significance of each of the three temptations.

It is generally admitted, we presume, that the temptation extended through the forty days of fasting; or at least that it was not confined to the close of that period. The language of Mark is: "He was there in the wilderness forty days, tempted of Satan;" and of Luke: "Being forty days tempted of the devil."[1] Why then were the three temptations recorded, since they were not all? Are they not to be regarded as *specimens* of a series of severe trials, to which our Lord was subjected at the hands of Satan? Taking, then, the first temptation, we ask: What was the class of temptations of which this stands as the representative? The answer may be found in the opening words of the devil: "*If thou be the Son of God.*" These words break the silence of those forty days, and show us that during that awful period Satan has been endeavoring, with all his arts and might, to *undermine Jesus' faith in his own divinity and sonship.* In how many ways Satan drove those torturing words into Jesus' soul we know not. We can easily imagine that all the features of his human nature, all his dependence on earthly things, and his subjection to his earthly parents, were brought in to daunt the young Messiah, and crush his aspirations as a Saviour. "If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread." The argument of the tempter seems to be this: 'Thou canst not rise above thy human dependence. Weak, faint, hungry One, see if thou canst supply thy pressing wants by a miracle. If thou dost not, thou art not the Son of God.' The point we have in mind may be expressed thus: Did Satan really desire that the proposed miracle should be

[1] Καὶ ἦν ἐκεῖ ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ ἡμέρας τεσσαράκοντα, πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ, Mark i. 13.

Καὶ ἤγετο ἐν τῷ πνεύματι εἰς τὴν ἔρημον, ἡμέρας τεσσαράκοντα πειραζόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου, Luke iv. 1, 2.

performed, or, presuming that it would not be performed, did he desire that its non-performance should recoil upon the mind of Jesus, and produce doubt and despondency? We suppose the latter. The artfulness of the temptation lies, we think, in proposing a *false test* of Jesus' divinity (as was afterwards done when a "sign from heaven" was demanded), and yet a test plausible in itself. The language employed certainly admits of this idea.[1] Compare the words used to our Saviour on the cross: "If thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross."[2] Was it the desire or expectation of those who uttered this taunt that he should come down?

That the main design of the tempter was to call in question our Lord's sonship and divinity, and thus his capability of being a Saviour, by insisting on a miracle which he did not expect to have performed, seems probable from several considerations:

1. Such a temptation would have been exceedingly *natural* and *timely*. Jesus was about to commence his public work. He would naturally feel his responsibility as he had never felt it before. Now, therefore, was the time for Satan to interpose, and, if possible, break down his purpose, by convincing him of his inability to fulfil his great mission. If the temptation be understood as merely an attempt to

[1] Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰπὲ ἵνα οἱ λίθοι οὗτοι ἄρτοι γένωνται (Matt. iv. 3). Alford, following Meyer, says: "The εἰ implies no doubt of the Lord's Messiahship." But neither does it imply any acknowledgment of his Messiahship. The indicative in a condition has, we suppose, no power of determining the relation of the supposition to reality, or to the doubt or certainty of the speaker. Such a relation is determined either by the form of the *conclusion* (as when a past tense with ἄν is used) or by the connection of thought. When joined with the imperative, the indicative with εἰ expresses *supposition for argument's sake;* but the design of the argument may be either to actualize the conclusion or to disprove the condition. Euthymius, as quoted by Alford (with Meyer), says that Satan designed to taunt our Lord with not being the Son of God, if he does not perform the miracle; but the taunt is regarded, if we understand the quotation, merely as an incentive to the miracle, and not as conveying the chief force of the temptation. The language is: ὥφετο ὅτι παρακινισθήσεται τῷ λόγῳ, καθάπερ ὀνειδισθεὶς ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ εἶναι υἱὸς Θεοῦ.

[2] Εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ Θεοῦ, κατάβηθι ἀπὸ τοῦ σταυροῦ, Matt. xxvii. 40.

lead Jesus to use his high powers to satisfy his own wants, we should rather look for it at Nazareth, in his earlier days, than now, at the great crisis in his earthly life.

2. Such a temptation would be a *severe* one, and would touch a vital point in the work of redemption. Notwithstanding the ingenious efforts of commentators, it is hard to see why our Saviour should be driven into the wilderness, to enter into a mighty conflict with the devil, on the point whether he should ever work a miracle to satisfy his personal wants. But if Satan designed to dispute and deny his *power* to work a miracle, and to fling this reproach in his face, till he should either believe it, or be maddened to attempt a miracle to pander to the devil's curiosity, then we can see that, to one who had *not yet performed his first miracle*, the taunt was bitter, and the temptation severe.

3. It was unlikely that Jesus would perform *any* miracle at the devil's bidding. Satan could not have expected it; but the grounds for demanding one were plausible enough to form a basis for discrediting Jesus' powers, and insisting that he was no Saviour.

4. The view we advocate harmonizes with the notion that this temptation is a *specimen*. The attempt to discredit Jesus' power as a divine Saviour, on the ground of his human nature and lowly condition, admits of a great variety of modes, and when pursued with the malice and ingenuity of an arch-fiend, would not fail to move the Saviour's soul in intense conflict.

If it be objected to this view, that Satan could not have undertaken so hopeless a task as is here supposed, it may be sufficient answer, to say that his votaries undertook the very same task during our Lord's public life. They tried to put down Jesus' claim, by demanding miracles which they never expected him to perform, and did not believe he *could* perform. In this they were of their father the devil.

This view of the temptation throws light upon the significance of our Saviour's reply: "Man shall not live by bread

alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." He might have declined the miracle without giving a reason. If he afterwards peremptorily refused a sign to an "evil and adulterous generation" which sought it from improper motives, much more might he have refused one to the evil one himself. Yet he condescended to show that the miracle was needless, and that such a test as Satan proposed was therefore unreasonable: "I will not perform the miracle, because, being unnecessary and no part of my duty, I will not stake the evidence of my Sonship on it. 'The meat that perisheth' is little worth. I will not doubt that I am the Son of God at such a test as thine. I decline the devil's miracle, and shall only work the works of him that sent me."

Satan undoubtedly was not satisfied with the reason. Changing the words afterwards uttered at the cross, but not their spirit, we can hear him say: "Ah! thou that wast just called the Son of God, thou that aspirest to be the world's Redeemer, save thyself from hunger, and I will be thy first follower."

The first temptation leaves Jesus undaunted, and therefore victorious; and Satan foiled, but not disheartened.

Much that we have said on the first temptation is applicable also to the second, which, like the first, is directed to undermining Jesus' faith in himself. The method pursued, however, is different. Our Saviour had quoted the scriptures. He had also expressed great faith in the care of God. These two circumstances are artfully chosen as the basis of a new trial. Satan, too, knows something of the scriptures, and with their help, he will now challenge our Lord's divinity on the score of his want of *faith* in God. "If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down; for it is written, He shall give his angels charge concerning thee, and in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone." In other words, "Show me now your trust in the Father. Show me your reliance on a promise like one which you yourself just now

quoted. Leap from this temple-roof; fear not the dizzy height, and trust the promise I have quoted. If thou dost not, thou art not the Son of God. Thou must go back to thy Nazareth, and think no more of being the world's Redeemer."

Thus it appears that, while the first temptation was a blow at Jesus' *power*, this was a blow at his *faith*, his union with the Father. The first said: Thou art not a miracle-worker; this: Thou art not a man of God even, much less the Son of God. Taking this, then, as a *specimen temptation*, we must conceive of every possible device that Satan could invent, by means of false tests, to break down Jesus' confidence in his own filial piety. Here was the struggle with the horrors of despondency.

But Jesus again refuses to do the devil's bidding: "I reject thy test. I am the Son of God, but I will not do an act of presumption to please thy curiosity, or avert thy shaft of malice. Say, if thou wilt, 'Thou art not the Son of God.' I will not tempt the Lord God in order to save myself the pangs of thy temptations."

Thus calmly and sublimely does our Lord rise above the second temptation, holding firmly his inward faith, while, with the self-control of true greatness, he refuses the vain outward exhibition of that faith.

Satan was already vanquished, but he seems not to have known it. He was vanquished because he had not shaken the soul of Jesus from its confidence in himself and his mission. Yet he may have fancied that because he had plied the Redeemer with outward tests which had not been fulfilled, therefore he had planted in his breast some doubt and distrust. This, then, was the time for his great proposal, his offer of a last resort to dispirited enthusiasm. He brings before Jesus all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. He offers them as the reward of fealty to himself. "Abandon thy purpose. Behold my influence over the world. Thou art not able to destroy my power. Art thou bent on such a mad career? Take the world as

it is. I will give thee a high place in its honors. I only claim the *highest* for myself; for I am the 'prince of this world.'"

Here is found the goal of all the temptations. The tempter has striven to fill the Saviour's soul with doubt and despondency, that he may be won over from the task of rescuing the slaves of Satan, and may become himself the vassal of the wicked one. This is the decisive moment. The history of the ages of eternity hangs on the answer of Jesus "Get thee behind me Satan; for it is written 'Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.'" This is all. Jesus declares his loyalty to the Lord God, and his determination to bring back a lost world to his service. The devil quails before a divine firmness and an unchangeable purpose.

If it be asked wherein this temptation can be regarded as a *specimen*, we answer that it presents the *outward difficulties* in the way of Jesus, as the other two had insisted on his inward unfitness for his work. The offer of those glorious worldly kingdoms which Satan made as a tempting prize, was suggestive of every species of *worldly opposition* if Jesus rejected the offer. It was as if a general should offer to his antagonist the second place in his own army. He need not add: "If you decline the offer, you must *fight* those whom you would otherwise command"; for this would be taken for granted. We, therefore, who know the subsequent history of our Lord, can see in this temptation the shadow of those dark days when the "prince of this world" came again with his array of both spiritual and temporal power, and brought Jesus to the cross. Refusing homage to Satan was welcoming the cross.

The third temptation also belongs in substance to every temptation like the first and second, as the *application* of them all, and of each one. Hence we need not accuse Luke of carelessness in placing this trial immediately after the first. It belongs with the first, with both, with all of their kind. The two were *preparatory;* this, *conclusive*. Jesus

overcame them all; and his victory consisted, not simply in retaining his personal integrity, but in retaining and strengthening his confidence in himself as the Messiah, and in repelling with utter loathing and immutable firmness, in full view of his sufferings and death, the proposal to resign his work and serve the world and the devil.

We remark, in conclusion, that although the temptation lies in the sphere of our Lord's Messiahship, it is by no means beyond the reach of human sympathies. True, we are not tempted to doubt our divinity, but how often have the servants of Christ, overwhelmed with the responsibility of following him and carrying on his work, been tempted to doubt the reality of their sacred mission, and their ability, through grace, to perform it. In these hours of darkness and despondency they have been in the wilderness with their Master, and the devil has been beside them to lead them to despair of the success of redemption, and to submit to the world and its prince. Happy are such when they have come off victorious by the help of him who "was tempted in all points like as we are."

ARTICLE VI.

REMARKS ON RENDERINGS OF THE COMMON VERSION (IN THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS).

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(*Concluded from Vol. XIX. p.* 225.)

As remarked in the former Article, the object here is not to revise the common translation, in course or minutely; but only to point out some of the more obvious changes, which are regarded by interpreters as due to the sense, or to a clearer representation of the sense, of the original text. It will be noticed that the current version of the passage is

given first, and then the corrected one, with brief explanations. The Greek has been cited to some extent; but an occasional reference to the Greek Testament may be necessary, in order to see the force of the criticisms.

CHAPTER IV.

Verse 2. *But is under tutors and governors.* 'But is under guardians and stewards.' The foregoing is now admitted to be the proper distinction between ἐπίτροποι and οἰκονόμοι. The former is a general term and designates those who act in any way (not excluding the παιδαγωγός) as the guardians or overseers of children who are the heirs of property; while the latter, on account of the importance of the particular trust, which that relation involves, singles out those among the overseers who regulate the pecuniary affairs of the estate. See especially Wieseler, *Ueber den Brief an die Galater*, p. 326. The common rendering is also that of the antecedent English versions, except Wiclif's.

Verse 4. *Made of a woman, made under the law.* 'Born of a woman, born under the law.' This use of γενόμενον (strictly *to begin to be, come into existence*), as applied to the birth of persons, is common in the Greek language. See John viii. 58 and Rom i. 3. In the latter passage, as well as in this, our version translates γενόμενον *made*, after Wiclif, and the Geneva and the Rheims versions, instead of *born*, as in Tyndale and Cranmer. It is barely possible that the more obvious rendering was set aside, as less congruous with the miraculous nature of Christ's birth.

Verse 5. *To redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.* 'That he might redeem those under the law; that we might receive the adoption of sons.' The ἵνα before ἐξαγοράσῃ bears the same relation to ἐξαπέστειλεν, that the ἵνα does before ἀπολάβωμεν. There is no reason, therefore, for employing the infinitive in one case and the finite mood in the other, as in the English version. The sentence represents the redemption and the adoption as parallel results, rather than consecutive; though

in the logical analysis the former, of course, would be the true order.

Verse 7. *And if a son, then an heir of God through Christ.* 'And if a son, also an heir through God.' Two changes should be made here. First, καί represents the relations as co-existent, i.e. heir as well as son, and hence means 'also,' and not 'then,' as if it were inferential. Secondly, we must substitute in the text κληρονόμος διὰ Θεοῦ for the received κληρονόμος Θεοῦ διὰ Χριστοῦ. So Lachmann, Schott, Tischendorf, Meyer, Ellicott. Usteri adheres to διὰ Χριστοῦ, because the inheritance is usually said to be through Christ, and not through God; but that circumstance itself accounts probably for the origin of the easier reading. As to the thought, Wieseler remarks very justly: "When a person has become a son of God, he has, in virtue of that relation, a claim also to the Messianic inheritance, which God will bestow on him; in like manner as he who is the son of a man has also, in virtue of that relation, a claim to his father's possessions."

Verse 9. *Whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage.* 'Whereunto ye desire again to be in bondage anew.' The common version treats ἄνωθεν as pleonastic. But πάλιν and ἄνωθεν differ from each other. The former describes the relapse in question, as one to *a* state of bondage, and the latter, as one to *the* state of bondage, through which the Galatian converts had already passed. Tyndale and Cranmer retain this significant distinction: 'Whereunto agayne ye desyre afresshe to be in bondage."

Verse 12. *Brethren, I beseech you be as I am; for I am as ye are.* 'Become as I am; for I also have become as ye are, brethren, I beseech you.' This passage has been treated as needlessly obscure. We have, undoubtedly, the key which unlocks the meaning in 1 Cor. ix. 20, 21. "Unto the Jews," Paul says there, "I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; ..... to them that are without law (I became) as without law, that I might gain them that are without law (ἄνομοι)." We merely repeat ἐγενόμην in the

second clause from γίνεσθε in the first, and supply the substantive verb. The sense then is: "*Become* in your relinquishment of Jewish rites as *I* am in that respect; *for I also*, who am a Jew, and consequently attached to such rites by every tie of natural sympathy, have forsaken them, and *become as you* are, i.e. have placed myself upon the Gentile ground, which is that of the non-observance of Jewish law. It is but reasonable, therefore, that I should ask you (δέομαι ὑμῶν) to concur with me, and thus be simply true to your own national position, when I, against every bias of birth and education, have cast aside the forms of Judaism, and assimilate to the Gentiles." Such scholars, among others, as Usteri, Winer, Neander, Fritzsche, De Wette, Meyer, Wieseler, Ellicott, concur in this view of the meaning.

Verse 13. *Ye know how through infirmity of the flesh I preached the gospel unto you at the first.* 'Ye know that by reason of weakness of the flesh I preached to you the gospel the former time.' The expression "through infirmity" seems to mean that it was in a state of weakness, under bodily infirmity, that Paul preached at this time to the Galatians. But the preposition here (διά) with the accusative can denote only the ground or occasion of the act. See Winer, *New Test. Gram.*, § 49. c. We must understand that Paul was detained in Galatia by sudden illness, and was thus led to preach there in the first instance, contrary to his original plan. The sickness was such as to render it impossible for him to prosecute his journey, but not such as to incapacitate him for declaring the gospel. Professor Jowett, who regards the New Testament Greek as peculiar, and not subject to the ordinary laws of Greek usage, decides for the other sense. It is better to be on the side of such critics as Fritzsche, Bengel, Meyer, Winer, Ellicott, Wieseler, Alford, Ellicott. Again, the surer meaning of πρότερον is not first, but former. The latter sense adheres more closely to the comparative form, and tallies precisely with the facts of history. We learn from the Acts of the Apos-

tles that Paul visited Galatia twice; first when he planted the churches there, on his first missionary tour (Acts xvi. 6), and the second time when he confirmed the same churches, on his third tour (Acts xviii. 23). He wrote his Epistle to the Galatians, undoubtedly, at Ephesus, soon after his second visit to them.

Verse 17. *They zealously affect you, but not well; yea, they would exclude you, that ye might affect them.* 'They zealously seek you, not well (i.e. not with good intent); but wish to exclude you, that ye may zealously seek them.' The evident alliteration here makes it difficult to find or frame a satisfactory translation of this verse. That of our version may answer very well for the words (ζηλοῦσι, ζηλοῦτε) in this place, but misleads the reader entirely in the next verse. Perhaps Ellicott's rendering shows what the difficulty is, rather than how it may be overcome: "They pay you court in no honest way; yea, they desire to exclude you, that ye may pay them court. But it is good to be courted in honesty at all times, and not only when I am present with you." Winer succeeds much better, with the aid of the Latin: "Ambiunt vos non honeste.....ut ipsos ambiatis. Honestum est ambiri in re honesta." It is needless to remark that 'exclude' is very ambiguous, to say the least; but the Greek word (ἐκκλεῖσαι) is equally so. It means, probably, that the false teachers wished to detach the Galatians from Paul and his friends, and make them partisans of their own.

Verse. 18. *But it is good to be zealously affected*, etc. 'But it is good to be zealously sought,' etc. The change in the last verse is required here. Very possibly our translators had the right conception; but ζηλοῦσθαι as passive corresponds evidently to ζηλοῦσι ὑμάς as active, and as the latter means to bestow zeal on others, the former must mean to have it bestowed on ourselves; whereas "to be zealously affected," certainly as we use language at present, means to be affected with zeal, to be zealous, and thus comes round again very nearly to the active, so as to confuse utterly the apostle's meaning.

Verse 22. *For it is written, that Abraham had two sons: the one by a bondmaid, the other by a freewoman.* 'For it is written, that Abraham had two sons: one by the bondwoman, and one by the freewoman.' The article represents the women (τῆς παιδίσκης, τῆς ἐλευθέρας) as historic persons. All the older English Versions, except the Rhemish, overlook this precision of the language. On the other hand, our version makes παιδίσκης definite in the twenty-seventh verse of this chapter, where, instead of "children of the bondwoman" we have in Greek of "a bondwoman," and thus the contrast in that passage between the nobility of one parentage and the degradation of another is greatly weakened. The manner in which our translators insert or omit the article is singularly arbitrary and inconsistent. It is hardly too much to say, that the irregularity in this respect could not well be greater if there were no article at all in the Greek language.[1]

Verse 24. *Which things are an allegory; for these are the two covenants.* 'Which things are an allegory; for these women are two covenants.' Unless we insert "women" in this connection, the pronoun also in English might seem to refer to the things (ἅτινα) which form the subject of the allegory. The difference of gender prevents that uncertainty in the Greek.

Verse 25. *For this Agar is mount Sinai in Arabia,* etc. 'For the word Hagar is mount Sinai in Arabia, etc.' In the Greek 'Hagar' is not the personal name directly, and 'this' a feminine pronoun agreeing with it (according to the natural inference from the English), but, as the neuter τὸ Ἄγαρ

[1] The writer on "Versions" in Dr. Smith's Dictionary of the Bible (Vol. III. p. 1681), assigns a reason for the fact, which may be in part the explanation of it: "Grammatical inaccuracy pervades, more or less, the whole extent of the present version of the New Testament. The true force of tenses, cases, prepositions, articles, is continually lost. The translators learnt Greek through the medium of the Latin. Lexicons and grammars were alike in the universal language of scholars, and this language was poorer and less inflected than the Greek, and failed utterly to represent, e. g. the force of its article, or the difference of its aorist and perfect tenses."

shows, it is the expression as such, and not the woman's name, that is meant. The apostle would say: "The word 'Hagar,' which was the name of the bondwoman, is a name also of the mount Sinai, whence the law was given, and hence, on account of that coincidence of the names, such a woman may be taken the more fitly to represent the law." Agar is the Grecised form of הָגָר, and should be written alike in the Old Testament and the New. For want of this agreement with reference to proper names, the English reader must be in doubt often whether the same person is meant or a different one.[1]

CHAPTER V.

Verse 3. *For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law.* 'Now I testify again to every one who becomes circumcised, that he is a debtor to keep the whole law.' There is no various reading which justifies "for" (*γάρ*), which our version adopts here from the Geneva version. The Greek connective (δέ) adds, perhaps, a slightly contrastive idea, and may signify either that the apostle makes the declaration not once merely (see iii. 12), *but* (δέ) now *again* (*πάλιν*); or, that the Galatians, if they occupied legal ground, would not only gain nothing from Christ, *but* (δέ) must depend for their justification upon a faultless obedience, and thus their cause be hopeless. The force of the participle (*περιτεμνομένῳ*) should be recognized. The *acumen* of the argument is not whether a person is in the one state (*περιτομή*) or in the other (*ἀκροβυστία*), but whether he passes from the latter to the former, whether, being uncircumcised, he submits to that rite because he feels that he cannot otherwise be saved. See Acts xv. 1. The apostle has in view those who take this course from a belief that such acts are meritorious in the sight of God, and entitle them to his favor and the blessings of his kingdom.

[1] For the manner in which the English scriptures deal with proper names, see Wemyss's Biblical Gleanings, pp. 241–243. The subject is discussed in one of Dr. Campbell's Preliminary Dissertations on the Gospels.

There is a similar turn of thought in the preceding περιτέμνησθε (v. 2), which it is not so easy to indicate in our language. The phrase would be, if allowable, "if ye are being circumcised."

Verse 12. *I would they were even cut off who trouble you.* 'Who unsettle you.' The word is a different one from that which our version renders "trouble" in v. 10 and in i. 8. Our translators have a singular partiality for this English term.' They employ it for rendering ten different Greek words or phrases, viz. (in addition to the one here) Matt. xxiv. 6; Mark v. 35; Luke i. 29, and x. 41; Acts xv. 19, xvi. 20, and xx. 10; Gal. v. 12; 2 Thess. i. 6; Heb. xii. 15. See Trench's *Authorized Version*, p. 111. Our language has certainly the means of a more exact discrimination than this. Some revisers would correct the verse still further. It may not be certain that the present English form suggests to us the apostle's meaning, but the meaning itself being uncertain, we are not to exchange one doubtful exegesis for another. If ἀποκόψονται signifies *get themselves cut off*, i.e. be expelled from the Christian body, as the proper reward of their conduct, our passive *be cut off* would express the meaning. For this passive receptive power as arising out of the receptive reflexive middle, see Jelf's *Greek Gram.*, § 364. 2; and Winer's *New Test. Gram.*, § 38. 4. Wieseler defends at length that explanation. Many of the early versions adopt it. But no doubt the stricter rendering (understand it as we may) would be *cut themselves off*, i.e. from the church, renounce at once and utterly all connection with it (see Ellicott's note, *Com. on Galatians*, p.109), or *mutilate themselves*, make their περιτομή a κατατομή (see Philip. iii. 2), since, as the apostle would indignantly say, they were so grossly exaggerating and perverting the true import of that rite. Chrysostom represents the patristic interpretation, which was singularly concurrent in this respect: εἰ βούλονται, μὴ περιτεμνέσθωσαν μόνον ἀλλὰ περικοπτέσθωσαν. So also many modern scholars, as Rückert, Usteri, Matthies, Schott, Hilgenfeld, De Wette, Meyer,

Alford, Wordsworth, in their respective commentaries. Winer (*Epist. ad Galatas*, p. 117) inclines to the same view, but admits the possibility of the other sense. This last deserves to be at least a marginal reading in an English Bible.

Verse 13. *Only use not liberty for an occasion to the flesh.* 'Use not the liberty,' etc. We miss here the article of the original, which points out "the liberty" which they were not to abuse as that to which they have been called. Compare the verse which precedes.

Verse 15. *But if ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another.* 'But if ye are biting and devouring one another, take heed that ye be not consumed by one another.' The verbs δάκνετε and κατεσθίετε are present, and represent the act as going on, not as completed. Unless we regard this force of the tense, something like an awkward tautology arises between the protasis (κατεσθίετε) and the apodosis (ἀναλωθῆτε).

Verse 17. *And these* (the Spirit and the flesh) *are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.* 'Now these are contrary the one to the other, that ye may not do the things that ye would.' The ecbatic sense of ἵνα, *so that*, which our translators adopt, critics at present discard, almost without dissent.[1] Fritzsche (*Com. in Matt.*, p. 836) denies that ἵνα ever has this force in the New Testament. It is so rare, at all events, that no one should ascribe to it that force unless it be absolutely necessary. See Winer's explicit testimony in his *New Test. Gram.*, § 53. 6. It is not necessary in this instance. The apostle predicates the teleological aim here of the σάρξ or sinful principle in man, which according to a correct anthropology is viewed as the ascendant influence before the beginning of a new life, and after that as still striving to maintain its ascendency. After having said that the two principles are thus arrayed against each other (ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται), he goes on to adjust the sequel of the sentence to that posture of the conflict: "They

[1] Tittmann's treatment of this particle (De usu Particularum, p. 32, at the end of his De Synon. in Novo Test.) is loose and unsatisfactory.

are opposed to each other, I say, and the danger is that you will remain under the old domination — the flesh, in this struggle with the Spirit, striving to bring it about that you should not (*ἵνα μη . . . . . ποιῆτε*) do the things which the Spirit has taught you to approve, and from which it would hold you back." See Rom. xii. 18, 19. Some (but that does not affect the translation) refer the *ἵνα*, or telic activity, to God, as purposely subjecting men to this conflict as a part of their probation or as a means of discipline. It will be seen how gratuitous is the interjected "cannot do" which our version copies from the previous versions (Tyndale, Cranmer, and the Geneva).

Verse 19. The best manuscripts omit *μοσχεία*, at the head of the catalogue, in the common text. The enumeration of the "works of the flesh" was thought to be incomplete, without it. It should be cancelled in the English version. In this same verse "lasciviousness" has too restricted a meaning for *ἀσέλγεια*. See, also, Mark vii. 22; 2 Cor. xii. 21; Eph. iv. 19; 1 Pet. iv. 3; and Jude 4, where our translators render it in the same way. On the contrary, they say "wantonness" in Rom. xiii. 2; 2 Pet. ii. 18. The latter is the proper term in all the passages. The Vulgate in like manner fluctuates between "impudicitia" and "luxuria." Trench has some good remarks on the word (*Synon. of the New Test.*, p. 86); but the passage is too long for quotation. Tittmann says: "*Ἀσέλγεια* est proprie protervitas et impudens petulantia hominis *ἀσελγοῦς*, non obscoenitas aut foeditas lubidinis." See *Synon. in New Test.*, p. 151. Lewdness is one of the ways in which *ἀσέλγεια* displays itself; but leaves out of sight too much the insolence (*ὕβρις*) and lawlessness (*ἀκολασία*) which the expression more strictly denotes.

CHAPTER VI.

Verse 5. *For every man shall bear his own burden.* 'For each one shall carry his own load.' In the second verse the apostle has just said: 'Bear ye one another's burdens,' and thus the two passages, as they stand in English, seem

to be in spirit and form opposed to each other. In the Greek the word in the second verse is *βάρη*, and in this verse *φορτίον*; and since they differ in meaning a different translation would do away at least the appearance of an inconsistency, and put the reader on a more direct way to the right conclusion. The one precept does not clash with the other. The "burdens" which the apostle urges his readers to "bear," are the faults and offences of others, toward which we are required to be tolerant, charitable, and the "load" which every one has to "carry" is that of his own accountability for all his own sins and deficiencies, be it as it may with others, whether they are more or less guilty than himself.

Verse 11. *You see how large a letter I have written unto you with mine own hand.* 'See with what large letters I have written to you with my own hand.' If we accept the results of the present exegesis, we must translate in this way. It will be seen that the Greek verb (*ἴδετε*) is in the imperative and not indicative. The adjective (*πηλίκοις*) refers to magnitude, and not quality, and must describe the size of the letters or written characters, and not the extent of the letter itself, because *ἐπιστολή* is the apostle's invariable word for that sense, and *γράμματα* as plural is never so used in the New Testament. With this latter meaning also, we should expect the accusative, and not the dative *γράμμασι*. For the philology of the passage, Wieseler's note, and especially Meyer's, will be found very full and decisive.

There is a harmony between this verse, as thus correctly understood, and 2 Thess. iii. 17, which may be worth pointing out. In the Epistle to the Thessalonians Paul speaks of the salutation there as added by his own hand, and as being a sign (*σεμεῖον*) or attestation of the genuineness of the letter, such, in fact, as he generally inserted in his epistles, and which consisted usually of a few autographic words written by himself. His mode of referring to this mark or sign, *So I write* (*οὕτω γράφω*), shows that it was some peculiarity by which his hand was readily distinguished

from that of the ordinary amanuensis. That peculiarity, as appears from the epithet (πηλίκοις) in our epistle, was the size of the written characters or letters, for which (οὕτω γράφω) he was well known.[1] Whether Paul wrote the whole epistle with his own hand, or the last verses only; whether he wrote in so peculiar a way from want of practice, and hence with awkwardness; and whether he alludes to the matter because he would authenticate the letter, or to remind the Galatians of his earnestness and painstaking in their behalf, are questions which do not affect the translation, and need not be considered here.

[1] The ground for this inference falls away of course, if Wieseler's singular opinion be correct, that Paul wrote the concluding verses (vi. 11–18) in large letters or capitals, because he would emphasize the contents of that paragraph as peculiary important. There is no evident reason for making such a destinction between this part of the letter and other parts.

ARTICLE VII.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

1. Description of the Ancient Town of Amadia in Assyria, by Rev. Justin Perkins, Missionary at Oroomiah, Persia.

About fifty or sixty miles to the northeast of the ancient town of *Elkoosh*, the home of Nahum the prophet, in Old Assyria, is the remarkable town of Amadia, among the Koordish mountains. This stronghold of the Koords has been known and noted from time immemorial. Some modern travellers have supposed it to be the Ecbatana of ancient history; but the Persian town of Hamadan, far to the eastward of Amadia, lays much better claim to that distinction. I visited Amadia on the same journey when I visited Elkoosh. My notices of it will best be conveyed in extracts from my journal, penned on the spot.

First, however, we may remark for a moment on the name *Amadia*, which seems to be synonymous with *castle* or *stronghold*, being derived from the word *amadh*, in Hebrew עָמַד, in Arabic عَمَدَ, and in Syriac ܥܡܕ, *to stand*; the last syllable of the name being local. This word, by the way, has been an apple of discord in modern times, being the one used in Syriac for baptism. It is, and has been, used by the Nestorians, in Syriac, from time immemorial, for that purpose. Our good Baptist brethren tell us that it means to take a standing position in the water, for baptism; but the Nestorians and their ancestors seem to have known only infant baptism. Good authorities hold that this term was adopted in the early centuries for baptism, when that rite, as applied to adults and their households, was, in a sense, synonymous with a public profession of Christianity, or taking a firm stand in favor of it. But I have too much esteem for my Baptist brethren to enter the lists of controversy with them; and I could only wish that, like the Baptists in England, they would open their communion to their Pedo-baptist brethren, and few would then object to their adherence to *their form* of a *rite*. So much for the name "Amadia."

May 26. We started a little after sunrise. Our course, the first half of the stage, was northeast, through a delightful valley containing several villages with many wheatfields and vineyards and a heavy growth of gallnut oaks. We gradually ascended, passing near a large brook, till we reached the head of the valley, which is considerably elevated, where a small party of nomadic Koords had their encampment. Much of the mountain bounding this valley on the southeast is red sandstone, with a superincumbent crust of limestone; while the whole of the opposite ridge, on the

northwest, is limestone. The pass at the head of this valley introduced us to the great valley of Amadia, stretching, in a transverse direction of the one we had followed, far away to the east and the west, reaching and passing the river Zab in the former direction, and extending to the Tigris in the latter. This valley is from six to ten miles broad, and contains a great number of villages, much cultivation, and a rich growth of the gall-nut oak. Near the top of this pass, on the north side, is a pure spring of fine water, with a spacious pool built below it for bathing. The tall poplars around it reminded us of Oroomiah. This valley may rather be called a low region of ravines and ridges, these succeeding each other, crosswise of the valley, in almost endless succession, though they are not so rocky or rough as to prevent cultivation.

We wound our way down the high range in a northeast direction. We had now entered the district of Supua, which includes Amadia, the general name of the country thence to Mosul being Baden. The town of Amadia soon appeared in the valley, far to the eastward, perched on a high, isolated hill, resembling at this distance a truncated cone. One of our companions inquired of our Koordish muleteer the distance. He replied, eight hours The Nestorian questioned the truth of this statement (the town appearing near), which the Koord strongly resented; and we soon had occasion to change our opinions, as we descended, and our course turned toward the east, leading down the steep ravines and again up them for many a weary league.

[Passing the incidents of the Sabbath, May 27th, spent in a village in this valley, the journal is renewed on Monday morning].

May 28. We again started with the rising sun. Our course now lay a little to the south of east, and in four hours we reached Amadia. Passing near the base of the northern mountain range, our road was less uneven than it would have been in the centre or lower part of the valley, where the ravines are deeper and the ridges higher. Most of the small streams of the ravines, rising in the mountains on the north side of the valley, run toward the south. These ravines and ridges continued in quick succession all the way to Amadia.

On reaching the town we found its situation to be just what it had appeared in the distance, when we caught our first view of it on descending into the great valley. It *is* a truncated cone of rock, somewhat higher than the countless ridges of the valley, and thus commanding a grand view of them. We crossed a small river, by an arched stone bridge, near the base, and then wound our way, by a zigzag course, up the cone. Its sides are strown with loose, isolated rocks, and at the top it is strongly guarded by a perpendicular rim of solid rock, from forty to seventy feet high, frowning defiance on every side. This cone, capped with the town, is on the north side of the valley and separated from the mountain range only by the deep ravine of the small river. It would require no great stretch

of imagination to suppose Amadia a favorite resort of Nimrod, the mighty hunter.

Near the top of the ascent we passed a beautiful spring, which supplies the town, the water being carried into it by skins. We entered the town through a natural break in the cliff, by a strong gateway of beautifully hewn stone, with iron sheeted doors. The even plane of the town is about three fourths of a mile in diameter. The northern half is covered with buildings and ruins, and the rest is a grassy plot, mostly covered with a great graveyard, and a fort on the southern brink of the cliff. The town is still much in ruins, having been taken and sacked by the famous Mohammed Pasha of Ravendooz, and more recently having been besieged and subdued by the Turks. It is naturally very strong; yet it may be so readily commanded from the mountain side, the plane of the town being on a level with the top of the natural wall, or rocky rim or hoop, that it cannot stand before ordnance, though so impregnable to the weapons of ancient warfare, or small arms.

The valley had gradually narrowed as we proceeded from the west; but it stretched still far to the eastward of the town, running into broken ranges, which send their waters on toward the Zab.

There are now in Amadia only about two hundred families, where there were formerly fifteen hundred. Sixty of these two hundred families are Jews, who speak the Syriac. A company of Turkish soldiers are there to guard the town and aid in governing the district. Amadia has no bazaar worthy of the name, though that name is applied to a few shabby shops among the ruins.

We lodged at the house of Kasha Mando, a Nestorian priest. He was himself at the village of Davia (Monastery) or Mar Abd Esho, three miles from the town, where he spends the summer. There are in the town only twenty Nestorian families. In the district there are many villages of Nestorians, most of whom have been converted by Papists. Priest Mando came towards evening. He was a pleasant, intelligent man, about fifty years old. He told us that formerly there were one hundred Nestorian families in Amadia, four fifths of whom have scattered. He related to us, in a graphic manner, the circumstances of the capture of the town by the Turks, a few years before, from the rebellious Koords; how the balls and bombs suddenly came rattling down upon the houses, most terrifically, in a manner altogether new and strange in these regions.

There is a mosque in Amadia, which has a very tall minaret of hewn stone, of almost unequalled beauty of structure and proportions. Tradition says that it was built two hundred years ago, by an Armenian, who was so perfect a workman that the Koordish chief of the town ordered his hands to be cut off when he had finished this structure, that he might never build another elsewhere, to rival it.

May 29. We passed over the plain of Amadia, and followed the cliff

half around the fortress. We found the graveyards to be of great extent — quite as large as the inhabited part of the town — which would indicate its antiquity. The waters of the Zab are visible from Amadia, about twelve miles to the southeast. The trees and grassy patches in the cultivated dales below appeared very beautiful as viewed from the rocky height.

Priest Mando had quite a collection of ancient Syriac manuscripts. We were anxious to purchase a *Baet Mootwee* (a portion of the Old Testament) to aid us in preparing a copy for the press; but he declared that he would much sooner part with his head than the book; and no importunity on the part of our helpers could induce him to change his decision. When told that we only wished it to aid us in printing correct copies of the scriptures, he said: "Our people would not hear us read from one of your printed copies; they would say: 'these are not the books of our fathers, and will lead us astray.'"

Toward evening we walked out and sat down among the ruins on the brink of the rocky rampart. Within a few feet of us was a tank cut into the solid rock, perhaps a hundred feet deep, as a reservoir of rain water, to provide for the contingency of a seige, when the springs without would be inaccessible. Nature seems to have formed this remarkable place for stormy scenes and bloody men; and art has somewhat improved on nature's work. None but an ardent mountaineer could describe, as priest Mando did, the falling and bursting bombs, among families and social circles, when the town was in a state of seige.

In wide contrast with our associations of war and blood, suggested by the ruins and the rampart, lay the sweet, smiling dell, on the stream far below us, filled with thrifty walnut and many other trees, and skirted by little cultivated patches, spreading out a miniature paradise of rural simplicity and quiet, and presenting, by the side of the frowning height on which we sat, a striking peace scene. Our eyes also wandered over the almost endless succession of ridges and ravines, looming, like vast furrows, across the valley, westward far toward the Tigris, now strikingly contrasting bright sunny streaks with alternate shade, under the last rays of the setting sun; the varied shapes of those ridges and ravines also presenting myriads of diamond forms, and different hues, from the emerald grass and trees, to white, bare earth, brown sterile rock, and vermilion sandstone — the whole being an assemblage of nature's freaks on a magnificent scale, such as I had never seen before, and all the more interesting as associated with this primitive land.

May 30. We went out three miles to the east of Amadia, to the village and ancient church of Mar Abd Esho, which has long been considered a Christian appendage to the town. We crossed the deep ravine that sweeps around the town on the north, by a natural, level, rocky pass, a few feet wide — a remarkable formation, as though struck out by the Creator's hand, on purpose for a highway from the lofty fortress to the country,

without descending and again ascending through the deep ravine. Our road led along the foot of the great mountain range. The village and church of Mar Abd Esho (Saint Servant of Christ), is situated in a narrow ravine in the base of the mountain, which is filled with trees, many of the walnuts being very large. There were also clusters of fig-trees and pomegranates, and grape-vines fantastically climbing the tallest walnuts. Among the trees, which form an almost continuous forest, are small terraced gardens, rising successively from the fields far below; and cool springs of the finest water were gushing from beneath the rocks. At the head of the village is the church of Mar Abd Esho. From every appearance, we judged it to be the oldest Nestorian church we had seen. Priest Mando told us, that in one of their ancient books its date is recorded, which runs back three hundred and sixty years before Mohammed. We are not of course fully prepared to endorse that date. The church consists of three successive arched chapels, each of considerable size, separated by walls of vast thickness and strength. There is a communication between these chapels by wide doors.

Mar Abd Esho was in former times a monastery. The steep cliff above the village, is full of natural cells, of various forms and sizes, some of them possessing almost the regularity of rooms, with door and chimney. They are now occupied by the villagers as stables — a much better appropriation of them than when tenanted by the choir monks of bygone ages. Yet, could they speak, what a chapter of church history might these venerable cliffs reveal. We inquired of priest Mando how long it is since this place was occupied as a monastery. He replied, that nobody knows; but that there was a New Testament, written on parchment, taken from the church by Mr. Kanaw, British consul at Mosul, which purports to have been written by a monk of Mar Abd Esho six hundred years ago.

Our mission have now a young Nestorian preacher stationed in the town of Amadia, and another in this village of the monastery, Mar Abd Esho, and members of our mission frequently visit these ancient localities. Thus in the beautiful figure of an oriental Christian, while the natural light rises from the East, spiritual light, in this age, comes from the West.

2. Letter from Rev. George C. Hurter, Beirût, Syria, May, 23, 1863.

Having recently returned from a visit to Mount Sinai, I thought you would be interested in the discovery of a spring of water under the east side of Mount Horeb, which I cannot learn has been noticed by any traveller who has written on Sinai; but which is so striking that had it been seen, it would certainly have been mentioned. Travellers generally go to the convent and lodge there during their sojourn at Sinai, and those who prefer to remain outside the convent pitch their tents on the usual camping

ground at the entrance of Wady Shu'eib, and near the east side of the Wady, under, or close by, a little hill, where we also encamped. Travellers almost always take dragomen with them, and never attend to the supply of water for the prosecution of their journey. Not having a dragoman with us, we had to attend to the filling of the barrels ourselves. In coming towards Mount Horeb we took the road followed by Dr. Robinson by the Wady er-Râhah. On page 89 of the first volume of his Rersearches he says: "On the left of Horeb, a deep and narrow valley runs up S. S. E. between lofty walls of rock, as if in continuation of the S. E. of the plain. In this valley, at the distance of nearly a mile from the plain, stands the convent." On the east side of this valley is a small hill separated from the mountain by a road about one hundred feet across, which travellers follow in going to the convent from Wady es-Sheikh; while those who go to the convent by Wady er-Râhah pass on the west side of the hill. On the south side of this hill is the camping ground, and in getting to it we made a short circuit of five minutes ride to avoid a precipitous bank. On arriving at our camping ground, we requested our camel-drivers, before dispersing to their homes, to fill our barrels with water. They said they would take two of them to a spring where there was a reservoir in which they would place them. They pointed out to us the direction on the west side of the valley under Horeb, and we perceived a few trees at that place. Towards evening I told my party that I would go and see whether they had filled and sunk the barrels in the pool. The direction of the spring was straight across the valley from the camping ground. After leaving the tents, in about two minutes I ascended the ground where we made the circuit, then passed down a slight declivity, after which the ground gradually rose until I reached the spring, in about ten minutes, by a rugged path, over large boulders of Sinaite granite. Here I was surprised to find a fine spring of pure water issuing from a rent in the rock; the rent was in an oblique direction, the highest part of it on the left, and sloping down towards the right. The lowest part of the fissure was as high as a man's head from the ground. The surrounding rock is the solid red granite of Sinai, smooth on its face and unbroken by fissure or seam. The fissure is about six feet long, about four inches wide, five inches deep at the bottom and twelve at the top, and runs down into the rock parallel with the perpendicular side of the mountain; the water seems to issue about two feet above the bottom of the rent, flowing over the lowest part of it in a stream about the thickness of a man's finger. The reservoir is about twelve feet long by five feet in width, and four feet deep, and was nearly full when I reached the place. When full the water is let off to irrigate some twenty or more fruit trees. As I was the first (as far as I am aware) to observe this singular "rent" in the "Rock of Horeb," and am unable to find any allusion to it in the books of Burckhardt, Robinson, Stanley, or other travellers, I have thought it my duty to inform the public of the fact, in order that

future travellers may not fail to see it. Could we suppose that Moses had a rod about six feet long, and that, raising the lower end of it as high as his head, he struck it obliquely against the granite cliff, and that a wedge-shaped cavity was thus miraculously formed, this rent would meet the conditions exactly.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Lewin's Siege of Jerusalem.

The Siege of Jerusalem by Titus, is the title of a recent contribution toward the topography of the ancient city, — an octavo of five hundred pages, from the pen of Thomas Lewin, Esq., M. A., of Trinity College, Oxford.[1] The volume is composed of three distinct parts. The first one hundred pages describe, in a graphic and spirited manner, the siege of the city by Titus, giving in the form of a regular and compact narrative, all the salient points of the story as told by Josephus, and guarding against the exaggerations into which the Jewish historian was betrayed through his flattery of Titus on the one hand, and upon the other, by his animosity toward certain leaders among his own countrymen. Mr. Lewin has succeeded in throwing about one of the most familiar, and even hackneyed, events of history a freshness and reality, that secures at once the attention of the reader, and sustains it to the end. We object, however, to the importance which he ascribes to the works of Josephus as collateral evidence for the Christian history.

"For the halo of light which the Wars and Antiquities have thrown upon the Christian religion we ought to be deeply grateful. Had these works not come down to us, what a cloud of darkness would have hung over the birth and rise of Christianity!" But why so? The birth and rise of Christianity are recorded in the four Gospels and in the book of Acts by historians who, to say the least, are as trustworthy as Josephus; and the comparison of these books with the Old Testament well illustrates the connection of Christianity with Judaism. By every fair canon of historical criticism, Luke should be accepted as an authority for the rise of Christianity, though unsustained, and even contradicted, by a hostile

[1] London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green.
[2] Page 6.

Jewish contemporary, who was notoriously given to vanity, credulity, and exaggeration. It is as reasonable, surely, to test Josephus by Luke as to revise Luke by Josephus.

The second portion of Mr. Lewin's volume, embracing one hundred and twenty-five pages, gives the journal of the author's visit to Jerusalem. There is in this little of interest to the classical inquirer; the new points being a full description of the bevelled stones brought to light in the excavations for the site of the Russian consulate, near the south side of the court of the Holy Sepulchre; and an account of the exploration of an ancient cistern at the southeast of Sion, within the walls, with a few items of minor importance. Indeed the journal seems to have been inserted chiefly for the purpose of certifying the reader of the author's competence, as an eye-witness, to discuss the topography of Jerusalem. In this view it serves as an introduction to the third and principal portion of the work: A Sketch of the Topography of Jerusalem from the earliest Times down to the Siege by Titus. In this essay the author vindicates, at much length, the positions assumed in his preliminary narrative of the siege.

How much controversy about the historical sites in the Holy City would have been spared, had Josephus been a little more explicit upon one or two points; had he furnished us a plan of the city walls in his day, or thought to mention whether the Lower City lay to the east, to the north, or to the northeast of the Upper! But even his more elaborate descriptions of the city are so marred by omissions, and so confused by seeming contradictions, that it is impossible to construct a plan of Jerusalem upon the general platform of the modern city, which will harmonize within itself all the data of the Jewish historian together with the topographical data derived from the Old Testament scriptures and the Apocrypha. Two hills, the one loftier than the other, separated by the Tyropoean valley, upon whose brink the houses stood face to face, the lower hill gibbous or crescent-shaped, the *two* hills starting from a common neck or plateau upon the north, but upon all other sides surrounded by deep ravines — such were the salient features of Jerusalem as described both by Josephus and by Tacitus. Next, a subordinate hill, still lower than the second, formed the platform of the temple, originally separated [*quere* from Acra or from the city] by a broad valley, which was filled up under the dynasty of the Asmoneans. Lastly, a fourth hill, Bezetha, lying toward the north, which was enclosed by the wall of Agrippa. To these general outlines must be added various incidental allusions to walls, gates, towers, palaces, etc., to make up the confused data of Josephus.

Upon the platform of the modern city it is easy to identify the first or highest hill, though there may be a question as to its terminus upon the north — whether at the Jaffa gate or beyond. The temple hill is represented by the enclosure of the Haram, and the outlet of the Tyropoean is marked by the pool of Siloam. But beyond these obvious identifications,

there lies a mass of confusion which only engineering and excavation — unearthing the Jerusalem of the past from the debris of ages — can arrange with even tolerable satisfaction. Meantime a gleam of light is occasionally thrown upon the obscurity by some chance discovery, and the collocation of such isolated facts may by and by lead to a reconstruction of the city as it stood in the time of Christ. Mr. Lewin has labored assiduously for this end, and we here give in outline his results, without following the details of the discussion.

1. The *High Town* was exclusively confined to the hill now called Sion; beginning at the Jaffa gate, and enclosed by the Tyropoean valley on the north and east, and by the valley of Hinnom on the west and south.

2. The *Low Town* lay principally on the eastern hill, called Moriah, at the north, and Ophel on the south. Its settlement began upon Ophel, where was the proper city of David, and afterward the palace of Solomon It was enlarged by the acquisition of the temple area, and subsequently extended over upon the western hill. This extension formed the Inner Low Town or Acra; the temple platform was the Middle Acra; and the Outer Acra lay upon Ophel.

3. The Asmonean valley is that which descends obliquely from the Damascus gate to the Haram, where it falls into the Tyropoean.

4. The *New Town* occupied all the northern portion of the city from the Jaffa gate on the west to the northeastern end of the Temple platform, exclusive of the tract comprised within the second wall. The course of the second wall, therefore, lay to the east of the church of the Holy Sepulchre, which Mr. Lewin regards as the true site of the crucifixion.

Mr. Lewin argues these points with much ingenuity of research, and he has constructed, in the main, a plausible and self-consistent theory. Yet the reader of Josephus will see that it is hardly possible to adjust some of his statements to this topography; and Mr. Lewin sometimes twists a word or a sentence of Josephus to suit his plan, not content to assume, with most archaeologists, that the castle at the Jaffa gate represents the tower of Hippicus, he makes the extravagant assumption that the three towers, Hippicus, Phasaelus, and Mariamne were all embraced within the present area of the El-Kalah or castle of David.

Mr. Lewin occasionally forgets his former positions, while pressing a new point of argument. Thus, to make the point that the Millo of David was the castle of the Jebusites at the north, he says, "Millo, in Hebrew means simply a *citadel*."[1] But when, a little later, he would argue that the Millo of Solomon was the walled platform of the Temple, he tells us that "Millo signifies literally, in Hebrew, a filling up or embankment; so that, from the force of the word itself, we look around in search of some great *earthwork*."[2]

[1] Page 237. [2] Page 256.

Again, he argues that David's palace and "city" were in the Low Town, inasmuch as "Solomon brought up the daughter of Pharaoh out of the city of David unto the house that he had built for her," that is, she was "brought *up* from the Lower Town in Ophel." Yet, a few pages later, he endeavors to prove that Solomon's palace stood upon Ophel, in the Lower Town, below the Temple platform, "in the quadrangular area now the garden of El-Aksa."[1]

But these incongruities do not seriously detract from a work which is really a valuable contribution to the topography and archaeology of the Holy City. J. P. T.

HODGE'S COMMENTARY ON ROMANS (last edition).

Darling's Encyclopaedia Bibliographica, published in London in 1859, gives the titles of more than three thousand separate books, which had then been written and published on the Apostle Paul and his Epistle to the Romans. It is not at all probable that that respectable bookseller, Mr. Darling, had discovered all the books on this subject which had then been written; and it is certain that the number has been considerably increased since. Every letter of every one of these books must have been laboriously traced by a living hand; every single type must have been placed separately in the composing-stick by the fingers of a compositor. There must have been proof-reading, justifying, press-work for every page, and then folding, stitching, binding, etc., for every volume, and some copies of each work must have found more or less of venders, purchasers, and readers. It would have been enough to drive the apostle crazy, if he were put upon calculating how many human fingers in all after ages would be meddling with his work; and the manner of meddling, in many instances, if he could have foreseen it, would have been still more trying. Of these three thousand writers and more, some probably wrote because they felt an impulse to write which they could not easily suppress; others, with the desire of doing good; others, excited by controversy; many, in the expectation of literary celebrity; a few, perhaps, that they might put a piece of bread in their mouths (and a small piece they probably found it); and all, with the hope of being read and attended to. How many of these three thousand have had their hopes realized? How many of them at this day are noticed or even known?

Yet with all these three thousand, the perfect commentary has not to this day been written. Perhaps each one of these books has done something, either positively or negatively, toward progress; they have, for the most part, afforded a harmless employment to the writers, and this is something:

"For Satan finds some mischief still
For idle hands to do";

[1] Page 268.

and type-founders, type-setters, printers, paper-makers, bookbinders, publishers, booksellers, etc., have all had some share in the benefit. Well, one cannot help thinking, with the wise man, "of making many books there is no end."

This last edition of Dr. Hodge's work is a decided improvement on all the editions which have preceded it. The Apostle Paul does not seem to be quite so much under the pupilage of Dr. Alexander the elder as he was at first. He speaks rather more freely and breathes easier than he did. The book is very well and ably written, both as to matter and style. The expositions are good, except where the author is bemired in the intricacies of an abstruse and comparatively modern theology, which the apostle never heard or dreamed of, and which aid in the interpretation of the epistle about as much as the differential calculus would help a boy to understand the multiplication table.

In the fifth of Romans Paul says nothing about Adam's posterity having had a *fair probation* in him; he does not even give a hint that Adam's descendants might be justly punished for sins which they had never committed, provided only that God would *impute* Adam's sin to them, though it would be very wrong for God thus to punish them if he did not first make that imputation to them. Paul had never learned to call Adam the federal head and representative of his race; nor did he talk of forensic or judicial proceedings on the part of our Creator in his dealings with his creatures. All expressions of this kind are the inventions of men much further from Christ than Paul was; inventions probably at first well meant to escape from metaphysical difficulties; but as to all practical purposes at the present day, they are like helping a man out of the mire by covering him over with clay.

We do not know that there is any special objection to the use of such terms as theological technics or the metaphorical expression of the results of philosophical speculation; but we cannot see that they have, or can have, any other uses. Examine carefully Dr. Hodge's elaborate discussion of Rom. v. 12 – 21. Let us state a case by way of illustration; unhappily a case that is very familiar and of every day occurrence. A brilliant, prosperous young man becomes intemperate, and sinks down, down to brutal, senseless, idiotic drunkenness. He has an accomplished, sensitive wife, and beautiful, intelligent daughters. They suffer all the evils of poverty, hunger, cold, destitution, as much as, even more than he does, and tenfold more than he does, from the agonies of a conscious degradation. This is the fact, the hard, cruel fact, as it exists to this day in thousands of cases, and as it has existed every day for thousands of years. Now, does it relieve the matter at all, does it make the fact one whit more intelligible or easier to bear, to say that the husband is the federal head and representative of the wife and children; that in him they had had a fair probation, that therefore it is right in God to impute his sin to them, and having imputed it to them, it is then

right in him to punish them with so terrible a punishment for sins which they had never committed, though it would have been very wrong in him to do so if he had not imputed the sins of the husband and father to them? If it is unjust to make posterity suffer for the sin of the ancestor, how does it diminish the injustice, even entirely take it away, to add falsehood to cruelty?

It is a fact clearly stated by the apostle, that, as a consequence of Adam's sin, all his posterity sin and suffer. This fact has its counterpart in every page of human history. Everywhere and every day human creatures, and other creatures also, do suffer intensely for sins which they have never committed, and simply in consequence of their involuntary and unavoidable connection with others who have committed these sins. Now does it help the matter at all to call these sufferings punishments; to say that those who did commit the sins are the representatives of those who did not commit them; that in the former the latter had a fair probation, and therefore it is right that the sins of the former should be imputed to the latter, and that this imputation renders it right for God to subject them to the most terrible punishments for sins which they had never even dreamed of committing? It does seem to us that it must require a long theological training to acquire the faculty of finding relief in any such intricacies as these; as well call the gout music, and then insist upon it that it affords a most pleasurable sensation. We must think (with reverence be it spoken, and begging every-body's pardon) there is a vast amount of solemn nonsense spoken and written on this subject. There are mysteries and difficulties in the character and condition of God's creatures, so far as known to us; but the explanations and alleviations proposed by theologians are often tenfold more trying than the mysteries and difficulties themselves.

The philological treatment of this passage (Rom. v. 12 – 21) is exceedingly defective. Dr. Hodge makes no account whatever of the Greek article (vs. 15, 17, 19) which Paul here uses with such significancy and precision. On Dr. Hodge's exposition the passage ought to teach, and must teach, clear, blank universalism, that is, the final restoration of all mankind, without exception, to holiness and happiness.

Chap. vii. 12 – 25 Dr. Hodge understands of the converted man, and of the converted man exclusively. But he admits, what, indeed, every one sees at a glance, that the preceding verses from vi. 1 are designed to show that the doctrine of justification by faith does not lead to sin, but to holiness; that, as man is, it is the law that leads to sin, and it is the gospel, and the gospel only, that does or can, in the present state of things, lead to holiness. If, then, the conclusion of the apostle's arguments on this point (vs. 7 – 25) applies exclusively to the converted man under the gospel, and not at all to the unconverted man under the law, has he not reversed his own argument, and shown conclusively that as to producing sanctification the gospel has no advantage over the law — that both law and gospel

here are equally inefficacious? Does not the very exigency of the apostle's argument require that the subject be not considered here as converted or unconverted, but as under the law or under the gospel; as seeking, whether converted or unconverted, to become holy by the law rather than by the gospel? This brings everything to its proper place, and makes the argument complete. As matter of fact it is true that every man must be either converted or unconverted; but abstraction is often a very important element in carrying on a sound argument.

We are on the whole gratified with the exposition of that most brilliant and exhilarating chapter, the eighth, though to some statements and criticisms we should take exceptions; and substantially the same remark we should make on the exegesis of the ninth chapter.

On the eleventh chapter Dr. Hodge does not tell us distinctly what it is that the Jews fell from, nor what it is that they are to be restored to. That it was not the opportunity of individual salvation that they fell from is perfectly plain, for, so far as this was concerned, they stood on precisely the same ground that the Gentiles did, and actually quite as many of the Jews in proportion to the whole number were then converted and saved as there was of the Gentiles (see Acts xxi. 20; xi. 21; v. 15; v. 5; ii. 94). What was it, then, that the Jews had lost, and which must be restored to them? Nothing, unless it was their pre-eminence as the church of God on earth. In what particular method their restoration will take place Paul does not say; the fact of such a restoration he distinctly affirms.

Our judgment of this commentary is, on the whole, very favorable, both as to its ability and great correctness. It has decided merits as well as glaring faults; and will well reward a discriminating and diligent study.

The great theological conflict, beginning with what is generally called the New Haven controversy, wrong as it was in some of its incidents, has resulted in great good. It has led to more careful definitions; it has at least partially dethroned the old dogmatists, whose word before was law; it has made necessary a closer and wider study of dogmatic history and the original scriptures; and has increased a mutual charity by enlarging the basis of investigation. The commentary of Dr. Hodge, as it appears in this edition, could not have been written at Princeton twenty-five years ago.

C. E. S.

Manning and Brown University.[1]

The title of this volume expresses the double purpose of its author; namely, to furnish a biography of Dr. Manning and a history of Rhode Island College under his presidency. Such a work will be read with

[1] Life, Times, and Correspondence of James Manning, and the Early History of Brown University. By Reuben Aldridge Guild. Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1864.

delight by the friends of sound learning, and especially by the Alumni of Brown University; for common tradition ascribes to Dr. Manning eminent abilities as well as usefulness, and to the college under his administration marked success. Moreover, the recent centennial anniversaries of the college and the Baptist church in Warren, remind us that a memoir of him who was the first president of the one and the first pastor of the other has not appeared too soon. "Nearly three quarters of a century have elapsed since he passed from earth. Of all Dr. Manning's intimate associates, and of his numerous pupils, not one is now living to aid by personal recollections any endeavor to embody, in a suitable form, memorials of his character and deeds." It is also to be remembered, that the records necessary to a proper delineation of his life were liable to perish, as, indeed, many of them had already perished. "The greater portion of Dr. Manning's papers," says Mr. Guild, "being loosely kept in barrels, were, through a sad mistake which good housewives sometimes make, unfortunately destroyed. These papers comprised, without doubt, private diaries, important narratives, records pertaining to the church, the college, the association; in short, ample materials for his own personal history and the history of his times." We are therefore grateful to the accomplished librarian of Brown University for gathering up the scattered leaves which remain, and by careful study preparing for us this goodly volume.

But was it wise to unite the biography and the history in one work? Would not the former have been more interesting and equally instructive, if only such references to the college had been made as were necessary to a description of the labors and character of Dr. Manning? And would not the latter have been more instructive and equally entertaining, if it had been given to the public in a volume by itself? Why attempt to carry along two distinct threads of narrative, and thus distract the reader's attention? It must be weighty reasons which justify a writer in undertaking so difficult a task. Do they exist in the present case? Dr. Manning, it may be said in reply to this question, was the head of the college during his entire public life. For it he labored with great singleness of purpose and persistency of effort. For it he sundered, though with deep regret, the ties which bound him to the church in Warren. For it he at last resolved to withdraw entirely from the pastoral work which he loved. For it he wrote and journeyed and prayed. His letters bear witness to his perpetual solicitude for its prosperity, his unwearied endeavors to increase its usefulness. More than any other man the founder of the college, he was also more than any other man its life and soul for above a quarter of a century. He was a leader in nearly every movement which affected its interests while he lived, and the history of its progress is therefore the history of his enterprise and action. If now it be added, that very little is known of his childhood and youth, we shall be able to see why a biography of Dr. Manning, occupied chiefly, as it must be, with his public life,

ought to embrace a tolerably full history of Brown University during the period of his connection with it; and we shall hardly object to the insertion of such additional notices of the college as are necessary to a complete view of its position and growth under his presidency.

But what shall be said of the numerous and sometimes elaborate sketches of other men, the teachers, associates, and pupils of Dr. Manning, or the large-hearted, munificent friends of the college? Do not these sketches turn away the mind too often from the central figure, the great personality of the work, and thus enfeeble the impression which his character ought to make upon the reader? Though exceedingly valuable to the student of the past, and most gratifying to all as evidences of careful research, do they not mar the unity and simplicity of the work, and thereby diminish its power for good to the mass of men? Must not a feeling of irritation disturb the reader, when the rapid and glowing narrative is suddenly arrested by a sign inviting him to learn below, in smaller type, what is the writer's authority for the exact shade of thought expressed in the text; or how far some previous historian has misrepresented a particular event; or when and where Mr. ——, mentioned above, was born, graduated, settled, honored, and at last died? All these facts are instructive certainly, and the intelligent reader would be sorely perplexed, if required to specify any one of them which ought to be omitted; but do they not fill the book too full of truth? Do they not weaken the power of one great example, placed distinctly as in broad day before the mind, by calling attention to lesser forms dimly revealed, as in the twilight? This may be true for those who have a morbid love of excitement and a morbid dread of thinking; who delight to float on the surface, grasping at bubbles instead of diving for pearls, and who read history or biography for the same end and in the same way as they read the latest novel; but it will not be true for him who loves the paths of knowledge and understands the price which must be paid for it; who wishes to tread on firm ground in the past and to have its notable men and events set before him as they really were; who believes in history as the record of God's providence as well as man's imperfection, and would reverently study its lessons of admonition, of rebuke, and of encouragement. For such a man the subordinate sketches of this volume will be not only instructive but interesting. They will assist his imagination in reproducing the scenes of the past. Step by step they will bear him back into the society of other days, and cause him to breathe the atmosphere which surrounded the first president of Brown University.

Let us take, for instance, the single item of dates as affording aid to the imagination. The observant reader will of course be struck with the description of Dr. Manning himself. His person was graceful and his countenance remarkably expressive of sensibility, dignity, and cheerfulness; his manners were polite without affectation, his colloquial powers versatile,

his disposition amiable, and his voice an instrument of extraordinary compass and melody. Moreover, he was distinguished for sterling good sense, for superior learning, and for genuine piety. But the fact will also be noted that he was twenty-six years of age when the college was founded. Who then were the men to whom he looked for counsel, sympathy, and support in his difficult enterprise? Were they persons of his own age or much further advanced in life? Were they young, vigorous, hopeful, and perhaps rash; or were they ripe in years, mature in experience, wise in council, but slow in action? Let us look at a single group, by the assistance of these auxiliary notices. As the reflective reader passes on he will observe that Hezekiah Smith and Moses Brown were of the same age as Manning; that Samuel Stillman was one year older, John Brown two years older, Samuel Jones three, Joseph Brown five, and Nicholas Brown nine. To go no further, here is a group of seven in the prime of early manhood, from twenty-six to thirty-five years of age, forming an inner circle, it may be supposed, around their accomplished leader, understanding his views, sharing his hopes, kindled by his enthusiasm, and ready to push forward a noble enterprise to a successful issue. Other groups, composed of older men, will also gradually array themselves before the reader's mind, as, turning his eye ever and anon to the bottom of the page, he takes in at a glance the cardinal events of their history, and assigns them their appropriate places in the mental picture which his imagination is limning. We do not say that the reader will prefer thus to group the friends of Manning and Brown University. He may choose to classify them by means of their local, professional, or ecclesiastical *status*. But we say that the numerous biographies in miniature, which characterize this volume, will be of inestimable service to him in reproducing the scenes and comprehending the spirit of that age; and we have sought to illustrate this statement by showing how even dates of birth and death, the driest perhaps of all facts, may assist the imagination in giving to men their true place on the historical canvas. Indeed, it is becoming every day more and more evident that no one can be a trustworthy historian without having penetrated the mystery of dates and numbers.

But still further. Whoever would excel in this department of literature must have a well nigh religious veneration for original manuscripts and all the primary sources of historical knowledge. Feeling that nothing is too minute for his patient scrutiny, he will gather up the stray leaves and broken sentences of the past, and transform them into a well-ordered narration; for the common-place of history will be clothed with fresh interest by a writer who has explored its by-ways and hidden retreats, finding in the latter many a record with which to correct, adorn, and enrich the former. Mr. Guild has given us this sort of proof that he was inwardly called to prepare the work which has occasioned these paragraphs. We were surprised as well as delighted to find in this volume so

large a collection of Dr. Manning's letters. These are all authentic expressions of his character. They also indicate the nature and extent of his labors, especially for the college. Moreover, they are a voice from the times in which he lived, touching freely and with a Christian spirit the great questions which filled the thoughts of his contemporaries. They take us through the period of the American Revolution, and enable us to breathe again the atmosphere of freedom in heroic conflict with power. They reveal the heartiness and unanimity with which the Baptists of this country embraced the cause of the colonists, though deeming themselves oppressed in religious affairs by the standing order. And they call out a no less interesting testimony to the fact that their brethren in the old country approved their struggle for civil liberty; for in a letter to Dr. Manning, written soon after the return of peace, the Rev. John Rippon of London speaks of "the late bloody and unrighteous war," adding this remark: "I believe all our Baptist ministers in town, except two, and most of our brethren in the country, were on the side of the Americans in the late dispute" — a sign and pledge (may we not hope?) of the position which will be held by a far greater portion of honest men in the same land, should the course of its government and nobility in our present difficulties bring on, at some future day, another conflict with her power.

It was our purpose to have spoken at length of some of the lessons taught by this volume; but circumstances beyond our control have rendered it impossible. The work of Mr. Guild is, however, we believe too instructive and entertaining to escape the notice of those who wish to understand the important period of which it treats, the growth of a flourishing university or the character of a distinguished educator, patriot, and Christian. A. H.

New Edition of Webster's Dictionary.[1]

The following are the contents of the present edition: A Preface by Prof. Porter; Index to a Classified Selection of Pictorial Illustrations; Editor's Preface to the Revised Edition of 1847; Author's Preface to the Edition of 1828; Memoir of Noah Webster, by Chauncey A. Goodrich, LL.D.; A Brief History of the English Language, by James Hadley, M.A., Professor of the Greek Language and Literature in Yale College; Key to the Pronunciation; Principles of Pronunciation, with Explanations of the

[1] An American Dictionary of the English Language. By Noah Webster, LL.D. Thoroughly revised and greatly enlarged and improved, by Chauncey A. Goodrich, D.D., LL.D., late Professor of Rhetoric and Oratory, and also Professor of the Pastoral Charge, in Yale College, and Noah Porter, D.D., Clark Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics in Yale College. 4to. pp. 1768. Springfield, Mass.: C. and C. Merriam; London: Bell and Daldy. 1864.

Key; Orthography; Abbreviations and Explanations; The Dictionary proper; Explanatory and Pronouncing Vocabulary of the Names of noted Fictitious Persons and Places, including also Familiar Pseudonyms, Surnames bestowed upon Eminent Men, and such analogous popular Appellations as are often referred to in Literature and Conversation, by William A. Wheeler, M. A.; Pronouncing Vocabulary of Scripture Proper Names; Pronouncing Vocabulary of Greek and Latin Proper Names; Etymological Vocabulary of Modern Geographical Names; Pronouncing Vocabularies of Modern Geographical and Biographical Names; Pronouncing Vocabulary of Common English Christian Names, with their Derivation, Signification, etc.; Quotations, Words, Phrases, Proverbs, etc., from the Greek, the Latin, and Modern Foreign Languages; Abbreviations and Contractions used in Writing and Printing; A Classified Selection of Pictorial Illustrations.

The reader will see at a glance, that this new edition of Webster's Dictionary contains much new matter; some things which were never before published in any form. The volume stands as a monument of the fact, that no great work is the product of any one mind. We speak of Webster's Dictionary, Webster's Definitions etc.; but what we ascribe to him is often the result of severe and protracted labor expended upon his principles by his successors. Prof. Hadley's "Brief History," etc., and Mr. Wheeler's "Vocabulary" are original and highly valuable contributions to the present volume. The "List of words spelled in two or more ways" is very convenient and useful, and mitigates one objection heretofore made against Webster's orthography. The Pictorial Illustrations are neat and exact. Dr. Mahn of Berlin has revised the Etymologies of Webster, and has evinced in this revision rare learning, judgment, and skill. The etymological researches of this eminent foreigner, and the scholarship as well as tact evinced by Professors Whitney, Gilman, Dana, and others in the definitions of the present volume add an immense value to it. By comparing the definitions of the present work with those given by Johnson, Perry, Walker, and Richardson, one sees the great advance made in English philology. The vocabulary of this volume contains more than one hundred and fourteen thousand words — about ten thousand more than are found in any previous Dictionary. "At the same time, the Revisers have been actuated by no desire to swell the list to the greatest possible number. Words which were the offspring of the individual conceit of a whimsical and lawless writer, which did not conform to the analogies of the language, and which were never accepted or approved by good writers of their own or a subsequent generation have not been admitted." "Self-explaining compounds have been designedly omitted by hundreds, if not by thousands; while care has been expended to introduce and explain those which need to be defined" (Preface, p. vii). We well remember the day when our dictionaries boasted that they contained "about forty-three thousand,"

or "about seventy thousand words," and even *then* we quoted the old stanza which was written when the number of recognized terms was much smaller:

> "Let foreign nations of their language boast,
> What fine variety each tongue affords;
> I like our language, as our men and coast, —
> Who cannot dress it well want wit, not words."

Thomas Fuller says that Queen Elizabeth begun her speech at Cambridge with the words: "Et si foeminilis iste meus pudor, — elegantly making the word *foeminilis;* and well she might mint one new word, who did refine so much gold and silver." ["Moneta ad suum valorem redacta," was part of her epitaph]. On the other hand, it is reported that Marcellus said to Tiberius Cæsar: "You, Cæsar, have power to make a man a denizen of Rome, but not to make a word a denizen of the Roman language." The tendency of the present age is to confer upon almost any writer the authority for coining new terms. We think that when a word has no better authority than that of Dickens, or Thackeray, or De Quincey, it should not be admitted into an English lexicon, unless under some form of a protest. The temptation of a lexicographer is to gather up such terms as are not in current use. He may do this with safety, provided he will note the distinction between the language of *books* and that of *private* intercourse; between the *established* and the *recent*, the *usual* and the *rare*, the *respectable* and the *vulgar*, the *dignified* and the *playful*, the *general* and the *local*, the *obsolete*, the *obsolescent*, and the *present*. We are pleased to see that Webster does this often; we could wish that he had done it oftener. Mr. Gilbert Wakefield states that he collected from Milton "five hundred solid and nervous words" not to be found in Johnson's Dictionary. More than a thousand words are found in Shakspeare, which are not acknowledged by Johnson as modern English. It is important that an English lexicon designate all such terms as are not sanctioned by modern use, as the present lexicon, for example, appends [*Rare*] to the word *Stylistic*. So will the purity of our language be preserved. The first three books of Spenser's Faery Queen were published in 1590; but without the glossary appended to them would now be difficult to understand. Yet they were published only twenty-one years before our present version of the Bible. Thomas Hobbes died in 1679; yet Sir James Mackintosh says of him: "Two centuries have not superannuated more than a dozen ot his words." A preacher of the gospel needs all the helps which he can find for keeping up the purity of his style, and avoiding the archaisms as well as novelties of the day. The old rule remains good:

> "Be not the first by whom the new is tried,
> Nor yet the last to lay the old aside."

We do not intend, in this brief notice, to enter into a criticism of

Webster's Dictionary. It is more fitting to be grateful than to be critical. Our opinion is, that his definitions have been frequently undervalued, and the objections against the encyclopaediac form of his work have been overstated. It is often, indeed, quite difficult to say how far a lexicographer should proceed in explaining terms, and where he should draw the line between a dictionary and an encyclopaedia. He may aim at precision, and fail in the requisite fulness, or he may aim at fulness and fail in the requisite precision. Webster's definitions, when not full, are unusually accurate, and when not precise, are unusually plain. Often, if he had been more exhaustive than he is, he would have merged his lexicon into an encyclopaedia, and if he had been less exact than he is, he would have become obscure and enigmatical. We had intended to notice at length some of his definitions illustrating this rather remarkable fact. We will content ourselves with a single illustration — that taken from the words Discover, Invent, Contrive. Webster's third definition of Discover, is: "To obtain, for the first time, sight or knowledge of; as of a thing existing already, but not perceived or known." Now, first, a man may be said to discover what he himself had not previously seen during a certain period, although it had often been seen by him before that period, as the voyager discovers the island which is his home, but from which he has been absent for weeks or months or years. Secondly, a man may be said to discover what he himself had never seen before, although it had often been seen by others; as an immigrant to America is the first on board the ship to discover the Western Continent. Thirdly, a man may be said to discover what no one of his class or nation had previously seen, although it had been seen by men of other classes or nations; as Columbus was the first Spaniard who discovered America, and the Northmen were the first Europeans who discovered it, but America had been seen and known by men of other tribes. Fourthly, a man may be said to discover what had never been seen or known before by any of his race. In one sense a planet is discovered by two or three astronomers, each of whom supposes that it was never previously seen; but when it is ascertained that one of these astronomers detected the planet a week, or a day, or an hour before it was detected by the other claimants, he is said to have discovered it; he gains the honor of being *the* discoverer. Still Webster's general definition remains good; to discover is "to obtain *for the first time* sight or knowledge, as of a thing existing already, but *not perceived or known.*"

He says further: "We invent by forming combinations which are either entirely new, or which attain their end by means unknown before." Now we do not hesitate to say that a man invents a machine, when he discovers, *without the help of others*, such a mode of combining means for an end as was entirely new *to him*, although the same kind of machine had been known and used by other men before he was born. Nothing is more

common at the Patent Office, than to reject a real *invention* because the same invention had been patented many years before. A true inventor may hasten to have his invention recognized, lest other true inventors anticipate him. From the fact that means in their separate state have certain capabilities, a man, without any suggestion from others, infers the mode of attaining an end by certain combinations of these means: this man *invents* the method, although he may afterwards ascertain that the method was not entirely, and not at all, new to other men. Discover is the general term: Invent is *one* specific term, and denotes the discovery of a mode of attaining an end by certain combinations of means. Contrive is *another* specific term, and denotes the discovery of certain combinations of means for attaining an end. Contrive differs from Invent, as the former has prominent reference to the combinations, the latter to the mode of making the combinations; Contrive and Invent are distinguished from Discover, as the two former refer only to a change, something to be done, but the latter refers *also* to that which remains after the discovery just as it was before. Thus Herschel discovered a planet which continued just as it was; Galileo invented the telescope, which was something made by new combinations of means; Gauss contrived the means of communicating intelligence by the electric fluid. Still Webster's general definition of Invent remains good: "We invent by certain combinations of means, which are either entirely new [to the inventor or to the race], or which attain their end by means unknown before [by the inventor or by the race]."

We do not intend to assert, that the above-named definitions of Webster are as good as they might be, or that all his definitions are correct. Perfection cannot be expected in any work, least of all, perhaps, in an English dictionary. For example, we often speak of God as self-sufficient; and we mean that he is not dependent for any excellence, or for any part of his bliss, on any other being or on any other thing. But Webster gives nothing more than the following definition to this adjective, which is so frequently used to express an attribute of God: "Having full confidence in one's own strength, or abilities, or endowments; hence, haughty, overbearing." And although theologians have long spoken of the self-sufficiency of God, yet we find in Webster only the following definition of the noun self-sufficiency: "An overweening opinion of one's own strength or worth; excessive confidence in our own competence or sufficiency." Dr. Ridgely says (Vol. I. p. 127): "As his [God's] *self-sufficiency* is that whereby he has enough in himself to denominate him completely blessed, as a God of infinite perfection; so his *all-sufficiency* is that whereby he is able to communicate as much blessedness to his creatures as he is pleased to make them capable of receiving." This distinction is so well recognized, and has been so long current, that it certainly should be noticed in an English lexicon.

While we pay our debt of admiring gratitude to the Editor of this volume, and to his learned coadjutors, we must also express our thankful appreciation of the service which the Publishers of the volume have rendered our country. They have withheld no expense and no toil from the vigorous prosecution of this noble work, and we trust that their enterprise will be rewarded in some fair proportion to its merits. No English scholar can dispense with this work.

Analogy Considered as a Guide to Truth.[1]

The object of this full volume of 626 pages is to show that the principle of analogy may be applied more widely than is usually done both as a ground of belief and a help to faith in the evidences and doctrines of natural and revealed religion. It is written in a modest and excellent spirit, and includes a wide field of inquiry.

Archbishop King, and after him Dr. Copleston and Archbishop Whately, define analogy as 'a resemblance of relations or ratios,' so that there may be an analogy between things that have no direct resemblance at all. Between the seed and the plant, the egg and the bird, there is a resemblance of 'relations,' although no external likeness. "A sweet taste gratifies the palate," says Dr. Whately, "so does a sweet sound gratify the ear, and hence the same word 'sweet' is applied to both, though no flavor can resemble a sound in itself." This limitation Dr. Buchanan thinks is too narrow. While it is true to a certain extent, it omits the use which we make of analogy in connection with concrete objects and substantive realities. It is liable also, he thinks, to the objection that it is founded on a comparatively small part of human knowledge, viz. the sciences of number and quantity. Without attempting a logical definition, the author of this volume seems to apply the term to all cases where a resemblance exists.

After showing how analogy differs from metaphor, the author proceeds to indicate its ground in nature and man, its influence on thought and language, its uses for illustration, for classification and arrangement, for suggestion and discovery, and for argument and proof, and then endeavors to point out the limits and peculiar claim of this mode of reasoning.

Part II of the volume is taken up with an exhibition of the sources of Analogy in Matters of Faith. The subjects here discussed are Analogy in respect to the Laws and Conditions of Thought; in respect to the Manifestation of Truth; in respect to the Extent and Limits of Knowledge; in respect to Thought and Language; in respect to Evidences between the volumes of Nature and Revelation; between the Interpretation of Nature and Scripture; between Human and Divine Testimony; between Secular

[1] Analogy considered as a Guide to Truth, and applied as an Aid to Faith. By James Buchanan, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Systematic Theology, New College, Edinburgh.

and Religious Education; between a little Child and a Christian Disciple; between Natural and Revealed Laws; between Human and Divine Relations; between Scripture and Experience; between the Constituent Truths of Revelation; between Type and Antitype; and between the Old and New Testaments. The bare mention of these various topics shows something of the extent and order of the discussion.

The III and concluding part of the volume is devoted to Analogy applied to modern Religious Questions. These are: the Natural Proofs of Theism; the Point of view of Deism; the Claims of Rationalism; Spiritualism in Religion; Religious Liberalism; Belief in Mysteries; the Relation between Reason and Faith; the Question of Authority in Religion; the Rival Rules of Faith; the Correction of Socinian Errors.

We have thus particularly enumerated the contents of the book, in order that its scope and purpose may be understood. It is written with sufficient learning, with a high Christian purpose, and abounds in good thoughts. It is not remarkable for scientific precision and accuracy, nor is it one of those fresh and original productions whose vital force insures their permanency. Nevertheless, it will do good service in the cause of religion and learning.

The Shemitic and the Indo-Germanic Races in their Relation to Religion and Science.[1]

This volume affords a good illustration of the intellectual activity which prevails in the German universities. Professor Hupfeld assigns the following among other reasons for the superior intellectual life of these institutions: First, each university is governed in the main by its professors. They form a close corporation, fill their own vacancies, and thus decide the character of the university. It is true that the government of the state has a veto upon the action of the Academical Senate, but the nominations of the professors are generally sanctioned by government, and the universities cannot easily be made the tame servitors of the civil power. In a good degree they have maintained an independence of the state in their scientific teachings. The professors have, of course, a personal interest in the appointment of such teachers as shall honor the university and make it attractive to students from foreign lands. Instances of favoritism and nepotism in the selection of teachers are comparatively rare. Secondly, the professors appoint to the chairs of instruction such men as have accomplished something in the literary or scientific world. In France a professor must be examined before he is allowed to enter the Board of Instruction;

[1] Semiten und Indogermanen in ihrer Beziehung zu Religion und Wissenschaft. Eine Apologie des Christenthums vom Standpuncte der Völker psychologie. Von Rudolf Friedrich Grau, Lic. Theol., Repetent und Privat docent der Theologie zu Marburg. 8vo. pp. 244. Stuttgart: Verlag von S. G. Liesching 1864.

but in Germany he must publish a book, or otherwise give evidence of his power to originate as well as receive ideas. Thus the promising scholars who aspire to connect themselves with the Board of Instruction in a university are stimulated to intellectual effort. A large part of German books are written by young men who are candidates for office in a university. Thirdly, the professors receive a limited salary from the government, but also receive fees from their pupils, and are thus incited by their pecuniary, as well as other interests to make their lectures valuable as well as attractive. Fourthly, before a man is elected to a professorship he is employed as a private teacher or repetent in the university, and in this office he receives no salary from the government, but depends for his support entirely on the fees of his hearers. Here is a new stimulus to activity. As attendance upon the lectures in the university is optional, a private teacher or repetent may attract a larger number of auditors than are attracted by a regular professor. The professor is thus constantly spurred on to exertion, by the fear that the lectures of the young candidate will supersede his own. In this manner is he delivered from the temptations to indolence. He has the conviction that unless he remain wakeful and keep himself abreast of his age, his lecture-room will be empty, and his former hearers will be found sitting at the feet of the youthful repetent. The repetent is not entitled to vote in the senate of the professors, but in the lecture-room he may have as much authority and power as his character will give him, and may here surpass the most venerable of the professors.

This rivalry between the young and the old instructors, affecting as it does their pecuniary condition as well as their literary fame, gives an animation to the German universitylife, which is unknown in this country. Often the rivals are bosom friends, and scorn to perform any act which is not honorable and kindly. Often, of course, it is not so. The youthful teachers are tempted to originate new theories, and to attract attention by a dazzling literature, rather than by real wisdom. Still there is activity, even where sound judgment is sacrificed to a parade of learning. The evils are incident to a system which keeps up a vigilant spirit among the professors.

Fifthly, if the repetents prove themselves to be well qualified for the work of teaching, they are nominated by the professorial senate, first, to the office of Professor Extraordinarius, and if they are successful in this office, they are nominated to the station of Professor Ordinarius, each successive post bringing an increased emolument. The Rectorship of the university is still another prize held out before the Professor Ordinarius, whose entire life, indeed, is filled with incentives to fresh activity.

The author of the volume before us is one of those young men, who, within a few years, have entered on their career of authorship. Although he still remains a repetent at Marburg, he enjoys a high promise of distinction in this or some other university. The present volume will open

to him the path of preferment. Already he has attracted to his lecture-room a larger number of students than listen to some of the eminent and highly meritorious professors at Marburg, and the animated style of this volume affords clear proof that he is skilled in imparting truth, as well as in garnering it into his own mind. It is an earnest of many and rich fruits yet to be received from his study. His tendencies are toward the high orthodoxy of the German Lutheran church, and he is in close sympathy with such divines as Vilmar, Hengstenberg, and Phillippi.

Stated in brief, the design of this volume is to elucidate the difference between the Shemitic and the Indo-Germanic races, and thence to derive a clear view of the difference between the Christian system, which is Shemitic, and the systems of mere science, of naturalism, of paganism, which are Indo-Germanic. The design of the volume is thus to oppose the fundamental principles of Renan and Strauss, and to form an energetic apology for Christianity.

Messrs. Sheldon and Company, New York, have published, in two volumes, "Explanatory Lectures on the Heidelberg Catechism," by George W. Bethune, D.D. These Lectures grew out of a requirement of the Dutch Reformed church in this country that the pastor should go through the exposition of the Catechism once in four years, giving to the congregation on the Sabbath a view of the doctrines taught in it. Forty-seven Lectures are here published. The number would have been extended to about fifty had the author lived to complete the work. The subjects presented are the most important in the theological science, and they are treated in a popular manner, in the pure and finished style for which the author was distinguished. The volumes contain a valuable exposition of the leading doctrines of the Bible; and most of the views presented will meet with a hearty assent: in a few instances there is ground for objection.

The beauty and richness of these Lectures will remind the reader of Leighton (12mo. 1864).

President Woolsey of Yale College has prepared a second and much improved edition of his "Introduction to the Study of International Law." The subject of neutral and belligerent rights has assumed new importance in this country since the first edition appeared, and is now fully and thoroughly treated. While the work discusses the most important and intricate questions of state polity, it presents them in a manner attractive and clear, even to those who have not given special attention to the subject.

In England and France persons are educated expressly for diplomatic service; while in this country political prominence is generally the immediate cause of diplomatic appointments. To meet this defect in our own course of education this work is eminently adapted, by its clearness, vigor of thought and admirable arrangement. And especially now, when we are

in the midst of a gigantic war, and are liable to foreign intervention, it becomes us to study the issues that may be presented, and to be ready to decide with fairness the intricate questions which are daily presented to us.

Every one who wishes to be able to form in his own mind an opinion on these great questions, and to settle them for himself, will find this an invaluable help in prosecuting such a study. It will also be found a valuable text book in our Colleges. (8vo. pp. 441. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864).

"Ancient Law," by Henry S. Maine, is an exposition of the growth of legal ideas — of the expansion of the law of the ancients to meet our broader views of justice.

The author presents the progress of law, from the rude decisions of the earlier kings of Rome to the clearer dicta of the "Twelve Tables," until, by the gradual infusion of Greek skill and learning, useless ceremonies were discarded, and the law approached its present form under the Justinian Code. He explains the gradual development of the principles of equity, by means of "legal fiction" and legislation, until it has reached its present high position in English and American jurisprudence. He also shows the great debt we owe to the past for the persistent efforts of the men of earlier times to elevate the standard of legal practice.

Quite a large portion of the book is devoted to the origin and progress of certain departments of modern law; for instance, the chapter on conveyancing will serve to elucidate what must seem to many, mere forms to which the legal practitioner is constitutionally wedded. The work throughout shows great research and ingenuity. Mr. Maine has filled a gap in our literature which has long remained vacant. To all, not to jurists merely, but to students who wish to understand the growth of constitutional government, which is founded on a liberal rendering of equity, we can commend this book. (8vo. pp. 400. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864.)

A Hebrew Chrestomathy; or Lessons in Reading and Writing Hebrew. By William Henry Green, Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. J. 12mo. pp. 261. New York: John Wiley, 535 Broadway. 1864.— This volume is accurately printed; the selections, as well of elementary forms for the exercise of the pupil as of passages for reading from both the prose and poetry of the Old Testament, are judicious, and sufficiently varied and extended; and the notes are accurate and valuable. Immediately following the vocabulary is a classification of nouns "according to the character of their ultimate syllable," which we have long believed to be the true principle, not, indeed, for a philosophical discussion of the forms of nouns in their relation to each other and to the roots from which they spring, but for the student's aid in the elementary part of his

course. The volume forms a good accompaniment to Prof. Green's Hebrew Grammar.

In connection with the above it is in place to add, that the "Indexes to Green's Hebrew Grammar," issued, we believe, subsequently to the publication of the Grammar itself, are of great value, adding much to the worth of the original volume.

We have received from Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway, New York, the following works:

The Dawn of Heaven; or, the Principles of the Heavenly Life applied to the Earthly. By the late Rev. Joseph A. Collier, of Kingston, N. Y. With a brief biographical sketch of the author. 12mo. pp. 305.

God's Way of Holiness. By Horatius Bonar, D.D., Author of "God's Way of Peace," "Hymns of Faith and Hope," etc. 12mo. pp. 261.

The Cedar Christian; and other Practical Papers and Personal Sketches. By Theodore L. Cuyler, Pastor of the Lafayette Avenue Church, Brooklyn. 12mo. pp. 215.

The Martyrs of Spain, and the Liberators of Holland. By the Author of "the Schönberg-Cotta Family." 12mo. pp. 400.

Egypt's Princes. A Narrative of Missionary Labor in the Valley of the Nile. By Julian Lansing, Missionary of the United Presbyterian Church in Egypt. 12mo. pp. 426.

History of the Reformation in Europe in the Time of Calvin. By J. H. Merle D'Aubigné, D.D., Author of the History of the Reformation in the Sixteenth Century. Vol. III., France, Switzerland, Geneva. 12mo. pp. 463.

Notes, Critical and Explanatory, on the Book of Genesis. From the Creation to the Covenant. By Melancthon W. Jacobus, Professor of Biblical Literature and Exegesis in the Theological Seminary at Alleghany, Pa. 12mo. pp. 304. — This volume will be reviewed in a future Number.

We have received from Carlton and Porter, 200 Mulberry Street, New York, the Life and Times of Nathan Bangs, D.D. By Abel Stevens, LL.D., Author of "the History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism." 12mo. pp. 426. — Dr. Bangs was distinguished, not only as a philanthropist and a Christian, but also as an author and a theological controversialist. His controversies with Mr. Williston, Mr. Haskell, and with the conductors of the Christian Spectator, will long be remembered. He was one of the best metaphysicians in the Methodist church.

A Notice of "Religion and Chemistry," by Professor Cooke of Harvard University, prepared for this Number, is omitted, as the work will be reviewed hereafter.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

WORKS ON THE LIFE OF CHRIST.[1]

BY REV. SAMUEL J. ANDREWS, HARTFORD, CONN.

THE numerous works published in Germany within the last ten or twelve years, some of the more important of which are given in the list at the foot of the page, show how deep the interest that is felt in the earthly life of our Lord. It confirms the fact, long since noticed, that the religious contests that agitate Christendom are centreing more and more

[1] Das Leben Jesu Christi. Von Dr. Joh. N. Sepp. Regensburg: 1853–1862. 6 vols.

Geschichte des Lebens Jesu Christi. Von Dr. J. H. Friedlieb. Breslau: 1855.

Das Leben Jesu Christi. Von Dr. Jordan Bucher. Stuttgart: 1859.

Francisci Xaverii Patritii e societate Jesu de Evangeliis Libri Tres. Friburgi, Brisgoviae: 1853.

Geschichte Christus und seiner Zeit. Von Heinrich Ewald. Zweite Ausgabe. Göttingen: 1857.

Das Leben Jesu. Lehrbuch zunächst für akademische Vorlesungen. Von Dr. Karl Hase. Vierte verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig: 1854.

Lebensgeschichte des Herrn Jesu Christi in Chronologischer Uebersicht. Mit erläuternden Anmerkungen von Dr. F. W. J. Lichtenstein. Erlangen: 1856.

Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte. Ein Kompendium für Geistliche und Studirende. Von Joh. H. A. Ebrard. Zweite Auflage. Erlangen: 1850.

Das Leben Jesu nach der Apokryphen. Von Dr. Rudolph Hofmann. Leipzig: 1851.

around his person. We cannot be surprised that this should be so. Christianity is no system of abstract doctrine. Christianity is Christ. It exists because he exists; and cannot be overthrown so long as he stands in the pathway of the assailant. The enemies of Christianity are not ignorant of this; and it is against him that they direct their deadliest attacks. Let the faith of men in him be destroyed; let sceptical criticism envelope in doubt the great facts of his earthly life; let the Gospels be resolved into myths or fables, and Christianity becomes an empty shell — a mere abstraction. A belief in a Supreme Being may remain, but all that is distinctive in the Christian faith passes away. Whatever tends to undermine the historic credibility of his work in flesh, as narrated by the evangelists, smites our religion in its most vital part. It becomes thus a matter of deep significance to every Christian to know how far the evangelical narratives stand the fiery trial to which they have been subjected during the last quarter of a century. Assaults from every possible point have been made upon them; have they yielded to these assaults? We think ourselves fully warranted in saying that the historical accuracy of the Gospels never stood so well confirmed, and in such clear light, as to-day. Time proves all things; and it has shown that the objections deemed but yesterday by their advocates irrefutable and fatal are cast away by the assailants of to-day as frivolous and worthless. Strauss despises the rationalism of Paulus, and Bruno Bauer despises the myths of Strauss. Who shall follow Bauer, or what new weapons against Christianity the enemy may forge, we know not; but we doubt not the future will be as the past, and that the cries of victory, which have so boastfully heralded each fresh attack, and are now so lustily shouted in the Westminster Review and kindred journals, will speedily die away into the silence of defeat. "I am the truth," said Christ; and he is also "the same, yesterday, and to-day, and forever."

It is not, however, now our purpose to enter into any controversial points, but simply to give some account of

the books placed at the head of this Article. Whatever tends to make clear the events of the Lord's life, to determine the chronological order, to settle the geography, to reconcile any seeming discrepancies in the statements of the evangelists, and to illuminate their narratives by the general history of his time, is valuable, and worthy of our attention. While there are, and perhaps ever will be, questions which can be but imperfectly solved, owing to the scantiness of our data, still each new investigation, rightly conducted, affords fresh material for future study; and we approach slowly but steadily to juster conclusions and more definite results. It is interesting to know also what is doing in this respect in every part of the church; and therefore we have selected several works written by Roman Catholics. These are the first four mentioned above, which, for convenience, we place together. The remaining five are by members of Protestant churches, though occupying various theological positions, and representing different critical tendencies.

The author of the voluminous work first mentioned, Leben Jesu, von J. N. Sepp, is a Professor of History in the Royal University of Munich. This is the second edition, and is but recently completed. The first volume, divided into two parts, is occupied with the chronology of the Lord's life; and with Uranology, as he terms it, or the age of the world, and the time of the great Jubilee period which is to begin at the consummation of its present history. In this part of his book, as indeed everywhere, Sepp shows a wide and multifarious reading, and multiplies citations not only from the Fathers, but also from the Jewish Rabbis and the heathen philosophers and poets. It is, however, very noticeable that he too often permits himself to be turned aside from his main topic, and proceeds to discuss at great length some merely subordinate and unimportant point. Like most German scholars, he has never learned how to blot.

To understand, and rightly to estimate this work, it is

necessary to keep in mind the position which its author assigns to Christianity, considered in its relations to other systems of religion. He holds that heathenism in all its forms contained many elements of truth, and that these, purified and explained, go far to illustrate and confirm the scriptures. In his own words, heathenism is like a field covered with snow; but under it is slumbering a rich world of vegetable life, waiting only for the warm breath of spring to bud and blossom. All old religions he finds to be symbolic. Christ is he in whom their symbols find their explanation. In him all the religious life of antiquity is exhausted. He is the beginning and the end of all history. If therefore we would know how much is involved in Christianity we must not confine ourselves to the study of Judaism, but study the Messianic expectations of all nations. Gathering up all traditions, we must trace their relations to Christ. Thus Christianity is the total religion, illustrated and confirmed by the sacred records, the worship, and the history of every people.

In these general statements we find little to which we object. Christ is the central figure of all history. He has ever been the Desire of all nations; and it is not strange that there should be in all the religious and mythological systems of antiquity types and symbols of him. But the great point is to read them aright. Here is needed not only wide and accurate knowledge, but sobriety of mind; and it is in this last particular that Sepp seems to us signally to fail. He everywhere finds allusions, analogies, and symbols. Does John Baptist say to the Jews, "God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham;" here is the tradition of Deucalion and Pyrrha. The eucharist is foreshadowed in the heathen "mysteries," and only through our knowledge of them can we come to a full and clear apprehension of its meaning. In his chronological system these analogies play very important parts. Thus in the three and a half years of the Lord's ministry he finds a fulfilment of Dan. xii. 11, 12, where mention is made of the

twelve hundred and ninety, and thirteen hundred and thirty-five days; for, counting from the day of the baptism to that of the resurrection, he makes exactly twelve hundred and ninety days, and adding forty-five days, or to pentecost, he gets the thirteen hundred and thirty-five days. Again, there was an old Jewish tradition that the Messiah should be a pilgrim upon the earth as long as was Moses, or the space of one hundred and twenty years. This number he obtains by multiplying the number of years of Christ's ministry, three and a half, into the number of years of his life, thirty-four and two sevenths. In his Uranology the same principle rules. From the creation to the birth of Christ he makes a period of four thousand three hundred and twenty lunar years to have elapsed, or four thousand one hundred and ninety-one solar years. The former number, four thousand three hundred and twenty, he regards as one fundamental, and to be found in all the ancient chronological systems. It is the thread of Ariadne that leads us safely through all their mazes. It makes a holy and prophetic period, a great year of God. When Christianity in its present form shall have continued four thousand three hundred and twenty years from Christ's birth, then a new era will begin, another great year of God will dawn.

We have no space to controvert or to criticise the chronological speculations of Sepp. It may be well, however, to state the results he has reached in his chronology of the Lord's life. His birth was on the 25th of December in the year 747 of Rome, or seven years earlier than the vulgar era. He was baptized October, 778, being nearly thirty-one years of age. In this date of the baptism Sepp departs from the current tradition, which puts it upon the 6th of January. His death was on the 15th of April, 782, at the age of thirty-five, and his ministry continued three and a half years.

To geography Sepp devotes much less space than to chronology, although a visit which he made to the Holy Land in 1845–46, for the purpose of studying the sacred

sites, enables him to speak with some confidence. The results of this journey are now in course of publication, but have not reached us. To tradition as determining sacred localities he attaches little importance, except in the cases of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth; and complains that most of the Latin monks in Palestine are Italians and Spaniards, from whom little can be hoped in the way of topographical investigation. We add that he defends the present site of the Holy Sepulchre, thinks there was but one Bethsaida, and agrees with Robinson in putting Capernaum at Khan Minyeh.

So far as regards the harmony of the Gospels and the order of events, we find in Sepp much that is novel, but little comparatively that is solid or valuable. Sceptical upon some points, he is credulous upon others. It seems strange to meet one at this day who gives credence to the fables in the apocryphal Gospels respecting the youth of the Virgin Mary; yet he gravely relates that there was at this time in Jerusalem, under a vow of temporary virginity, a holy circle of deaconesses, who, under the supervision of the high priest, gave themselves to religious duties. In this circle the virgin was enrolled, and was educated in the temple, under the special care of Zacharias the priest, whose wife was a sister or a cousin of her mother. As usual Sepp finds here an analogy to the heathen custom of devoting the virgins to the service of the gods. At the age of fourteen Mary was at liberty to go home, but, of her own accord, took upon herself the vow of perpetual virginity. All this, and much more of the same kind, he relates as if it were veritable history. But of the fanciful character of his mind we need not seek further illustrations. While thus receiving much that the Protestant mind rejects as fabulous and unauthentic, Sepp in some points shows a decided tendency to scepticism in his interpretations. We give but a single illustration. The Lord's word respecting Jonah the prophet, that he was three days and three nights in the whale's belly, are explained as an allegory. Jonah is the

symbol of the Jewish people, and the fish the symbol of Nineveh. To the Jews God gave the commission to teach the nations, but neglecting this, he punished them by national shipwreck, and they were swallowed up by the Assyrians. After three days, or three generations, they were restored to their own land. In this figurative way is the account of Jonah to be taken, and as such the Lord uses it, and applies it to his own mission.

To one able to sift carefully this work, the large quantity of material he has gathered will yield much good fruit; but to the ordinary reader it will be but bewildering and almost useless.

The work of Friedlieb, the second in our list, is very unlike that of Sepp. He is Professor of Theology in Breslau, and is known to students of the Gospels by his "Archäologie der Leidensgeschichte," published at Bonn in 1843. As preliminary to the narrative of the Lord's life, he discusses briefly the character of the several Gospels, and the chronological and other questions bearing upon his subject. These discussions are marked by good sense, accurate statement, and freedom from prejudice. In his chronology he reaches the following results. The Lord's birth is put upon the 25th of December, 749 of Rome, five years earlier than the present era; his baptism, January the 6th, 780; and his death the 7th of April, 783. Thus his ministry continued three and one fourth years, and he was in his thirty-fourth year when put to death. In selecting the 25th of December and the 6th of January as the days of the nativity and baptism, he doubtless followed tradition, for it cannot be said that there is any other than traditional evidence; yet Friedlieb is by no means inclined to receive such apocryphal fables as are related by Sepp. He seems carefully to avoid saying anything respecting the virgin and our Lord which is merely legendary, or which has not some scriptural basis.

While in some important points we should be forced to disagree with him, we yet regard this Life of our Lord by Friedlieb as a very good and useful one. Indeed we ques-

tion whether there is in English for the general reader anything so good. It avoids the usual fault of the Germans, extreme prolixity, and is not hard reading through its excess of learning. We cannot accept his arrangement, placing the presentation of Jesus in the temple after his return from Egypt; nor that placing the election of the apostles and the Sermon on the Mount before the second passover of his ministry. But in the main the arrangement is satisfactory, and the grounds upon which it is based clearly stated. Strangely enough Friedlieb places Machaerus, where the Baptist was imprisoned, in Galilee, between Tiberias and Capernaum.

The work of Bucher presents no very new or remarkable features. In his introduction of some two hundred and fifty pages he devotes considerable space to the creation and fall of man, the character of heathenism and of Judaism, and the work of Christ in salvation; the discussion being of course from the Roman Catholic point of view. In his arrangement of the events in the Lord's life he follows the same order as Friedlieb, and reaches the same chronological results. Like him he passes over in silence the traditional history of the virgin. The visit of the magi is placed soon after the Lord's birth, and before the presentation in the temple; the star which they saw was not an ordinary star, nor a conjunction of planets, nor a comet, but a luminous body created especially for its end of pointing the way to Jesus. As the murder of the innocents and the flight into Egypt took place immediately after the coming of the magi, the presentation was not till Jesus had returned, and his parents had taken up their residence in Galilee. This order, however, we may remark, seems to us to bring greater difficulties than it removes. Upon the much disputed point whether the Lord kept the paschal supper on the 14th or 15th of Nisan, he defends the latter, and argues that there is no real discrepancy between the Synoptists and John.

Of Patritius personally we know no more than is stated on the title-page of his book, that he is *e societate Jesu*. He

writes in Latin, and his work is divided into three books. The first, qui est εἰσαγωγικός, discusses the authorship and origin of the several Gospels; the second, qui est συναλλακτικός, gives a harmony of the Gospels, in Greek upon one page and in Latin upon the other, the Greek being that of the *textus receptus*, with Griesbach's emendations, and the Latin that of the Vulgate; the third, qui est ἐξηγητικός, contains full notes upon the various questions presented by the text. The whole extends to near twelve hundred pages, quarto.

There is in this book a great deal of patristic learning. For example, more than one hundred pages are given to an examination of the opinions of the Fathers, down to the fifteenth century, respecting the time of Christ's birth and the length of his life; and at the end these opinions are summed up in five very elaborate and useful tables. If his examinations have been thorough and his results are accurate (points upon which we have not sufficiently examined him to be able to express an opinion), all students of Gospel chronology are certainly deeply indebted to him for his diligence. Another dissertation, *De genere Jesu Christi*, extends to seventy pages. In some instances, however, the copiousness of treatment seems quite disproportioned to the importance of the subject, as where he gives fifty pages to the discussion of questions respecting the magi. In his chronology of the Lord's life, Patritius follows Sanclemente, putting his birth in the year 749 of Rome, and his death in 782. To tradition in this matter he pays no regard, asserting that there has never been any fixed opinion in the church respecting the year when Jesus was born, and that the point is wholly open to investigation. He holds fast, however, to the 25th of December as the day of the nativity. To geographical investigations he pays much less attention, and rarely makes allusions or references to the more recent writers and travellers. We observe that in a few instances he criticises the elder Rosenmüller; but the later commentators are not noticed at all, or very briefly.

To one comparing this work, proceeding from the Romish church, with those of an earlier period, as for example that of Baronius, there is ample proof of progress. A more accurate scholarship has much weakened the authority of tradition by clearly showing that on very few points has there been anything like unanimous consent. Few now of her scholars care to defend the sacred sites along the Via Dolorosa, or to assert as historically certain that Jesus was born on the 25th of December. Such fables as that of the house of the virgin being transported by angels, to Loretto, which found in Baronius a defender, and is hesitatingly maintained in the Kirchen Lexicon of Wetzer and Welte, are passed over by him in silence; and the line of distinction between the apocryphal and canonical Gospels is in general clearly drawn. In harmonizing the several Gospels the writers of this church have always used much freedom, as they have not been restrained by any rigid theories of inspiration.

From Roman Catholic we turn to Protestant authors; and first to Ewald. "The History of Christ and of His Time" forms the fifth volume of his History of Israel. This work has all the peculiarities that mark the writings of its very learned and able author. To those familiar with them it is unnecessary to speak of his excessive arrogance, his indifference to the opinions of others, his love of paradoxes, his contemptuous and often abusive language to all who venture to differ from him. These faults are so glaring that none can overlook them. On the other hand, no one can deny him a most vigorous and original mind, a large and sound scholarship, a thorough knowledge of Semitic languages, indefatigable industry, and great firmness of purpose. Perhaps the best illustrations of both his moral and mental character may be found in the pages of his Jahrbuch, a review written almost wholly by himself, in which he publishes articles upon various points relating to Biblical science, and passes judgment upon all new works in this department. Very rarely are his decisions favorable, or his criticisms sympathetic and appreciative. Looking over

the first nine numbers of the Jarbuch we find very few instances in which he speaks of any author with praise. Most are dismissed with a few sharp, rough words.

Before we consider Ewald's "History of Christ" it is indispensable that we understand the position he assumes in regard to the origin of the Gospels. Among those who would apply the principles, if there be any such, of subjective criticism to the scriptures, he is prominent. To say nothing of his treatment of the writings of the Old Testament, he finds in the Gospels several distinct documents, which he supposes himself able to distinguish and classify according to the time when written. In his translation of Matthew, Mark, and Luke (Göttingen: 1850), he marks out to the reader's eye, by printing in so many varieties of type, nine various recensions of the Gospel history. A very brief outline of his theory, as given in his Jahrbücher for 1848–49, must suffice us.

At first the sayings of the Lord were not committed to writing by the disciples, but their most striking thoughts and expressions retained in the memory. For more easy retention they were arranged in groups of similar contents; in this grouping regard being had to round numbers, and especially to the number seven. Thus the seven parables now found in Matthew xiii. were brought together and arranged for more easy remembrance. The chief miracles and incidents of his life were arranged in a similar way, and thus preserved in the memory. The first written work was one containing a brief outline of some of the most prominent events arranged chronologically; as the baptism, the temptation, the crucifixion, and also some of his discourses with explanatory statements. Not improbably this work was written by Philip the deacon and evangelist. The second was a collection of his teachings and sayings as they had been remembered by the disciples, and which were arranged by the unknown compiler as best he could. Third, came Mark, whose work we now have in substance, and who in its preparation made use of the two earlier collec-

tions. The fourth was a work narrating the most important events of that history, and was a revision of the first. Fifth, followed the present Gospel of Matthew; and to this were soon added three works which Ewald finds it difficult accurately to distinguish, but of whose separate existence he is confident; and last of all the present Gospel of Luke.

If we now ask upon what grounds this theory of the origin and growth of the Gospels rests, and by what arguments it is supported, we get no satisfactory reply. All that Ewald says in its support is based upon some supposed distinctions of style and manner in the several narratives of the evangelists as they now stand, and which, if real, could be more easily explained by other suppositions. Upon this narrow basis he builds his great superstructure, and shows his critical skill by piecing together his fanciful conjectures so as to give the "airy nothing" a show of learned solidity. To any one but a German "gelehrter" this would seem very like child's play, if the sacredness of the subject should not rather make us call it foolhardy presumption. How far Ewald believes the words of the Lord: "The Holy Ghost shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you;" or whether he recognizes any degree of inspiration on the part of the evangelists, or any special providential care determining what records of the Lord's life should be left to the church, we know not. To one, however, who has faith in the divine Sonship and mission of Jesus, and in the presence of the Spirit guiding into all truth, the simple narratives of the evangelists will be now, as they have been for so many centuries, their own sufficient evidence; and maintain their historic credibility against all negative criticism, if it were a thousandfold more acute than it is.

That a Life of Christ written from Ewald's point of view must be very unsatisfactory and defective, is apparent. He holds himself at full liberty to judge how much there is of fact in the evangelical narratives, and to separate the primitive kernels of truth from the later additions. Thus the

very definite account of the temptation as given us by the Synoptists, the leading of Jesus by the Spirit into the wilderness, and his continuance there for forty days, exposed to Satanic assaults, is supposed to have so much of a basis of fact as this: that some interval of time elapsed between the baptism and the ministry in Galilee, and that this was naturally regarded as a period of trial and preparation. This is all that was contained in the oldest and simplest version of the history. In the later versions the desert was specially mentioned and the wild beasts, because the place where John was baptizing, and where He was baptized, was near the wilderness; and the period of forty days was assigned, because in the Old Testament it was thought to have some typical reference to the Messiah. How completely are the Gospels stript in this way of all their life and freshness and power! Portrayed by the pen of one of our negative critics, the actors in the sacred history would bear a relation to the living, breathing, moving figures that diversify the pages of the evangelists, — apostles, priests, scribes, pharisees, sadducees, publicans, kings, governors, courtiers, and beggars, — like that which "the boneless, watery, pulpy creatures," that one has described as inhabiting Jupiter, do to the stoutly-framed, muscular, symmetrical bodies of flesh and blood that inhabit the earth. Happily the sound instincts of men crave something more solid than ideas; they need facts. To meet our need, God has given us in the scriptures a record of facts, and these we are to hold fast. All attempts to make facts the mere symbols or moulds of ideas, and therefore worthless when the idea is once possessed, will prove idle. The world wants no ideal, but the historic Christ; the Christ of the evangelists, not the Christ of the philosophers.

Fundamentally defective as Ewald's work is, it is not, however, without its value to those who can use it rightly. The views which he presents of the relation of the Jews to the Roman rule, the general dislike to Herod and his family, the wish of the more conservative that Judea might be

made a province, the steady growth of Messianic hopes, the internal divisions and spiritual weakness of Judaism, are very forcible, and help us to understand the troubled and stormy character of the time, as reflected in the pages of the evangelists. No writer has so clearly set forth the irreconcilable antagonism between the theocratic spirit of Judea and the despotic spirit of Rome; the Jew deeming himself the elect of God, and therefore head of the nations; the Roman resistless in military prowess, and actual conqueror of the world. Upon many points, also, more directly connected with the Lord's ministry, his observations are both just and sagacious. Into questions of chronology and geography he does not enter with any fulness. The Lord's birth, he thinks, was not later than in 746 of Rome, or eight years earlier than our era. Luke's expression that he was about thirty when he began his ministry, is to be taken in a large sense, as he was, in fact, some years older. His death took place in 786, thus making his life about forty years. Ewald, however, does not give them as exact, but only as proximate results. He interprets the passage, "This taxing was first made when Cyrenius was governor of Syria" (Luke ii. 2), as meaning that it was made before he was governor. He thinks that the Lord did not eat the true paschal supper, but anticipated it. Capernaum, he identifies with Tell Hum, and finds two Bethsaidas mentioned by the evangelists. It is scarcely necessary to say that mere traditions, however venerable, find no favor in his eyes.

The Life of Jesus, by Hase, is a well-known work, of which that before us is the fourth edition. It aims to be, as the author tells us in his first preface, a purely learned and scientific biography. The learning, at least so far as it is shown by very full references to all that other men have written upon the subject, is ample, and will not be questioned; but what are we to understand by its scientific character? Science and scientific are, as most know, very favorite words among the Germans. No book on any subject has any value unless it is scientific. Not only their philosophy,

and their history, and their criticism, but also their theology, must be scientific, or they are nothing. But what does the term mean, as applied to the life of our Lord? Plainly all that science can demand of us here is to find and embody the true meaning of the evangelical records. If they affirm that Jesus was "the Word made flesh" for the salvation of men, we must take this as our starting-point, and judge them throughout in conformity with this fundamental fact. If they are consistent with this, if his life, as portrayed in them, is in harmony with its assumed supernatural conditions, they are scientific in the true sense, and in the only sense in which the term "science" as applied to them has any meaning.

Hase, however, understands the matter differently. According to him, the faith of Christendom, that in Christ God became man, avails in science only as an idea by which the facts of his life are to be measured, and therefore the aim of science is to set aside this presupposition of faith. This means, if we rightly apprehend him, that, in order to a scientific examination of the Gospels, we must first wholly dismiss from our minds that interpretation which the faith of Christendom has for so many centuries put upon them, and, instead of regarding them as a history of Jesus, the God-man, must assume that he was simple man, and interpret them from this point of view. He tells us that the life of Jesus must be regarded as "a purely human life," or it cannot come at all within the scope of historical investigation. That Jesus was very man, and that therefore his life was a human life, we admit and believe. It is expressly taught us by the apostle: "For verily he took not on him the nature of angels, but he took on him the seed of Abraham: therefore in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren." The Word, made flesh, came under the common conditions of humanity, even "to be tempted in all points, like as we are." But does this community of nature imply that he was man only? Was it impossible that the Son of God could become very man? So we understand

Hase to affirm. A purely human life, according to him, involves that Jesus should enter into being like other men, be begotten of an earthly father, and share in all the common experiences of the race. But how was it with sin? Was he sinless? This, Hase, though with considerable hesitation, admits, and attempts to explain, by saying that religious genius, like artistic, comes by birth; and that the humanity of Jesus, like that of Adam at his creation, was pure, and he preserved it pure. This, however, is no explanation of the difficulty. The fact remains that here was one "without sin." If this can be said of no one else of the human race, how was his life a purely human one? It was certainly peculiar; was it not also supernatural? He was man; was he not also something more than man? This the church has always affirmed, and to deny it is to make the statements of the evangelists both unintelligible and contradictory. Into any dogmatic questions it is not our purpose to enter. We wish merely to show what the so-called scientific method of treating the gospel demands. We are to begin with the assumption that Jesus was merely man, and to interpret all the statements of the evangelists in accordance with this assumption. Of course we enter at once into a labyrinth from which there is no escape, except by the expedient of denying the historic accuracy of their narratives. We must pare down here and lop off there in order to bring our ideal Christ into a forced likeness with the real. Granting, on the other hand, what the evangelists everywhere assume, the reality of the incarnation, and this we affirm to be the only scientific method of dealing with their histories, all is plain. His life is consistent in all its features throughout; a life truly divine and truly human, because he is very God and very man. Denying this fundamental fact, no acuteness, no eloquence, and no sophistry can make the Gospels other than discrepant and unintelligible.

To us, we confess, there seems very little to choose between Hase and Strauss. The latter openly denies the possibility of a miracle. Of course the gospel affirms them, the

gospel, then, is false, and this ends the matter. "Jesus," says Strauss, "was a mere man, the son of Joseph; he wrought no miracles; he did not rise from the dead, nor ascend into heaven." "Jesus," says Hase, "was the son of Joseph, but he did work miracles; he did rise from the dead." Whither he went after his resurrection he declines to say. Now we are safe in saying, that of the disciples of unbelief whom the two may gather around them, the great body will go with Strauss. Hase stands in that half-doubting, half-believing position, in which no man stands safely, or will stand long. We cannot find firm footing midway upon a hillside; we must go up to the top or descend to the bottom. This he himself feels, and complains, in the preface to the last edition, that in this half-way attitude he finds no ardent and enthusiastic friends. Still, he congratulates himself that a German pastor had been led by this book into a freer study of the Lord's life and character, and hopes that, with God's blessing, it may serve also to restrain the arbitrary wilfulness of some. Why he should expect that his readers will be bound by the shadowy lines which he has drawn between the fabulous and the historic in the evangelists, and dare to go no further than he has done in scepticism, we do not understand.

As compared with Ewald, Hase seems far inferior in depth and earnestness of character. He makes the impression upon us, both in this work and in his Church History, of a very skilful rhetorician, a master of style, and able to use his materials in the most effective way, but without strong moral convictions, and of a shallow spiritual nature. There is something, difficult to express, but jarring and repellant in the whole tone of his writings, and especially in the book before us; and we cannot help feeling that he looks upon Jesus rather as a good literary hero, than as his Saviour from sin and death.

The translation of this Life of Jesus, by Mr. Clarke,[1] we

[1] Life of Jesus. Translated from the German of the third and fourth improved edition by James Freeman Clarke. Boston: 1860.

have not examined at length. It seems to be faithful, but can hardly be called elegant. The translator has omitted the literary references which follow the several sections in the original, and which, in our judgment, constitute its chief value, although he gives at the end a list of books sufficiently full for most purposes. We regret the translation, for the book satisfies no one, and establishes nothing, and its tendency must be to suggest doubts to the believing, and to make sceptics still more sceptical.

The work of Lichtenstein is in its spirit, as well as in its arrangement and purpose, very unlike that of Hase. It shows on every page that its author is one who believes in the inspiration of the Gospels, and has no disposition to resolve all supernatural statements into holy legends. His work is designed especially for clergymen, to aid them to give to their congregations a connected and consistent account of the Lord's life. To this end it is well adapted. Points of a theological character are passed by as foreign to its purpose, and much attention is given to the right arrangement of events. In the beginning is a chronological outline of the history compiled from the several Gospels, and with numerical references to the annotations or notes which make up the body of the book. In his chronology he agrees substantially with Friedlieb. The Lord's birth is put in July or December, he thinks the former more probable, in 749 of Rome; his baptism in December, 779, or January, 780; his death upon the 7th of April, 783. His ministry continued a little more than three years. The unnamed and much disputed feast mentioned John v. 1, he regards as a feast of tabernacles. It is in connection with this feast that he presents a new view respecting the Lord's ministry. It is generally agreed among harmonists that Jesus ceased to baptize and left the province of Judea in November or December following his first passover. Lichtenstein supposes that the whole period elapsing between his departure and this feast, a period of not less than nine or ten months, was spent by him in retirement, as not till

the imprisonment of the Baptist did he begin his work in Galilee, thus making his public life to have embraced, in fact, but little more than two years. This long interval of inaction is intrinsically improbable; and we do not think that his arguments, showing the feast to be that of tabernacles, are by any means convincing. We are still inclined to hold the early opinion that it was a passover, and that the ministry in Galilee began immediately after it.

In many points Lichtenstein follows in the footsteps of Dr. Hofmann, Professor of Theology at Erlangen, a man whose views are often original and profound, and who seems to have exerted a strong influence upon the minds of his students. At the beginning of his book he places a lecture of Hofmann's upon the characteristics of the several evangelists, which contains some valuable suggestions. He gives also at the end another lecture of the same critic upon the order followed by Luke, with special reference to the point whether this order is chronological. The conclusion reached is, that the promise of Luke to "write in order" means to write a connected historical account, and not that every event shall be narrated in the exact order of its occurrence. Both agree that the Lord ate the paschal supper at the appointed time, and that there is no discrepancy between the Synoptists and John. Lichtenstein devotes considerable space to the question: Who were the brethren of the Lord? and maintains that they were the children of Joseph and Mary, and his own brothers and sisters. The genealogy given by Luke is that of Mary.

We can commend this book to all who wish to examine our Lord's life in its critical aspects as well worthy of perusal. The discussions are uniformly conducted with ability, good sense, and fairness, and with competent learning. The article "Jesus" in Herzog's Real Encyklopädie is by this author.

The work of Ebrard, though entitled a Compendium for clergymen and students, has a decided polemic cast, and is an answer to the attacks of Strauss, Bauer, and others.

This second edition is much altered from the first, in order to meet the new forms of error which had in the interval become prominent. The author observes in his preface (1850) that, in the seven years preceding, the negative criticism had very much changed in character. Then the mythical hypothesis of Strauss was its last product; but this was antiquated, and now almost forgotten. The latest novelty was the hypothesis of F. Bauer and the Tübingen school, and this had cast all earlier ones into the shade. He therefore finds it necessary to notice this in considerable detail, though still devoting much space to Strauss and Bruno Bauer.

In his introduction Ebrard gives an outline of the history of modern criticism, dividing it into four periods, and enumerating the chief writers of each period; but this we must pass by. Nor can we dwell upon the distinction which he takes between chronology and akoluthie; or follow him in his examination how far the evangelists observe the order of time in their narratives. A careful comparison of the connecting particles and phrases used by them, as he has gathered them in his tables, shows very plainly that most of these are indefinite, and mark no immediate sequence. This part of the book is worthy of careful examination. But in the application of his principles to the history we cannot think Ebrard wholly successful. There are not a few instances in the Gospels in which we cannot determine merely from the connecting particles or phrases how closely one event followed another, but must determine it by the scope of the narrative; and here the exegetical tact of the critic is brought into play. In this tact Ebrard by no means excels; and his general arrangement is open to grave objections. We give his chronology of the Lord's ministry, and its divisions. The first year of Tiberius, in which, according to Luke, the Baptist began his labors, is not to be reckoned from the time of his colleagueship with Augustus, but from the death of the latter, when he became sole emperor. This was the year from August, 781, to August, 782, of Rome.

Toward the end of this year Jesus was baptized. The first passover following was that of 783, when he appeared publicly in Jerusalem and purified the temple. The summer of that year he spent in Judea, baptizing; in the autumn he goes into Galilee, and there begins his work. This work continued two years, and may be divided into two periods. In the first of these, Jesus appeared especially as a Rabbi, or teacher, announcing the approach of the kingdom of heaven, and warning the people to repent. It was at the end of this period that he chose his apostles and spake the Sermon upon the Mount; a sort of summary and recapitulation of all his teachings up to this time. In the second of these periods his labors have a more systematic and aggressive character. He organizes his disciples, and sends forth the twelve, and in every way presses the kingdom of God upon the people. At the end of this period the transfiguration may be placed. To this still another period may be added, extending from the transfiguration to the last passover, in which the Lord, withdrawing from the public at large, devoted himself chiefly to the instruction of the disciples. His death was at the passover of 786.

As Ebrard places the Lord's birth in 747 of Rome, he was thus at the beginning of his ministry thirty-four or thirty-five years old. But this is doing violence to the statement of Luke, that he was about "thirty years of age;" as his general use of language does not permit us to interpret "thirty" as a round number, which may embrace five years more or less. Nor is the order of the ministry in Galilee satisfactory; since it fails to exhibit that progress in the Lord's teachings and works which must have taken place. We cannot well believe that the teaching in parables could have come early in his ministry, and before the Sermon on the Mount. Plainly they were not spoken till he had chosen the twelve to whom it was especially "given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven." Nor can we believe that at the outset of his work the Pharisees accused him of being in a league with the prince of the

devils. This marks a later period, when their anger against him had been aroused by his great popularity, and by his sharp rebukes. Making the feast mentioned John v. 1, to be a feast of tabernacles, between it and the feast of tabernacles of the following year, he finds no events to be narrated, but the sending of the twelve and the feeding of the five thousand. But it is scarcely possible that the evangelists should thus pass over in almost total silence so long a period, and one in which Jesus must have been very active. That the labors of the Lord had several distinct stages, and that these may be clearly marked, we do not question, but the distinctions of Ebrard fail to set them forth with clearness.

The last portion of this work is given to an examination of various critical theories, having reference first to criticism of the evangelical history, and second to criticism of the evangelical writings. Here many points are discussed with vigor and acuteness; but except one is specially called upon to enter into these controversies, the whole is very tiresome reading. It is well known that every learned German must have his special "Richtung," and since the great minds that can advance anything both new and true are very rare, most must content themselves with some startling paradox, or some assertion or theory so audaciously false that it forces itself upon our attention. If the German theological world has nothing more important to do than to read Strauss and the Bauers, and write elaborate answers to their objections, then let it multiply books; but let us not forget that a church filled with the life and power of Christ is the only answer that will stop the mouths of these gainsaying men. An evil and adulterous generation wants proof, present and actual, that Jesus is the Living One, and that all power in heaven and earth is given into his hands, and it never will be content with critical theories. Let the church *be* his body, the habitation of God, the salt of the earth, and the light of the world; let it show forth his power in mighty acts, his holiness in holy living, and all these

questions respecting the authenticity, the inspiration, the credibility of the Gospel history, vanish forever. The very importance which we attach to these transient schools of negative criticism, shows the absence of those positive elements of faith and hope and courage, by which alone we can successfully meet our scoffing age.

To those, however, who are disposed to enter into these questions, this part of Ebrard's book will be valuable. As a polemic, he scorns no weapon that he can use, or finds at hand; and opposes his antagonists, not only with solid learning and strong argument, but also with wit and sarcasm and ridicule. Perhaps he uses the latter a little too often, and thus mars the impression which he would otherwise make. It is but rarely that a fool can be answered according to his folly, even if, as in this case, the provocation is great. A little coarseness, however, can well be forgiven in one who battles in so good a cause, and with such evident sincerity and zeal.

The last book on our list is that of Hofmann: The Life of Jesus according to the apocryphal Gospels. Its object is to gather up all in these Gospels relating to him, and fusing together the various statements, give a chronological and connected outline of events. Sometimes he quotes from them literally, at others gives only the substance of their accounts. All along he shows the relation between them and the canonical narratives; and in very copious annotations explains and illustrates the text by references to later traditions and to the Fathers. Thus many points important to the understanding of Gospel history are made plainer, especially those connected with the birth and infancy of Jesus. The work is laboriously and carefully prepared, and brings together a great mass of information from sources not readily accessible to scholars in this country. To one desirous of knowing what fables early began to get currency respecting the Lord, some of which are constantly reappearing in the patristic writings, and even now find a semi-belief in not a few portions of Christendom, the book will be very useful.

We observe that in some instances Hofmann is disposed to accept traditional statements, even when they seem at variance with the statements of the evangelists. One case of this kind occurs when speaking of the appearance of Jesus, after his resurrection, upon the mountain in Galilee. The language of Matthew (xxviii. 16), "Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them," he thinks may better be translated, "They went up on Galilee, the mountain," etc. This mount of Galilee was, according to tradition, the northern summit of the Mount of Olives, and thither the eleven went. Aside, however, from the difficulty of thus interpreting Matthew, the tradition is not well confirmed.

Besides the light which the apocryphal Gospels throw upon the canonical, the comparison between them, must, to any impartial mind, go far to show that the evangelists were men enlightened by the Spirit of God. The contrast is marvellous. Let us compare the infancy of Jesus as it appears in the two accounts. The evangelists say simply that he was circumcised and presented in the temple as the law prescribed; he was worshipped by the magi; he was taken to Egypt, and thence to Nazareth. Of his life at Nazareth it is simply said: "And the child grew, and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom; and the grace of God was upon him." At the age of twelve he visits Jerusalem, and there takes the place of a pupil "sitting in the midst of the doctors, both hearing them and asking them questions." Returning to Nazareth, he was subject unto his parents, and "increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man." This is all we are told of him till he began his public labors. What wise silence, what holy reserve is here! Aside from the supernatural circumstances attending his birth, his infancy, to human eye, is like that of other children, his youth like the youth of other men. He exercised no miraculous powers; he did not, so far as we can judge, assume at all the office of a teacher, nor did his nearest acquaintances suspect what gifts of wisdom, knowledge,

and eloquence were hidden in him, or they would not have manifested so much astonishment as they did when he began to teach in public. He doubtless followed Joseph's occupation, and to his neighbors appeared as a God-fearing, pious, obedient, industrious youth. Not till he was anointed with the Holy Ghost, after his baptism by John, did the higher elements of his character come into manifestation. Then all saw in him the truth and power of God.

Turning to the apocryphal books, into what a different atmosphere do we enter. Here all is miraculous. Passing by all that precedes the flight into Egypt, what marvels meet us daily on every side. As they journey, they seek repose in a cave. Many dragons suddenly appear, but Jesus leaps down from his mother's bosom, and they worship him. Lions and other wild beasts go before him to point out the way. Being hungry and thirsty he commands a palm-tree to bend down its boughs laden with fruit, and a fountain to spring forth at its root. As he enters Egypt all the idols fall down in the temples, and he heals the son of a priest possessed with devils. Almost every day he works some wonder, healing now the sick and leprous; now setting free the enchanted, and frightening robbers; now causing water to flow from the ground in which his coat might be washed, and changing drops of sweat into balsam. After the return from Egypt, he went to Bethlehem, and his mother heals sick children by sprinkling them with the water in which he had been washed, and in the same way cures the leprosy. A portion of his garment made into a tunic preserves a boy from burning and from drowning. One is healed by lying in his bed; Judas Iscariot is delivered from the power of the devil; sparrows are made of clay, which fly away singing; dead children are brought back to life; garments are dyed of such colors as the dyer wishes; Joseph's poor carpenter work is made perfect; a single kernel of wheat produces enough for all the poor of the place. Of this unmeaning, or trivial, or extravagant character are the miracles of the boy Jesus, as found in these

books. Those which impute to him anger and malice, as some do, we purposely omit.

How shall this contrast be explained? Why is it that, according to the evangelists, the Lord put forth no act of miraculous power till his ministry began? Why did not, in their narratives, these supernatural signs distinguish his infancy and youth? Men adapting themselves to the taste of their times, or guided by their own sense of what was fitting, would never have consigned to utter silence these long years of childhood and youth. They would have found wonders all along the pathway of so wonderful a being. How much is there that we desire to know of that early life, not to minister to an idle curiosity, but to bring him more clearly and fully before us. The silence of the evangelists can be explained only by the fact that they wrote, not out of their own hearts, but under the direction of God. All that can cast light upon the work of Christ in our redemption is written for our instruction; and more than this we need not to know.

We regret that the account given of the books before us is necessarily so brief; but it nevertheless shows that we have much reason to be thankful to the Christian scholars of Germany for the zeal and industry with which they have devoted themselves to the study of the gospel narratives. Even the most sceptical and hypercritical have done something to advance our knowledge; at least they have provoked investigations which have added new defences to the points assailed. So far as accurate and profound learning, great acuteness, and, on the part of many, we may add, truly devout and Christian feeling, can fit them to portray correctly the earthly life of our Lord, they have done it successfully. Yet we confess that we are waiting for something better than they have yet given us. Breathing continually such an atmosphere of unbelief as surrounds them they become infected unawares. Ever listening to sceptical doubts and criticisms, it is very hard to have a hearty, simple, childlike faith. A feeling of distrust mingles itself,

perhaps often unconsciously, with their apologetics, and manifests itself in the haste with which they not unfrequently yield some contested point to a very weak assailant, and the alarm that seizes them at every new phase of infidel criticism. In no other country than Germany would a book like that of Strauss have filled the church with terror, as if the eternal foundations were sliding from beneath her feet.

We may here allude also to another point, the pride of literary reputation, which characterizes so many of the best German writers, even upon theological subjects. In too many instances it seems as if the author had chosen his subject as a mere stalking-horse by which to approach the public, or a pedestal on which he may stand while displaying his learning and acumen. And in cases where we have no reason to suspect this, the consciousness of authorship in many ways peeps out, challenging the sympathy or admiration of the reader. This, always offensive, is never more so than in a life of our Lord, or in commentaries upon his words. A sad, though doubtless unwitting, instance of this is seen in Stier, who while unfolding the teachings of Jesus, and ofttimes with rare depth and felicity, cannot help showing repeatedly his petty mortification that some of his fellow critics should think his labors unworthy of mention. Not a little of this is seen also in Sepp. Of the egotism of Ewald it is unnecessary to speak, since it is inwrought into the whole character of the man. Upon such sacred ground and in such a Presence let not the writer intrude himself upon our notice. Let those who seek a literary reputation seek it in legitimate fields, and let those only who can imitate the reticence of the evangelists engage in these high themes.

It is a matter of Christian congratulation that in regard to the main features of the life of Christ upon earth we are gradually arriving at more sure and definite results. The years of his birth and death are not yet, indeed, beyond dispute; but there is general agreement among chronologists that the former must be placed a little before the death of Herod, in the year 750 of Rome, and the latter about thirty-

three years later. We cannot far err if we say that he was born 749 U.C. and crucified in 783, and that his public labors continued a little more than three years. The topographical questions, which have been raised in connection with his history, are of very little importance, and interest us, not as casting any special light upon the evangelic narratives, but from the instinctive desire to give to every incident its "local habitation." The contest is still fiercely waged over the site of the sepulchre; nor is there entire agreement respecting the cave of the nativity or the place of the ascension. We do not yet know with certainty where Capernaum stood, nor whether there were two Bethsaidas or but one. Still Palestine has become to us in all its main topographical features a well-known land, and every year adds something to our knowledge. Very recently the examinations of Dr. Thomson have cleared up satisfactorily some difficulties connected with the miracle of the healing of the demoniacs in the country of the Gergesenes, and with that of the feeding of the five thousand in the neighborhood of Bethsaida. Robinson has pointed out with strong probability the site of Ephraim, and Barclay affirms that he has discovered the site of Aenon. So far as our Lord's life can be illustrated in this way, we have already gathered ample material, which needs only to be sifted and arranged. Nor in regard to historical questions has there been less success. It is becoming more and more clearly seen that the evangelists were not men ignorant of the general history of their times, nor did they indulge themselves in random statements. There are, indeed, points not yet wholly cleared up, and which probably never will be. We do not know how it was that both Annas and Caiaphas were high priests at the same time, nor the exact nature of the taxing decreed by the emperor Augustus. But the most thorough investigations go to confirm, and not to disprove, evangelic accuracy. The old objections that Lysanias was not the tetrarch of Abilene, nor Cyrenius governor of Syria, as stated by Luke, can scarcely be again repeated by any competent critic.

As to the asserted discrepancies between the evangelists, these also are dwindling away. Gradually the fact is becoming recognized, that no one of them proposes to follow an exact chronological order, but arranges his matter with freedom, having reference both to the spiritual condition of those for whom he especially writes, and to some principle of affinity in the matter itself. This is a great step gained, and except from those who stumble at the Gospels on dogmatic grounds, we shall not hear much more of the objections, that Matthew and Luke are at variance with each other, because one speaks of the Lord's flight into Egypt and the other is silent; and that Matthew on the one side and Mark and Luke on the other cannot be reconciled because the former speaks of two demoniacs and two blind men as healed, and the latter speak of but one. This style of criticism will vanish away and become as obsolete as the Osiander style of harmony. What is now especially needed is a commentator able to enter into the spirit of the several evangelists, and bring out with clearness that which is distinctive in the scope and arrangement of each. But this demands something much higher than learning, or acuteness, or fine exegetical tact. The first and chief requisite is spiritual discernment. He only who inspired the evangelists can give the power to interpret their words. They who come in their intellectual pride with their learned apparatus to the study of the gospel, as they go to the study of a heathen historian or poet, will miserably fail of their end, and find only the dead and unmeaning letter. Seeking to lay hold on Christ that they may set him up as a show for the world to wonder at, he now, as of old, vanishes out of their sight. Only to one who, like the beloved apostle, reclines upon his bosom will he reveal himself, and only in the light of this personal revelation can the records of his life on earth be read, and their meaning be discerned.

The time, we are persuaded, is near, when, the follies of all negative criticism having been fully exposed, we shall have a history of the Lord upon its positive side, which

shall show forth in a more comprehensive manner than has yet been done, the "treasures of wisdom and knowledge that are hid in him." What a glorious theme is here! Starting from the fact, so often and distinctly declared in the scriptures, that by him and for him were all things made, we find in him the great Archetype of the creation, the Beginning and End of all the works of God. All worlds and all creatures were made for him, and all are what they are because he is what he is—the God-man, the Word made flesh. He is the image of the invisible God, and in him all things consist. What a field is open here for the investigations of Christian science. To learn the purpose of God in him; to trace the historical fulfilment of that purpose from the day when the foundations of the earth were laid, the long ages of preparation for him, the stages of his earthly life, his present priestly work, his future kingdom and eternal majesty; to discern how all history is a prophecy of him, how all nature is full of types of him, how every created thing reflects his image; to show how the universe stretches itself out around him as its centre, and rests upon him as its corner-stone, and the ages circle around him as the Alpha and Omega, the First and the Last; this is the high calling of the church. It cannot remain unfulfilled; for the Spirit of truth is come to guide into all truth, and Christ is the truth.

It will be remarked by the reader that the works named above are but a part of those worthy of insertion. We might have added those of Neander (1845) and of Lange (1847), both of which have been translated, and are accessible to English readers, and the recently published works of Schleiermacher, Strauss, and Schenkel (1864). Of Renan's work, and the numerous replies it has called forth, we have no space to speak. In every part of Christendom the life of the Lord, and the history of the church during the first and second centuries, are subjects attracting to themselves the attention of all, more and more. The result must be the furtherance of knowledge and truth.

ARTICLE II.

MORE RECENT WORKS ON THE LIFE OF CHRIST.

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THE most noteworthy Lives of Jesus that have appeared during the last two or three years are those of Renan, Schenkel, and Schleiermacher, and the revised edition of Strauss's. The first of these has been so widely circulated, and has called forth so many criticisms, that it seems almost superfluous to add anything to what others have said. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and of convenience of comparison, it may be well to take here a cursory view of the work.

If we compare Renan with Strauss, in reference to the general impression which their works are fitted to make, the former must be pronounced the least objectionable. He aims at a more positive result. He does not manifest such an utter lack of sense for the dignity of Christianity. There are parts of the book which, by the vividness which they impart to certain scenes in the life of Christ, must be called by every one exceedingly interesting and valuable. German critics usually call Renan's work less profound than that of Strauss; and so it is, if minuteness of discussion and criticism is made the test. But Strauss wrote for the scientific, Renan for the popular, reader. This gives Renan's work a perspicuity and attractiveness which by no means necessarily indicate lack of learning or of care. In one respect, certainly, Renan is superior to Strauss; we mean in his acquaintance with the genius, customs, and literature of the Jews. And this acquaintance has been skilfully used. In one particular, however, we may admit the charge to be well founded. While Strauss by one fundamental assumption, that of the unreality of the supernatural, and the consequent simple humanity of Christ, jus-

tified his absolute rejection of the New Testament as a source of history, Renan, though starting with the same assumption, ascribes also a considerable degree of credibility to the Gospels. Consequently he is obliged to resort to numerous, and often fanciful, conjectures, in order to make the two assumptions harmonize. His logic is less rigorous than that of Strauss, because his appreciation of Christianity and his regard for historic probability are greater. In short, he has not the courage to develop a fundamental error so fearlessly to its legitimate results.

As to the four Gospels, Renan's view is as follows: they are all, speaking in general terms, genuine and authentic; but we do not have them in their original form. For, at first the Christians had no scruples in making additions to and changes in the Gospels. "Each one wrote on the margin of his copy the sayings and parallel passages which he found elsewhere, and which pleased him." Not till after the middle of the second century did the Gospels receive their present form and authority. Mark is more authentic than Matthew, and Matthew more than Luke. John's Gospel is, as to the historical part, superior to either of the others; but the language there ascribed to Christ is in general not so authentic. Although the origin of this Gospel is a puzzling problem, it must be considered probable that John wrote the most of it, putting, unconsciously, his own later-learned philosophy into the mouth of Jesus. For "our recollections are formed like everything else; the ideal of a person whom we have known changes with ourselves." In general, of the fourth Gospel we may say that it contains "the reminiscences of an old man; sometimes marked by wonderful freshness, sometimes by strange errors." But all the Gospels are "partly legendary." This must be inferred from the fact that they are so "full of the miraculous and the supernatural." The problem, therefore, is to separate the wheat from the chaff, and construct an authentic life of Jesus. In order to do this, the chief thing needed is an "aesthetic sense"; "conjecture" must be

allowed to play freely. The deficiencies of the Gospels in pragmatic and chronological arrangement must be supplied by hypothesis.

Renan's general hypothesis respecting Jesus is, that he must at first have availed himself of moral aphorisms and customs which were current at his time, in impressing his views on the people; that then, having become more mature and self-possessed, he acquired a calm, poetic eloquence, holding himself aloof from controversy; that gradually he became more stimulated by his ideas respecting the kingdom of God, i.e. "the kingdom of the spirit," was roused by opposition, and at last dealt chiefly in polemics and invectives. "These," adds Renan, with great näivete, "are the periods which are clearly distinguishable in the Koran." With this plan before him, the writer has nothing to do but to compose the life, selecting now a passage from this place, now one from that, just according as it best serves to execute the plan, rejecting what does not suit it at all, as being legendary. As a security that his "artistic sense" does not mislead him, he can only say that, when one examines the Gospels carefully, "the real words of Jesus disclose themselves, so to speak, spontaneously." Let one example illustrate his principle and method: the narrative contained in Mark iii. 21, says Renan, belongs to the latter part of Christ's public life. But, one might object, it comes very early in the book; it seems to belong there; do you not know, besides, that, according to very many critics, it is in Mark especially that we may look for the most accurate historical sequence of events in the narratives? That proves nothing, would be the reply; my business is to bring order out of chaos, and to do that, this passage must be moved. But why just this passage? Because, according to the progress of development in Jesus' character, it could not be that in that early period, when he lived in Galilee, surrounded by such bewitching scenery, loved and followed by admiring disciples, waited on by women, who, to be sure, "loved him more

than his work," but towards whom he yet cherished "extraordinarily tender sentiments," — it cannot be that in that first year, when he only preached the kingdom of the humble and lowly, in that year "when God veritably dwelt on earth," — it cannot be that during that "idyllic" life he could have been accused of being beside himself. But why not? Because this could only happen after he had been in Jerusalem, when his fanatical tendencies had been developed; when he went so far as to disown family ties, to require absolute poverty and celibacy; when he fancied himself possessed of superhuman authority; when he had ceased "to find pleasure in living, loving, seeing, and feeling." But how do you know there was just such a development in Jesus' character, and that only late in life he proclaimed his "destructive principles"? Because this was the case with Mahomet, and must have been also with Jesus. But how do you know that Jesus' life must have presented the same phases as Mahomet's? My "aesthetic sense" tells me so. But others hold different views; why must we trust your "sense" rather than theirs? Because "in order to write the history of a religion, it is necessary, first, that one should have once believed in it; secondly, that one should fully believe in it no longer."

This is no caricature. We are asked by Mons. Renan to trust implicitly to his *a priori* conceptions of what Jesus' character and life must have been, and that, too, for the very reason that he no longer believes in Christianity! The audacity of this claim would seem more amazing, did Renan not have the art of clothing the most surprising, and even offensive, sentiments in such a poetic gracefulness of style. Whatever may be thought of his taste in conceiving, he certainly has a rare skill in delineating. The title taken by the Dutch theologian Osterzee for his review of Renan's work, "History or Romance?" is a most fit one. If the novel is not a model one, the failure is due rather to the fundamental error of Renan's estimate of Christ than to his lack of genius and fancy.

A more serious question is that which relates to Renan's honesty. The most candid reader cannot deny that it is, at least, open to suspicion. Such contradictory representations as he gives of Christ's character certainly agree ill with his declared purpose to give a consistent picture. Jesus, we are told, was "sinless," and yet "not free from sin." He was "the greatest of moralists"; yet accepted the title "Son of David," only because "without it he could have hoped for no success." He is a man "who will never be surpassed"; yet he was a very ignorant man, having even no "clear idea of what it is that constitutes individuality." He is of such importance that "without him history is unintelligible"; yet his doctrines were "utopian and chimerical." He "attained the very summit of human greatness"; yet he was a fanatic, who "violated the sacred restraints of human nature, and even praised his followers for being bad sons and unpatriotic citizens, when they became such for his sake. He was "the creator of the eternal religion of humanity"; yet this creation was an accident, for had not John the Baptist been beheaded, he "would have continued to be only an unknown Jewish schismatic." These antitheses might be almost indefinitely multiplied. And no fewer quotations might be made, showing in what manner Renan, in his patronizing explanations and defences of Jesus' conduct, contrives to damn with faint praise or with half-concealed irony. When he attempts to transfer his own pantheism to Jesus, we are reminded of his remark that our "ideal of a person changes with ourselves." The cavalier-like manner with which he sets aside the most prevalent beliefs respecting Christ and the sacred narratives as hardly worth noticing, may be cunning, but is not quite ingenuous; and, even with the greatest stretch of charity, one can hardly believe his enthusiasm to be sincere when he exclaims, in reference to Mary Magdalene's account of her visit at the tomb of Jesus: "Divine power of love! Holy moments in which the passion of a visionary woman gives to the world a risen God!"

But to notice all such instances of misinterpretations and unfair insinuations would require a volume.

We turn to Schleiermacher. The delay in issuing his Life of Jesus has been occasioned by the difficulty of procuring an accurate version of his Lectures, as they were delivered; he himself having left only a fragmentary manuscript.

Those who are acquainted with Schleiermacher's other works can infer what in general would be the characteristics of this. That Christianity is the only true religion; that Christians constitute, and, in order to be such, must constitute, a church; that this church is animated and permeated by the spirit of Christ; that its life is drawn, not merely from Christ's doctrine, but from his person,—this is, in brief, Schleiermacher's creed. He denies Christ's divinity, as being unintelligible if he is to be also considered as a real man; yet he accepts the doctrine of the church, that Christ was specifically different from all other men. His task then is, as he states it, to show how Christ is the sufficient ground for the salvation of all men, and yet how he can be simply human. Schleiermacher does not attempt to present a connected account of Christ's life, confessing this to be impossible, in view of the imperfect data furnished in the narratives of the evangelists. Without attempting any minute criticism of the origin and relation of the four Gospels, he accepts the universal testimony of the church that the fourth is really from the apostle John, and attaches to it, therefore, special value. He makes it the basis of his representation of Christ's character and work, assigning to the others a secondary, but nearly co-ordinate importance.

The following is a summary of the most noticeable points in Schleiermacher's view of Christ's life: Matthew's and Luke's narratives of the Saviour's early life cannot be harmonized with each other, and are little trustworthy. Neither Christ's birth, nor anything connected with it, was miraculous. Yet Luke ii. 41–52 is authentic. The baptism was of no special importance; by submitting to it, Christ

wished merely to recognize John as his forerunner, and forgiveness as necessary for the Jews. The temptation must be considered as not a real occurrence, but as having probably a parabolic significance. Jesus had no distinct plan respecting his public work. He entered upon it gradually, even before the time when he is in the New Testament represented as beginning it. Being in the strictest sense sinless, he must have become very early in life conscious of being destined to a peculiarly high vocation. He labored where and as circumstances drew him out, following the movings of his benevolence and his pure moral sense. The term "Son of God" is explained in Heb. iii. 5, 6. Christ having been in a special manner acquainted with the will of God, as a son, in distinction from a servant, shares the counsels of his Father. Jesus' doctrine respecting himself is not essentially different from that found in the writings of the apostles; but we must distinguish what is polemic and apologetic in Christ's teachings from his direct affirmations, which distinction affords a wide margin for the doctrine of accommodation. Jesus' quotations from the Old Testament are mostly applications, rather than explications, this being to a certain extent true even of his claim to be the expected Messiah. His mission was to invite men to come to himself, "in order to receive from him all the elements of the spiritual life." The communion of Christians with Christ is the mystical, of Christians with one another the ecclesiastical, side of Christianity. Jesus' death had no expiatory virtue; it was only necessary to the highest success of his mission. The Holy Ghost promised by him to his disciples is nothing but the spirit of Christ remaining with them, i.e. the spirit of brotherly love and union, springing from attachment to a common Lord. This indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the church is the best analogue by which to illustrate in what sense God was in Christ. Jesus was a mere man, yet a generic rather than an individual man. He had an altogether peculiar relation to God; such an acquaintance with God

[Gottes bewusstsein] that he could truly say: "No man knoweth the Father but the Son"; but he had no existence before his life on earth. The expressions in John which seem to favor this doctrine, are to be referred rather to God's foreknowledge and fore-ordination of Jesus' relation to his work of redemption.

Schleiermacher's treatment of the miracles of Christ is a very interesting part of the book. It is quite evident that if the most striking miracles had been recorded only in the synoptical Gospels, Schleiermacher would have explained them all away, as invented or exaggerated by a later generation. But this not being the case, he resorts to the hypothesis that the miracles of healing were effected in a natural way, although in a very remarkable degree, by the force of Christ's spiritual nature acting on the physical constitution of others through the medium of an excited and expectant state of their emotions. This makes the greater number of the miraculous occurrences "comprehensible." In general, if we can understand Christ's *motive*, and also his *mode* of working, in a given case, there is no trouble. When either of these conditions is unfulfilled, the problem is difficult; when both fail, the accuracy of the narrative may be doubted. Thus, there was no need of Jesus feeding the five thousand, and we cannot see how, with so small a quantity of food, he could have done it; hence, probably nothing wonderful took place. This seems also to be indicated by the expression in John vi. 26. The daughter of Jairus was not dead, and probably the same is true of the young man at Nain. Lazarus was not raised by Christ, but, as Christ himself says, directly by God.

We cannot enumerate further particulars. The discussion of this subject, though not lacking in acuteness, must strike every reader as very unsatisfactory. Indeed, Schleiermacher himself acknowledges that no settled doctrine respecting this matter should be looked for until the origin of the Gospels is more critically investigated.

In sketching the sufferings and death of the Saviour,

Schleiermacher, following John, as usual, doubts the truth of the account of the agony in the garden, and of the miraculous occurrences mentioned in the other Gospels. The different narratives of the resurrection are compared, and the discrepancies presented, but no positive result is obtained. One can hardly tell whether the author has any opinion or not. Having begun with the promise to make the life of Christ comprehensible, he brings us at last to a most important point, where the real state of the case is left entirely unexplained. We are left in doubt whether the crucifixion resulted in a real death; in doubt, therefore, whether there was a real resurrection, and in still greater doubt how Jesus' life finally ended. Schleiermacher evidently discredits the whole story of the ascension. Yet he cannot believe that the apostles knew of Christ's actually dying a natural death after the resurrection. Hence we are told that the question is involved in uncertainty, this only being certain, that it was better for the disciples that Jesus himself should be away, so as not to overawe them, and thus render them unable to work independently.

Schleiermacher's Lectures on the Life of Jesus were heard by so many, and their purport, therefore, was so generally known, that the appearance of this book, of course, excites no very great attention. Yet not an inconsiderable party in Germany occupy still substantially Schleiermacher's theological point of view, and welcome its appearance. It is not unworthy of its great author, however faulty in many, and those even important, particulars. Though he often wrenches the scriptures, following his strong bent to develop everything out of his consciousness, yet he seems not to be conscious that this is a questionable course; he does not write in the spirit of a narrow controversialist, but seems rather to be driven by an inward impulse. He is sceptical, we may say, but not a sceptic who looks at Christianity from the outside, and affects thus impartially to examine it. He not only professes to be a Christian, but his spirit, in spite of all which is open to criticism in his views, is one which no true Christian can fail to respect.

Prof. Schenkel's "Characterbild Jesu" deserves notice, not so much because it is a specially valuable contribution to theological literature, as because it is the work of a prominent theologian, and indicates a certain tendency in German speculations. If we were in general terms to compare Schenkel's work with Renan's, we should say that the latter is as truthful a picture of the life of Jesus as one could expect from an infidel, and that the former is as untruthful a picture as one could expect from a Christian. As is well known, Schenkel has been for several years receding more and more from his former orthodox ground; this work may be taken as an index of his present position.

The key-note of this work, as of the two just considered, is the professed determination to make the life of Jesus thoroughly comprehensible. In his introduction, Schenkel reviews the past and present church doctrine respecting the person of Christ. He declares the notion of the union of two natures absurd; laments that the Reformers should have left their work half done, by omitting to attack this error; finds herein the chief source of rationalism — a movement which went too far, was checked by Schleiermacher, but not overcome, since he started from a too subjective point of view, thus leaving the way open for Strauss, by a stricter historical criticism, to attack the foundations of Christianity, by which attack many were frightened back to orthodoxy, but to a worse one than the former, because not so sincere. Hence, Schenkel concludes, a truthful presentation of the life of the Founder of Christianity is urgently needed. This he here attempts to give.

As to the sources of his biography, Schenkel accepts as satisfactory the investigations of Holzmann, and takes Mark as furnishing the most authentic narrative. The order of events as given by Mark is followed, as being chronologically correct. He thinks that Mark himself wrote somewhere between A.D. 45 and 48. His priority to all others is proved by his having no apparent special design in writing, by the lack of artistic arrangement, by the absence

of all accounts of Jesus' childhood and of different journeys to Jerusalem, and by his giving less of the miraculous. Matthew wrote, probably, before A.D. 60, Luke still later, and is the least trustworthy of the three. As for the fourth Gospel, Schenkel cannot away with it. He denies its genuineness; finds in it no "development" of Jesus' character; declares it utterly irreconcilable with the others; detects everywhere a distinct dogmatic purpose, viz. to exalt and deify the character of Christ; declares it impossible that Christ should have talked so long and in such a strain as is here often represented, and concludes that, though it contains trustworthy records, and may partially and indirectly be traced to John, it is yet of comparatively late origin, being written after A.D. 110. Schenkel's treatment of this topic is conducted neither with candor nor with critical thoroughness. He seizes at every item which may serve to weaken the authority of John, and ignores every effort that may be made to reconcile his Gospel with the others.

According to Schenkel, Christ was a mere man, yet a man of unexampled dignity, the hope and light of the world, the Saviour of men, etc. Schenkel does not affirm Jesus' sinlessness so emphatically as Schleiermacher, yet he seems to hold it. This, however, he can do with less difficulty than Schleiermacher, for he believes in no kind of innate depravity. Christ had naturally remarkably strong religious sensibilities. Luke ii. 41 seq. is probably authentic, "especially as all marks of legendary embellishment are lacking." Jesus' relation to the Baptist is "difficult," but we must suppose that curiosity led him to visit John, and a desire to identify himself with the people, not a sense of sin, to have induced him to be baptized. At that time he began to feel himself called to a great work, but he had yet no conviction that he was the Messiah. He had no plan respecting his labors in general. He preached a more thorough kind of repentance than that required by John. He never looked with favor on the Mosaic law; hence it is certain that the Sermon on the

Mount as given by Matthew is less accurate than in Luke. Hence, too, Matt. xxiii. 3, and other similar expressions, are spurious. In Mark viii. 27 we find the first intimation that Jesus began to think that he must call himself the Messiah. "This was the only way, at least with a part of the Jews, to make his thoughts gain entrance, and to attain the object of his mission." His opposition to Judaism grew more and more decided. He did not go to Judaea but once; that was, however, several months before his crucifixion. The cleansing of the temple indicated that the fall of the temple service was "an already accomplished fact." Christ's agony in the garden was occasioned by his fear of death, dread of disgrace, and especially by the thought that he must bear the hate of men. When on the cross he did not address John, for John was not there. Luke's account of the conversion of the thief is also wrong. The death was real, and there followed no resurrection. The subsequent appearances of Christ are to be considered as spiritual. This is indicated by Paul, who puts his own vision of Christ by the side of that of the other disciples, as if of the same nature.

As to miracles, Schenkel of course rejects them, but allows, like Renan and Schleiermacher, to Jesus a peculiar healing power. Whenever this cause is not a sufficient explanation of a recorded effect, it is only necessary to say that the record is "a later tradition." If it is found also in Mark, it is the work of "the subsequent reviser." Whenever it suits his purpose, Schenkel prefers Matthew or Luke's statement to Mark's. Sometimes he even gives the preference to John. In such cases he has only to remark that the expression or narrative is "genuinely historical."

But the task proposed of making Christ's life comprehensible, as being that of a mere man — is it accomplished? In the sense of having denied to him divinity, it is indeed done; this requires only a few strokes of the pen. In the sense of pronouncing all narratives of miraculous events

spurious, it is also done; this requires only a few strokes more. But taking what is accepted by the biographer as authentic, do we find even then everything made so very simple? Jesus, we are told, was *the* Light of the world; his character and vocation were altogether peculiar; from the nature of the case such a phenomenon as his life cannot be repeated. Here is a mystery which, if we admit no special divine interposition, is vastly more incomprehensible than the miracles which Schenkel finds it so hard to comprehend. How is it explained? Not daring to say that Jesus had a clear consciousness of being the incarnate Word, Schenkel hopes to make the case comprehensible by representing Christ's consciousness as dim, and gradually growing in clearness. The peculiar dignity of his person and work, it is said, "passed before his soul." He had a "presentiment" that he was to be the Redeemer of men. His commission seemed to come to him "like a gleam of silver light from above." He came at last "to recognize himself as the Mediator between God and man ..... as the peculiar Son of the heavenly Father." He learned this from "the mysterious depths of his own consciousness." During the progress of events "it had become to him an incontrovertible certainty that he would have to undergo anguish, pain, and death, as an offering for the oppressed and abused portion of humanity." "The tyranny of the letter had to kill Jesus, in order to die with him." "With his death he paid to the ordinances their last debt." This death was a propitiation for the sins of the world, "because in its blessed consequences the condemnatory effect of the [Jewish] ordinances was abolished." Such are some of the vague expressions by which Schenkel tries to smooth over the difficulty of reconciling the actual narratives of Christ with his own assumption of Christ's simple humanity. They may satisfy those who already hold substantially the same views; they will scarcely convince any real believers or real unbelievers.

There is in the book a certain moral earnestness, which deserves recognition. Though not entirely free from a

polemic tinge, it can hardly, like Renan's, make the impression that the author is using clandestine means to gain his end. He has certainly a thorough belief in the superiority of Jesus to all other men, and in Christianity as the one perfect religion. He professes to wish to relieve the church of errors which impede its progress. He is apparently convinced that his views are the only tenable ones. We will not dispute his honesty, but must regard his work as an unsuccessful attempt to accomplish an undesirable end.

Strauss, in the new edition of his work, gives, as a prominent object of the revision, a desire to make it more suitable than the first form for popular reading. The difference, however, in this respect, is trifling. This edition may, in general terms, be characterized as an attempt to restate and fortify the position taken at first. Strauss has given up nothing of the rigor with which he before maintained the mythical theory of the origin of the Gospels. Indeed, in point of scientific thoroughness of discussion, the new work is superior to the old, and would, were it not that his theory has been already so often replied to, receive, or at least deserve to receive, more attention than did the former. Strauss avails himself of the critical investigations which in the last thirty years have been directed, especially by the Tübingen school, against the genuineness of the New Testament books. The title of the present work is as great a misnomer as that of the other. The expectation that, in imitation of Renan, he would produce something of a more positive character than before, is disappointed. Strauss extends a very friendly word to his French coadjutor, expressing the hope that his [Strauss's] work will prove to be as well adapted to Germany as Renan's is to France; but the greeting can be occasioned only by the fact that he is more anxious about the result of his efforts than about their special character, for he has to express his regret that Renan should have fallen into the "fundamental error" of ascribing any credibility to the Gospels. As for himself, he still insists on the principle that no trust should be given to testimony in favor of the genuineness of those books, if

the force of it can by any means be weakened. Whatever is not absolutely demonstrated has for him no binding force. He has not relaxed from the rigor with which he applies what Professor Tholuck calls the Castor and Pollux canon of criticism, viz. the principle that when two authors disagree, *neither* tells the truth. We have here no occasion to enter into the details of his treatment of the main subject. Perhaps the most noteworthy fact suggested by the appearance of the book, is the fact that Strauss, after so long a silence, and after his former book had almost sunk into oblivion, still clings to his belief, and even cherishes the hope that it will yet obtain general currency.

Nor, to speak honestly, does this expectation of his appear to us very quixotic. The review which Strauss, in the opening of this revised edition of his Life of Jesus, passes on the different writers on the same theme, from Hess to Renan, is, to our mind, the most valuable part of the book — valuable as pointing out the weaknesses of the arguments of those who have undertaken to reconcile the authenticity of the Gospels as they stand with rationalistic or semi-rationalistic views of miracles. Strauss's logic is here unquestionably very keen and vigorous. He points out, with unsparing severity, the inconsistency of trying to effect any such reconciliation. For our part, we would much rather not be required to meet him on the ground taken by those whom he there criticises. His view seems to us, we will not say more nearly correct, yet far more easily to be maintained, than that of those who treat the Gospels as real histories, and yet assume, independent of all external guidance, to "feel out" the truth, throwing away what their feelings dislike as legendary and false. We cannot but hope that this work will do good, by serving to show the uselessness of seeking to eradicate the miraculous element from revelation. If we must choose between considering Christianity as a myth, and considering it as a revelation from the God of nature, who both could and did use miraculous measures in revealing his will, we have little to fear as to the result of the contest. Strauss makes the

issue extremely simple. He disdains to argue at any length the question whether miracles are possible or probable. He simply assumes that to believe in miracles is absurd. Admit this premise, and his conclusion is the most logical one that can be drawn. He holds that the impossibility of miracles implies the impossibility of such a phenomenon as a sinless man. In his opinion, to say that Jesus was a person whose like cannot be again expected, is just as much the affirmation of a miracle as is that of the resurrection of a dead man. And he is right. Herein even Renan violates his own doctrine; Schenkel, as to his general position, is still more assailable, while Schleiermacher, unwilling to admit the reality of a physical phenomenon the *how* of which he cannot comprehend, yet affirming in the case of Jesus with such sharpness and boldness a wonder in the realm of spirit just as incomprehensible, and infinitely more important, than the others at which he stumbles, reminds us of nothing else so much as of one who strains out a gnat and swallows a camel.

To conclude, Strauss's work, far from being one whose doctrines are outlived, in reality represents a strong tendency of the times. Utter disbelief in the supernatural is the form which rationalism now inclines to take. In Strauss it finds one of its ablest representatives. The sight is in itself a sad one; but the Christian may even rejoice that the enmity of his foes, if it is not to be avoided, takes so violent a form. When it is maintained that Christianity owes its very existence to pure lies or silly fancies; when it is seen, moreover, that this is the most consistent form that the enmity can assume, we may take courage. The work is easier than when directed against the puzzling sophistries of half-way infidels, or the timorous doubts of half-way Christians. The enemy is not a smooth-tongued Wordly-Wiseman, but an unmistakable Apollyon, straddling quite over the whole breadth of the way. The scientific defender of Christianity can meet the opposer by a simple *reductio ad absurdum;* the practical defender needs only to use the sword of the Spirit and the shield of faith.

ARTICLE III.

THE PERMANENCE OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE INTENTION OF ITS FOUNDER.[1]

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

In closing his epistle to the Romans — that compact and comprehensive exposition of the gospel in its adaptation alike to the Jewish and to the Gentile world — the apostle Paul gives, in few words, a summary of Christianity as a final revelation of the one absolute and universal religion. In Rom. xvi. 25 – 27, in the condensed phrases of a single sentence — in form a doxology — the origin and the mission of Christianity are set forth in almost every feature and function that could characterize a revelation as being complete and final: its historic continuity in the scriptures; its gradual unveiling through the ages; its concentrated manifestation in the ministry of Christ; the universality of its sphere; the permanence and the absolute supremacy of its office as the religion appointed of God for the enlightenment and the reformation of mankind.

In these particulars, the close of the epistle tallies exactly with its opening.[2] There, Paul speaks of the gospel which God "had promised afore by his prophets in the holy scriptures;" and here he describes the gospel as made known or opened up "by the scriptures of the prophets." There he speaks of Jesus Christ, his incarnation and his resurrection from the dead, as the very "gospel of God"; and here the preaching of Jesus Christ is the full revealing of that "mystery" which though "kept secret" as to the

[1] The substance of this Article was delivered as a Baccalaureate Address to the Senior Class in Andover Theological Seminary, in July, 1864; and also as an Anniversary Discourse before the American Missionary Association, at its meeting in New Haven, October, 1864.

[2] Rom. xvi. 25 seq., and i. 1–6.

time and the manner of it, had been silently unfolding since the world began.[1] There, he speaks of himself as having received from Christ an apostleship of this gospel "among all nations"; here, again, he describes the gospel as appointed "to be made known to all nations, by commandment of the everlasting God." And alike in the opening of the epistle and at its close, to secure a universal "obedience to the faith," as herein declared, is the purpose of God in "giving commandment" for the propagation of the gospel. And this was the very formula by which our Lord defined the object, the method, and the duration of the Christian ministry. "Go make all nations my disciples; baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."

Clearly, then, in the intention of its founder, and in the conception of its chief expounder and propagandist, the apostle Paul, Christianity, contemplated as an entire system of religious faith, unfolded with historical unity in the Bible, was designed to be the permanent, the universal, and the only religion of mankind; complete as a revelation of divine truth, and as the manifestation of the divine life and love; adequate to all the wants and all the phases of humanity, and adapted to all the coming ages of the world.

Whatever theory of Christ and Christianity men may adopt; however widely they may differ in their estimate of the facts of the gospel, or in their interpretation of its doctrines; whatever place they may assign to Christianity among the elements of our civilization; whatever value they may give it as a system of truth, or a power for social and moral progress; whether they accept it as a divine revelation authenticated by miracles, or construe it into a myth of purely human invention — there can be no question as to the claim of Christianity itself to have come from God to men, and to be, by divine appointment, the one, sufficient,

[1] Compare 1 Pet. i. 10–13.

authoritative, and unchanging system of faith and of morals, and the only hope of the world with respect to an enlightened, spiritual, and saving progress. All this is claimed by him who said of himself that he "came into the world to bear witness unto the truth"; that he is "the way, the truth, and the life"; that he is "the light of the world," and that "the world must be saved through him"; and who said concerning the scriptures that testify of him and his kingdom, "it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail." Completeness of adaptation to mankind, with a view to permanence of control in the sphere of morality and religion, and to universality of effect upon human society — this is written upon every page of the New Testament, from the announcement of the birth of Jesus as "a light to lighten the Gentiles and the glory of Israel," to the commission of the apostles "to make known the gospel unto all nations for their obedience to its faith," and onward through all the recorded and the promised triumphs of Christianity, until "the nations of them which are saved shall walk in the light" of the new and holy Jerusalem.[1]

Christianity, we repeat, in the intention of its Founder, is the complete and the final system of religious faith and practice for mankind; and the permanent, comprehensive, and universal agency for the moral advancement of the race. It is not one among religions; it is *the* religion. It is not one among agencies of moral reform and progress; it is *the* agency for constructing a true civilization. It is not one among systems of truth divinely accredited; it is *the* truth set forth by divine appointment to be everywhere received and obeyed.

But there has arisen of late years a social philosophy which treats all religions as the natural development of the human mind in successive stages of its progress, and which regards Christianity as simply a stage in that development; not a supernatural religion, ordained to be

[1] Rev. xxi. 24.

universal and permanent, but a natural growth of its era, and destined in turn to give place to some higher product of philosophic thought.

Akin to this philosophy of social progress is the claim of some modern scientists, that their discoveries in nature antiquate the Bible as the crude product of an unscientific age, when mysteries were miracles, and the legends of superstition were accepted as supernatural facts. This form of disbelief has in it nothing of the rancor that marked the infidelity of the eighteenth century. It may be supercilious toward Christianity as a theological experiment that has had its day, or may affect to patronize it for certain ideas and principles worth retaining in the future of the race; but it does not denounce the Bible as wholesale imposture, or sneer at Christians as priest-ridden fools. Yet, because of this air of candor and superiority, which admits certain excellences in Christianity, but passes these to the credit of human nature, while it also claims that the world has outgrown the system whose virtues it retains, this form of disbelief challenges a more serious refutation than the old infidelity would now require.

It goes beyond Mr. Parker's distinction between "the transient and the permanent in Christianity," and affirms that Christianity was in its very nature transitory, and is now ready to vanish away; that the claim of an historical revelation contained in a book, must yield to the "original revelation of consciousness[1]"; that "the interior spirit of any age is the spirit of God," and that the spirit of each age must appoint for it a "creed of its own;" that "the new religion of nature," in whose articles "revelation is the disclosure of truth to the active and simple reason," and "regeneration the bursting of the moral consciousness into flower"—this "theism of nature," interpreted by science, and developed from the human soul, must become the faith of the future, in place of the supernaturalism that has ruled in the faith of the past.[2]

[1] Miss Frances Power Cobbe, in "Broken Lights," p. 190.

[2] Address of Rev. O. B. Frothingham, at Cambridge, 1864.

Conceding to Christianity a place in the religious development of man, conceding that it was even an immeasurable advance upon foregoing religions, that it met certain needs of its time, and has accomplished vast good by its higher ethics, this new faith yet joins issue with it as a supernatural religion, introduced into the world by God for the permanent and universal governance of mankind. It seeks not to oppose Christianity by naked infidelity, nor by positive irreligion; but claims to advance upon the Bible by a more intellectual and more absolute conception of religion. Thus Comte, confounding, as French scepticism is apt to confound, the Church of the Middle Ages with Christianity, says of that theological polity, "no true philosopher will ever forget that it afforded the beneficent guardianship under which the formation and earliest development of modern societies took place; but it is equally incontestible that, for three centuries past, its influence among the most advanced nations has been essentially retrograde, notwithstanding some partial service."[1] Hence he asserts of this organized Christianity, that a system which "could not hold its ground before the natural progress of intelligence and of society, can never again serve as a basis of social order"; and then going beyond the polity to doctrine, he adds that the ascendancy of the scientific spirit must hinder any real restoration of the theological spirit; that "religious doctrine has lost its moral prerogatives," and that morality must be systemized by the normal growth of human faculties and affections, "without religious intervention."

And Mr. Herbert Spencer, while he disowns Comte's Positivism as the ultimate philosophy, yet treats all religions, from the grossest Fetichism up to the most refined creed of Christianity, simply as "so many natural products of human nature"; and holds that "the religious creeds through which mankind successively pass, are, during the eras in which they are severally held, the best that could

[1] Comte, Positive Philosophy (American ed.), pp. 402, 404, 751, 771.

be held"; and that with the growth of humanity "the creed which each period evolves is one more in conformity with the needs of the time than the creed which preceded it."[1]

"These various beliefs," says the same writer, "are parts of the constituted order of things; and not accidental, but necessary parts. Seeing how one or other of them is everywhere present; is of perennial growth; and when cut down, develops in a form but slightly modified; we cannot avoid the inference that they are needful accompaniments of human life, severally fitted to the societies in which they are indigenous. From the highest point of view, we must recognize them as elements in that great evolution of which the beginning and end are beyond our knowledge or conception; as modes of manifestation of the Unknowable; and as having this for their warrant."[2]

A late number of the Westminster Review speaks of the Christian faith as already falling into desuetude, through the law of progress in man's moral nature: "The crumbling decay and eventual downfall of a wide-spread faith and cultus, which have existed for centuries," is with it a foregone conclusion. It tells us that sceptical opinions now fall on the public mind "like sparks on tinder. They pervade literature and society like an atmosphere or a gas which no doors or windows will exclude." "Has man," asks the Review, "once for all, been provided, in any of the traditional creeds of Christendom, with something invariable and indestructible, which no progress can throw out of date, no discovery permanently injure, no change of circumstances render unsuited to society? These questions are now fairly put before the world, and must be answered one way or the other."[3] In a word, the sum of the Positive philosophy, as taught by its various schools, is that Christianity can by no means be accepted as a finality in religion, but that something in advance of this as a system

[1] Essay on the Use of Anthropomorphism.
[2] First Principles, p. 121.
[3] April, 1864, pp. 184, 185.

of belief is yet to be evolved from the world of science, the experience of history, and the nature of man.

If this be so, then our churches and our pulpits are a superfluity; or worse, they are a hinderance to the progress of true religion. If Christianity is already antiquated, then our schools of theology are a clog upon thought, since both their systems and their text-book are of the past. If human nature is to develop a higher, better faith than that of the Bible, then our missions will but delay the advancement of pagan nations, by imposing upon them doctrines and beliefs which human science and society have outgrown, and which they, in turn, must lay aside in order to a real and substantial progress. Why do, at so much pains and cost, that which philosophy and experience teach us must be undone, if we would accomplish the very end at which we aim — the permanent improvement of mankind in knowledge and the arts of life, in social condition and in moral character?

The question, then, whether Christianity was intended to be, and is adapted to be, the religion of mankind in all ages, is not a theoretical speculation, but a vital, practical question, — a question that should be fairly tested by the new lights of physical and social science, as well as by the older lights of history and experience. To establish the claim of Christianity to a universal and permanent domination in the sphere of religion, we must prove not only that in its origin it was a revelation from God, but also that it was given as a finality, and for universal diffusion. The Jewish ritual was equally of divine origin; yet this was of limited obligation, and was designed to be of limited duration. And it were conceivable that Christianity, though a revelation from God, could, like Judaism, have had some provisional or transient purpose in the progress of the race, leaving to after-times the full development of man through the discoveries of reason or by new revelations. But the peculiarity of Christianity is, that in its origin it was, in no manner, an outgrowth of its age, while in its spirit, its doctrine, its methods, and its scope, it is equally adapted to all ages.

I. Christianity was not a natural development of human thought, but an incoming of divine thought and love upon the plane of our nature.

Christianity derived nothing either of doctrine, of precept, or of ritual from any system of philosophy or of religion outside of the land of Judea. Its founder never passed beyond the limits of his native Syria; he attended no school of secular learning; and his life at Nazareth was so remote from such means of education as his native country afforded, that his townsmen expressed their astonishment at his wisdom, knowing that he had had none of the advantages of the schools. Jesus of Nazareth never came under the influence of the Grecian philosophy. He did not grow up in an atmosphere of Roman culture. There is not a word of his recorded utterances that would suggest that he had ever read a line of Plato or of Aristotle, or had heard the then fresh fame of Cicero. He knows no book but the Hebrew scriptures; quotes no other as an authority for his sayings; mentions no name outside the line of Jewish history, and no opinion outside the pale of Jewish thought; but gives forth his own doctrine in simple, independent aphorisms, and in brief parables and discourses, without reference to any school of philosophy or system of theology in preceding ages, or then extant. Nor can the doctrines and precepts of Christ be traced by affinity or assimilation to any such school or system of antiquity. He borrowed nothing from his own age, nor from any prior age; and neither himself nor his religion was an outgrowth of his times; but both were a protest against the world as it then stood toward God.

With one exception, his apostles learned all they knew directly from the master. "Unlearned and ignorant men" was the designation given them by the Sanhedrim. Unskilled in languages, unversed in literature, knowing only that which Christ had taught them; they borrowed nothing from their age. Paul, the exceptional case, while he knew the drift of the Greek philosophy, and was personally

familiar with the religious systems of his time, knew these but to condemn them as false, corrupt, and destructive. In the very centres of philosophy and art, he knew nothing save Jesus Christ, and him crucified, though "to the Greeks the preaching of the cross was foolishness." Though an occasional resemblance may be traced between the ethical principles and maxims of Seneca and those of Paul — enough to establish an identity between natural and revealed religion; yet the grand doctrines of Paul's epistles concerning God's plan of restoration for a sinful race can be traced to no pagan writer of antiquity. So far from being a natural outgrowth of the times, Christianity was in oppugnation to the times, and the times were everywhere hostile to Christians. Beginning as a small minority among the Jews, they were hated and persecuted by their own nation. Then exiles scattered abroad, they were at first despised as weak enthusiasts, then persecuted as enemies of the state and of the gods. Christianity originating in a narrow, subjugated province, among a people unrecognized in the sphere of philosophy and of literary culture, originating independently of all foreign systems of philosophy and religion, won its way against the contempt of genius and learning, against the strength of social customs and religious usages, against popular superstitions, the prejudices of caste and race, and the persecutions of the civil power throughout the whole world. It encountered the keen intellectual weapons of a Celsus and a Julian, as well as the sharpness and pains of persecution. There is nothing either in its doctrines, in its spirit, or in its history to mark it as a natural outgrowth of its age, or a product of human nature in any age. Tacitus, the most intelligent and candid pagan historian of that period, has recorded how despicable and how hated was this new superstition of the despised and hated race of Jews.

There was, indeed, in the moral needs and failures of antiquity, in the decay of the old philosophies and religions, a silent, unconscious preparation of the world for the pure

and sublime teachings and the remedial influences of Christianity; but the adaptation of Christianity to its age no more argues its natural outgrowth from that age, than the adaptation of the Sanitary Commission to the wants and the wounds of our soldiers argues that the Commission is a natural outgrowth of the spirit of war; no more than the adaptation of free institutions to recover the South from the material waste and the social dissolution of war argues that free institutions are the natural outgrowth of the system that has brought upon her these vast and terrible woes. The horrors of war occasioned the demand for that healing Commission which is a development, not of the age, but of the spirit of Christianity. The wastes of war have unveiled to us the curse of slavery, and the need of those remedial institutions which are the outgrowth of the spirit of freedom. So the acceptance of Christianity was, in some sense, "a symptom of the wants and aspirations struggling beneath the surface of the age." But let us not confound occasion with origin, nor an adaptation to heal with an outgrowth from the disease.

In one respect Christianity was an outgrowth, a development from that which had gone before. But this only in the line of the Hebrew scriptures and the Jewish ritual. It was the unveiling of the mystery that lay hidden under those ancient prophecies, within those venerable forms. It was the revelation of that great plan which was intimated to man directly upon his fall, yet which, in the manner of it, had been secret since the world began, whereby man should be restored to the likeness and the fellowship of God, and the earth should be renewed as the garden of the Lord. The mystery of ages, "How shall man be just with God," became a *manifestation* "through the preaching of Jesus Christ," according to "the scriptures of the prophets." And this doctrinal unity of the scriptures, in the great facts of the holiness and the justice of God in his moral government over the world, of the apostasy and the condemnation of mankind, and of the reunion of man with

God through the divine sacrifice for man's redemption; this unity of thought in the narrow line of the Hebrew scriptures, apart from all the philosophies and religions of the world; unity in conceptions so just, so true, so unequalled, so sublime; a unity that stands unveiled in Christ from germ to stalk and to the crowning flower,—this argues not a spontaneous outgrowth from the soil of nature, but a special planting by the hand of God.

That calm and comprehensive historian of the Roman Empire, Mr. Merivale, speaking from the point of view of historical criticism, and contrasting the genius of Christianity with that of antecedent and contemporary faiths, shows how foreign from any and all of these was the conception and origin of the new belief: "The old beliefs of the primitive ages, which had done something at least to temper prosperity and sweeten the ills of life, had perished to a poisonous core in a shrivelled husk. The science of ethics was apparently exhausted. It had finished its career in blank disappointment, and there was no faith or courage to commence it afresh. Alexander wept on the margin of the eastern ocean that there were no more lands to conquer; Caesar, from the farthest bourn of philosophic speculation, may have confessed with a sigh that within the visible horizon of human intuitions there were no more provinces for reason to invade. The Great Disposer had yet another leaf to turn in the book of his manifold dispensations; but the rise and progress of a new religion, with vigor to control the jarring prejudices of nations and classes, asserting supernatural facts, and claiming divine authority, appealing with equal boldness on the one hand to history, on the other to conscience, shaping an outward creed, and revealing inward ideas, the law of the simple and the science of the wise, exalting obedience in the place of ambition, and expanding patriotism into philanthropy, was the last offspring of the womb of time that Caesar could have imagined, or Cicero have ventured to anticipate."[1]

[1] History of the Romans under the Empire, Vol. II. pp. 427, 428.

Call Christianity a development if we will; its germ lay not in the decaying husks of the old philosophies. Call it a development; its vital impulse came not from the current thoughts and hopes of its time. The almost contemporary writings of Cicero "may be searched in vain for a single expression of reliance on the progressive improvement of mankind. The two poles of his philosophy, between which he wavers with perpetual oscillation, are regret for the past and resignation to the present." [1] Christianity redeemed the past and created a future. Call it a development, if that term suits our philosophy; yet must we admit that this is a development from another source than any that philosophy had yet disclosed, and in another line from any that the best faiths of the world had indicated.

All the essential characteristics of Christianity — its doctrines, its methods, its aims, and its effects — prove it the development of a divine plan, "kept secret since the world began," but made manifest by the gospel of Jesus Christ illumining with one broad, glowing belt of light, the starlit heaven of the prophets.

II. But these very scriptures teach us also that, "according to the commandment of the everlasting God," this gospel is to be "made known to all nations, for the obedience of faith." It was designed to be the final, the universal, the perpetual religion of mankind. This it asserts as its aim and its prerogative. It is the gospel of truth and of salvation "to all nations" down to the end of the world. To justify this assertion, Christianity must prove itself equal, as a *religion*, to all the wants and all the capacities of mankind, in all phases of society and in all periods of time. Now Christianity has, thus far, met the religious wants of the race without exhausting itself, and it is to-day equal to the demands of the human soul and of human society, in all that pertains to religion, in an age of intellectual inquiry, of political progress, and of humanitary reform.

That Christianity has proved adequate to the needs of

[1] Merivale, Vol. II. p. 427.

human society and the developments of human progress hitherto, history will testify by this one pregnant fact: that Christianity has lived on steadily through eighteen centuries, and no age has yet come up to its standard of personal living, or its measure of social regeneration. Here we summon a witness whom none will accuse of a superstitious veneration for the scriptures, or of a blind devotion to Christianity under any received form of theology or of worship. Speaking of the true spirit of Christianity, the late Theodore Parker said: "For eighteen hundred years this Christianity of Christ has been in the world, to warn and encourage. Violence and cunning, allies of sin, have opposed. Every weapon learning could snatch from the arsenals of the past, or science devise anew, or pride and cruelty and wit invent, has been used by mistaken men to destroy this fabric. Not a stone has fallen from the heavenly arch of real religion; not a loop-hole been found where a shot could enter."[1] How "vast has the influence of Jesus been. How his spirit wrought in the hearts of his disciples, rude, selfish, bigoted, as at first they were. How it has wrought in the world. His words judge the nations. The wisest son of man has not measured their height. They speak to what is deepest in profound men; what is holiest in good men; what is divinest in religious men. They kindle anew the flame of devotion in hearts long cold. They are spirit and life. His truth was not derived from Moses and Solomon; but the light of God shone through him, not colored nor bent aside. His life is the perpetual rebuke of all time since. It condemns ancient civilization; it condemns modern civilization. Wise men we have since had, and good men; but this Galilean youth strode before the world whole thousands of years, so much of divinity was in him. His words solve the questions of this present age.[2] ..... Let men improve never so far in civilization, or soar never so high on the wings of religion and love, they can never

[1] Discourse of Religion, p. 296 seq.

[2] Parker's Miscellaneous Writings, p. 175.

outgo the flight of truth and Christianity. It will always be above them. It is as if we were to fly towards a star, which becomes larger and more bright the nearer we approach, till we enter and are absorbed in its glory."[1]

When we analyze more particularly the adaptations of Christianity to our times, we find, in the first place :

(1) That the religion of the Bible is equal to the demands of man's spiritual nature in the most advanced stage of scientific thought, and under the highest stimulus of intellectual inquiry. To demand of a book of religion, written in the most ancient times, for popular instruction in religious truth and duty, that it should anticipate the discoveries of physical science by many centuries, that it should arrange the phenomena of nature under scientific formula and always speak of them in scientific terms, were an incongruity that science itself must condemn. That were to defeat the very object of the book, by making it unintelligible, and so far incredible. To charge such a book with scientific errors because it describes nature according to popular modes of conception and speech were equally illogical. As a book for the common people it could not do otherwise ; and this very feature of it makes it a book for all ages and nations, at whatever grades of intellectual culture. Science can fairly demand of the Bible neither the facts nor the phrases which it employs within its own sphere. But it can insist, and ought to insist, that, as a scheme of religious thought and of spiritual life, the Bible shall be equal to the wants of an intellectual and inquiring age ; and that in matters of fact it shall contravene no fact or principle fairly established from other sources. For if the Bible be not equal intellectually to the demands of human thought when enlightened and stimulated by science, then it must lose its hold upon the world as knowledge advances ; and if it be found at variance with truths well established from nature and reason, then must it yield its claim to obedience as having divine authority.

Now with regard to matters of fact in the physical world,

[1] Parker's Miscellaneous Writings, p. 184.

the portraiture of nature in the Hebrew poetry, Humboldt being witness, is marvellous for its comprehensiveness and its accuracy.[1] No physicist could improve upon it for purposes of popular description and of devotional meditation. So of the Mosaic record of the creation. Neither the principles of Hebrew criticism nor the theories of geology are yet in a condition to warrant a minute "parallelism between the ages of nature, as revealed to us in the fossiliferous strata, and the days of creation described in the first chapter of Genesis." Yet, as a Christian scientist, Dr. Duns observes: "Intelligent readers must often have noticed the remarkable way in which many of the most striking words of Genesis fit into the requirements of true science. Take the last and most scientific treatise on meteorology, and, in the light of all it makes known of the action of light and heat on the elements which compose our atmosphere, of evaporation, and of the watery treasures which the air holds suspended in it, you will be struck with the harmony between these phenomena and the changes described upon the second day of creation, when God divided the waters from the waters, lifted the vapory clouds from the face of the deep, and made

> "The firmament, expanse of liquid, pure,
> Transparent, elemental air."[2]

Taken in its broad outlines as a scheme of the world's origin, this record of the physical creation, together with the unity of the race and the geographical dispersion of the primitive nations therein described, finds a growing confirmation in the soberer judgments of science. Science is still in the stage of hypothesis concerning that far antiquity; and what to-day seems contrary to some received interpretation of the Bible, may hereafter be harmonized, through new discoveries or a wiser criticism. The account of the creation in Genesis is marked by that sublime principle of *order* which is among the highest results of science, and by

[1] Cosmos, Vol. II., Hebrew Poetry.
[2] Duns's Biblical Natural Science, Vol I. pp. 57, 58.

the assertion of a *cause* which science itself must recognize as the end of all inquiry.[1] That general order or plan of the creation the mature results of science tend more and more to verify; and the biblical account of nature, when interpreted as popular, unscientific language should be understood, stands as good for this age of microscopic scrutiny and mathematical analysis, as for an age when the eye was the only observer, and unlettered traditions were the only record. The Bible speaks of physical phenomena in that tropical language which is the habit of the East; but "let not western metaphysics misjudge, lest it be found to misunderstand, eastern aesthetics."[2]

While thus unimpeached upon the physical count, when tested by sound interpretation, this religion of the Bible stands above and beyond all science in its exhibition of the spiritual forces of the universe. Mr. Spencer himself, who proposes a complete philosophy of nature as the basis of a higher religion, makes this candid admission: "The sincere man of science, content to follow wherever the evidence leads him, becomes by each new inquiry more profoundly convinced that the universe is an insoluble problem. Alike in the external and the internal worlds, he sees himself in the midst of perpetual changes, of which he can discover neither the beginning nor the end. If, tracing back the evolution of things, he allows himself to entertain the hypothesis that matter once existed in a diffused form, he finds it utterly impossible to conceive how this came to be so; and equally, if he speculates on the future, he can assign no limit to the grand succession of phenomena ever unfolding themselves before him. ..... When, again, he turns from the succession of phenomena to their essential nature, he is equally at fault. Though he may succeed in resolving all properties of objects into manifestations of force, he is not thereby enabled to realize what force is; but finds, on the contrary, that the more he thinks about it,

[1] See Prof. Blackie on the Mosaic Cosmogony, in "Good Words," Oct. 1861.
[2] Murphy on Genesis, p. 43.

the more he is baffled. ..... In all directions his investigations eventually bring him face to face with the unknowable; and he ever more clearly perceives it to be the unknowable..... He feels, with a vividness which no others can, the utter incomprehensibleness of the simplest fact, considered in itself. He alone truly *sees* that absolute knowledge is impossible. He alone *knows* that under all things there lies an impenetrable mystery."[1]

In these days of vagrant hypotheses, that assume the air of established theories, it is refreshing now and then to hear from some true scientist the confession of an impenetrable mystery in nature. How confident at first was the nebular hpyothesis of solving the formation of the universe![2] Yet plausible and self-consistent as was this hypothesis, fifty years have added nothing to confirm the ingenious guesses of Herschell and Laplace. It remains only an *hypothesis;* and an eminent authority does not scruple to suggest that "all nebulosity may arise from deficiency in the optical powers of the astronomer, rather than inhere in the constitution of the nebulae themselves." In any event, "the nebular hypothesis throws no light on the origin of diffused matter; and diffused matter as much needs accounting for as concrete matter." So with the hypothesis of development — not yet raised to the dignity of a theory. Like the hypothesis of apostolical succession, it fails at the vital point of the first links; there is nothing to

[1] Illustrations of Universal Progress, pp. 59, 60.

[2] "Laplace once went in form to present an edition of his Systéme du Monde to the first consul. Napoleon, whom some wags had told that this book contained no mention of the name of God, and who was fond of putting embarrassing questions, received it with: 'M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on the system of the universe, and have never even mentioned its Creator.' Laplace, who, though the most supple of politicians, was as stiff as a martyr on every point of his philosophy or religion (e.g. even under Charles X. he never concealed his dislike of the priests), drew himself up, and answered bluntly, 'Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse là.' Napoleon, greatly amused, told this reply to Lagrange, who exclaimed, 'Ah! c'est une belle hypothèse; ca explique beaucoup de choses.'" — Prof. de Morgan, in the Athenaeum.

hook it to the beginning; since, "the first strata, had they been preserved, instead of containing the lowest rudiments of life, might have contained the foot-prints of the present archangels."[1] It is becoming, then, in science to admit at the beginning, "an impenetrable mystery."

But just where science confesses itself incompetent, Christianity comes forward to unveil the mystery hidden from ages and from generations. It brings us face to face with a personal God, the creator of the universe and its lord; and it brings God face to face with us in Jesus Christ, the incarnation, which was also the manifestation, the unveiling.

Not long ago there was set up in a public square in the city of Frankfort, a huge frame, which purported to contain a work of art designed for a national memorial. For many days it stood there unopened and unexplained; only the dim outlines of a colossal statue were visible to the curious through the chinks of the screens. At length, on an appointed day, the magistrates, the artists, and the literary men of the city, with government officers of rank, accompanied by a band and a chorus of musicians, went in procession to the square, and there, in presence of an immense concourse, the screens were carefully and ceremoniously removed. But curiosity was still baffled by a thick white veil enveloping the statue from head to foot. A long and learned oration sounded forth the genius and worth of a great poet and historian of Germany; and a grand overture of Mendelssohn rendered its homage to the hour. Yet all the while the eager crowd saw nothing but the outlines of a figure veiled in white. At last, the speech and the music over, the ropes were cut from behind, the veil fell, and amid the huzzas of the vast crowd, *Schiller* stood revealed, holding in one hand an open book, in the other a ready pen.

Long time there stood, in the high place of human thought and concourse, seen of many, penetrated by none, a mysterious screen, behind which was said to be hidden the

[1] North American Review, July, 1864, p. 16.

source of all thought and power, the poem of life and of the universe. At length, when art and culture, and science and philosophy had achieved their highest renown, the trumpets sound, the world gives ear, and some Plato or Aristotle discoursing, with majestic music, of nature and the divine, the screens are drawn aside, and there stands the figure — still covered with an impenetrable veil. Art, music, poetry, all bring their homage, science and philosophy essay their description, but there is no vision, no motion, no life. Only the outer screens are removed; the veil remains untaken away. Then, in the fulness of time, there reaches forth from the Invisible a hand that cuts the cord; the veil drops, and we behold "the brightness of the Father's glory," the "image of his person;" in his hand the Book of life, and the pen that reveals all truth, that writes all destinies. Does science sneer at "the mechanical God of Paley," and insist that the theory of development presents a loftier ideal of the First Cause; that "creation by manufacture is a much lower thing than creation by evolution." We care not to argue the secondary question between these methods or processes of creation, since the scriptures, which admit as well of either or both, at the very beginning lift us to a far higher plane of thought. For the first presentation of God in the Bible is of a personal Spirit, having will, wisdom, power, as put forth in the act of creation, be that instantaneous or immeasurable in time; be its method mechanical or derivative, by collocation or by growth. And the next view is of a loving Father caring for the children made in his own image; and the next, of the just Ruler condemning sin; and thus on, in the series of divine manifestations, until Sinai sets forth the holy and merciful Sovereign, and Calvary the righteous and the redeeming God. No pantheistic emanation, no scientific theory of evolution, no metaphysical scheme of the Absolute, can ever so task, so elevate, so satisfy, so exhaust the intellect of man. Robert Browning shows herein a larger faculty than Herbert Spencer, whose highest faith reaches

only to some "unknown reality which underlies both spirit and matter":

> "I say that miracle was duly wrought
> When, save for it, no faith was possible.
> So faith grew, making void more miracles,
> Because, too much, they would compel, not help.
> I say, the acknowledgment of God in Christ
> Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee
> All questions in the earth and out of it,
> And has so far advanced thee to be wise."[1]

(2) Christianity is equal to the whole work of social reform and of humanitary progress which our age proposes, and will accomplish that work by the wisest, the simplest, and the surest methods. It might well be argued that the very impulses toward reform that mark this as an age of practical philanthropy, owe their origin to Christianity; for Christianity exists not merely as a doctrine in a text-book, and as an institution in the organic form of the church, but is abroad in the world as a light and an atmosphere; so that the organic philanthropy which is a distinguishing feature of this century, has come into being after so many centuries of Christian influence in *humanizing* mankind, and as a side-growth from its ever-diffusive spirit of charity. This philanthropy originates nowhere outside the pale of Christendom. Though sometimes magnified as a practical religion by men who reject the theology of the Bible, it does not spring from the spirit of religious scepticism as its root, and cannot be sustained by that as its vital force. But all works of philanthropy affiliate themselves with Christianity by a law of natural affinity; they rely mainly upon Christian charity for resources, and upon Christian activity for their accomplishment; and when all is done, philanthropy can be nothing more than a practical improvement of the beatitudes of Christ and his sermon at Nazareth; its achievements can never go beyond the simple record of his life — the Son of man came to seek and to save that

[1] Browning's "Death in the Desert."

which is lost; he went about doing good, healing all manner of diseases and infirmities, and all that were oppressed of the devil; and philanthropy can frame no higher motto than that which the Lord Jesus gave his disciples: "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

A theist of the new school, who unites a masculine vigor of intellect with a feminine delicacy of sentiment, affirms that "the faith founded on consciousness must look for its moral law to the intuitions of the soul, and not to the authority of a book"; and this faith of intuition, she thinks, will teach us the brotherhood of mankind; the love of the weak and the lowly, even though they be unlovely; and will "pour the spirit of love into duty."[1] But we have a book that teaches all this, and more, in its ten commandments and its Sermon on the Mount. Why, then, give up the faith this book has taught us, and which stands transfigured in the life of Christ, only to reconstruct the same of doubtful "intuitions."

Christianity equal to the demands of the age for reform! What but Christianity has given birth and utterance to these demands? What but Christianity has produced an age capable of embracing the interests of humanity, and of making the elevation of man the theme of literature and the care of politics? "In modern times," says one, "all moral and political speculation is forward-looking, and is full of anticipations of new discoveries in happiness and knowledge. But Roman statesmen and philosophers took no such comprehensive survey of the destinies of their race."[2] That survey can be gained only through the gospel, which at once declares that God made of one blood all nations of men, that he hath redeemed them with the blood of his Son, and that he will judge them in righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained. Man, the offspring and the image of God; man, so loved of God that God spared not his own Son to redeem him; man, so great in his sphere of moral action and in his immortality that God will judge him for his ways

[1] Frances Power Cobbe, "Broken Lights," Chap. XI.

[2] Merivale's Roman Empire, Vol. II. p. 427.

— ah! here is a subject for philanthropy, and a motive as well, greater than all that nature and science and philosophy can supply.

(3) Christianity is adequate to the work of political reconstruction for which the nations are yearning with hardly suppressed griefs, or heaving with internal fires. While it is as true to-day as when our Lord spake it to Pilate, that his kingdom is not of this world, and that the gospel does not teach political science, nor furnish a model for civil government, nor pronounce upon the forms of government that men have instituted; it is true also that the New Testament is the best manual of political ethics and of civil polity that any age or nation has seen, and that no political society has yet attained to the perfection which the spirit and principles of Christianity would produce, did they once pervade the body politic.

We may even go further and affirm, with a Jewish publicist of France, that there does not exist in Europe to-day a government which, in regard for justice, for liberty, for equality, will compare with the civil state established by Moses, "a democracy based upon duty," in which Duty and its correlative Right are the basis of all law, and the general good the motive of the law. "When," he demands, "has an agitator, from Savonarola to Robespierre, assailed tyranny and proclaimed liberty in the name of Plato or of Plutarch?"[1]

Where shall we look for a description of the origin and functions of civil government and of the obligations of loyalty, so wise, so just, so comprehensive, as that given by Paul in the letter addressed to Romans living under a despotism, yet as appropriate to Americans under a constitutional republic? — that government is an ordinance of God for maintaining justice, for protecting the good, for punishing the evil; that obedience to government, thus constituted and administered, is a religious duty; that tribute should be paid, not under coercion, but for conscience' sake; and that every

[1] Moïse et le Talmud, par Alexandre Weill.

subject of government should simply and always "do that which is good." What rule of good citizenship, of good neighborhood, of commercial honesty, of social intercourse will once compare with this: "Render to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor; owe no man anything, but to love one another."? Or this: "To obey magistrates; to be ready to every good work; to speak evil of no man; to be no brawlers."? Or where shall we look for such an adjustment of political equality and the rights of man, with proper elective affiliations in society, and with reverence for just authority, human and divine, as in these sententious precepts: "Honor all men; love the brotherhood; fear God; honor the king"? What is it that Mexico needs for her true development? An imported emperor? A bauble throne, floated to her from over the sea? These may arrest for a time her chronic state of revolution; but her regeneration must come through the enlightenment of the masses by the word of God.

What is it that the South needs for the reconstruction of social order? What "resources of statesmanship" are required to quell rebellion and restore our peace, save these simple rules, that masters should render to their servants that which is just and equal, and should submit themselves to those civil ordinances which God hath sanctioned in this land, whether it be to the central and supreme authority, or unto governors as appointed for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well? The state of this nation to-day is proof at once of the necessity for the Christian faith, and of its vital presence.

As with a purposed rebuke of that social and humanitary science that affects to supercede her prerogative of reform, Christianity calmly and resolutely addresses herself to the gravest problem that has tasked human society since Jesus came to preach deliverance to the captives, and the gospel to the poor; how, in the face of social prejudice, of political outlawry, and of judicial contempt, to lift a race subjected

to two centuries of legalized injustice and of irresponsible cruelty, up to the standard of the Christian citizen. How marvellous the testimony to the living power of Christianity that is given by the faith, the patience, the hope, the love of four million slaves now being transformed into freemen! Fort Wagner and the ramparts of Petersburg and Richmond bear witness that, not cowardice nor incapacity, but a sublime faith in God, kept these simple people patient under almost hopeless wrongs. Their forbearance to avenge these wrongs, when the promise of deliverance from without combined with the atrocities of their rebel lords to provoke an uprising; their grateful devotion to the government that has set them free; their ready industry and application stimulated by religious feeling, and the desire to possess all the blessings of the gospel, — these demonstrate the indestructible and elastic life of Christianity, though buried under all the strata of ignorance and barbarism that ages of wrong could deposit. Call it a mere Hebrew tradition — yet the story of Moses and the exodus has been as a pillar of fire to these dwellers in Egyptian night; their cry has been to the God of Israel; and when at last he came to them personified in the President whose name had been the scorn and the dread of their oppressors, not Abraham's faith was more implicit and resolved than theirs. The song of Miriam has echoed on the banks of the Mississippi, the Tennessee, the Potomac, the James, as these ransomed ones have seen the salvation of the Lord; and all the glory of the New Jerusalem has lighted their way, as they have come up out of the house of bondage, singing Hallelujah to the name of Jesus:

> "It must be now de kingdom comin',
> An' de year ob jubilo."

That an antiquated religion which is capable of such majestic achievements of faith and love! which can go down into the lowest deeps of our humanity, and there inspire the patience of hope, and then, when the convulsions of the

nation stir those deeps, can bear aloft a rescued race in its regenerating arms! Call that a tradition, a superstition of the past, which is alive with all the forces of the present to reform evil, to renovate man, to reconstruct society upon the basis of justice, of freedom, and of virtue!

Well enough, will some say, down there at the low level of the African mind, with a sensuous imagination to be wrought upon by its legends and its symbols; but outgrown by the maturity of the Anglo-Saxon with his arts and inventions, his physical science and his political philosophy? But what if the old master of the South had, to-day, that faith in God and that love to Jesus which characterize the just emancipated slave? What if *his* belief in a just God and an overruling Providence should leaven our political action and our entire social condition? Have we yet outgrown the need of such a virtue and such a justice as the gospel inculcates and provides?

A religion that can inspire the lowliest with hope by inspiring the loftiest with the sentiment of justice; that can teach the weak and suffering to be patient, and the strong to be magnanimous; that can restore humanity from the imbruting degradation of slavery, and reconstruct society from the chaos of war, — a religion that can solve all social, moral, political, and humanitary questions that the wrongs of the past have transmitted, or the spirit of the age has raised, is the religion for this age and for all ages — is the religion for man, and is given him of God.

(4) Christianity alone can meet those spiritual wants of man which are as vital as the soul and as lasting as the race. Science, philanthropy, politics, paramount as they seem to those who make either a specialty, are, after all, but secondary and superficial in view of the compound nature of man, and of the inner and higher life of the soul. These concern themselves with the organization and details of man's outward condition, and with the development of intelligence and sensibility for wise and useful ends, with respect to life as it is. But religion addresses itself to the soul as a

spiritual substance and life, the central part of the man himself, the central force of all material and social organization, and also an integral part in that vast spiritual system, whose centre is God, and whose cycle is eternity. Your mere physicist cries aloud his facts — hard, stubborn facts; your positivist boasts his laws — immutable and inevitable laws; and each would have us bound the universe of thought and being by his discoveries in physical fact, or his determinations of phenomenal laws. But God's universe is not a mere bundle of facts and laws; there are POWERS as well; and the soul is a power over nature, and a maker as well as a subject of law.

> "For though the giant ages heave the hill
> And break the shore, and evermore
> Make and break and work their will;
> Though worlds on worlds in myriad myriads roll
> Round us, each with different powers,
> And other forms of life than ours —
> What know we greater than the soul?" [1]

The facts of consciousness and the laws of moral action are as real as are the mountains, and as much more grand than they as the soul is greater than a stone.

Laboulaye has finely said, that "while physicists, shut up within the material universe, have failed to find God, and have not recognized his presence in the living laws that govern all things, Moses, in a few words, makes us acquainted with the divine liberty and with our own; a truth that science does not give, but which our souls feel, and which is the very foundation of religion." [2]

Christianity alone fitly recognizes the moral condition and needs of the human soul. No law of development in human nature has outgrown the fearful fact of sin, or antiquated that aboriginal decree of death, that hath passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. Be it that the stars were compressed into shining spheroids by the slow rota-

[1] Tennyson.

[2] Etudes Morales et Politiques, p. 98.

tion of impalpable nebulous rings; my conscience gets no cover from the clouds; it wins no hope from the stars. Be it that man is only the latest development from some primitive monad of existence; still he has that which no antecedent link in the series of being has known — the consciousness of personal guilt. Be it that man had his age of iron, his age of bronze, his age of stone, in a far antiquity; he lives now in an age of sin, and traces that damning mark over all the history of his race. And *that* fact no physical science, nor metaphysical speculation, nor social philosophy can alter, remove, or even palliate. Christianity alone provides for this one baleful yet characteristic fact of human nature a philosophical and a sufficient remedy. Science, which vainly attempts to evolve from its own facts the mysteries that lie behind them, is utterly helpless and speechless when summoned to the work of restoration in the human soul, where sin has wrecked peace, happiness, hope. Not progress, nor education, nor development is the key to that mystery. Redemption, *Redemption* is the mystic word that alone can reach it; and that is not a word or fact of human origin, but is born into the language and the history of the race from above. This makes Christianity as permanent as the race itself.

It stands, then, as true to-day as when Paul uttered it amid Greek philosophy and art, and Roman prowess, letters, and luxury, that a true civilization is to be attained, a true humanity developed, a golden age of light and love to be restored, through the preaching of Jesus Christ to all nations "for the obedience of faith." They who are called to preach the Gospel should have the utmost confidence in its efficaciousness for overcoming all evil, and ensuring all good, while the world shall stand. They should learn not to fear philosophy, but to frame it to their use; not to shrink from the criticism of the Bible, but to employ this for the exposition and the defense of the Christian faith; not to stand aghast at science as a foe to revelation, but to wring from science new proofs of a personal God, to whom

that which for us is supernatural in the government of the world, is but the natural outgoing of his power and love. And being thus trained to an intelligent freedom under the laws of systematic truth, instead of running behind the breastworks at every alarm, the preacher of the gospel will rightly measure the strength and resources of the enemy, and will meet and rout him upon every field.

It is time that we had done with the apologetics of Christianity and had better proved its dynamics. Believing in the gospel as the divine religion for all time, the Christian church should go forth to the conquest of the world, and "fight it out on this line." Abandoning the defensive for the aggressive, holding ever to the right and the duty of a world-conquest for Christ, she should turn the very fortresses of error into pivots for the truth to swing round upon, while "by the left flank forward," she marches to the final victory. In the confidence of this gospel, and in the living faith and love of it, she should preach it in centres of culture and of criticism, of a sceptical sensualism, and a scientific pantheism. In the confidence of this gospel the church should seek to re-create society in the disorganized wastes of the South, to establish a Christian order and beauty in the growing empire of the West. In the confidence of this gospel she should go to humanize the barbarian tribes of Africa; and to purify and ennoble the traditional civilization of the East; go to elevate and save mankind by subduing them to the cross of Christ, and cease not from labor or from hope till God shall bring all nations unto the obedience of faith. And "to Him that is of power to establish us according to his gospel, to God only wise, be glory through Jesus Christ for ever. Amen."

ARTICLE IV.

HISTORICAL STUDIES IN COLLEGE,

THEIR DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE, AND THE BEST WAY OF CONDUCTING THEM.[1]

BY REV. B. SEARS, D.D., PRESIDENT OF BROWN UNIVERSITY.

By history we understand a faithful record of the progress of society, or of the course of events affecting society, viewed in their relation to each other as causes and effects. Facts taken out of their relation to each other, and represented as so many units, are untrue to nature, and consequently are untrue to history. Chronicles merely furnish the materials of history. Descriptive history, though destitute of the philosophical element pertaining to this study, if it be a faithful narrative of events in their natural order, may give lessons of political wisdom, and be justly entitled to the dignity it claims; but it is not the most instructive form of history. Its object is entertainment rather than instruction; and it may be very useful to the young, by attracting them to the study, and preparing them for more solid productions when their minds shall become mature, or to the uneducated in general, by giving for their leisure hours a healthier recreation than is furnished by popular writers of fiction.

As has been already intimated, a nation that makes no progress has no history. When a barbarous people, like the ancient Germans, emerge from obscurity, and step into the rank of civilized nations, there is a history that can be recorded. They have permanent abodes. They begin the arts of life. Society is organized. There is a division of labor. The different orders of society enter into complex relations with each other, in which their interests are har-

[1] The outlines of this Article were read before the Association of College Officers at their meeting held in New Haven, Nov. 1 and 2, 1864.

monized. In short, there is a state, and a national career of progress is begun. The ethnographer and the antiquary would fain pry into their primeval history, and learn their origin, their migrations, their customs, and their religion. But the statesman, the man of progress, would be little the wiser, if he had before him a complete account of their previous savage mode of life.

History is to society what experience is to the individual. The more advanced a nation is in civilization, the more valuable is the instruction to be derived from its history. Grecian history teaches us more than oriental history; English, more than Grecian; the history of the period of George III., more than that of the period of Richard III. Political science is the offspring of history. Without such a parentage it becomes an "Utopia," "a republic," like Plato's, or "a commuity," like Fourier's. Speculative philosophy alone cannot be trusted to form a social organization. Government is too practical a thing to be founded upon anything short of practice. Reflection may suggest improvements. Philosophy may reduce the facts to a theory. But the basis of the political system of any nation must be national improvements, extended and improved by the experience of other nations whose condition is analogous. The reason of this is, that, in the working of any new theory of government, there will be innumerable disturbing influences, which no mere theorist could foresee, and which nothing but experience or observation can teach.

In no nation is the need of historical information greater than in our own. Our government is professedly founded on the idea of progress. We took for our guidance the last results of British experiments for establishing liberty. In doing this, we took our lessons of political wisdom from British history. From that time forth we found no existing nation whose constitution and government are like our own. By necessity we have been limited in recent times to our own experience. And now, at last, we have entered upon a new and unexpected era. We may be forced to try

some new and bold experiments. If it should be possible to try it first on a small scale, and to take the necessary time to observe all its results, we might be secure against any great danger; but we may be called upon to decide without time to experiment in this manner, and to choose without delay one of the alternatives before us. In such a case, we shall need all the analogies which the history of the world can furnish us. And who can tell what great political questions may be opening continually before us, requiring the maturest wisdom, and the broadest historical induction for their proper solution.

Besides, ours is not a government administered and controlled by a few. Our frequent elections, our successive legislatures, bring fundamental questions almost continually before the people. We are a nation of polititians. The more the nation can be kept on the track of experience, both its own and that of other civilized and free states, the less danger will there be of its plunging unprepared, like France, again and again, into a new social condition. For this reason the historical elements in our system of education should be improved, so far as the condition of our schools and colleges shall allow.

But this brings us to the inquiry: What studies ought to gain admission into the collegiate course, already overcrowded? Not every useful study can claim this honor. Only those studies which conduce to the end contemplated in a plan of liberal education can be admitted. And what is that end? It is the development of the mind by the training of its faculties; the acquisition of that knowledge which is necessary for this purpose, and also of that which will place all other knowledge within the student's reach. In general, those studies which require a knowledge of the past, and those which do not, or, in other words, literature and its kindred branches on the one hand, and mathematics and their kindred branches on the other, are pretty equally balanced in our courses of study. To the former division belong history, criticism, art, political and mental philos-

ophy. Criticism must go back into the past as far as the time of Homer, and must draw much of its material from Grecian and Roman literature, and then descend to the present times. Art was born in Greece, and cannot now be well understood by one ignorant of the works of the ancient and mediaeval artists. Nothing but a knowledge of the various schools, both ancient and modern, will keep one from falling into mannerism. It is well known how much modern art has been improved by the historical studies of Winckelmann and his numerous followers. The dependence of political science on history has been already shown. Mental philosophy, though it can be commenced without a knowledge of history, cannot in any other way be so effectually kept from narrowness and one-sided tendencies as by a knowledge of the leading philosophical systems, from the days of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to the present time. The subject of mind and its relation to matter, and the reference of both to a first cause, together with the thousand questions growing out of these, cannot be exhausted by any one age or school of philosophy. Here, even more than elsewhere, knowledge is slowly cumulative. Progress is made only by small additions and by reconstruction. The whole field can be laid open to the mind only by history. The want of such a knowledge was the great weakness not only of the scholastic writers, but of the shallow philosophers of the eighteenth century.

The importance of history in a system of academical education, will depend on two considerations: 1. Its necessary connection with other studies as a means of their successful prosecution. 2. Its effect in giving unity to our acquisitions, and thereby giving us a more perfect mastery over them. In respect to the subserviency of history to other studies, it is obvious to remark that this is pre-eminently true of all the studies pertaining to ancient literature. While the study and interpretation of those parts of the Greek and Roman historians which are usually read in college supply some of the historical information that is

needed, these selections themselves require introductions and illustrations drawn from general history. The epic and tragic poets require the same. The writings of Homer are an encyclopedia of traditional knowledge, demanding for their comprehension a great amount of historical and geographical information drawn from later sources. Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides can be properly understood only by one who is at home in Grecian life and manners and traditional history. To the comprehension of the Greek orators, especially in their public orations, the whole body of contemporary Greek history is necessary as a preliminary. The orations of Aeschines and Demosthenes on the crown, for example, carry the student through a long period of political life and diplomacy, which nothing but the history of that period can clear up. Besides, the whole state organization of the Athenian republic, and the details of its public economy, form an essential part of the study of the orators. All the treasures of learning, bearing upon these points, brought out by Wachsmuth, Böckh, Hermann, Meyer, and Schömann belong to the department of history.

The same principle is only differently applied in the study of the philosophers. No considerable progress can be made in reading Plato or Aristotle till the history of all the preceding systems of philosophy is understood. In reading Cicero's philosophical works, we seem to be reviewing the history of philosophy, and are obliged to study the history of opinions in order to follow the author intelligently, and to form a proper judgment of the character of his criticisms. It is hardly necessary to remark what a roundness and completeness is given to all these subjects when they find a common centre in general history. It is well nigh absurd to undertake to study the ancient classics without the light shed on them by history.

In respect to modern culture, it is true that mathematics, physics, chemistry, and natural history, indeed all the studies relating to matter, can be successfully pursued without the aid of history. But all studies of a moral nature, all

that relate to the mind as their subject, except the merely formal science of logic, have in them more or less of a historical element. How impossible it is to understand the sciences that relate to the social nature of man without a historical view of what Christianity has done for society. One of the strongest arguments in favor of the study of modern history in colleges, is, that otherwise much of the light of Christianity is shut out from the study of the social sciences.

As to modern languages and literature, while they may be studied in their rudiments, no great progress can be intelligently made in them, without a knowledge of the nationalities and general history of the people to whom they belong. The language of a people is, in part, its history. Words not only record thoughts, but contain the history of a people, as petrefactions do that of extinct animal races. All these allusions to the former condition of a nation, contained in peculiar words and phrases, are elucidated by means of other facts recorded in history. Even the structure of the English language carries us back to Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, and Norman history, and the history of the language cannot be given apart from a history of the people.

The literature of a nation in respect to its subjects, leads us into the province of history as certainly as does its language. He who should study the monuments of the English literature, from Piers the Ploughman down to the present time, will need to be familiar with the condition of the English nation, the character of its government and of its successive rulers, and the causes of its successes or calamities. Langlande, Wiclif, and Chaucer are constantly referring to the mediaeval state of society in England; the literature of the period of the Stuarts is as strongly marked by the state of the nation; and the relations of the Royalists and Puritans to each other must be known to the reader of Hudibras, or the book is without meaning. And how little of the popular literature of England under Victoria can be

fully comprehended by one who is ignorant of the condition of the working people in England, and the struggle going on between them and a powerful landed aristocracy. The England of Dickens and Thackery is very different from the England of Walter Scott.

It may be said that all these things, true in themselves, apply with less force to the undergraduate than to the man of letters. It is indeed so; but it is no less true that the studies of the undergraduate should educate him to be a man of letters. There are other studies, such as political economy, constitutional history, international law, the science of government, and the evidences of Christianity, which depend, in no small degree, on history for their materials. Some of these subjects may be treated speculatively; but such speculations can be little relied on in practice, unless they rest on a solid historical basis.

Enough has been said to show that, indirectly at least, many of the college studies would derive aid from history. The next point of inquiry is, whether it tends to consolidate these different branches of knowledge and give the mind more power over them by bringing them all under one view. It is a well settled principle in academic education that it is an evil to multiply disconnected and independent studies. Every study in the early part of a course should, as far as possible, be made preparatory to that which follows; and the later studies should require the student to make frequent use of his earlier acquisitions. The more perfectly this can be effected, the greater will be the unity of the system, and the thoroughness of the student's knowledge. As one part of the academical course finds its unity in mathematics, on which so many sciences depend, so the other part finds it in language and its kindred historical studies. The various historical introductions and explanations mentioned above, as being necessary to a complete view of the subjects discussed, will be quite fragmentary if they stand alone. Though each will be connected with its own subject, yet those parts pertaining to different subjects

will not be connected with each other. Let there be a systematic course of history in which each part, whether relating to the physical or moral and intellectual interests of society, shall have its proper place, and then all those scattered historical notices will, like the radii of a circle, have a common centre. The classical teacher will find his work, as historical interpreter, half accomplished; and what is superadded by him will be as special history when added to general history. These additions will find their appropriate place in the general arrangement of the subject, and will be laid away in the mind as classified knowledge ready to be called up at any time. The metaphysical teacher has only to carry out a little further the intellectual history of different periods, as it manifests itself in a few great thinkers, and he has before him the materials which his class needs, and to which he can apply his analysis and criticism. The teacher of modern literature, whether English or foreign, and the teachers of the other branches dependent on history, will have the same advantages. Or if any of them, by the arrangement of the studies, should precede the teacher of history, the latter would be able to gather up all the fragmentary knowledge of his subject imparted by others, furnish the connecting links, and put the whole into the form of a well-arranged system. In this way, it will be seen, knowledge gains in intensity and improves in quality no less than it gains in extension. It is well known that, in the multiplication of branches of instruction in the colleges, during the present century, not only has the number of studies become so disproportionate to the time that can be given to them, as to lead necessarily to superficiality; but that they are often so heterogeneous in their character as to present a disjointed medley instead of a well-compacted system. It is hardly enough to say that no new study can be admitted; it should rather be said that, of those already introduced, only such should be retained as are closely connected with other studies. If there are exceptions, it must be for special reasons, or on account of peculiar circum-

stances which need not be noticed in a general view of the subject.

To some it may appear that history is only a part of general reading, and may therefore be properly referred to the student's private industry. This is true of the intelligent but uneducated part of the community, and must be true of the details of history with those who are liberally educated. But besides this miscellaneous reading, and even besides reading the great historians in course, there must be, if history is to be rationally and profoundly studied, a severe method, which shall task, not only the memory, but the reflective and critical powers, of the student. Reading books in course, without sifting evidence and comparing authorities, will indeed give one general intelligence, but will never make him a historian, or a safe historical reasoner. History, in order to be a safe, practical guide in managing public affairs, must be accurately studied and thoroughly comprehended. The student of history must, within a limited range, possess the means and form the habit of independent judgment. He must be instructed in respect to the laws of criticism, and carefully trained to apply them. Just as the philological critic is formed by the precepts and the example of a great master, and by a careful and methodical training under his eye, so the young student of history should learn his art of one who knows how to teach it. Such a course of study is highly disciplinary, and thereby justifies, in part, its claim to a place in a system of liberal education.

To all this, and much more of the same kind, it may be said, in reply, that the question before us is not so much what is highly desirable, as what is practicable, in our colleges. The consideration of this point brings us to the second division of our subject:

"The best way of conducting historical studies in colleges."

Here we encounter, at the very outset, the chief difficulty of the subject. There is such a disproportion between

the work to be accomplished and the time that can be set apart for it, that it might seem an almost hopeless undertaking. The domain of history is so wide, that even the historian by profession must limit himself to certain portions of it, if he would accomplish anything of importance. A critical knowledge of universal history is impossible. A clear outline of what is known to be well-authenticated history is, indeed, within the reach of every scholar; but this is rather the indispensable condition for the study of any particular age or country than the study itself. The *ordinary* student of history, no less than the professed historian, must have both a general and a particular knowledge of his subject, the one giving its connection with other periods, the other giving a special insight into the portion selected. The only difference is, that his standard of accuracy and thoroughness is not so high as that of the historian by profession. In both cases, special history is to be seen in the light of general history. While one's knowledge of general history should, in respect to civilized nations, be as nearly universal as possible, the study of special history must, for the sake of thoroughness, be limited in its range. A thorough knowledge of the history of any great nation, which has completed its career, and gone through nearly all the stages of civilization and refinement, and exhibited nearly all the phases of human society, will leave us in ignorance of but little that history ever teaches. Either the history of the Roman commonwealth, or of the British empire will illustrate all the leading principles taught by the experience of any great practical nation. The former will have the advantage of completeness, its career being ended; the latter, that of a higher civilization, having Christianity for its basis. The history of Greece or of France will give a fair specimen, though under different forms, of the good and ill fortunes of more brilliant and volatile nations. The same questions of freedom, of the relative strength and security of different forms of government, of harmonizing the interests of the many and of the few, of labor and capi-

tal, of alliances and balancing of power, of patriotic virtue and political corruption and venality, present themselves for consideration in these four nations; and the study of any one of them does but little more than confirm, to the philosophic mind, the lessons, both political and moral, taught by the study of the others. He who understands the history of any one of them well, and has digested his knowledge, and connected it with the study of the social nature of man as learned by observation, is a safer reasoner and statesman than he who has a superficial historical knowledge of them all.

The Germans, who teach history better than any other nation, and who have written some excellent works on the best methods of teaching it, are pretty generally agreed that, even in the *gymnasia*, before the student enters the university, where historical instruction is given in its highest and most perfect form, there should be three successive courses, each of them having a peculiar character adapted to corresponding differences in the age of the pupils. In their courses of history, particularly their juvenile courses, the German teachers rely much less on text-books, and more on oral instruction, than we are accustomed to do.

The first course is adapted to the tastes as well as the capacities of the youngest pupils. As to the matter of instruction, only those things are selected at this period, which are adapted to strike the imagination and excite the curiosity of the young learner: biographical pictures of important characters, leaving out the difficult or intricate parts; interesting personal narratives; descriptions of remarkable events: in short, the attractive and romantic side of history is what is presented in this first stage of instruction. There is no attempt at connected history. A few starting-points are fixed in the imagination. By this means the veil that covers all the past is lifted a little here and there; and the mind is left to enjoy the novel and strange things brought to its notice from a world hitherto unknown.

But soon the materials thus accumulated will need to be arranged, in order to prevent confusion. A second course will be called for, in which the intervals of the first shall be filled up by giving a more continuous narrative. The imagination is still the chief faculty employed. The teacher seeks to give employment to attention alone during the hour of instruction, leaving the memory to be exercised afterwards by reproducing what the teacher has said. The teacher draws his materials, not from dry text-books, but from such writers as Herodotus, Plutarch, and Froissart. He gives vivid pictures and glowing accounts of what is adapted to interest and instruct his class. A few important dates and localities are selected and fixed permanently in the memory. The object of this second course is partly to create a love of the study, and partly to store the mind with a variety of interesting details, which shall prevent the necessity of over-tasking the memory in a later stage of the study. Before the understanding is much developed, or a taste for abstract principles is formed, the imagination and memory are both vigorous, and, if properly appealed to, will act spontaneously. The multitude of particulars necessary to a good knowledge of general history will not often be possessed by one who did not begin the study when the love of the marvellous furnished the chief inspiration. When the young have been led skilfully into this, by a teacher who understands the nature of the juvenile mind, there will be formed a sort of background of history, which will be of material service when their matured faculties shall have prepared them for attending to the more important questions of history.

The third course, for the higher classes in the *gymnasia*, enters upon history proper, to which the other two are introductory. Now the flow of events from the beginning of a nation's history, in the natural order — developing the tendencies of things, showing the relation of the parts to the whole, and the dependence of effects upon their causes, so far as they are obvious, and can be comprehended by

the young — must give a new form, a certain relative completeness, to the plan of instruction.

But as we have only four years in our colleges, instead of the eight or ten at the command of the teachers in the German *gymnasia*, it is out of the question for us to lay out three, or even two, courses of instruction in history. If an outline of Grecian and Roman history were to be required as a term of admission to college, select parts of two courses might then be given, the one for a younger, the other for a more advanced class. In that case, the course begun in the preparatory school would be continued in the freshman class, in connection with the study of the ancient languages. Afterwards, in the junior or senior year, instruction of a higher character would be given by the professor of history. Even then, both courses would necessarily be incomplete.

Taking the colleges as they are, and conforming ourselves to one course of history as given by the professor in that department of instruction, we shall be compelled to admit the necessity of selecting certain important periods for exact study, and concentrating attention upon them. Nay, more; the teacher may find it expedient, after a general outline by way of introduction, to limit himself, not only to one period, but to a single country in that period, and even to certain topics of its history. Much will depend on the judiciousness of the selection, and on the reasonableness of the amount of work undertaken. Too wide a range will lead to superficiality; too narrow limits will prevent our seeing the full operation of those causes which require time to bring out their results. We do not say that the selection or the amount should always be the same. Teachers of different capacities, talents, acquisitions, habits, and tastes will do best in their own way. The same teacher will often find cause for varying his course and method. One of the most difficult questions to be settled at the outset, is that of the relative claims of ancient and modern history, or rather of Grecian and Roman, and modern European, history.

The arguments on both sides are so strong, that the teacher is reluctant to surrender either the one period or the other. First, the history of the Greeks and Romans is so closely connected with the study of ancient literature, that it seems absurd to drop it. No period of history is so nearly identified with the fundamental studies embraced in a course of liberal education. Secondly, ancient history is simpler than modern history, and therefore is better adapted to introduce the young student to this difficult science than the more complicated history of modern nations. Without exaggerating the differences between ancient and modern times, it may be said that there was an openness, a simplicity, in ancient life and manners, not to be found in modern society; and, with all the cunning of the Greek and statesmanship of the Roman, there was nothing in them like the impenetrable secrecy of modern diplomacy, the intricacies of which no historian has been able to disentangle. There were then no such systems of states as the modern European system; no life-long training to state-craft, as with the Burleighs, Talleyrands, and Metternichs of England, France, and Austria. Three centuries have not been sufficient to remove the mysterious veil that hangs over some parts of the policy of queen Elizabeth of England, and Charles V. of Germany. And as to the history of the Stuarts and of Cromwell, the testimony is so contradictory, that he is a nice critic that can strike the balance between them so evenly as to get at the truth at last. Ancient history has its obscurities from defect of testimony; but it has no such unfathomable abysses as those in which modern statesmen and diplomatists conceal their policy. The student of modern history must penetrate into the secrets of many courts before he can get a clue to the foreign policy of the particular government whose history he is investigating. It is too much to expect of young men, wholly unpractised in this study, to find their way through the most difficult period of all history at the very outset. Thirdly, the Greeks and Romans stand before us, not in the midst of their career, but

with a complete and finished history. The student can trace their fortunes through all the centuries of their political existence, and observe not merely the tendencies of their government, laws, and institutions, but the actual results, to the very close. The lessons which history teaches are, therefore, set more distinctly and completely before his eyes in the case of these nations than in that of those whose end is yet far distant. Fourthly, what has descended to us from antiquity is the source of much of modern history. Christian Rome inherited not a few things from pagan Rome. The Christian emperors regarded themselves as the successors of the old Roman emperors; and Rome in the Middle Ages was the civilizer of Europe. To these great traditions was added the revival of ancient learning, the influence of which has been felt ever since in every civilized nation of Europe. It follows, that modern history cannot be traced to its true sources without going back to the classic nations of antiquity, as well as to the beginning of the Christian era. A knowledge of ancient history is therefore the best introduction to modern history.

If ancient Grecian and Roman history alone were to be studied in college the teacher would have time to perform his task with some degree of satisfaction to himself. Arrangements could be made for instruction to be given, either by himself or by the teachers of the ancient languages, to the freshman class so far as it is required in order to understand the classics. If the time were to be taken from that which belongs to the department of languages, it would be no encroachment upon that study; for what would be taken away from the latter in one form would be replaced in another. The historical information thus gained would, indeed, be unsystematic and partial; but this would be no evil in the end. It would furnish materials for future use, and these would all find their place in the systematic arrangement of the second and principal course. The latter would appropriately belong to the junior or senior year, when the mind shall have reached some degree of maturity

in age, discipline, and knowledge. At this time a regular, connected, and comparatively thorough course of instruction might be given. If the ground to be passed over should seem to be too extended to admit of thoroughness, certain important periods might be selected for chief attention, and the rest be disposed of by way of introducing the subject or of supplying connecting links. There ought to be a certain completeness in the view taken, developing the leading events in their natural order, so as to exhibit clearly antecedent and consequent, cause and effect. Such a method would be demanded the more from the circumstance that all the historical information previously acquired is wanting in arrangement and order. This summing up and rounding of the knowledge of the whole period under review, while it necessarily leaves much for future reading, should embrace that range of topics, and that comprehension of them, which is compatible with the age and intellectual condition of undergraduates. The amount to be undertaken cannot well be particularly indicated in a general discussion like the present. It is a practical matter, and must be settled by actual trial and experience. If the instruction be skilfully and successfully given, such a beginning in historical studies may be made, and such an interest in historical investigations awakened, that, even were the instruction to stop here, the history of other ages and countries might be left, with tolerable safety, to private study in later years, on the presumption that historical reading will, with all who have a taste for it, be a part of their life-work. Though the most important period of history would hereby be postponed, that which is most elementary, which is best adapted to the student's capacities, and most closely connected with his other studies, would be embraced in the college course, and receive that degree of attention which excludes superficiality. We confess that in a course of liberal education these things weigh more with us than general utility. Utility, indeed, ought not to be, cannot be, disregarded; but it comes, in

its proper place, afterwards. A liberal education aims at completeness in mental discipline only, and in the mere instruments of knowledge. In relation to practical knowledge, even the most necessary, it is exceedingly incomplete.

It would be well if the amount of time given by the colleges to the study of history could be so increased that the course might embrace modern Europe as well as ancient Greece and Rome. Until that shall be done, — and it is not easy to see what study shall give place to this, — a choice must be made between ancient and modern history. They cannot both be well taught in so short a time as is now generally allotted to the study. Indeed, there is hardly time for either. If, as we apprehend, the preference of most teachers shall be for modern history, then classical studies and general reading must be relied on to give the student some little knowledge of antiquity. The grounds of such a preference as is here supposed have already been intimated in part. The first is, that as history is studied for the lessons which it gives in respect to the laws of social progress, it is important to draw those lessons from the experience of Christian states, the only ones in which progress is, or can be, perpetual. Until this is done, there is a conviction that history, in its highest philosophical sense, has not been studied at all. All other history teaches how empires rise and fall, and civilization and barbarism alternate. This teaches how states, founded on a principle that supports Christian morality, and battles with effeminacy, luxury, and corruption, or provides for a renovation of society when it sinks into profligacy and crime, may not only rise and prosper, but continue, with some alternations and revolutions, to maintain indefinitely their civilization. A second reason is, that a class starting with the general knowledge of antiquity, which all advanced undergraduates must be supposed to have, may easily follow a teacher who shall begin with the overthrow of the Roman Empire, pass lightly over the Middle Ages, and then enter upon modern history, and bring it down nearly to our own times. By this means, it

will be said, the student may have a thread of history to which he may easily attach all his future reading in this department of study.

It will be seen that modern history, so construed, spreads out before the student an immense field, stretching through more than thirteen centuries, and embracing many nations. The history of the mediaeval church, of Mohammedanism, of the crusades, of Judaism, of the old German empire, of the Italian republics, of the municipal government of the Free Cities, of the Hanseatic League, of the kingdoms, duchies, electorates, and petty principalities of that time, of the universities, of scholasticism, of the revival of learning, of the voyages of discovery, and of the Reformation, to say nothing of the arts, — these subjects, of themselves, are enough to overwhelm the mind with details, and fill it with confusion. And still the student is as yet only on the threshold of modern history. And from this dividing line of mediaeval and modern history onward, what an amount of study is required for each of the following subjects: the German empire, and the states embraced in it from the time of Charles V. to that of Napoleon; the French monarchy from Francis I. to the Revolution; Spain, from Philip II. to the independence of the South American republics; Italy, from Leo X. to Victor Immanuel; England, from Henry VIII. to George III. We will suppose that Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, Greece, and even America, are entirely omitted. Does not this enumeration show that the professor of modern history will have no easy task to lay out his course? If it be said that a mere survey of general history is all that can be reasonably undertaken, the ready reply is, that general history neither creates a love for the study, nor initiates the student into it as a science. If that is all that is to be done, the time might as well be given to another study, and manuals of history be read in private at the student's convenience.

Two things are here indispensable: the one is, to limit

the amount; the other, to make a proper selection of what is to be studied. As the temptation will all be on the side of making the amount too large, there is little danger of making it too small. It is impossible, on the one hand, to understand modern history without mediaeval history, and equally impossible, on the other, to give, in a single year, a complete course in both. One of them must be made subordinate to the other; and we do not hesitate to say that the former must be subordinated to the latter. But even then there will not be sufficient time for universal modern history, on account of the great number of states embraced in it. The historical view of the Middle Ages may be general, because the states of Europe were not then so distinct from each other as they are now. They hardly admit of a separate treatment in that period. The course in modern history must be more select and special, being limited mostly to one state and its connection with others. This limitation will be absolutely necessary to any degree of thoroughness. Of course, only a beginning can be made in modern history, the remainder being left for future study. But it is better that it should be so, and be somewhat exhaustive as it respects the means at the student's command, than that it should be without accurate and critical investigation on his part. Neither studying a general compend, nor hearing a course of lectures, however important both may be in their place, will give one a true insight into history. The student must have the time and the means of doing something more.

If the view here given should be adopted, it might still be a question, which of the three states, England, France, or Germany, should be selected for study. In Germany we should find a great empire, strong and tolerably compact at the beginning, the component parts of which, however, gradually rise in power and sovereignty, till Austria overshadows the empire, and both she and other German states become quite independent, and the empire is at length dissolved. The history is complicated, and yet very instruc-

tive. In France we should observe the opposite process of an assemblage of petty states gradually consolidated into a great monarchy. While liberty declines, and religion, leading to bloody persecutions, is made more and more a tool of the state, the government rises in splendor and power, and the court becomes the most influential in Europe. England, while, by its insular position, it is more disconnected than France or Germany with the rest of Europe, is easier to understand, is more progressive in its government, more tolerant in religion, and more closely connected with our own country and its institutions. It would therefore undoubtedly be chosen by most American teachers as the European state to receive chief attention in a course of modern history.

For the purpose of illustrating our general principle, we will adopt this view, and see by what means a plan, like the one above indicated, could be carried into execution. Other methods than that which we shall describe might, no doubt, be made to answer the same purpose, or another as good.

The course in modern history, brought within the narrow limits already specified, naturally divides itself into two parts; the former embracing a general survey of Europoean history from the fall of the Roman empire to the overthrow by the mediaeval system and the division of Europe by the Protestant Reformation. We say "general survey," first, because in that period the leading states of Europe must be viewed collectively, as the position of no one, if separated from the system to which it belonged, would be intelligible; secondly, because this period is important, not so much for what it is in itself, as because it introduces and explains that which follows. To pass suddenly from ancient history to that of the last three centuries would be a violent transition. Both the Christian element of society, which constitutes the radical difference between ancient and modern history, and the barbarous element, which was introduced by the new population of central and southern Europe, and which was to be over-

come by Christianity and by the revival of learning, must be seen in their action and reaction upon each other and in their long conflict, or the state of society in the sixteenth century will be a perfect enigma. Only so much of this intermediate period as is a key to the following is indispensable. The spirit of the Middle Ages must be given; the rise, supremacy, and decay of its gigantic system, both in church and state; its grand ideas, and failures in attempting to realize them; its lawlessness and universal reliance on brute force; its peculiar political and social organizations arising from the violence of the few and the helplessness and misery of the many,— these, together with the great events in which they find their best illustrations, must all be presented in a connected narrative. There is here no room for special history, except so far as it throws light on general history. It would indeed be appropriate, if time would allow it, to give special prominence to the most brilliant period of the Middle Ages, the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, — the period of the crusades; of the Franconian emperors and the Hohenstaufens; of Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII., the greatest popes; of Abelard and St. Bernard; of the reigns of Philip Augustus and Philip the Fair of France. The two periods of disorder and weakness, the one preceding and the other following the three centuries of vigor and strength named above, might be disposed of in a more summary way.

The second half of the course in modern history would, according to our plan, be devoted to the special history of England, with so much of the history of other states as is necessary to a clear understanding of its foreign relations. Here again, on account of the vast extent of the subject, we must resort to the method of selection. Some periods, those nearest our own times, undoubtedly, must be omitted altogether. Others, those of its mediaeval history, must be greatly abridged; and only a limited period — that which embraces the foundations of the present British monarchy

— can receive the attention necessary to furnish a true specimen of thorough historical treatment. The whole history of England cannot, in any satisfactory manner, be given in so short a time. The attempt to shorten the course, by adopting Hallam's Constitutional History of England, whatever omissions we may make in it, will prove a failure, partly because we cannot understand constitutional history without a previous knowledge of civil history, and partly because the constitutional history of England does not begin with Henry VII., where Hallam's work begins, but goes back as far as the Norman Conquest, and even further.

If English history is to be seen in its organic relations, there must be, after an introductory notice of the Saxons and Normans before the Conquest, at least a sketch of the period from William the Conqueror to Henry VII., and then a pretty full narrative of the age of the Tudors, from Henry VII. to Elizabeth. This is the least that should be undertaken, and, we are obliged to add, the most that can be accomplished. Were it possible, it would be desirable, not to say necessary, to extend the period to the Revolution; for at that time the English government received its modern popular form, and the grand features of the constitution were all settled.

In the outline of the mediaeval period two epochs will need to be treated with considerable fulness of detail, — that of the Conqueror, and that of Edward III., in the last of which the whole strength of the English character, in the arts of war, in government, and in literature, was brought to view. Of the reigns between the times of those two great monarchs, as well as those which cover the period from Edward III. to Henry VII., a briefer narrative will be sufficient; for both these periods are semi-barbarous, and consequently only half historical, with few signal events to characterize them. The factions and quarrels of the barons are important chiefly on account of the elevation of the people by means of their downfall. Henceforth the two great parties in English history are not the king and the

great barons, but the king and the people. The power of the former, on the overthrow of the ancient nobility, and before the people had learned to use their strength, rose steadily from the reign of Henry VII. to the Revolution; that of the latter, after they had learned their strength, and the constitutional way to exert it, has, with here and there an exception, been constantly rising from the Revolution to the present day. Of these two important periods of English history, the former, being fundamental, and serving as a key to the latter, must be studied first. To invert the order, or to omit the former and study the latter, would be absurd. Indeed, it may be laid down as a method to be followed by all classes, be their time longer or shorter, to begin with the details of English history as early as the reign of Henry VII., and proceed so far, and only so far, as with thorough study they are able to do. This will be the only part of the whole course of instruction in history, in which the historic art can be fully illustrated. On this account we deem it advisable in what we say further to descend more to particulars. If we lay out more work than can be actually accomplished, it will be for the sake of being more explicit than we could otherwise be in our statements.

We will suppose the student to be provided with one or two of the best Manuals, such as White's Landmarks of English History, or his later and somewhat fuller History of England, and the Student's Hume, together with chronological tables and a historical atlas, like Spruner's smaller Atlas. The place of the latter might be supplied by furnishing the lecture-room with Bretschneider's Mural Maps.

The text-books will need to be studied, whether they are made the subject of class-examination or not; lectures to be heard; and a considerable amount of other reading to be performed. It is hardly necessary to remark that the professor will guide the whole course, and in such a way as to secure, by these different means, a complete view of the period under examination. His own lectures, instead of giving the whole narrative, should undoubtedly be, for the

most part, either introductory, or supplementary to the reading performed by the class. One object of the lectures will be to present to his class the last results of historical research. The books studied or consulted by the class are generally far behind the state of historical criticism. The lectures should place the student nearly in the same condition in which he would be if he had before him new and thoroughly revised editions of all the works which he has occasion to consult. This will give freshness and value to the lecturer's instruction. The class will not feel that they might as well read history by themselves at home. Every class-exercise, whether it relate to the lecture, the text-book, or other books, will involve historical criticism, and will foster a taste for it. The student will by degrees learn to estimate the character and weigh the authority of every writer he examines by a standard of his own, which will become more and more perfect as he advances. The lecturer will aim to put a true construction upon history; to enable his class to see it from right points of view, and to judge of men and measures, not according to the prejudiced opinions of authors, nowhere more manifest than in English history, but according to just canons of historical criticism.

The lecturer may choose to be very brief on those topics which are well presented in the manual used, or to omit them altogether, and point out the passages to be read, and require them to be incorporated with the lecture in the recitation of the next day. In this way the teacher will be relieved of much useless labor, and the student will have enough to occupy his attention, whereas lectures alone leave too little for him to do. The objection which might rise in the minds of some, that such a method would produce disorder and confusion in the student's thoughts, is its chief recommendation. The daily practice of analyzing and arranging for one's self the materials of history is one of the best historical exercises which can be required of a student. If everything be studied and arranged for him, his judgment

and invention will lie dormant, and his memory only be exercised. All historical studies, if they are to discipline the student, and to initiate him into his art, must constantly require the exercise of his power of combination and arrangement. In the mental process here proposed, the materials to be arranged are very simple, and will easily find their place, if the omissions are indicated in the lecture at the points where they occur.

Those periods of the early political history of England, which, according to our plan, are abridged on account of their minor relative importance, may still be presented in a less formal way, in many of their details, by means of essays on interesting collateral topics, such as manners, customs, popular amusements, chivalric adventures, celebrated places, families, domestic life, the lives and characters of distinguished men in church and state, in philosophy, literature, and art. In many instances the biographies of the early queens of England are both more interesting and more instructive than either the biographies or the reigns of the kings. We would instance the empress Matilda, who, being the daughter of one king Henry, and mother of another, besides being widow of a third Henry (the emperor of Germany), acted as regent for her son; also Matilda of Boulogne, consort of Stephen, whose fortunes were so sadly interwoven with those of the empress, her rival; Eleanor of Aquitaine, who brought to her husband Henry II. large possessions in the West of France, and whose public life as queen of France, and then as queen of England, and whose domestic relations are so full of strange adventure; Isabella, consort of Edward II., "the she-wolf of France," who kept England and France busy enough, during her remarkable and most eventful life; the good queen Philippa, wife of Edward III., England's greatest monarch; and Margaret of Anjou, who was the exciting cause of the War of the Roses, and was as badly eminent as her spouse, Henry VI., was weak.

On these and other topics of similar interest, essays might

be assigned to the class, being so distributed that each should have a different subject. On these the students should task themselves severely, summoning all their strength and industry to present, both as it respects research and elaboration, a model essay. One such performance, undertaken and excuted in the right spirit, will have an influence upon the writer's mind that will long be felt. It is often the beginning of a new method of study. It will be needful for the professor to point out particularly the sources of information on each subject, together with the order in which they should be read, and to allow ample time for the preparation, which will, of course, vary with the extent and difficulty of the subject. The reading of these various essays before the class will bring together the information contributed by them severally. If a given number relate to parts of the same general subject, or are in any way nearly related to each other, they might be read in connection, and the subject of them be made the lesson of the class for that day. In this manner, the whole class would be led to take a special interest in the criticisms made upon the several essays.

The object of requiring essays is partly to secure a suitable amount of private reading on the part of the student, and partly to train him to read by subjects, using different authors, rather than to read single authors through in course. When the mind is interested in a subject, that is the time to investigate it. Many questions will arise which can be settled only by resorting to other books. If we read the account given by one writer only, we have no proper means of judging whether he is right or wrong. If we leave the matter to be decided at another time, and proceed to new topics with the author we have in hand, the subject will pass out of our mind, and by the time we come to read on the same subject in another writer, we shall have forgotten so much that we found in the first as to be unable to compare the two accounts and to form any critical judgment of their relative accuracy. Two or more authors can be com-

pared best when read in connection with each other. After two or three of the best authorities, on a given subject, have been critically studied, others can be perused rapidly, while the whole subject is fresh in mind; the good and the bad in each are easily separated; what is new can be appropriated, and what is old and familiar passed over; and more be accomplished in a few hours when the mind is heated on the subject, and better done besides, than in as many days at another time. Not only can the whole subject be placed before the mind at once, in all its aspects, so that one part, if need be, may be corrected by another; but the respective merits of all the writers can be seen in a clear light, and a sound critical judgment passed upon them. We would lay special stress upon the observation, that *this is the true way to train students to habits of critical investigation.* The subject of inquiry may be limited; but the critical spirit, and the enthusiasm awakened by it in susceptible minds will be far-reaching.

In this or in some similar way all collateral, as well as subordinate topics, or any portion of them, might be disposed of by the teacher who does not wish to encumber his lectures with them. It will thus be the office of the instructor to guide and stimulate his class; lay out the work to be performed; perform a part of it himself, namely, the part which the manual or text-book does not, and which the class cannot, perform, and require the class to perform for themselves what they have the means and the power to do. The course of instruction, thus pursued, will not be an easy one, either for the teacher or for the class; but will be inspiring and advantageous to both. Nothing can be more injurious in its effects, as it regards future study, than the dull and plodding way in which, unfortunately, history is sometimes taught. It not only renders the present study of it nearly useless, but, what is far worse, it well nigh destroys the natural taste for it which one may have. Any expedient which shall aid in averting such a calamity from a young man is entitled to consideration.

But we return from this digression to our course in English history. Thus far it has been merely introductory. We shall now dismiss the Middle Ages, and contemplate a class as taking up English history at the end of that period with as much fulness as the time allotted them will allow.

With Henry VII. begins the modern history of England. It is no longer the history of contending factions without any result, but the history of a nation under a settled and consolidated government. The events of his reign, all that is known of them, are easily told. The ordinary manuals give the most important of them. But it is not so easy to form a correct estimate of his policy and of the character of his government. It would not be amiss to seize upon the opportunity offered to give a somewhat elaborate criticism of the two opposite views taken of the subject by different historians; the one class being represented by the Pictorial History of England, the other by Turner's History. The subject is not so extensive as to be beyond the reach of the comprehension of students near the end of their collegiate course. A field of inquiry thus circumscribed, and not very intricate, is most favorable for trying the skill and exercising the judgment of a class in history. The teacher, by presenting the evidence on both sides, may initiate his class by easy gradations into the practice of weighing historical evidence with impartiality. The facts of history are studied with greatest interest, and are best comprehended, when they are examined in connection with some great historical problem. Studying the character of this reign with such an end in view, the more ambitious members of the class would be sure to read Lord Bacon's account of Henry VII.; an admirable work for teaching a student how to form his judgments with nice discrimination.

To present the history of Henry VIII., will test both the powers of the professor and the industry of the student. Still this reign furnishes one of the finest opportunities for studying and practising the historic art. A knowledge of many groups of details, a keen insight into the policy of

crafty and cunning men, both at home and abroad, and large views and nicely-drawn generalizations, are here quite indispensable. The events of his reign: his tragical domestic history; his rivalry with Francis I.; his quarrels and truces with Charles V.; Woolsey's grand projects; the sinuous policy and duplicity of the papal court; the severance of the English church from Rome; the great achievements of the reforming parliament; the suppression of the monasteries; and, finally, the idiosyncrasies of that able, jovial, vain, cruel monarch, are all to pass under review and be scrutinized, both separately and in their connection with each other. How is all this to be accomplished with a class? Difficult as the task may be, it must be undertaken, because an understanding of the character of this monarch's reign, peculiar on very many accounts, and opening for the nation a new career of independence, is a key to the comprehension of the history of the whole Tudor dynasty. In addition to the professor's instruction, there will be demanded imperatively no inconsiderable amount of reading. In order to bring this great mass of complicated materials, in some form, before the whole class, it will be necessary to distribute the work among all its members. One might prepare an essay on the legal and moral rights of Catharine of Arragon, together with an examination of the grounds on which the partisans of Henry justified his course. The character and history of each of his queens might form the subject of so many essays. The lives and characters of Woolsey, Cranmer, Gardner, and More would throw no less light upon this reign. One member of the class might present so much of the character and reign of Francis I. as is connected with the history of England; another might do the same in respect to Charles V.; a third, the same in respect to Luther and his English adherents. Other essays, less biographical in their character, might be assigned on some specific point in the several topics named at the beginning of this paragraph. Both the professor and the students must enter upon the work with an energy that stops at no difficulties,

or the whole subject will not be grasped. The substance of Froude's apologetic view might well be presented by the former, partly on account of its new and important facts, and partly for the purpose of correcting its false judgments; as also the results of Ranke's masterly exposition of the foreign policy of England.

Mere examinations of a class from a text-book, on such a subject as this, would be stupid and almost absurd. Such a feeble, humdrum course would be an unpardonable surrender of a capital opportunity to kindle young and ardent minds into a perfect blaze of enthusiasm. One such effort, though it should be limited to the reign of a single monarch, will do more for a student, by way of making him a lover of history, and, in the end, an adept in it, than a whole text-book committed to memory, and duly recited to the professor. The mention, from time to time, of such writers as Turner, Froude, Knight, and Vaughn, with a spirited criticism of their views, will make the class eager to read such parts of their writings as relate to the subjects which they are investigating. The student loves to feel the influence of his own century, as it appears in recent or living writers. He is thereby made to breathe a fresh, instead of a dusty, pent-up atmosphere, and to hear the ripple of a living, rushing stream, instead of contemplating a stagnant pool.

It is unnecessary to extend these illustrations. The spirit in which we would have history taught — the only thing in this whole discussion to which we attach special importance — may be easily understood from what has already been said. The particular manner of instruction to be adopted must be invented by each teacher for himself. Indeed the manner of the same teacher must vary from time to time, according to the nature of the period he is considering. With the two next reigns, those of Edward and Mary, both of which are periods of transition, the plan and mode of instruction must be different from that marked out for the reign of Henry. Elizabeth did not establish her policy, which led to the political greatness of England, in

any degree after the model of her immediate predecessor; nor did she return exactly to that of Edward. In her estimation, while, in the matter of religion, Mary went to a ruinous extreme in the direction of Romanism, Edward, or the protector in his name, went to the other, less perilous, extreme of Genevan Protestantism. The last catholic reign in England was like the last pagan reign, that of Julian, in the Roman Empire. In both instances the old and decayed religion proved to be inadequate to the exigencies of the times. The *religious* reformation which took root in England under Edward — that introduced by Henry was purely political, and that restored by Elizabeth was more in the spirit of her father than in that of her brother — perpetuated itself only in the Puritan party. Elizabeth's power was built up, therefore, mainly on the foundations laid by Henry; the influence of Edward upon the superstructure being rather modifying than controlling. The strictly progressive movement in the policy of the state was from Henry to Elizabeth, leaping over the two intervening reigns. In a *moral* point of view, the reign of Edward was very important. Tragical as the end of the two protectors was, whose careers filled the period of this reign, and dark and gloomy as were the events which characterized Mary's government, they rather require of the historian a graphic representation and glowing dramatic description than a development of great political ideas and principles. At least, it must be said that the great political undertakings of both reigns proved entire failures. The interest, therefore, of the historian, arising from unfolding the growing power of the state, will receive considerable abatement during this period of disasters and public calamities, but will rise to a still higher pitch in the reign of Elizabeth. These facts cannot but have their effect in giving a new shape to a skilful teacher's plan of instruction. Perhaps in one respect they will be favorable in their influence, to wit, in breaking up the monotony of a uniform method, and to give to the course the charm of variety. But we must break off here,

as we fear the teacher of history will be obliged to break off long before finishing the period of the Tudors.

Before closing, we must say one word in respect to the method of teaching introduced by Guizot. He is undoubtedly one of the best French historians. His writings are highly valuable, and deserve to be studied by every student of history. But they do not so much teach us history as furnish us aids in the study of it. If any one is ambitious to resemble him as a historian, he will find it necessary not only to read his writings, but, what is vastly more important, to study what he studied. We do not call in question the truth of his principles, or the soundness of his method of stating them. He is not chargeable with the fault into which so many speculative writers are betrayed, of theorizing without facts; nor even with that, which is still more common, of building up a system which rests upon too slender an historical basis. He investigates his subjects thoroughly, and draws his conclusions by a method strictly inductive. He then analyzes his conclusions, resolves them into general principles, and, descending again from them, reconstructs the framework of history with the same facility that a Hegelian constructs or creates it.

But the great objection to teaching a class of students history in this way is, that it presents nothing but the results of investigation, leaving the student entirely ignorant of the processes by which they were reached. These results may in themselves be very valuable. They may be useful for the truth which they contain, for storing the mind with ideas, and for arousing reflection. But whatever worth they may have in themselves, or whatever general influence they may exert upon the mind, they do not educate one to the science of history. The method is too much like that of teaching arithmetic by rules. The rules may be convenient. The principles on which they rest may be very familiar to him who formed them; but not so to the learner; he takes them upon trust. It is as true in the study of history as it is in that of mathematics, that the conclusions of others are

valuable to us only as we make them our own. The general views given by Guizot are conclusions to which his own mind has arrived, of the accuracy of which the student has no means of forming a judgment. The several propositions which he lays down are to the student, who is ignorant of the processes by which they were established, a series of conclusions without premises. Now we maintain that the processes are infinitely more important to the student than the conclusions. Without them he has learned nothing of the historic art; nor does he even know, by any perception of his own, whether what he maintains is true or not. He is like the mathematician who has committed to memory answers to problems which he has never worked out. We do not deny that he may learn much that is valuable from the study of such books; but we maintain that he does not learn history. He can be nothing more than a retailer of another man's opinions. Connected with the study of history proper, these opinions may be of great service to him.

Neither conclusions alone, nor the facts alone which lead to them, constitute history. History includes both, and presents the latter as growing out of the former. It is just as preposterous to pretend to understand history without a knowledge of its facts, as it is to profess a knowledge of ancient literature through translations, without an acquaintance with the ancient languages. Guizot himself stood between the old chronicles which he studied and the books which he produced, and could lay his hands on both. In him they were both united, and through him they stand in correlation to each other. It may not be necessary for every one to be a Guizot, or to study the sources of history as he studied them; but without a knowledge of the facts of history from which to draw conclusions, one is no more a historian, than one is of royal blood because he has seen a king. History itself lies between facts and principles; these are its two poles. The want of either destroys the system. It is useless to say that there is not time to study the facts of history. The student of mechanics might just

as well say that he has not time to study mathematics. The philologist might just as well say that he has not time to study the facts of language, and therefore must content himself with the philosophy of language. The facts of history are permanent; opinions founded on them are variable and often transient. With a knowledge of facts, one may constantly improve his theory. A theory without facts can neither be safely used nor mended. There should, at least, be one period of history, longer or shorter, general or special, in which the student is so far at home that he can see with his own eyes and think his own thoughts. That spot will be a bright light to him, and will aid him essentially in understanding other things.

ARTICLE V.

THE SCRIPTURAL PHILOSOPHY OF CONGREGATIONALISM AND OF COUNCILS.

[This Article, written by Rev. Dr. EDWARD BEECHER, is the Twelfth in the Series of Articles representing the views of different ecclesiastical denominations.]

WHEN any system is itself a part of a higher and more comprehensive system, the development of its philosophy is equivalent to an exposition of its end, and of the relations of that end to the higher system of which it is a part.

The higher system of which Congregationalism is a part, is known in the sacred scriptures as *the Kingdom of God.* To this higher and more comprehensive system Congregationalism sustains vital relations. It is our present purpose to set forth its end, and the relations of that end to the higher system of which it is a part. As this exposition cannot be made by the light of reason alone, but depends on the testimony of God in the sacred scriptures, it may properly be called the scriptural philosophy of Congregationalism.

The Kingdom of God.

In studying the life, aims, and actions of Christ, we are impressed with three great facts:

1. There were on record certain prominent and sublime predictions as to the kingdom of God, which were to be fulfilled by him.

2. He accepted them as of divine origin, and undertook the work of their fulfilment, by ordaining a system of means to that end.

3. He regarded the universal extension and the absolute supremacy of that kingdom as lying in the distant future.

Let us consider these facts a little more in detail.

The predictions of a future kingdom of God on earth in the Old Testament are many. Of these, however, none are more explicit and sublime, and none more specially regarded by Christ, than those contained in the Book of Daniel. In particular, in the seventh chapter of that book, the prophet first exhibits, as presented to him in vision, a series of worldly kingdoms, represented by a corresponding series of bestial forms, arising from the great sea, amid the strife of the four winds of heaven.

At the close of the series, the Messiah comes, in fiery flames, to judge and to destroy these bestial kingdoms, and to establish, instead of them, *the kingdom of God.* This glorious consummation is described in language of unequalled sublimity, and concludes with these words: "There was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him. His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed."

This, at the close of the chapter, is explained by the angel-interpreter as equivalent to a reign of God through his regenerated people; for, concerning the same kingdom that was given to the Messiah, it is said, "the kingdom and the dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of

the Most High, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him."

For centuries before the Messiah came these divine oracles had cast their cheering light amidst the gloom of despotic and idolatrous powers. At last he came, and, before the nation and the world, recognized the truth of these great predictions, and declared that the glorious *kingdom of God*, so long foretold, so long expected, was at hand. He affirmed, also, that he came to fulfil all that had been predicted concerning it in the oracles of God. That he did fulfil the divine oracles, that he did develop and establish the kingdom of God, in its essential elements and principles, is no less true. That he did so, is implied in his fidelity to God, and is repeatedly declared in the divine word.

But he did not effect that universality and supremacy of this kingdom which had been foretold. All people, nations, and languages did not serve him. The kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, were not given to the people of the saints of the Most High. On the other hand, Christ regarded the kingdom of God, *in its full development*, as still in the future, and to be attained only by ages of conflict. The judgment and burning of the bestial kingdoms were not effected in his day. On the other hand, even after his resurrection and ascension on high, he foretold by his servant John, particularly in chapters xii. – xix. of the Apocalypse, a protracted reign of that great bestial power which had absorbed all its predecessors, and the corruption of the nations by a false church, sustained by the beast; and after this a judgment, equivalent to that foretold by Daniel; and after this the reign of the saints with Christ, or the fully developed kingdom of God. This is yet in the future. It appears, then, that the fully-developed and all-embracing kingdom of God is to be an ultimate result of a system of principles and measures introduced by Christ in his day. In order, then, fully to understand this system of principles and measures, we need to consider what is involved in the ultimate result, and their relations to it.

The Kingdom of God fully developed and Universal.

Christ's declaration that his kingdom is not of this world, that is, is not a secular, civil state, but a spiritual kingdom, has led many to regard civil government, commerce, the arts and sciences, education, and the schools as in such a sense *secular* as to form no part of the kingdom of God. This, according to them, is purely spiritual, and is confined to things ecclesiastical. From this flows an assumption, not always stated, but in fact made a basis of feeling and action, that these secular things are, in some sense, of necessity, unsanctified and worldly, and that, as such, God has no deep interest in them, and does not design to bring them all under his own influence and control.

Now, though it is true that these great departments of human life have been for ages unsanctified and unsubordinated to the laws of God and to the gospel, and though it is true that in this state of things God reigns, in cordial sympathy, only in and through that ministry of regenerated men who form the church, while the world lies in wickedness; yet the very end for which the church was ordained, was to bring to pass ultimately another result, and that is to bring civil government, the state, commerce, political economy, the arts and sciences, and the schools, under the influence of God, so as to pervade them with the influence of his law and the gospel, and thus to make them a harmonious and consistent part of his kingdom. Such a result can only be effected by the universal indwelling of God in the individuals of whom human society is composed, inclining and enabling them to act on his principles and for his glory in all that they do, in all departments of life; so that, according to an ancient prophecy, *holiness to the Lord* shall be inscribed on all things, even such as have been regarded as earthly and secular.

Viewing the church in this light, even when vastly in the minority, it contains in itself the elements and principles of the kingdom of God in its full and universal development. For this reason our Saviour compares it to leaven, designed to leaven the whole lump.

The fully-developed and all-comprehending kingdom of God on earth is, then, a conception as simple as it is great and glorious. It is the reign of God in all departments of human society, through regenerated and holy men. It involves that constant action of God, in and through men, for which an infinite and omniscient Spirit alone is competent. This action Christ illustrates by the analogy of the constant action of the vine on its branches, which is essential to their vitality and fruitfulness. No power of angels or of men can take the place of this action of God, in and through the individual elements of the social system. No form of government or mode of organization can be a substitute for it. From it results a kingdom which no one can administer but God himself. In it he can have no vicar. He is its constant life, its controlling power. And he controls it, not by force, but by truth, and by holy emotions in view of truth. Hence Christ declared his kingdom to be, in its highest and noblest idea, a kingdom of truth, and thus distintinguished it from secular kingdoms of force, with which Pilate was in danger of confounding it (John xviii. 36, 37).

This kingdom of God does not absorb into itself, or abolish, the civil governments of earth; but it sends a divine influence through them, that directs, perfects, regulates, and controls them. It does not involve one outward, universal, civil government, administered by Christ and the saints; but it implies that all men have become saints, and administer the various civil governments of earth, and transact its business under the inspiring and illuminating influence of God.

Nor does it imply an outward ecclesiastical organization, with human officers and administrators. It implies solely a Christian organization of society, in all nations and in all its parts, effected, sustained, and animated by God, acting in regenerated men.

Of this perfected society local churches will still be a part. But they alone will not fill out the full idea of the predicted kingdom of God; for that will include the whole

of human life in all departments of action. This is what we mean when we say that Congregationalism is a part of the higher system known in the scriptures by the name of the kingdom of God.

To be in such a kingdom is always a reality, and never a form. No man, as our Saviour declares, enters it except by regeneration. Of this, the reason is plain: every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him; while he who loveth not, knoweth not God, for God is love. The pure in heart see God, and the poor in spirit possess his kingdom. These are the elements which, fully developed and made universal, shall establish on earth the kingdom of God.

Means of attaining it introduced by Christ.

If the kingdom of God, as it has been set forth, was before the mind of Christ as a result to be attained, it follows of necessity, that he ordained a system of means for the attainment of this end. This invests with peculiar interest the inquiry what that system was, and what are its relations and adaptations.

We should, from the very nature of the case, be led to suppose that, if the kingdom of God, at which he was aiming, had any striking characteristic, he would adapt his means wisely to the attainment of that characteristic. Such a characteristic we have seen there was. The universal kingdom of God is a kingdom in which none but God, as an omnipresent, omniscient, all-illuminating, all-vitalizing Spirit can be, or act as king. No angel or man, and no organization of angels or of men, can take his place. As well might we attempt to organize the solar system around a lamp, instead of the sun. That this was the characteristic of the kingdom of God, none better knew than our Saviour. We should not, then, expect from him any system tending to supersede God in his kingdom as its only possible bond of unity and vital power. On the other hand,

we should expect to find his whole system pervaded by the recognition of the great truth, God, and God only, is able to be the omnipresent and omni-agent king of the whole earth, and the all-pervading and sympathetic bond of union to all men, animating, perfecting, and controlling the social system in all its parts. We should expect from him a distinct statement of this great truth, with a design to exclude great human centralizations, whether monarchical or aristocratic, from his system, lest they should intrude themselves into the place of God, and turn men away from their only true life and uniting and controlling power.

As we should expect, so we find. This is the import of the words: "One is your master, even Christ, and all ye are brethren. Call no man your father upon the earth; for one is your Father, who is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters; for one is your master, even Christ. But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant" (Matt. xxiii. 8 – 11). Of a similar import is his reply to a request for the highest seats of power in his kingdom. After referring to the exercise of centralized power in the kingdoms of the Gentiles, he says: "it shall not be so among you; whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant; even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many" (Matt. xx. 20 – 28). So carefully did he guard the peculiar prerogatives of God in his kingdom, and rebuke all attempts of unholy human ambition to intrude into, and vainly to try to fill, his place.

Nor did he attempt to fill the place of God by extended hierarchal organizations of particular churches into one great body, with legislative and judicial power. If this mode of organization had been regarded by our Saviour as a desirable and legitimate means of introducing and establishing the kingdom of God, there was no reason why it should not have been so declared at the outset. The kingdoms of earth were extended organizations. Such an organization the Jews anticipated. All were ready to adopt it.

If it was not introduced by Christ, if something entirely unlike it was introduced in its stead, there must have been a real and a deep reason for such a decision, and that reason could have been nothing but this, that the system excluded was not adapted to introduce the kingdom of God, and that the system introduced was thus adapted.

The historical fact is plain and undeniable. A hierarchy was not introduced by Christ and his apostles. The system actually established by them was a system of free, independent, self-governed, local churches. This is conceded by eminent church historians of all denominations. The historical facts alleged by Congregationalists, and conceded by the most eminent historians, are:

1. The establishment of local churches, and not of an extended organized church, either for the world, or for nations or provinces.

2. These churches were composed of professed believers in Christ, or regenerated persons.

3. Their object was the cultivation of holiness, and its extension among men.

4. These churches were independent of each other, in the sense that each had full power to conduct its own worship, to admit its own members, to exercise its own discipline, to choose and ordain its own officers, to make its own regulations, and manage its own affairs, without subjection to any organization or head.

5. Each of these churches was accustomed to come together, for worship and for the transaction of business, into one place. Nor is any example given of a church of which this was not true.

6. The permanent officers of the churches were of two kinds, pastors and deacons. The pastors were also called elders, overseers, and teachers. The apostles had no successors. They are still in the church, and rule it by their inspired writings.

7. The exercise of discipline with final power is, by positive law, enjoined on the local church, and its exercise is illustrated by the action of particular churches.

8. The churches admitted the divine origin and relations of each other, and the fellowship growing out of it, and in cases of doubt consulted each other.

Moreover, this system grew out of the true and divine idea of the kingdom of God which it was designed to introduce and establish. It was a system adapted to develop and cultivate personal holiness, and thus to unite the individual elements of all social systems to God; and it left room for God to be the universal uniting, organizing, and ruling power of human society. Moreover, it created an obvious necessity for him to act as such, by introducing no great outward organization, or system of forms, which could be idolized or worshipped in his place. It thus created a felt necessity of a present God, and of universal personal holiness, with which he can enter into vital and sympathetic communion, and through which he can act in all the relations of life, "above all, and through all, and in all" (Eph. iv. 6).

The Fundamental Warrant and Reason of Congregationalism.

If the great end of Christ, if that upon which the introduction and establishment of the kingdom of God depends, is the development and culture of personal holiness, and the extension of divine influence through it, in all the relations and offices of the social system, then the fundamental reason of his institution of the Congregational system as a means to that end, must have been its superior fitness to promote it. Of this we might, through faith, be sure, from the very nature of God. For the attainment of so great an end as his kingdom, he would not introduce any but the wisest and best adapted means.

But we are not confined to faith. We can see and state the reasons of this superiority of adaptation. It is best adapted to keep Christians in direct and vital contact with the Bible, and thus with God, through it.

The nature of holiness is such that all that belongs to its development and culture, is more fully and more perfectly

revealed in the words of God, than anywhere else. This is, and ever must be, the great fountain-head of holiness. We cannot abide in Christ, except as his words abide in us. There is a fulness, a many-sidedness, a vitality, a perfection, a power, in the word of God, which cannot be found, and never will be found, in any human compositions. The Bible does not tend to one-sided development; it nourishes the whole man. It does not produce dry, intense, heartless speculation, but it suffuses the whole intellect with love.

Now it is evident that the Bible, as the word of God, designed to produce holiness, can be fully and perfectly developed in a local church. There is no need of an extended organic system in order to effect this. The laws of love, the nature of sin, human depravity, the atonement, regeneration, repentance, and faith, and the fruits of a holy life, viewed in a practical light, are plain. And in the culture of holiness, a covenant with God and one another, to lead a holy life, Christian fellowship, mutual watchfulness, the study of the Bible, and Christian activity, are all provided for, in the fullest manner, in the local church. For the culture of holiness, no system can be more simple, perfect, and powerful than this.

But there are, from the nature of the case, necessary limits to a practical power to act in covenant relations, to exercise watchfulness, and to meet for worship; and it is worse than useless to try to transcend them. Hundreds of thousands, or millions, cannot meet together in worship, or act together in covenant care and fellowship.

Hence the real and practical work of cultivating holiness must be effected by limited local organizations, for the social study of the Bible, for preaching and worship, for covenant co-operation and watchfulness. For these ends, free local churches are perfectly competent, and they tend to concentrate all the energies of the mind on these ends. The result is a practical conviction, which the Bible ever tends to produce, that God only is great, God only is to be adored. He is the King of all worlds, he fills all things with his glory;

he, and he alone, can fill, animate, and control all things by his vital power. There is thus produced a constant desire for the vision of his glory, and a deprecation and holy abhorrence of all human attempts to eclipse him and to take his place.

On the other hand, the introduction of higher organizations, judicial, legislative, executive, at once introduces human systems of order, articles of belief and human books as authoritative standards, between the churches and the Bible. Under the system ordained by Christ and his apostles, the word of God is always, and alone, *the book*. *The Bible*, as the title of the sacred writings, is the natural result of that system. On the other hand, extended organizations always produce some guide-book of human composition, which, by a natural course of things, usurps the title of the word of God, and is called *the book*.

Thus is created a field of interest and action, in legislation, interpretation, and judgment, adapted to divert the interest of the mind from the practical and experimental study of the Bible in the present local sphere which results from Congregationalism.

Thus, too, the way is opened for making, fearing, and worshipping a great idol, called *the church*, in the place of God. Thus, too, are introduced temptations, addressed to the love of wealth, power, honors, and place.

Nor is this all. An essential element of the cultivation of holiness, is the power of discipline. This is given by Christ to the local church (Matt. xviii. 15–18); and in the local church, as ordained by him, there is no standard but the Bible. All hierarchal organizations, from the necessity of the case, and as a matter of fact, take away this power from the local church. Thus is Christ's great law of discipline suspended, which contemplates the local church only, and recognizes no higher power.

These tendencies of hierarchies are not merely speculative. They have revealed themselves in facts, and have been fearfully effectual in every age. And, at this time,

there is no hierarchal organization on earth, in which human legislation and creeds do not come between the local churches and the Bible, or in which the law of Christ can be carried out in the administration of discipline. Under any hierarchy the local church has not the ultimate power of discipline, and cannot have it; for no local decision can be made that is not liable to reversal by superior powers.

We see, then, as we might suppose, that as free local churches were ordained by Christ, so they are the wisest and most effectual means of gaining his great end; and that their establishment was not owing to any peculiar and transitory circumstances of the age. In proportion as Christ's ideal of holiness, and of the kingdom of God through it, is understood; in proportion as the culture of true scriptural holiness becomes a matter of intense desire,—will the superior adaptation of free local churches to these great ends be the more clearly seen.

And it is an undeniable fact in church history, that in proportion as hierarchies subverted the system of free local churches, originally ordained by Christ, in the same proportion the study of the Bible receded, and the study of the traditions of men took its place. This process went on until the Old and New Testaments, the two great witnesses of God among men, were clothed in sackcloth, and testified for ages in vain. We use these words, not as the interpretation of a prophecy, but as the best description of a great and undeniable historical fact.

In antithesis to this, is the great and equally prominent fact, that the system which has been most efficient in producing popular education and intelligence, freedom, individual energy and enterprize, and a development of the claims of God to pervade and control the whole social fabric, is the system of free churches, organized on the assumption of the supremacy of the Bible as the inspired and only infallible rule of faith and practice.

The Great Temptation and Delusion.

The great impulse towards higher organizations has ever been found in aspirations after *the unity of the church*, falsely understood. That God desires and aims at a unity of the church, is clearly asserted in his word. But it is a matter of great moment to know what this unity is, and what it involves. The Congregational view is, that it is not an external and formal unity, produced by organization, standards, rulers, and forms, but a real union, made and sustained by God. It is a union which is not possible without holiness, and which is real and powerful in proportion to the reality and power of holiness. Hence as free local churches are the wisest and most effectual means of producing this holiness, they tend most directly to this unity. In proportion as men become holy, God and his system become real to the mind, and are truly seen, and they have real and vital communion with him, and through him with one another. Thus are men united by God in the highest forms of intellectual, moral, and sympathetic unity.

This unity is commensurate with the globe. No lines of nations or continents bound it. It is a unity produced by that God who can at all times fill all things. It is a unity which no created being, or system of beings, can produce. It is the glorious result of the highest and most peculiar prerogatives of God. At this unity intelligent Congregationalism aims. It is content with nothing short of it, or below it.

On the other hand, Congregationalism teaches that any unity based on legislative and judicial organizations above local churches is not the unity desired by God; but results either in one world-embracing hierarchy, or else in divided and manifold hierarchies.

For if legislative and judicial organization, above local churches, is essential to preserve the unity of the church, then it ought to be commensurate with the unity to be preserved. But as God and his church are world-pervading, so must be the unity of his church. Here, then, we land in

a world-embracing organized hierarchy. This is the aim and profession of the Roman church; and it is a logical result of the premises. Rome at least is consistent with this principle.

If we still introduce higher organizations above the local church, and yet fall below a universal hierarchy, then we have organizations of local churches in particular states and nations, called churches of such states or nations. But what is to unite them? They must either remain divided, or at last rely on intellectual, moral, and sympathetic unity in God, on which Congregationalism relies from the beginning.

But if in addition to this, in any state or nation, as in ours, there are many organizations above local churches, each called a church, then the unity of each is not the unity of Christ's whole church, even in that nation. How, then, are these great churches to be united? To make any union, they must again resort to intellectual and moral unity, through God, even as Congregationalism does from the beginning.

But such large organized hierarchies, called churches, instead of promoting the union desired by God, tend rather to produce division, in its worst and widest forms. For when divided opinions as to doctrine or order or the choice of rulers occur, the interests, powers, and honors involved are vast, and tend to blind and deceive the conscience, and result in immedicable schisms. And when, in such vast organizations, schisms occur, they run through many local churches. Moreover, in large bodies, extending over a wide extent of territory, and developing love of power and honor, and by them intensifying conscientious convictions, and party beliefs and interests, the causes of division and disruption are not only multiplied, but are so intensified as to become irresistible.

Hence the history of hierarchies is a history of divisions, wide-spread and intense. The history of the Roman hierarchy is a history of schisms. The attempt to unite the

church under a world-embracing hierarchy, led to the great and immedicable schism between the Greek and the Latin hierarchies. The schisms of the Greek church still pervade the oriental world. Who does not recall the great schisms of the papal hierarchy, when European Christendom has been divided between two or more contending and excommunicating popes? Who cannot recall the numerous schisms of Presbyterianism, both in Scotland and in this country? How many Presbyterian bodies there are, each of which calls itself the church, and talks of the unity of the church. What hierarchal body is exempt from such tendencies, and similar facts in its history? Such centralized judicial and legislative bodies, therefore, neither unite the church as a whole, nor do they unite even those portions of the church which they embrace. On the other hand, they involve in themselves the elements of division, and that of the worst and most wide-spread kind.

Congregationalism alone, by rejecting the hierarchal principle entirely, and aiming at an intellectual, moral, and sympathetic unity, through God, aims at a unity commensurate with the kingdom of God. This is a universal, a world-wide unity. It aims not at the unity of one denomination, not at the unity of all the churches of the nation, but at the unity of all who are redeemed by Christ in all nations. If this is to be effected by the hierarchal principle at all, it demands a universal hierarchy. Congregationalism renounces the hierarchal principle entirely, and aims at universal, intellectual, moral and sympathetic unity through God. Even hierarchal systems lower than the papacy are obliged to resort to the same principle, or else renounce other Christian bodies as no part of the church or of the kingdom of God.

It is the grand peculiarity of Congregationalism that it resorts to this idea of unity from the beginning, from the free local church. By this they aim to cultivate holiness, and by the power of God acting through this, to unite all the Christians of this earth as one.

The Power of the Congregational Principle.

It cannot be denied that the most powerful influence, intellectual and moral, that can act on the human mind, is communion with God and subjection to his influence through his word. Nothing so ennobles and so healthfully develops the intellectual powers. Nothing gives to the mind such true enlargement and comprehensiveness of vision. Nothing so quickens and perfects the moral sense. Nothing gives such courage and energy to adhere to the right. Nothing so searches the heart, reveals sin and error, and delivers from delusion. Nothing so surely guides in the study of all truth, theoretical and practical. But the grand, the vital idea of Congregationalism, is to bring all men, as individuals, into habitual communion with God, and to keep them under his influence, through his word. For this very reason it avoids ecclesiastical monarchies, and all large centralized organizations. For this reason it denies the existence of two orders of Christians, one of which, as a clerical caste, has dominion over spiritual things, and is the essential medium of intercourse with God to the other class. It teaches that all Christians are kings and priests to God; that all have, through Christ, direct personal access to the Father; that all can enter the holy of holies. This was the original apostolic doctrine and practice. A distrust of the reality of this divine power of God over all men as individuals, and a fear to rely on it, lead to hierarchies. A caste of spiritual rulers, to act as mediators between God and common men, and to centralize them in religious monarchies or aristocracies, is felt to be needed to take care of the church. Confidence is reposed in the great whole, so organized. In one sense, this view produces a strong government. It is strong to prevent free, general, and popular intellectual growth and development. It is strong to enslave the human mind to the traditions of men. But to produce universal popular development, in the highest and noblest form, it is not strong. It does not tend to a universal reign of God through intelligent regenerated men, organized in free, self-governed people.

On the other hand, Congregationalism is powerful in this direction. It centralizes the local church around God's word in the Bible as its supreme law of thought, feeling, and action. It aims to bring each individual under the direct influence of God, through the Bible. It thus makes God the great centre of all things, and not a human monarch, nor the church. It aims to make each man a king and a priest to God, intelligent, God-governed.

Thus the rejection of the hierarchal principle, that is sometimes alleged as the weakness of Congregationalism, is the very source of its peculiar and highest power; for it centres all things around God in his word.

Congregational Councils.

We are now able to understand the grand peculiarity of Congregational councils. They are a mode of securing and expressing that unity, sympathy, co-operation, and fellowship among Christians, which grow out of the nature of God and the universality of his kingdom, *without introducing the hierarchal principle.*

Viewed in their relations to God, there is a unity among all regenerated persons, which they can neither make nor unmake. They are, in the nature of things, so united to Christ, that, in the strong language of inspiration, they are "members of his body, of his flesh and of his bones."

If they act in sympathy with God, through his word, they must aim at the same great ends. They are one by reason of the unity of divine thought, ends, purposes, and emotions, proceeding from that God who is above all, and in all, and through all. Hence from the nature of God, and the universality of his kingdom, originates a unity, sympathy, co-operation, and fellowship, among all Christian churches, which Congregationalism acknowledges its obligation to develop and preserve.

The hierarchal principle it regards, as we have seen, not only as not adapted to this end, but as in spirit diametrically opposed to it. It therefore excludes it.

This exclusion of the hierarchal principle is the grand peculiarity of Congregational councils. As soon as they lose this, the system loses its vital element of power, and is transformed into one of the many hierarchal systems with which Christendom has been filled.

A council is an assemblage of the representatives of any number of Congregational churches, to investigate and give light on doctrinal or practical questions of common interest, to give advice in difficult cases, to express fellowship, to aid in forming churches, in ordaining and dismissing pastors, in conducting difficult cases of discipline, and in removing divisions and dissensions.

A council convened for any of these ends receives its fundamental character from two great facts: 1. that the Bible, and that alone, is its fundamental constitution and only standard; 2. that the churches retain the right of judging all its decisions by the Bible, and accepting or rejecting them, as they are found to agree with it. On this point, the Cambridge Platform is express. Concerning the decisions of synods and councils they say, that they are, "*so far as consonant to the word of God*, to be received with reverence and submission;" without such agreement, they say, "*they bind not at all.*" Of course the churches must judge for themselves of this agreement. In general, they say that "synods and councils are not to exercise church censures in a way of discipline, nor any act of church authority or jurisdiction." In these views eminent Congregational writers are unanimous.

If, in view of this statement, it should be alleged, as it often is, that councils are devoid of power, let the following things be considered:

1. That personal holiness, and a sense of the presence of God, and prayer, all of which the Bible requires in a council, do more than anything else to remove the causes of error and division, and to lead into all truth, whether doctrinal or practical.

2. That the truth itself, when clearly stated, in a right spirit, has great power.

3. That the aid of the Holy Spirit is always granted to those who act prayerfully, and in the name of Christ, in such assemblies.

4. That those who are to be acted on are, as a general fact, regenerated, spiritual men, even if in error or in sins.

Bearing these things in mind, it cannot but be that a Congregational council, *conducted in the true spirit of the system*, should be a body of great power. It is indeed a peculiar kind of power, and so is that of the gospel. The wisdom of God in convincing of sin, in reforming, in guiding into the truth, is concentrated in the gospel. It is the design of a council to develop and to rely on this peculiar power. Errors, delusions, divisions, have their roots in the heart. It is the design of councils, through the revelation of God in the gospel, to reach and to remove the root of the evil, to invigorate the regenerated spiritual nature, and to destroy the power of the flesh. This is especially true in cases of discipline, or of division and strife.

Nothing can better illustrate these principles than a reference to actual facts. In a work by William Wisner, D.D., entitled "Incidents in a Pastor's Life," on p. 114, occur's the following statement: "A congregation in central New York was thrown into great disorder, and for years had its influence for good paralyzed by a quarrel between two of the leading families in the village. Various efforts had been made to settle the difficulty without effect, when the church, with the consent of the contending parties, agreed to submit the whole matter to a number of ministers not belonging to that presbytery, of whom I was one. Invitations were accordingly sent to those persons who had been agreed upon by the church and the parties, and we all assembled, on the day appointed, to enter upon the business for which we had been selected. I was chosen chairman of the council, and the parties were present with their advocates and their witnesses, all in readiness to commence the contest. But as the council belonged to other presbyteries than the one with which that church

stood connected, I called for *the commission* under which we were to act; when, to our surprise, we were informed that *their presbytery* had not even been consulted on the subject. We at once agreed that we had no power to act officially in the matter, but recommended to the church and the parties to unite with us in a season of prayer for the gracious interposition of God's Spirit. All seemed to fall in with this proposal, and we adjourned from the place which was intended as the arena for a desperate conflict between the brethren, to a place where prayer was wont to be made. As this was about ten o'clock in the morning, we continued at the throne of grace until twelve, when we had a recess for dinner. After dinner we reassembled, and engaged again in our supplications for the restoration of peace and love to that afflicted church. In a short time one of the offending parties came forward, and, with many tears, confessed that he had been awfully guilty, and begged the forgiveness of God, of the other party, and of the church, for his unchristian conduct. As soon as he sat down, the other party came and insisted that he was the guilty originator of the trouble, and that if his brother had done wrong, it was in consequence of provocation which he had given, and he wished the forgiveness of his brother and of the church and of God. The two principals having thus been brought to repentance, those who had become their partisans followed their example, and, for a long time we sat there hearing brethren who had been engaged in an unholy strife, confessing their sins to one another, and praying for one another." From this originated a revival of religion, of which he gives an account.

Here are presented the true elements of that highest power, to which a council may always resort, a sense of the presence of God, the quickening of the spiritual nature, the illuminating and the searching power of the divine Spirit, and the vision of eternal realities. In this case, the church in fact had assumed the Congregational right to call a council without leave from the presbytery. The want of

a presbyterial commission prevented the formal and legal action, which they would have taken under presbytery. The hierarchal connection ceased. They became, in fact, a Congregational council, at least in spirit, and resorted to prayer. Nothing could have been done better adapted, or more powerful, to secure the end aimed at. The gospel is not a system of law, but of love and of divine influence and of heart-searching power. Such should ever be the atmosphere created by a council; such the power on which it relies. Well does Dr. Wisner say: "contentions among brethren always grow out of the want of a heavenly mind, and usually take place in the absence of the sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit." The power of a council, then, in such a case, lies in the restoration of that which has been lost, and in a manifested sense of the presence of God. This is especially important in all cases of division and contention. But it is universally true of all councils, that a devotional atmosphere should predominate in them. A formal acknowledgment of God is not enough. If it be true that the Lord giveth wisdom, then prayer is the most powerful mode of gaining wisdom for others, on all subjects on which a council is called to act.

In accordance with these views, the national Congregational council, which is soon to assemble at Boston, will devote the whole of the first day to prayer. Questions of doctrine, of church order, and of benevolent enterprise, will come before them. But on all questions, nothing can throw so much light as the presence of the divine Spirit, and a powerful development of the spirit of self-sacrifice and self-denial for the good of others, in accordance with the example of him who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many. This is the vital essence of Christianity. This is its true doctrinal, organic, and practical power. The field is wide. The necessities are obvious. An unparalleled work of Christian evangelism and organization for our country is needed. The great practical question is: Has the denomination the

power, liberality, self-sacrifice, and self-denial needed to meet the emergency?

It appears from this general view of Congregational councils, that they differ greatly in principles and spirit from those assemblies known in church history, after the second century, as councils. These were based on the hierarchal principles, and passed authoritative canons. This introduced into the church a kind of canonic literature, which has expanded into folios, and, like the Jewish traditions condemned by Christ, made the word of God of no effect. This principle of hierarchal unity required councils above councils as larger territories were represented, and metropolitans and patriarchs to preside in them; and an attempt at an organized universal hierarchy was the logical result. There has indeed been some dispute in this hierarchy as to the supremacy; some placing it in the pope, others exalting a general council above him. But by securing the right to call the council or not, at his pleasure, the pope, in fact, has carried the day.

The restorers of Congregationalism were well acquainted with the history and effects of such councils, as one main cause of the subversion of the original Congregationalism, and it is not surprising that at first they should apply some other name to their own assemblies, based on a denial of the hierarchal principle. Accordingly we find, in the old writers, that they are called by various descriptive names, such as conferences, consociations, conventions, synods, rather than councils. But their advisory nature, or some other reason, has led to the adoption of the term "councils," for the common and smaller assemblies of the representatives of the churches, applying the term "synod" or "consociation" to the larger and less frequent gatherings. But at last, usage is extending the name to what would formerly have been called a synod. Our national council is the legitimate successor of the general synods of New England.

Ideals of Congregational Development in the Future.

Congregationalism, since its modern restoration, has acted in circumstances opposed to the proper development of its real tendencies and full power. It began its career in the midst of compactly organized ecclesiastical hierarchies covering the whole ground. Of course it could not act on society according to the original idea of its divine Founder. Let us consider what would be involved in this, and what would be the results of Congregationalism were it to become universal.

Let us then suppose that the Congregational principle of unity, intellectual, moral, sympathetic, among free local churches, to the exclusion of all hierarchal organizations, has obtained the ascendency.

One obvious result would be, the cessation of the division of local churches among many independent upper organizations covering the same ground. Then the Christian population of each locality could form itself into as many local churches as should be needed, and could properly be sustained Then would come to an end the extravagant system of multiplied feeble local churches, to which rival hierarchies give rise, and the waste of resources, collision of interests, jealousy, proselytism, and unbelief which necessarily result.

In the primitive church, there was not even one such upper hierarchal organization. Mosheim has on this point stated the truth so emphatically, that we quote his words: "All the churches in those primitive times were independent bodies; or none of them subject to the jurisdiction of any other. For though the churches which were founded by the apostles themselves frequently had the honor shown them to be consulted in difficult and doubtful cases; yet they had no judicial authority, no control, no power of giving laws. On the contrary, it is as clear as the noon-day that all Christian churches had *equal rights*, and were, in all respects, on a footing of equality. Nor does there appear in this first century any vestige of that *conso-*

ciation of the churches of the same province which gave rise to *ecclesiastical councils* and to *metropolitans*. But rather, as is manifest, it was not till the second century that the custom of holding ecclesiastical councils first began in Greece, and thence extended into other provinces" (Murdock's Mosheim, I. 72).

In a Christian population there are always strong tendencies to local unity, which will organize, in the requisite number of local churches, all who are not divided by fundamental doctrinal error. The departing principle, the principle of waste and extravagant expenditure, is found in the upper hierarchal organizations. Let it be but once universally conceded that these are in opposition to the unity at which Christ aimed, and to the highest development of his kingdom, and the great, the all-pervading principle of division and of repulsion among Christians will be done away, and the true principles of Christian unity will begin to operate with a power unknown before. God, through his word, will centralize, unite, and control his free and holy churches with a divine, all-pervading, joy-diffusing power of light and love.

Another result would be, the opening of the way for the removal of doctrinal differences among Christians, by an unobstructed comparison of views, and a reference of all things to the divine standard of truth — the word of God. Nothing has so great power to neutralize and arrest candid investigation and comparison of views, as the existing hierarchal organizations. They are bound to defend, by their whole organic power, all that is within their respective enclosures. Creeds become, not declarations of doctrinal results, reached at particular times, to be used in the study of doctrinal development, in which light they are of great use, but fixed doctrinal standards, above the Bible, and between the churches and the Bible. Remove the hierarchal principle, let no hierarchal interests divide the Christian community into fixed organizations, holding together their elements by powerful organic attractions, let the Bible

and the true laws of interpretation and development have full sway, and a candid comparison of views be unobstructed, and existing doctrinal differences would be finally removed, and all of the sacramental host see eye to eye.

Another result would be, an increase of patience in thought and investigation, as opposed to the haste and authoritative decisions of hierarchies. All decisions made in haste and under excitement, by the mere power of a majority of votes, are simply adjournments of discussion to other and better times and circumstances. No decision will permanently stand that is not based on truth. But all hierarchies tend to a hasty decision, by majorities, according to existing standards. On the other hand, Congregationalism tends to patient thought, full discussion, and a decision by the Bible. This operation of the system, in certain well-known cases, is so well set forth by Professor Park, that we cannot do better than to use his words :

"When President Edwards promulgated his views, the clergy opposed him. His friends were few, his foes were the vast majority of staid and gentlemanly divines. Had he and they been trained under an authoritative organization of churches, there is little doubt that he would have been summoned before their tribunal, and, in its summary action, every member of the court inflaming every other, and all of them in a state altogether unfit for grave deliberation on intricate themes, he would have been condemned, and in all likelihood a new denomination would have been started, and its differences from the old would have been exaggerated, and its distance from the old would have been looked upon as a great gulf. But he appealed to the sober men of the country, wherever he could find them ; they reflected, each man for himself, and some approved, others doubted ; and the more part could see no reason broad enough to warrant their refusal of fellowship with him; and so the truth increased mightily. His friend Hopkins was thus encouraged to show his opinion. The clergy resisted him. He was reasoned against and rhymed against.

If he and his enemies had been drilled under a concentrated government of churches, he also, in all likelihood, would have been summoned for trial, and in the haste and heat of his judges, each one igniting the other, and disqualifying the other for a patient study of his analyses, he too would have been the cause of a new explosion in the church, one fragment repelling, and repulsed by its antagonist. But he sought out the calm thinkers of the land, fit readers, though few; he sent his volumes to the farmers and the merchants. They read; each man by himself reflected; some received, others disowned his views, and the majority chose to see them discussed, rather than to see the church divided; and so again the word of the Lord grew. The essential spirit of Calvinism made a bold stride. The friend of Hopkins, Emmons, was thus emboldened to publish his investigations. He had more clerical friends than either Edwards or Hopkins; but they were less numerous than his opponents; and if a church court could have seized upon him, he would have been crushed under its quick-rolling wheels, and schismatics would have been multiplied, and the denomination would have again been riven asunder. But he knew the patience of the people, their proverbial slowness to condemn any man who *means well*, and is *about* right; and he threw his sermons among them; they looked and pondered; many disbelieved; some approved; but the dominant opinion was, that a sound creed would be preserved by candid thought longer than by judicatories and schisms; and thus again the old faith of the church was yet more surely embedded in the heart of the people."

Another result of Congregationalism would be, the production of thinking, intelligent, self-governed, or rather God-governed people. A Congregational church is a school for all those traits of character which fit a people for self-government. Relying not on authority and forms, and sacraments, but on truth, and holiness, and the fear of God, it demands and encourages popular education, and the

highest standard of practical morality. It trains men to reason and think, and to bear responsibility. Thus it creates the elements of free, intelligent, God-fearing, self-governed people.

A final result would be, the sanctification of all departments of human society, and the full development and establishment of the kingdom of God. There would be no union or confusion of church and state. The church universal would not be organized under one great hierarchy, or under divided hierarchies. The Christian element, united in free local churches, would be universally diffused. The majority of the people, or even all of them, would be converted to God, and would act in his fear and love, and on his principles in all departments of life.

Congregationalism assumes that the regeneration and sanctification of fallen men is the end of this world, and that this is to be effected by a definite system of truth revealed in the Bible. It assumes that the system of natural material life is analogical to that system of truth, and in harmony with it, and with it makes one great whole, adapted to gain the divine ends of human society in this world. It assumes that this great system, as a whole, ought to be pervaded and controlled by the love of God and a regard to his great ends. When this is done, men will be free, human society will be simple, loving, and not despotic or oppressive, and God will be above all, and in all, and through all.

Congregationalism assumes, also, a divine influence of the Holy Spirit to make this great system of truth apparent, not being limited to the department of theology, but pervading all fields of human thought. It assumes a self-revealing power of God, such that it shall make his being real, and cheer all men by his universally-diffused thoughts and emotion, just as the sun reveals himself by light and heat. This is the essential element of the kingdom of God. This is its all-pervading power. The full development of the kingdom of God is divinely set forth by this very symbol. "The

sun shall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightness shall the moon give light unto thee; but the Lord shall be unto thee an everlasting light, and thy God thy glory. Thy sun shall no more go down, neither shall thy moon withdraw itself; for the Lord shall be thine everlasting light, and the days of thy mourning shall be ended (Isa. lx. 19, 20).

Congregationalism has never been anywhere perfectly developed according to its true and highest ideal. At an early period it was subverted by the hierarchal principle, and human canons and traditions. It was still more excluded from its true place and from regaining its power by the union of church and state. Even the Protestant reformation did not remedy this abuse. That work of emancipation was reserved for later ages, and for this continent. An entire redemption from hierarchies of all kinds is yet in the future. It may be that the experiment of hierarchies not united to the state may yet demand some time in the providence of God, in order to bring out the truth by the revelations of history.

Meantime the view which has been taken should, at this important crisis of our history, impress upon all Congregationalists two great lessons.

The first is, that the full and perfect development of the system can be secured only by the highest degrees of holiness and communion with God. When the hierarchal principle is entirely renounced, when the centralizing power of great organizations is gone, then there is no uniting and organic power left but the influence of God. But this power, truly used, is enough. It may be developed beyond any conceivable limits. If it is developed in a high degree, it is the greatest intellectual and moral power that can enter the world. Many things will become practicable and attainable, which are hopeless without it. To meet the emergencies of the present day and of the future, it must be secured, in extent and power, to a degree hitherto unknown. Until this is done, the system of Congregationalism will not

be seen in its true power and glory. There will be a constant tendency to abuse it by bringing into it the spirit of a hierarchy, by which the system will be perverted and misused. Hierarchal systems have repeatedly infused their spirit into its administration, and always with evil results. Its true power is not hierarchal, but divine.

The great practical questions of the age, then, are: To what degree are we authorized to expect communion with God? and, How shall it be secured?

The second lesson is, that this communion with God should not be limited to the religious sphere, technically so called, but should be extended to all departments of human life. It is time more profoundly to study what, and how much, is involved in this. The sanctification of the whole social system is the last and highest work of God, and it is to be effected through the people. The kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, are to be given, not to a monarchy, but to *the people* of the saints of the Most High. In this great nation, God has put the power into the hands of the people, in order that they may rule for him. But how can they do it unless they study what it involves? And how can they do this except they are taught? The Congregational churches, as eminently the advocates and leaders of the great popular movement, are imperatively called on to study this momentous problem. Nor does it involve a leaving of their proper sphere. Religion cannot have perfect soundness, so long as any department of human life is conducted on irreligious principles. We have seen the malignant power of slavery to corrupt religion and lead to apostasy. Unchristianized systems of political economy, commerce, and government, exert the same corrupting power. The leaven of the gospel has not done its work until it has leavened the whole lump.

Now that God has smitten slavery unto death, he has opened the way for the redemption and sanctification of our whole social system, which was before impossible. We are

therefore loudly called upon to study this problem as never before.

In making these remarks as to Congregationalism and its responsibilities, we are not conscious of a want of love or respect towards Christians of any name. On the other hand, we speak as we do because we love them, and because we desire Christian unity in a higher degree than ever before. We feel that the unity of this great nation cannot be preserved permanently by any power lower than the uniting power of God, exerted through his united people. This is adequate for all time and all circumstances. Nothing else is.

Our government, too, by reason of its vast resources and immense patronage, is in great, constant, and imminent danger of corruption. How shall this corruption be averted? How shall it be exhibited to the world pure, benevolent, and glorious? There is but one way. God must animate it through a free and holy people. The people must be all righteous. Then will the national government truly represent them, and be pure and glorious.

To reach these results, an inconceivable degree of moral power is needed, high, high above anything that has yet been attained. How shall it be secured? It can be only by the observance of the great, the divine laws of unity, ordained by God, and involved in the very nature of things.

It has been our purpose to discuss these laws, not, as we trust, under the influence of denominational pride, but from a sincere desire of the speedy and glorious coming of the kingdom of God.

It is conceded by all that no progress can be made in the development of the powers of the natural system, but by obedience to its laws. Obedience to the laws of fluids, ordained by God, has given us the steam-engine, with its wondrous powers. Obedience to the laws of electro-magnetism has given us the telegraph, and its miracles of communication and intercourse.

And are there not laws of life and union in God, as real and irrepealable as any of the laws of this material world?

Have not these laws been long enough disregarded? Have not the divisive tendencies of hierarchal unity, so called, been sufficiently developed? Is it not time to ask: Is there not a real, a higher unity, of which God is the direct and constant author, and which needs no hierarchy for its full development; nay, which repudiates all hierarchies as at war with its very first principles?

Nor is it for man's sake merely that these questions should be asked. True, there is a joy and a strength of universal Christian unity, after the ideal of Christ, of which there has been as yet but little practical knowledge—a joy unspeakable and full of glory. And no words can state the worth or the power of that joy.

But high above this should we place the wishes and purposes and joys of God. There is a unity contemplated by Christ in that intercessory prayer with which he closed his earthly labors. A unity that is to affect the world. Has that unity yet been realized? There is a unity involved in the gift to the bride, the Lamb's wife, to put on fine linen, clean and white, and to prepare herself for the marriage supper of the Lamb. Has this unity yet been realized? And as there are laws by which the wonders of the material system have come to pass; so there are laws by which the wonders of the spiritual system are to be developed. Is it not time to study those laws and to obey them, even more for God's sake than for our own?

The full force and real import of the scriptural phrase *the kingdom of God* ought to be more profoundly studied, and more sympathetically realized. It has receded from the current thought of most Christian denominations. Its unity, its universality, its power and glory, are dimly seen and faintly felt, if at all. And yet, in an eminent sense, it is true that the kingdom of God is at hand. He is to reign through emancipated and regenerated free people. No part of De Tocqueville's great work on Democracy is more sublime than his Introduction, in which he unfolds the great democratic movement of God's providence for ages, powerful

alike, whether men oppose or aid. It filled him, he says, with religious awe in the contemplation. If we succeed in our war for liberty and union, new power will be added, even our enemies being judges, to the great democratic movement of the ages.

Is it not time for us to look upon this great movement in its ultimate relations to the kingdom of God, and more clearly to conceive what the coming of that kingdom implies?

It is God who is to reign. God is to be king over all the earth. The theory of a divine reign through hierarchies, leaving the people ignorant and passive, has had its full trial. The reign of God through free, intelligent, regenerated people, is to have its day. Is it not time thoroughly to understand the conditions of this great problem?

ARTICLE VI.

GEORGE CALIXTUS.[1]

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THE first half of the seventeenth century was a period fruitful of abiding influence on the succeeding condition of Germany. The treaty of 1555, which conceded to the several states the management of their own ecclesiastical affairs — a concession of which the Protestants did, but the Roman Catholics did not, avail themselves — secured, indeed,

[1] The materials of this Article are taken from "George Calixtus und seine Zeit," by Professor Henke, of Marburg, Hessen-Cassel. In this work, consisting of two octavo volumes, the subject is presented with a master's hand, a view being given not only of Calixtus's life and labors, but also, as fully as the nature of the work admits, of the general political and ecclesiastical condition of Germany, particularly of Brunswick, during the period treated of. Without attempting any further analysis or criticism of Henke's work, we avail ourselves of it in composing the following sketch.

a temporary quiet; but the storm was only postponed, not averted. The immediate danger of a violent struggle between the two sections of the church passed away; but Germany lost in unity what the Protestants gained in immunity. The process of dissolution was further promoted by the incessant bickerings and conflicting claims of rival princes, more bitterly prosecuted now than ever before, because difference of religious belief was often added to the lust for power, and the decisions of the emperors themselves, not seldom determined by religious considerations more than by regard for inherent right, irritated more than they soothed. Above all, these tendencies to dissolution were busily and cunningly fostered by the other European powers. And finally, to all other causes at work was added the bitterness of opposition between the Lutheran and Reformed churches. Encouraged by the check which these intestine quarrels had put to the progress of the Reformation, itself awakened into a new life and freed from many of its worst failings, the papal church, acting more or less in concert with the German emperors, aspired to reconquer the lost ground. At the diet of 1608 the archduke Ferdinand, a Hannibal among the Jesuits, violating the wishes of the more pacific emperor Rudolph II., whom he there represented, secured the enactment of measures which impelled the Protestants to leave the diet and form a Union, headed by the Palatinate, while the Catholics formed the League, under the lead of the duke of Bavaria, a prince devoted to the emperor, but still more to Catholicism, and most of all to himself. The more remote result of the breach was the Thirty Years' War, whose movements seemed to be dictated by no plan and to promise no result except to subject Germany to the devastations of the armies of Wallenstein, Pappenheim, Tilly, and Gustavus Adolphus; the various changes depending on the varying policy of the discordant princes, each too weak to rely on himself, and hence leaning on the emperor, the king of Sweden, or the king of France, according as caprice, the chances of war, the prospects of per-

sonal aggrandizement, or the influence of religious convictions held sway. To the people, if not to the rulers, it was a religious war; but not only were Catholics opposed to Protestants, but each of these parties was afflicted with intestine dissensions, while among the Protestants not only were the Lutherans and the Reformed church at variance with each other, but even in each of these divisions, especially among the Lutherans, there was no concert, some siding with the emperor, others with the Swedes.

The duchy Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel suffered its full share of the devastations of the war. Duke Frederick Ulrich (1613–34), a weak and irresolute prince, at first took part with the Palatinate and the Hessians, but afterwards attempted to maintain a neutral position, which not being able to do, he was forced to throw himself successively into the arms of the king of Denmark, of the emperor, and of Gustavus Adolphus, and was thus compelled to see his land ravaged, in turn, by Swedes and Germans, by friends and foes alike, himself impotent to avert the disaster. After his death, a new division among its various dukes led to new complications, not only in the relations of Brunswick to the war in general, but in those of the rival dukes to each other. Duke August, who inherited the most of Frederick Ulrich's territory, was inclined to side with the emperor; but, irritated by breach of faith on the side of the latter, he allied himself with the Swedes, yet afterwards renewed his old allegiance, receiving as a reward, what his predecessors had long sought in vain, full possession of the city of Brunswick, which now became his capital instead of Wolfenbüttel. The treaty of Westphalia soon followed (1648), and the duchy began to resume its former prosperity.

It was during this period, and in this duchy, that George Calixtus flourished.

He was born in Medelbye, near Flensburg in Schleswig, Dec. 14, 1586. His father, in his student-years a pupil and always a warm admirer of Melanchthon, served fifty years as pastor. George, studying partly at home,

partly at the gymnasium in Flensburg, finished his preparatory course in 1602, and in the spring of 1603 entered the University of Helmstädt, was made master of arts two years afterwards, and permitted to read private lectures. He did not devote himself specially to theology until 1607. Then, after making a short visit home, where he was somewhat inclined to remain as his father's colleague, he returned, in 1609, and resumed his lectures. Not seeing any prospect of a speedy appointment to a professorship, he undertook, in the same year, a journey for the purpose of enlarging his acquaintance with the men and the movements of the time. He visited Jena, Giessen, Frankfurt, Tübingen, Augsburg, and other cities, forming a personal acquaintance with many prominent theologians, and returned in May, 1610. He now resumed his lectures as Privat-docent, studying at the same time mathematics, medicine, and physics. A year later, he undertook another still greater journey, this time spending some months in Cologne among the Roman Catholics, passing somewhat hastily through Holland, visiting in England the distinguished Protestant Casaubon, and, on his return, the equally distinguished, though far from bigoted, Catholic de Thou, in Paris. After the death of duke Henry Julius he made another short stay in Schleswig, and then once more resumed his lectures in Helmstädt. Soon after, by a disputation at Hämelschenberg with the Jesuit Turrianus, undertaken for the sake of winning back from an inclination to popery the young knight Ludolph von Klencke, although unsuccessful in this object, he so increased his previous reputation for ability and scholarship, that, in spite of resolute opposition from many who distrusted his orthodoxy, or were jealous of his talents, he was installed as Professor Ordinarius of Theology, Jan. 18, 1615. In this position he remained until his death, March 19, 1656.

The University of Helmstädt in Brunswick, extinct since the beginning of the present century, was founded by duke Julius, in 1576, and named, after him, the Julius University. The auspices under which it was opened were good, and

the institution speedily assumed a commanding position among the German universities. It had one characteristic which at that period was not common to many others. Lutheran theologians had been, as a general rule, inclined to discourage the pursuit of classical and philosophical studies, almost verifying the charge of Erasmus: "Ubicunque regnat Lutheranismus, ibi literarum est interitus." Helmstädt, at least soon after the foundation of the university, was the home of liberal culture. The most illustrious representatives of it were John Caselius, installed as Professor of Philosophy in 1589, remaining until his death in 1613; and Cornelius Martini, also Professor of Philosophy, installed 1592, only twenty-four years old, and likewise remaining in Helmstädt until his death, which took place in 1621. Caselius exercised a commanding influence. His remarkable acquaintance with ancient literature, with philosophy, and law, combined with a zeal for a broad culture, which yet did not interfere with a healthful devotion to the interests of the church, attracted, in spite of the opposition of bigots, a large attendance of students from all parts of Germany. Martini, called by his enemies the tyrant of the university, had been a pupil of Caselius in Rostock, and was a man of the same spirit. He devoted himself particularly to the study of Aristotle.

It is true that the theological faculty was not at first in full sympathy with these men. The most influential adviser of Julius at the foundation of the university was Chemnitz, one of the authors and most zealous advocates of the Formula Concordiae; and the theologians in general looked with suspicion on philosophy and the humanists. The latter found a very bitter opponent in Basilius Sattler, court preacher and counsellor of the consistory. Still more violent was Hofmann, who however because he had allowed his violence to betray him into personal abuse of his colleagues, was removed from his professorship in 1588. The Corpus Julium, which the duke had ordained as the creed of the land, agreed essentially with the Formula Concordiae, and there

seemed to be at first every prospect that the university would take sides with those at Wittenberg, Giessen, and others, not only against the Calvinists, but also against the Philippists. But having allowed his son, yet a mere child, to be chosen bishop of the Catholic chapter at Halberstädt, for the sake of the political advantage which he expected from the appointment, Julius displeased the most of the theologians, and being offended by their protestations, he broke not only with them, but with their theology. By diligent investigation it was found that the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body was not only not positively affirmed in the Corpus Julium, but that it was not unequivocally affirmed in the Formula Concordiae itself, to which most of the Brunswick clergy had subscribed; and it was declared by Julius and those among the theologians who sympathized with him that, as the doctrine was distinctly laid down only in the Apology of the Formula Concordiae, no one could be required to hold it. The result was, that the strict Lutherans lost their power. The professors, though Lutherans, and some of them of the strictest sect, were not pledged to the commonly-received Lutheran creed, and continued to hold a peculiar position.

Calixtus was a pupil and ardent admirer of both Caselius and Martini, especially of the latter, in whose house he lived many years, and with whom his intercourse was always intimate. He was a Lutheran, but was inflexibly opposed to the narrow-mindedness then so prevalent among that denomination. He rejected the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body, and in general belonged to the school of Melanchthon, following this reformer in his love both of classical culture and of harmony among Christians. To describe his life in a word, we may say that he did little else than to fight theological battles in behalf of peace. His favorite idea, early cherished and never relinquished, was that the differences between the different bodies of Christians, not even excepting those that divided the Protestants from the Papists (he always jealously refused to allow to the latter an exclusive

right to the name of Catholics) were not sufficient to warrant the separations which had actually been produced. He maintained that all Christians are substantially agreed as to all the really fundamental articles of belief, and that differences on minor points might continue without involving any schism. Another favorite principle, kindred to this, was that, inasmuch as the early Christians cannot be supposed not to have been in the possession of truth enough to secure their salvation, we must assume that all the essential truths of Christianity are to be found stated in the works of the church Fathers. The tendency of this notion was to lead him, seemingly at least, to underrate the importance of the Reformation in a doctrinal point of view, while his avowed desire to see the open breach between Protestants and Catholics healed up, exposed him to the constant charge, from the side of the most ardent Protestants, of himself tending to Catholicism. Considering the extreme violence of the theological polemics of that century, it is not strange that such, and even worse, accusations were made. And, assailed with such fury by those whose creed most nearly resembled his own, and from whom he might have expected a more lenient treatment, it is also not strange that he did modify, as he grew older, the severity with which in his earlier works he attacked the papists, unable, as he was, to conceal from himself that Christianity was to be found among the latter as well as among his co-religionists. He did not believe that councils should attempt to exclude all free investigation and condemn all honest, even the slightest, variations from the standard symbols. He abominated the bigotry which led so many Lutherans not only jealously to guard against the inroads of heresy, but to deny even the possibility of salvation to all without the pale of the Lutheran church — a bigotry which went so far that some affirmed that the slighter the variation in belief might be from the authoritative utterances of the adopted formula, so much the more dangerous, because the more insidious, the changes were, and therefore

so much the more earnestly to be condemned. He lamented, too, the obstinacy which led fellow Protestants to reject all pacific propositions, and welcome the dissolution of Germany rather than yield what might easily have been yielded without any real sacrifice.

Calixtus's labors were for the most part purely literary. After his inauguration as professor, his personal intercourse with his contemporaries was small. He seldom went away from Helmstädt. Even in the years 1625 – 28, when the university was virtually broken up by the war, he remained at his post, almost the only representative of the faculties, the others having sought refuge in Brunswick from the annoyances and burdens of the war, or secured places in other universities. But in 1633 he spent two or three months on a trip to Franken, a Swedo-German duchy, newly formed out of parts of the bishopries Würzburg and Bamburg, at the solicitation of duke Ernest, who had invited him to take up his residence in the land as the duke's theological adviser. This invitation he had declined, but yielded to the further request that he would at least come and assist in the organization of the schools and churches. On his return he became acquainted in Jena with John Gerhard, who upon thus learning the worth of Calixtus, found his previously strong prejudices against him to be quite unjustifiable, and ever afterwards cherished for him a genuine friendship. Calixtus also visited Schleswig once more, on the occasion of the death of a brother, in 1634. Furthermore, in the summer of 1645, he went to Thorn, in Poland, to take part in a disputation which had been ordered by king Wladislaus IV., for the sake of promoting harmony among the different religious parties in his kingdom. Foreigners, as well as Poles, were allowed to take part in it. Through the influence of his friend Fabricius of Danzig, attention was called to Calixtus as an eminently suitable person to be invited to the disputation, and, notwithstanding the opposition of the Lutheran zealots, Frederick William of Brandenburg, the great elector, himself attached to the Reformed confession,

sent a special request to Calixtus to come to Thorn. Already nearly sixty years old, so long a journey was to him then a great undertaking; but he could not refuse to lend a helping hand to whatever promised the furtherance of unity among Christians, and accordingly he accepted the invitation. Upon his arrival in Thorn, however, he found that through the intrigues of the uncompromising Lutherans, he was to be allowed no active part in the disputation. And although he was asked by the Reformed theologians to sit with them as an adviser, and was thus enabled to contribute much by his learning and his counsel, yet the unyielding bigotry of certain Lutherans, especially Hülsemann of Wittenburg and Calovius of Danzig, who really desired no union, the whole object of the movement was frustrated. The discussions were more private than public; the dissensions were widened, not healed. Near the end of November Calixtus returned, disheartened, to Helmstädt.

Turning to a more particular consideration of Calixtus's literary labors, we may divide them, in general, into those which were of a polemical character and those which were more purely scientific. Yet many of his most important theological treatises had more or less of a polemic tinge. The first-mentioned class may again be divided into those directed against Catholicism and those directed against Lutherans.

He wrote frequently in opposition to the papacy, beginning as early as when he was in Cologne, where he composed a *tractatus de missae sacrificio*, in opposition to the notion that the sacrifice for sin can be repeated. He also attacked various other errors of the papal church, as e.g. transubstantiation, ascription of canonical authority to the apocrypha, celibacy of the clergy, communion in one form, etc.; but his chief object in his polemic writings was not so much to show how far apart the Protestants and Catholics were, as rather to prove how unnecessary it was that they should be apart at all. This, however, could not be done by a

Protestant without protesting at least against the Catholic notion of the infallibility of the pope; and this dogma he did oppose with special earnestness. He insisted that the antichrist told of in 2 Thess. ii. 3 – 8 is none other than the pope himself. With his vast knowledge of history, which enabled him to make his opponents refute one another, he dealt the pretensions of the Roman see many a heavy blow. But the confidence expressed in his earlier treatises, that the power of the pope was nearly at an end, was much shaken by the events of the subsequent war, and the increasing number of apostates from the Protestant to the Papal church. The case of Marcus Antonius de Dominis, a Jesuit scholar of no mean attainments in the languages and natural sciences, who had, in 1616, left the papacy, fled from Dalmatia, where he had been archbishop, to England, joined himself to the established church there, written several important works against Catholicism, but in 1622 returned to the Roman church, was suited to attract general attention. But Calixtus was more intimately affected by the apostasy of an acquaintance and former friend, Barthold Neuhaus. He had been licensed to deliver lectures in Helmstädt at the same time with Calixtus. In 1614 he wrote a treatise, in which, because he held that reason could prove the existence of God, he was declared to have contradicted 1 Cor. iii. 19; his work was condemned by Sattler, and he was forbidden to teach any longer. Though the order was afterwards modified, yet he received at this time, without doubt, the first impulse to go over, as he did in 1622, to popery. Neuhaus was not a man of great weight of character; and though after his apostasy he took special pains to draw Calixtus into a controversy, the latter long refused to yield to the solicitations. Nevertheless, after Neuhaus had issued, in 1632, a work against Protestantism, in which he insisted that Protestants, in order to be true to their principles, must find unequivocal biblical proof-texts for all their doctrines, in which, moreover, Calixtus and his colleague Horneius were particularly attacked and challenged, Calixtus

complied so far with the earnest advice of his friends that in 1634, when he published his *Theologia Moralis*, he added a *digression*, in which he considers Neuhaus's work; a digression, nevertheless, itself three times as long as the rest of the book. He here maintains that the Protestants, so far from absolutely rejecting the authority of men, hold that their principles are to be found in the patristic writings, and that this fact is an argument in their favor. He quotes from Catholic writers who acknowledge that the consent of the church Fathers is a sufficient authority. He then undertakes a proof of the correctness of the several Protestant doctrines, and invites the Catholics to do the same. But his irenic efforts met only with ridicule from Neuhaus. He had overrated the willingness of the Catholics to make a compromise with the Protestants. Neuhaus often afterwards renewed his attacks, manifesting all the peculiar zeal of a proselyte, and exhibiting a malicious pleasure at the divisions and misfortunes of his opponents, not seldom abusing Calixtus personally, although in fact retaining a deep respect for his once intimate friend. But Calixtus never replied to him directly. In 1638, Calixtus was especially aimed at in a work by the French Catholic, Verons, who issued a new edition of a work nearly twenty years old, called "Methodes pour les Controverses." Verons commends Calixtus's position, that doctrines are to be proved from the scriptures and from the testimony of antiquity, but points out how different is the ground taken in the Magdeburg Centuries, and by the Protestants generally. He concedes that certainty may be attained in natural things by experience, or even by rational inferences, but contends that articles of faith cannot be thus established, and that therefore some authoritative standard must be had. Verons sent his work to Calixtus, inviting him, in the use of very complimentary expressions of regard, notwithstanding he had formerly spoken contemptuously of him, to join him in bringing about a true peace. But Calixtus would not reply to this, knowing that the cause of peace would be favored

by Verons only on condition that the Protestants should return and acknowledge again the supremacy of the pope.

In 1644 Calixtus was attacked by the Jesuit Ebermann, Professor of Theology at Mainz, in a production entitled "Anatomia Calixti," a work of much ability and ingenuity, in which it was argued that Calixtus's pacific projects were utterly impracticable unless all should consent to let Calixtus be the arbiter of all differences. Although the tone of Ebermann's work partook little of a conciliatory character, yet, as it came from a quarter from which, if the subject could be further discussed, more might be hoped than from debates with such men as Neuhaus, Calixtus determind to prepare a careful reply. With him, carefulness meant a thorough and even wearisome circumstantiality in the treatment of his theme from a historical point of view. He here insists, again, that the truths necessary to salvation are few, that they are all contained in the Apostles' Creed, and that this is accepted by all Christians. He argues, further, against the infallibility of the pope. Ebermann soon replied, showing that, though all might accept the Apostles' Creed, yet this effects no union, unless all agree in its interpretation; whereas, in fact, Protestants and Catholics do not agree in the explanation even of those few articles. After the failure of the disputation of Thorn, Ebermann issued another pamphlet, making sport of Calixtus's experience there, and derived from that a fresh argument in favor of the necessity of having an authoritative standard for the settlement of differences and difficulties.

As his end drew near, Calixtus was obliged to see, what he had long before feared and predicted, the apostasy of many prominent Protestants. In 1650, Christopher von Rantzau, a countryman and pupil of Calixtus, was in Rome, and, dazzled by the splendor of a Catholic celebration there, was inclined to apostatize. A long letter from Calixtus was insufficient to change his resolution. His reply, not lacking in expressions of the most sincere respect for Calixtus in particular, showed how sadly the narrow-minded and quarrelsome char-

acter of the Lutherans in general had disaffected many who had no other reason for leaving their society. Through Rantzau's influence, the young duke John Frederick of Brunswick was also converted to Catholicism. On him Calixtus was unable to exert a direct influence; but his colleague and former pupil, H. J. Blume, who was sent to Italy to keep the duke from going over, was himself converted. Furthermore, Ernest, youngest son of the landgrave Maurice of Hessen, became inclined to popery, in Vienna. Not being ready hastily to renounce Protestantism, he desired to hear a discussion on the subject by prominent theologians of both confessions. One was held at Frankfurt-on-the-Maine, in which Calixtus was invited to take part. He did so, but only in writing, not being able himself to go so far. But here, too, his efforts were fruitless.

Finally, in 1653, he was engaged in another and still more important attempt to prevent an apostasy to Rome. Queen Christiana of Sweden, daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, in whose court Italians, French, and Spaniards had taken the place of the less frivolous Dutch and Germans, began to waver in her attachment to the religion for which her father had fought. Before abandoning it, however, she sent to Calixtus a special request for the writings which the case of the duke Ernest had drawn from him. Of course he gladly complied with the request. But the result was as unsatisfactory as before. The queen, in 1654, gave up her crown, went secretly to Brussels, and in the year after at Innsbruck publicly connected herself with the Catholic church. In 1653 was held the diet at Regensburg, the last German diet. Great expectations were cherished that here, at last, the strife of arms being ended, some effective measures would be adopted for bringing about a real peace. Duke August had sent, as his representative, Schwartzkopf, Calixtus's brother-in-law and ardent friend. Von Boyneburg, the distinguished statesman of Mainz, who had gone over to Rome, yet continued to be a warm admirer of Calixtus, called the attention of many Catholics to him. The

emperor himself read some of his works, and seemed to be favorably disposed towards him. It was hoped that, on the basis of Calixtus's conciliatory views, some understanding might be reached, by which at least the hitherto incessant wranglings would be prevented. But the Catholics could trust no peace which did not involve the return of the Protestants to the pale of their church, and the strict Lutherans refused to stop denouncing the Helmstädtians; and so the diet which had promised so much accomplished nothing.

Calixtus's collisions with the rigid Lutherans began with the beginning of his professorship. His appointment itself was opposed by them. Sattler laid every obstacle in the way, but his efforts resulted only in securing the appointment of a young relative, Strube, a man after his own heart, to another professorship, and furthermore, the enactment of a provision according to which no professor could publish any theological work without its being first signed by all the faculty, and submitted to the censorship of the consistory. However, although some of Calixtus's colleagues, as Martini and Boethius, became thus involved in strife with the authorities, and others, as Neuhaus and Werdenhagen, left, or were driven from, their places, yet Calixtus himself prudently avoided a conflict. In 1616 he wrote a treatise, *de Immortalitate Animae et Resurrectione Mortuum*, and sent it to Wolfenbüttel to be examined by the consistory. From here it was sent to Giessen, to receive from the faculty of that university an opinion respecting its orthodoxy. One or two unimportant points were found in which Calixtus had dared to differ from Luther; it was also complained that he had used philosophical arguments in proving the soul's immortality, whereas he should have confined himself to the words of revelation. He was told that on condition of making a few changes he might publish the work. But he preferred to leave it, for the time being, unpublished. In 1619 appeared his *Epitome Theologiae*. It was published without his consent, at Goslar, the manuscripts of his hearers

having been used for the purpose. What was done could not be undone; but the consistory did what it could, sending the book to Giessen, where it received from the professor Balthasar Mentzer a severe criticism, which detected in the work various approaches towards Catholicism and Calvinism. Calixtus was also not neglected by the Saxon theologians. In 1621, Hoe von Hoenegg, the court preacher and highest ecclesiastical officer of the elector John George I., assembled at Jena twelve theologians, whom he wished to constitute a sort of directory for the settlement of doctrinal and ecclesiastical difficulties. The meetings of this body were continued until 1628. At the first session, Calixtus and the Helmstädtians received a liberal share of attention. One member suggested that, as the innovators were not worthy to be refuted by any man of note, some young men should be sent to them and play with them, like a cat with a mouse; and it was at last resolved that, as it was not to be hoped that Calixtus and Martini could be silenced entirely, in future their heresies should be thoroughly refuted by young students, or each theologian should simply defend himself when attacked. One of the members of this council was the celebrated John Gerhard, and an earnest attempt was now made to secure him as a counterpoise to Calixtus in the university at Helmstädt. Martini died near the end of the year; Boethius and Fuchte, in 1622; the overthrow of the ministry of Streithorst removed some of the limits of Sattler's power; and it was desired to improve these circumstances by securing a check to the growing influence of Calixtus. Gerhard declined to come; but Michael Walther, a relative of his, who had been court preacher to the widowed duchess Elizabeth, and had taken an active part in the negotiations for the appointment of Gerhard, received it himself. In him, although he left his chair upon the breaking up of the university in 1627, Calixtus (or Calvinomixtus, as Walther generally called him) found a life-long enemy. In 1624, Sattler secured the appointment of a general consistory, which he intended to

make an effective barrier against the Philippists and philosophers; but his death, which occurred in the same year, took away the leading spirit of the stiff Lutheran party in Brunswick, so that thereafter Calixtus met with little opposition in his own country, and became the acknowledged and revered chief of the Brunswick theologians. In other lands, however, his supremacy was not so readily conceded. The university of Helmstädt, and Calixtus, as its most eminent representative, were looked upon by all zealous Lutherans with growing suspicion; in many universities the theological and philosophical faculties became divided on this very question, the former opposing, the latter defending Helmstädt. In the Netherlands, although Calixtus had, in the great Vossius and others, warm admirers, yet, as a scholar of Calixtus writes, it was "as if a second Sattler were living in Amsterdam." In Hamburg, writes the same man, "everything is venal, even the ecclesiastical offices; murders and debauchery are the order of the day; but the preachers busy themselves only in declaiming in favor of ubiquity; and whoever comes from the Helmstädt school has there at least no prospect of a settlement." In Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein, where the Formula Concordiae had never been adopted, Calixtus found more favor. He was about this time much encouraged by the efforts of John Duräus, the son of a Presbyterian clergyman of Edinburgh, banished by king James, himself pastor of a congregation in Elbing, in Poland, until that place was captured by Gustavus Adolphus. Encouraged by the Swedish king, and after his death by his chancellor Oxenstierna, also by the English ambassador at Stockholm, he spent the years 1632 and 1633 in travelling over Germany, endeavoring to awaken the Protestants to the importance of uniting themselves. Duke Frederick Ulrich encouraged the movement, and, the university being called on for its opinion, one was given, composed by Calixtus, heartily approving the project. A convention was actually held at Frankfurt-on-the-Maine, in the spring of 1634, for the purpose of dis-

cussing the measure; but, like all other similar efforts, this fell to the ground. These strivings to promote peace received no countenance from the rigid Lutherans. Their plan for obtaining harmony was to root out everything that deviated from their creed.

In 1638, Stats Büscher, a pastor in Hanover, the author of several works written in defense of Lutheranism and the Ramistic philosophy, alarmed by the progress of Calixtinian principles, wrote a work which he was at first going to name "Abomination of Desolation in the Julius University," but finally called "Cryptopapismus Novae Theologiae Helmstadiensis." Here he subjects Calixtus's "Theologia Moralis" to a critical examination, finding in his views on the standard of orthodoxy, on original sin, on justification, on the authority of the pope, and on the mass, dangerous leanings towards Catholicism. In conclusion he exclaims: What will our religion become at last but a completely Babel-like confusion, a perfectly epicurean, heathenish, devilish mess, in which neither God nor religion will receive any more reverence!" He had designed to publish the work anonymously, but by some means was in this disappointed. Calixtus, sending a copy to duke George, of whom Büscher was a subject, characterizes it as "crowded with calumnies and lies," an expression rather more severe than he was wont to use, but almost justified by the unfairness with which Büscher had attempted to prove Calixtus a papist from a book written directly against popery. Upon being summoned by the duke to present himself, and answer for this attack, not only on Calixtus and the university, but also on the consistory, he evaded the summons, pleaded his fear that the consistory which was to try him could not be impartial, and, although a special commission was appointed, he still refused to obey, and fled to Harburg, where he issued pamphlets in self-defense. Calixtus, seeing the general interest which the case had awakened, even among the laymen, determined to prepare an elaborate reply to Büscher's book, and to write it in German, a language in which he always wrote with great

reluctance, and never without an urgent reason. He here replies at length to the charges made against him, and closes by showing that Büscher himself, though so zealous a stickler for confessional orthodoxy, dissents in several points from the authorized creeds. Just as the last sheets were going through the press, Büscher died, and no one else ever ventured on an answer to the work.

In 1641, a Saxon theologian, H. Höpfner of Leipsic, addressed to Calixtus a remonstrance against his views on the necessity of good works. These strictures applied also, and perhaps still more particularly, to the position of Calixtus's friend Horneius, who on this subject was accustomed to express himself still more decidedly than Calixtus. Höpfner's criticism was not public, and was respectful in its tone. Calixtus replied to it in a way of which he seems to have been fond, not in a special production for that purpose, but in a long excursus to a commentary on the latter part of the book of Genesis, conecting it with the story of Joseph's resistance to temptation. He illustrates the necessity of personal effort in order to salvation, by comparing faith to fire in a house, and resistance to temptation to the roof which prevents the rain from extinguishing the fire. The roof is not the cause of the fire, but it is a condition of its continuance; so grace in the heart is not received because of good works, but cannot be preserved without them; the works are not the *causa vera*, but are a *causa sine qua non.*

By the disputation at Thorn, already spoken of, the flames of controversy, which had for a while burned less fiercely, were fanned into new life. John Latermann, a young man and a pupil of Calixtus, had become professor in Königsberg, where, through a dissertation *de Aeterna Dei Praedestinatione* he became involved, in 1646, in a public dispute with his colleague Myslenta. The dispute attracted general attention. Latermann was considered only as a representative of the Calixtinian school. The opinions of theologians in all parts of Germany were solicited. Myslenta, in sending for the sentence of these men, indicates what

sort of an answer he would like to receive, when he mildly declares that from the time of Osiander, Satan has been disturbing the Prussian church; that he lately, in the form of a Calvinistic spirit has been scattering poison, and that he now has chosen as coadjutor of the Calvinists a Lutheran, Calixtus, whose emissary, Latermann, is carrying on the work of the devil in Königsberg.

The matter did not rest here. Pushed on by Jacob Weller, just called from Brunswick to Dresden as successor of Hoe von Hoenegg, the three Saxon universities, Wittenberg, Leipsic, and Jena, sent an "Admonition" to Calixtus and Horneius, "an offensive document," says Calixtus, "though mixed with sweet words," urging on the Helmstädtians the necessity of adhering closely to the symbols of the church. Calixtus prepared a severe reply, telling the Saxons that he understood the grounds of their opposition to him, viz. dislike of liberal culture, and a poverty of mind which left them contented with one single composition, the Formula Concordiae, as the full and unimprovable expression of all theological knowledge. He exposed, moreover, their inconsistency and presumption in trying to set up as a rule of faith their opinions on questions not decided by the symbols, as also their littleness in magnifying insignificant matters and making hair-splitting distinctions. But to the charge that he is loosening the foundations of all evangelical doctrine, he nearly loses patience, and says that whoever affirms this is guilty of a base falsehood, and furthermore, that he will consider him a calumniator, defamer, and villain until the assertion is proved.

Hülsemann of Leipsic (whither he had in 1646 been called from Wittenberg), who had distinguished himself by his opposition to Calixtus at Thorn and had had a prominent part in getting up the admonition, was not a little alarmed by the tone of this reply. The mouse had displayed far less willingness to be played with than the cats had desired. He saw that, unless there was a clear retraction on one side or the other, the Helmstädtians would be irrecoverably lost

to the Lutheran church. Calixtus expressed himself ready to take back his charges on condition that the Saxons should themselves do the same with their admonition. Hülsemann replies in a very humble and deprecatory tone, appealing to Calixitus as a friend of peace not to adhere to such violent expressions against his own brothers in the faith. But Calixtus was not thus to be won over; conscious of having been unjustly accused, he refused to recede from his judgment until his abusers first retract their slander. Thus the breach was made complete. The Saxons, unwilling to undergo the humiliation of modifying their charge, had to set themselves about proving its truth. The fact was, that they were aiming to secure for themselves a supremacy over the Protestant part of Germany, which indeed they already had exercised to a certain extent, and which was further confirmed to them by the diet at Regensburg, but never embraced any authority in matters of faith.

The next year, 1648, in which peace was declared, was the most unpeaceful year of Calixtus's life. The opinions which Myslenta had collected concerning Latermann's dissertation (but which were directed against Helmstädt and Calixtus more than against Latermann, although the latter was never endorsed by his teacher), had been printed, and had now arrived in Helmstädt. A few were of a pacific tone, but the most were fierce against the "neutralism," "syncretism," "atheism," of the Helmstädtians. Especially so were those of Calovius of Danzig, and of Michael Walther, now general superintendent in Celle. These attacks aroused the resentment of the Helmstädtians. They sent an address to duke August, in which they implore him to defend his injured university; in this address, Calixtus, not content with pointing out the animus of his enemies and defending himself against attacks, himself assumes the aggressive, accusing the Wittenbergers, among other things, of holding that the vices enumerated in Gal. v. 19, and other places do not exclude one from heaven. This charge was founded on certain utterances of Hülsemann made against Hugo

Grotius, which, however, did not deserve the severe interpretation put upon them at this time, and at other times, by Calixtus. The duke's reply was favorable. All three of the dukes who now had an interest in the university came together. A second complaint was presented to them directed against Walther. They resolved that Calixtus and Horneius should prepare a reply to the Königsberg censures. Before this was completed, but too late to be noticed in it, appeared another formidable attack on Helmstädt, in the shape of a book entitled "Mysterium Syncretismi," by Dannhaver of Strassburg. In the autumn of 1648 Calixtus and Horneius completed their apology. But as Duke Frederick of Celle was attached to the Formula Concordiae, he could not quite approve the severity with which the professors had handled their accusers. The three courts agreed, however, to ask of the same men a special exposition of their views on five points which had occasioned the most criticism, viz. the authority of the primitive church, good works, the insufficiency of the Old Testament for the demonstration of the doctrine of the Trinity, the theophanies of the New Testament, and the efforts to promote unity among Christians. In this exposition Calixtus and Horneius were to refrain from all offensive charges. In the meanwhile duke Frederick died, and his successor Christian Louis was supposed to be more favorable to the Helmstädtians; earnest efforts were made by the latter to secure Walther's removal, but no change was made; and the statement concerning the five points, mild as its tone was, failed to meet the approbation of the three courts, and so the labor was in vain.

The storm now grew more furious. In Saxony the theologians were ordered to prepare an elaborate work, treating each article of faith separately, showing how far the Helmstädtians had wandered from the truth. This work gradually grew into the "Consensus Repetitus." The elector of Saxony, fully sympathizing with the theologians, sent an address to the dukes of Brunswick, not only protesting

against the innovations of Calixtus and his adherents, but intimating that Saxony, as the leader of Protestant Germany, ought to be obeyed. This attempt to usurp authority, which the political headship of Saxony by no means involved, excited the alarm and resentment of two of the dukes, but the third continued rather indifferent, and so no concerted action of the dukes could be effected. But the theologians continued the conflict; and, though Horneius died in September, 1649, and Calixtus, by reason of old age and a long experience of the fruitlesness of these quarrels, was reluctant now, single-handed, to carry on the strife, yet he could not avoid it. The Saxon elector's address, and a violent attack made on him by Weller shortly after, were, after considerable delay, officially communicated to him, and he was directed to prepare a reply. This he did at considerable length, in German. This was soon followed by renewed attacks from Hülsemann and Weller. Myslenta of Königsberg and Calovius of Danzig, also continued their opposition in the most bitter and uncompromising spirit. The Brunswick dukes began at length to consider what should be done to arrest the wrangling. At a conference called for that purpose, Schwartzkopf proposed that the three courts should write to that of Saxony, protesting against the attempted usurpation of the latter, furthermore that a general convention of the civil rulers should be held, and that, until then, the theologians on both sides should be ordered to keep still. This proposition prevailed; but the Saxon government not only did not accept it, but did not even reply to the Brunswick address at all. So through the years 1650 and 1651 the Saxons continued to fulminate with increased intensity, encouraged by the disposition of their government to support them and by the enforced silence of the Helmstädtians, bringing out at last, early in 1652, a statement of Helmstädt innovations, of which they enumerated and anathematized ninety-eight. In 1655, in the Consensus Repetitus, the number was reduced to eighty-eight. This work was designed to substantiate the charge

so much resented by Calixtus, that he had loosened the foundations of all evangelical doctrine, also to counteract the wide-spread and powerful influence of an elaborate production of Calixtus published in the autumn of 1651, entitled "George Calixtus's Refutation of the Unchristian Slanders with which Dr. Weller, court preacher of Saxony, has desired to soil him." This was the last controversial work which he published; though his opponents continued their assaults, he saw that a prolongation of the strife would be useless, since his enemies accused him of going too far in just those points in which he more or less distinctly felt that he had not gone far enough.

We give, in conclusion, a brief notice of some of Calixtus's most important theological works. The first one of considerable size was issued before he became professor. It was called "Disputationes de Praecipuis Religionis Christianae Capitibus," and is a wonderful work, as coming from a youth of twenty-four years. It consists of fifteen disputations. In each of these he states first, with great clearness and conciseness, the dogma and the difficulties attending it; secondly is given an historical account of the different views respecting it; thirdly, the Lutheran doctrine is stated and defended. Only in one point does he here distinctly reject the Lutheran view. Insisting on the logical principle that the joining of two abstract terms, of two predicates, can never produce a judgment, he declares that to say "humanity is deity" is just as senseless as to say "man is a lion." To Christ, as one person, as the God-man, he would ascribe human and divine attributes; but to identify the human and the divine, according to the strict Lutheran confessions, he pronounces absurd.

In 1619 appeared his *Epitome Theologiae*, which, as the name indicates, treats of the whole body of Christian doctrine. This is a still more important work than the other. Calixtus here draws the same distinction which afterwards Schleiermacher so much insisted on, between the contemplative and the practical sciences, assigning theology to the

latter. He divides his theme as follows: In every practical science it is to be inquired what is (1) the object to be aimed at; (2) the being who seeks this object; (3) the means to be used in gaining it. As preliminary to the discussion proper of these topics, he enters upon an investigation of the sources of human knowledge, drawing a sharp distinction between immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge, or that which is derived merely from an analysis of or inference from the immediate. Truth consists in the correctness of this derivation of the mediate from the immediate. The latter admits of no demonstration; it must be accepted as it stands. To this class belong the contents of the moral and religious sense. The truths of revelation serve as a complement of these, not conflicting with them, yet not derived from them by any discursive process. In the first section of the main part of the work Calixtus seeks to show that man knows through the immediate utterances of his moral sense that his true end is an eternal one; revelation only fills up this knowledge. The second section treats not only of man, the being appointed to this eternal destiny, but also of God. As to him, natural religion teaches his existence, spirituality, wisdom, and goodness; revelation tells further of the Son and the Holy Ghost. As to man, whatever belongs to philosophical knowledge, as also undecided free-will, mortality of the body, is to be called natural; whereas whatever revelation discloses as belonging to the original condition of man, i.e. knowledge of what we now know only through revelation, also undisturbed decision of the will in favor of the good, freedom of the body from pain, etc., — this is to be considered as a supernatural gift. Here, it will be noticed, Calixtus really adopts, in substance, the Tridentine doctrine, and in this one particular his critics had some pretense for charging him with agreeing with the Catholics. Yet it was no leaning to popery, but simply a natural inference from his view of the sources of human knowledge, which is discerned here. Human depravity, moreover, he pictures in a darker light

than the Catholics do. He ascribes it wholly to man; rejecting decidedly the doctrine that sin is to be ascribed to God as its author in any other sense than that he permits it. To guard more surely against this doctrine, Calixtus holds further the view that sin is of a privative nature, he being unable to see how anything which has a positive existence can be ascribed to any other creator than God. The third section treats of the work of redemption. The chief points are: Salvation is wholly an act of God's mercy. The infinite justice of God demanded an infinite merit in the sacrifice. Christ's merit was both active and passive. In him the Son of God assumed a human nature; of either nature of the God-man may be predicated, but only to a certain extent, attributes of both natures. Justification is conditioned on faith, and consists in the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of Christ's merit. Predestination to salvation is conditioned on foreknowledge of the faith of the elect. As, however, faith is itself an act transcending the natural powers of man and comes through the word of God, it is to be assumed that the Spirit conditions his working of the faith on the attentive heed given to the word. Baptism should, in the case of adults, be preceded by instruction, in order that their faith may flow from the hearing of the word; but children should be baptized early, in order that they may receive forgiveness and regeneration. At the Lord's supper faith is strengthened by partaking of the true body of Christ. But against the Catholics it is argued that the bread and wine are also really present, and that there is no real sacrifice in the case, since the notion of a sacrifice involves that of the slaying of a living being. He rejects the doctrine of the power of the clergy to bind and to loose, also the Catholic doctrine of the uncertainty of the state of grace, as well as the Calvinistic doctrine of perseverance. The church is, even as a visible church, one, holy, catholic, and apostolic; its constitution is monarchical, Christ being King; its members are divided into teachers and learners; the apostles have no successors; all bishops

are equal; laymen are to support the church according to their means, especially should Christian magistrates exercise a guardianship over its outward concerns; synods are the best guardians of purity of doctrine; factious heretics may be punished, but should not be put to death.

In 1628 appeared Calixtus's *Apparatus Theologicus*, a work designed as an introduction to theological studies. It consists of three parts: first, an encyclopedia, which lays down the position which theology occupies as a science, in which Calixtus insists on the importance of philology and philosophy, as the two wings without whose aid no great height in theological science can be attained; second, a history of the science, in which is given a summary of the theology of all the different denominations and periods of Christianity; third, methodology, directing how to study each dogma. This work, though incomplete and lacking in symmetry, is a monument of Calixtus's vast learning and rare power of analysis.

A year later he published an edition of Augustine *de Doctrina Christiana*, and of the *Commonitorium* of Vincent of of Lerinum, prefixing a long introduction in which he sets forth his views respecting the weight to be attached to the opinions of the church Fathers in the establishment of creeds. This was the occasion of much opposition and misrepresentation. For he here sets himself against the tendency of the Lutherans of his time to consider the symbols, not as being designed to select from the many doctrines found in the Bible the few which are most fundamental, but to consider rather all doctrines as alike essential, and the symbols as superadded to the Bible, and equally binding. The testimony of the patristic theologians he regards not as strictly authoritative, but as having a peculiar weight. By the stress which he laid on this point, he exposed himself to the charge of depreciating the importance of the Reformation, and so of favoring Catholicism; whereas in so far as he differed from his fellow Protestants he was rather hyper-protestant than otherwise, since he wished to dimin-

ish the number of dogmas and rites that should be held to be absolutely indispensable to Christianity, condemning the virtually papal tendency of the Protestants of his time to make their creeds as binding on their churches as the pope's decrees on the Roman Catholics.

Perhaps Calixtus's most important work is the *Theologia Moralis*, issued in 1634. This was, indeed, not the first treatise on this subject produced by a Lutheran; yet after Melanchthon, and his immediate pupils Chyträus, Hemming, and Von Eitzen, it had been so thoroughly neglected that many of Calixtus's contemporaries, narrowly confining themselves to purely dogmatic theology, regarded his work as a dangerous innovation. Calixtus does not carry out the distinction, begun by some of his predecessors, between dogmatics and ethics in general, but rather brings the two nearer together by making a sharp distinction between philosophical and theological ethics, the former being held as indeed separate not only from dogmatics, but from theology in general; the latter, however, which his work alone handles, being closely connected with the system of Christian doctrine. He treats it as a science concerned with the progress of sanctification in the believer. The work is divided into two parts; one treating of the regenerate man, the other, of the laws to which he is subject. The Christian, again, is considered both according to his internal and his external condition. As to the former (the one principally treated), there is recognized as characterizing every converted man a constant strife between the flesh and the spirit, only, as not in the unregenerate state, no sin can be committed with relish and approbation. The work of sanctification, carried on by the Spirit of God, must be considered in relation to the three faculties of the soul, the intellect, the will, and the desires. To the first belongs the conscience. That the conscience errs, is therefore to be attributed to the fact that the intellect is itself darkened by the fall; but no man errs in such a way as not to admit that the good ought to be done and the bad to be avoided. On the will Calixtus says little; on the desires, almost nothing.

In treating of the moral law, he oversteps the limits set to his task, and enters the field of general ethics. The law, as the specially revealed will of God, is essentially the same as that given in the hearts of men, but is superadded to the latter by an act of grace, and serves to correct the errors into which men fall in deducing inferences from their immediate cognitions. The moral law, contained in the decalogue, is one from which God himself cannot absolve us. When we are unable to deduce the necessity of certain commands from first principles, these commands are called positive laws, of which, though man does not know the ground, yet God does. The question, what the highest moral principle is, Calixtus does not distinctly answer; he seems to treat as such simply the divine will. After discussing the positive commands of God, he considers human laws, insisting that their fitness to promote the general good should always be clear. Ecclesiastical and civil laws are then distinguished; the former are praised for their simplicity; in treating of the latter, the author loses himsef in a consideration of the history of Roman law, occupying with this theme a fourth part of the whole work, if we consider as not exactly belonging to it the already mentioned digression directed against Neuhaus. It is easy to see that this work is too devoid of symmetry, and that the plan of it is itself too imperfectly carried out, to allow it to rank as a standard work. But it is exceedingly valuable, as containing the germ of much that has since been produced in the same department.

Calixtus wrote several treatises on eschatology. In one, *de Supremo Judicis*, published in 1635, he discusses at length the signs of Christ's second advent, the resurrection, the judgment, the new heaven and new earth, etc.; he holds in general to a strict interpretation of prophecy, yet is freer than most of his contemporaries. He rejects all chiliastic theories, though admitting some to be not heretical. Kindred to this work is that *de Bono Perfecte Summo*, published in 1643, in which the highest good is, with Aristotle, found in the θεωρία; the more perfect the object of knowledge, the higher is the knowledge; to see God is the summit of

blessedness. The damned will know God only as an avenger, having no love for him; the risen bodies of the saved will retain, perhaps, the same faculties as they now have, but will be free from all disturbance; the bodies of the lost will be literally burned, and the punishment will be eternal. These two works may be considered as complementing an earlier one, published in 1627, *de Immortalitate Animae*, a work which he himself esteemed as the most complete and thorough of his monographs.

The last of Calixtus's larger treatises was the one *de Factis quae Deus cum Hominibus iniit.* It was issued in 1654. Here he discloses some similarity to the views of the Calvinists and Arminians; but the covenants, of which he makes two, the Adamic and the Christian, are considered less as eternally made between the Father and the Son, than as consisting of an established relation between God and man. Here, as in his other works, Calixtus undertakes a comprehensive historical discussion of his theme, including a history of the Jews and a thorough investigation of the significance of the ceremonial law. But he himself felt that the subject was not exhaustively handled.

We must omit even to name the many other treatises which Calixtus produced. Besides his numerous controversial writings, he wrote on almost all branches of theology, especially historical theology. His style is sometimes heavy; his works often lack clearness of plan; he attempts too much, and, finding the work growing on his hands, is often obliged to break off abruptly. But his learning, his industry, and the breadth of mind were remarkable. He was the Schleiermacher of his age. Not entirely free from prevailing prejudices and errors, yet he was vastly elevated above the most of his contemporaries — too far above them to be appreciated by them. The constant abuse to which he was subjected from his bigoted enemies, for no other crime than that of advocating charity and peace, and the singleness with which, in spite of this abuse, he constantly pursued his object, are an abiding evidence of his catholicity of mind and his purity of heart.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Grau on the Semitic and Indo-Germanic Races.

We gave the title and a brief notice of this volume in our January Number, but have since received from an English clergyman, now residing in Germany, the following more extended comments upon it:

Some few years ago attention was called to a new and most important field of investigation — the psychology of nations — by a journal entitled "Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft," published still in Berlin, and edited by Dr. Steinthal. As there is a psychology of the individual man, so is there a psychology of nations, which manifests itself in their language, religion, arts, sciences, and political and social institutions. That different nations, and families of nations, have very different characters is an old enough observation; but it is new to make these diversities the subject of accurate philosophical inquiry. One plot of this great field — a field as wide as the world and history — has been selected for investigation by Lic. Grau, with a view to winning new defences of Christianity against some of its modern German and French assailants, to wit, the psychological relation between the Semitic nations, that is, the Syrians, Hebrews, and Arabs, on the one hand, and the Indo-Germanic or Aryan nations, that is, the Greeks, Romans, Celts, Hindoos, Persians, Slavonians, and the Romanic and Germanic people, on the other. Now it is a remarkable fact, whatever explanation may be given of it, that the former have been the great representatives and teachers of monotheism, with its belief in miracles and direct revelations, while standing at a low level relatively to art, science, philosophy, commerce, and politics; whereas the latter, though distinguished in other respects, have ever evinced a tendency to polytheism and pantheism. A writer in the "Revue des deux Mondes," for Dec. 15, 1864, remarks: "La science a constaté que la tendance originelle des peuples âryens est le panthéisme, tandis que le monothéisme proprement dit est la doctrine constante des populations sémitiques. Toute l'Europe est à la fois âryenne et chrétienne, c'est à dire panthéiste à son origine et par ses dispositions naturelles, mais habituee par une religion venue des Sémites à admettre le dogme de la création." The believer in supernatural interference and revelations might answer, the fact is the result of the action of God; God's action was not conditioned by any natural tendency to monotheism in the Hebrew. The truth, however, lies perhaps in the middle. Apart even from *direct* divine interference, Semitic nations have evinced a natural capacity for, and

inclination to, monotheism, witness the Arabs, whereas no Indo-Germanic race has inclined thereto. Of late it has become not uncommon in Germany and France to characterize the Semitic nations, because of their lack of science and so forth, as an inferior race: to say, their utterance regarding God and miracles do not rest on objective realities, but on a subjective, Semitic mode of looking at things; we of the Indo-Germanic nations, therefore, must translate, as Bunsen used to express himself, Semitism into Japhetism; in other words, modern atheistic science is the highest truth, and the Jewish and Christian religions are the product of a lower state of culture.

Lic. Grau concedes the psychological differences from which these conclusions are drawn, but tries to turn the flank of his antagonists, by maintaining that the Semitics being as superior in religion as they are inferior in science, the two great families in question mutually complement instead of contradict each other; both are designed to interpenetrate and mould each other. This explanation coincides, undoubtedly, with the course of history since the rise of Christianity, and would seem therefore to be in the main correct. The work contains many interesting and valuable hints, and though not quite up to the mark in point of logical closeness, is thoroughly deserving of attentive perusal as a new contribution to the apologetics of Christianity.

The Advantages to be derived by the Evangelical Church from the late Discussions on the Life of Christ.

At the last "Deutsch-evangelischer Kirchentag," held in Altenburg, Professor Beyschlag of Halle delivered a lecture on the subject: "*Welchen Gewinn hat die evangelische Kirche aus den neuesten Verhandlungen über das Leben Jesu zu ziehen?*" which has since been issued as a book, under the same title. Professor Beyschlag tries to show that the attacks made by Strauss, Renan, and Schenkel on the orthodox view of the person of Christ, are in part the fruit of the undue stress laid on the divine, to the exclusion of the human, element in his nature. The truth in these "Lives," and in the general tendency of German and French thought, is the attempt to get close to Christ, and bring him close to us; they are false, of course, in supposing that if human he cannot be divine, and if divine not human; but, says Professor Beyschlag, we must profit by the lesson here read us, and seek to set forth and comprehend Christ both in his humanity and divinity. To lay exclusive stress either on the one or the other aspect is fraught, as the history of the church abundantly proves, with unutterable danger.

The little book is beautifully and clearly written; as such we commend it to our readers, without, however, by any means indorsing the solution of the great Christological problem suggested by Professor Beyschlag, — a

solution which is giving rise to a good deal of criticism. One thought, which, if we understand aright, seems to underlie some of the Professor's reasonings, we must briefly refer to, though our space is limited: that in judging of the possibility of an union of God and man, we ought to start, *not* with the *abnormal* man of common history — man defaced and dwindled by sin; *but* with the normal man, or the man of the divine idea, realized in Christ himself. Inquiry commences ordinarily with man as he has become under the influence of sin, which is as perverse as it would be for one who only knows African Bushmen to say: man could never paint as did Raphael, sculpture as did Angelo, or compose as did Beethoven.

The Wrath of God.

Vom Zorne Gottes. Ein biblisch-theologischer Versuch von Dr. Ferdinand Weber. Mit Prolegomenen über den bisherigen Entwickelungsgang der Grundbegriffe der Versöhnungslehre. Von Professor Franz Delitzsch Erlangen. — The main divisions of the above valuable work are the following: 1. The Prolegomena, which contain a brief summary of the history of the doctrine of the atonement, including a controversy recently carried on between von Hofmann of Erlangen and Drs. Philippi and Thomasius. 2. Of the nature of the divine wrath. 3. The history of the revelation of the divine wrath, in four stadia: *a*. The beginning of the revelation of the divine wrath, or wrath of God and Adam's sin; *b*. The revelation of the divine wrath in the time of patience, or God's anger and the day of the Lord; *c*. God's anger and the work of Christ, or Christ the turning-point in the revelation of the divine wrath; *d*. The complete revelation of the divine wrath, or the wrath of God and the final judgment. The author's method, it thus appears, is rather historical than doctrinal. The general spirit of the treatise will be best understood from the following extract: "The wrath of God is the manifestation in act, of the jealousy of his love. Only by viewing it in this light can we reconcile the two expressions, ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν and ὁ Θεὸς ἡμῶν πῦρ καταναλίσκον. Absolute love asserts its exclusive right to the creature, by becoming a consuming fire to the creature which repels it. Fire shows how serious a thing love is. Holiness is the repellent principle in wrath, love the attractive; for wrath includes both. The former removes the enemy, the latter refuses to let him go, till he rends himself completely away. Because God loves his creature, *therefore* does he keenly feel its apostasy; this his feeling is divine jealousy; because he is holy, he manifests his jealousy in act. In short, anger is not opposed to, but is an expression of, love." Schenkel, and with him Unitarians say: "a God who feels anger is a God who does not love." Dr. Weber answers: "God is angry because he loves." This is one of the most beautiful and pregnant ideas of the newer school of theologians in Germany; and with some modifications needs vitally incorporating into our

own theology. To prevent a mistaken estimate being formed of Dr. Weber's tendency, however, we will supplement the above summarized extract by the following words: "The goal of the divine wrath in its various revelations of itself is the triumph of love over sin, whether by the restoration of the enemy to fellowship, or by the eternal exclusion of the sinner who wilfully persists in his enmity to God."

Schneckenburger's Lectures on the New Testament Times.

Vorlesungen über neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte. Von Dr. Matthias Schneckenburger, late Professor of Theology in Bern. — The posthumous work whose title we have just given is not a New Testament history, but a history of what was contemporary with the rise of Christianity. It aims at giving a view of the framework into which Christiantity was set; of the soil of event, life, thought, into which it was planted, and to which it owed, of course, its temporal form. With great clearness, though with perhaps too little detail, Dr. Schneckenburger has delineated, 1. The political and social history of the Jews, and of the Romans so far as the latter were connected with the Jews; and 2. The general religious physiognomy of the age, the religious state of Jews, Romans, and Greeks.

Few studies are more deserving of the attention of theological students than that to which this work is devoted. For lack of some of the knowledge which would be thus acquired, our exegesis is often chargeable either with deadness or perversity, and we regard much as novel or strange for which contemporary events and thought supply remarkable points d'appui.

A work of similar tendency to this, in two volumes, with far fuller details, though on the whole less reliable and independent, was published by Professor Lutterbeck (Roman Catholic) of Giessen, under the title of "Neutestamentliche Lehrbegriffe oder Das Zeitalter der Religionswende, die Vorstufen des Christenthums und die ersten Gestaltungen desselben."

Both works are exceedingly valuable, especially now, when the enemies of the old faith have taken to the cuttle-fish trick of envoloping all things connected with its rise in haze and uncertainty.

Büchner on Force and Material.

"*Kraft und Stoff. Empirisch-naturphilosophische Studien. Von Dr. Louis Büchner.* Leipzig: 1864. — This is the eighth edition since 1855, of one of the shallowest and most supercilious books that the vanity of the modern physiological school has yet produced. Why notice it then? Partly because it has created a great deal of stir and mischief among the middle classes of Germany, and is about to appear in an English dress; partly because honestly thoughtful, though doubting, minds can be supplied with no better spiritual emetic than Dr. Büchner's watery "Kraft

und Stoff." It is the favorite text-book of such as seek to persuade the working people of Germany that the overthrow of Christianity, and of faith in God and immortality, will clear the way for the "good time that is coming." Dr. Büchner says, in his preface: "If materialists were the rulers of the world, we should no longer hear of famine typhus; houses of correction would no longer be the main wheel in the social machine; and we should no longer encounter, day after day, phenomena which reveal a bottomless abyss of misery and corruption yawning behind them." This is the new gospel; listen to the new prophet: "Annihilate God, sweep away the dirty cobwebs of the immortality and spirituality of man, and so forth, and crime will cease, the millenium will dawn. Natural science is the cure-all of our physiological Germans." We can apply to this book with perfect truth the saying — "What is new is not true, and what is true is not new." Most of the arguments against the spirituality of man, and what goes along therewith, are a wretched hash of stale professed and real facts, that used to be adduced by English deistic writers, and which have been refuted or satisfactorily explained times without number.

The early Pagan and Jewish Opinions concerning Christ and Christians.

Die Urtheile heidnischer und judischer Schriftsteller der vier ersten Jahrhunderte über Jesus und die ersten Christen. Von Richard von der Alm. Leipzig: 1864. — This book is intended to supply an answer to the interesting question: What opinion was entertained by cultivated heathens and Jews regarding the beginnings of Christianity? It collects in a convenient form all that was said by the contemporaries of Christianity in condemnation of our Saviour and his disciples; that is, all that is now extant; for a large proportion of the works witten with this tendency was destroyed at a very early date. Richard von der Alm is the author also of *Theologische Briefe au die deutsche Nation*, which are a popular resumé of the objections which have been raised against the Old and New Testament by the critical school of German theologians. Like owls which, purblind by day, see clearly by night, Richard von der Alm and most of his school, stumble at every step among the evidences for Christianity, but tread confidently and freely the moment they enter the gloomy, tangled waste tenanted by its antagonists. With singular fatuity he finds the objections and arguments advanced by Celsus, Porphyrius, Julian, the Talmud, and even that miserable production (as Dr. Gost, the Jewish historian, candidly terms it), the Toldoth Jeschu, forcible and credible; while he has nothing but sneers for Christian witnesses, notwithstanding they sealed their testimony with their blood. Such a collection of opinions, however, will have an effect on unprejudiced minds directly contrary to that desired by its author; they will reason, if Christianity were such as these heathens

represent it, either it could not have won the position it has, or the world is one vast bedlam; if, on the contrary, mankind be possessed of reason, Christianty must be true; and if mankind be mad, then "where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise." In this sense, we can recommend the book as an armory of weapons *against* the foes of Christ.[1]

Harkness's Latin Grammar.[2]

The progress which has been made of late years in our country in the more critical study of the Latin language, has required a grammar which should be a better exponent of the language than any we have had. The manuals which have been accessible met well the requirements of the times when they were prepared, but they have not kept pace with the progress of philological study. The present work was prepared in view of this want. The author is himself an experienced and successful teacher; he has had the advantage of studying with the ablest German philologists, and is familiar with all the best writers on the subject. He has thus brought to the preparation of his work rich materials, gathered from the best sources. These materials have been well digested, and used with skill and good judgment; and the work now given to the public meets the wants of the times, and is the best manual for schools and colleges which has been published in the country. It is not an accumulation of isolated facts about the language, but a natural and philosophical development of its laws. It is methodical in its arrangement, clear, direct, and concise in its statements; not so full as to perplex and discourage the student, and yet sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy all the ordinary wants.

In the inflected forms the endings are printed in a different type from the stem, so that the eye catches at once what is accidental and what is unchanged.

While the syntax generally has received special attention, the treatment of the subjunctive mood is very thorough and satisfactory. The subject as here presented is relieved of much of the obscurity and perplexity which has usually attended it.

The brevity in the statement of principles is a valuable feature in the Grammar; and yet in some few instances a fuller elucidation of the euphonic changes and of the laws by which words have particular forms would have been desirable. Did our space permit, we would give illustrations of this remark. But the deficiencies are very few compared with

[1] The books noticed above may be easily procured at or through Messrs. A. Asher and Co., Bedford Street, London, and Unter den Linden, Berlin.

[2] A Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges. By Albert Harkness, Ph. D., Professor in Brown University, author of First Latin Book, etc. pp. 355. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1865.

the excellences. The work needs only to be known to be appreciated. Teachers and pupils who shall use it, will thank the author for the rich contribution he has made for the more pleasant, thorough, and successful study of the Latin language.

Neander's Planting and Training of the Christian Church.[1]

Dr. Jonathan Edwards Ryland, the British translator of this work, is the son of the celebrated John Ryland of Northampton, England, who has been for a long time well known in this country as an author and pastor, the intimate companion of Andrew Fuller and Robert Hall, a friend and correpsondent of Dr. Johnatan Edwards, Dr. Samuel Hopkins, and other American divines. Dr. J. E. Ryland is a learned and excellent man, and has given to the British public several valuable translations of German treatises. He has long resided in Northampton, near the old chapel in which his father preached, and also near the venerable church edifice of Dr. Doddridge. Our readers are familiar with his translation of Neander's Planting and Training of the Christian Church. That translation was made from the *third* edition of Neander's work, and was published in 1841. A new edition appeared in 1851, containing "Additions and Corrections," taken from the *fourth* edition of Neander's work. "To say nothing of the inconvenience and awkwardness of such an arrangement, there remained, necessarily, a large number of alterations, both in the notes and in the text, of which no notice could be taken without a thorough revision of the translation itself. To make such a revision has been the attempt of the editor in the present edition" (p. iii, Preface to the American Edition). Dr. Robinson appears to have performed his work with care and skill, and merits the gratitude of American scholars. He has been successful in overcoming many of the difficulties of Neander's style. That style is peculiarly cumbrous, and does not exhibit to an American reader the real clearness of Neander's conceptions. The merits of the original work are well known to our clerical scholars, and the present edition of it will raise it in the esteem of those who have not access to the German edition.

Bannerman on Inspiration.[2]

Dr. Bannerman defines the act of inspiration to be, "the supernatural operation of the Spirit of God upon a man, by which he is enabled to

[1] History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles. By Dr. Augustus Neander. Translated from the German by Dr. J. E. Ryland. Translation revised and corrected according to the fourth German edition, by E. G. Robinson, D.D., Professor in the Rochester Theological Seminary. 8vo. pp. 547. New York: Sheldon and Co., 335 Broadway; Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1865.

[2] Inspiration. The Infallible Truth and Divine Authority of the Holy Scrip-

speak or write with infallible accuracy the objective truth revealed to him by God for that purpose" (p. 218). He distinguishes between revelation and inspiration thus: "A supernatural communication of truth from God is a *revelation;* the supernatural transference of the truth to the spoken or written word is *inspiration*" (p. 151). "In the instance of a communication between man and man, we have a twofold phenomenon exhibited; *first*, of the thought or truth to be communicated, as it originated in the mind of the first; and *second*, of the presentation of the thought or truth to the second of the two parties between whom the communication takes place" (pp. 153, 154). The first of these is revelation; the second is inspiration. The author maintains that the whole of the Bible is not only inspired but also revealed, and the whole of it is thus an infallible record. "Infallibility," he says, "does not, rightly speaking, admit of degrees; nor can those who believe that the Bible is infallible, consistently assert of any passage or statement in it, that it is more or less true than another." "In respect to all portions of the Bible equally, what it asserts or authorizes, is characterized by infallible truth and divine authority" (pp. 95, 96). The Holy Spirit revealed to the sacred penmen not only that which they did not previously know, but also that which they did previously know; and he thus secured infallible accuracy in the word.

Dr. Bannerman is not, however, an advocate of the theory of verbal inspiration, "that human language was the medium through which the Holy Spirit both revealed truth to the prophet, and empowered him to speak with infallible accuracy." "The theory of verbal inspiration ought not to be counted — it certainly cannot be found to be — inconsistent with the scriptural facts of the case. Still it is a theory," — a theory "which, if it cannot be affirmed to be false, can as little be affirmed to be true. If it does not run counter to anything found in scripture, it is, we suspect, an explanation of the mystery which scripture does not demand" (p. 247). Throughout this treatise, *all theories* of inspiration are discarded, and the mere *fact* is insisted on that all the statements of the Bible are revealed as well as inspired, and are absolutely free from error.

Dr. Bannerman also maintains, that "the personal fallibility of inspired men generally is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of the infallibility of their writings in the Bible" (p. 503); and that "there is a certain kind of imperfection even in these writings themselves which is compatible with supernatural inspiration"; "the defects or imperfections proper to the sacred authors, as authors, are quite consistent with the doctrine of plenary inspiration. The presence of the supernatural agency of God with the sacred penmen does not involve or require an exemption on their part

tures. By James Bannerman, D.D., Professor of Theology, New College, Edinburgh. 8vo. pp. 595. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 38 George St.; London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.; Dublin: Robertston and Co. 1865.

from those natural deficiencies as writers which without inspiration they would have manifested" (p. 507).

In noticing the objection, that it is difficult or impossible to construct a harmony of the events of our Saviour's life out of the four biographies which we possess, Dr. Bannerman says: "These narratives do not, throughout, or in many cases, profess to follow the succession of time. It may perhaps be impossible to arrange them all according to such a principle" (p. 501). The biblical writers did not always intend to teach chronology, and were not inspired to teach it.

Although the main design of this treatise is to defend the infallibility of the Bible as a record of facts and an exponent of doctrines, yet the author states: "the necessary limitation of human language as a vehicle of thought, unavoidably leads to a greater or less degree of incompleteness in the scripture expressions of truth" (p. 547); "the necessary limitations of the human mind, exhibited in all its conceptions and productions, comes in aid of the imperfection of language to give more or less a character of incompleteness to all expressions of truth by men." "All this is familiar to us in the case of the spoken or written statements of ordinary men. It is no less found in the statements of inspired men" (pp. 553, 554).

The citations given above are sufficient to show, that while Dr. Bannerman, with signal ability, advocates the old and strict doctrine of "infallible inspiration," he does not mean to press the doctrine beyond the claims of the inspired penmen themselves. He does not maintain, that because these writers *were* inspired where they *pretend* to be, therefore they were inspired where they do *not* pretend to be. They had infallible guidance as teachers of religion, but not as teachers of astronomy or geology, rhetoric, logic, or any other secular science. We regard the work of Dr. Bannerman as one of much merit. It is lucid and instructive. While it defends the more rigid doctrine of inspiration, it treats with respect the disscussions of Henderson, Lee, Alford and others of the more moderate theorists. Indeed we think that the present treatise often differs from the treatises of Henderson and Lee in *words* merely, where it appears to differ in *things*.

Note from Mr. Alexander McWhorter.—In the Bib. Sac., Vol. XXI. pp. 876, 877, occurs the following statement: the English author, Mr. Thomas Tyler, "complains that Mr. Alex. McWhorter has reproduced his [Mr. Tyler's] view [of the Memorial Name] in a modified form, but with the omission of an acknowledgment of the source whence the ideas on which they were based were derived." In his note Mr. McWhorter replies: first, Mr. Tyler does not complain that there has been an omission of *all* acknowledgment, but only of *suitable* acknowledgment; secondly, Mr. Tyler's view of the Memorial Name was referred to in Mr. McWhorter's Article in Bib. Sac., Vol. XIV. p. 104; thirdly, in his Preface to the Memorial Name, Mr. McWhorter "expressly disclaimed originality in respect of any fact or interpretation brought forward."

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

CLEMENS ROMANUS: AN APOLOGETICAL STUDY.

BY DR. D. W. SIMON, BERLIN, PRUSSIA.

I. Life and Epistle of Clement of Rome.

§ 1. *Life of Clement.*

All that can be said, with any show of probability, regarding the life of Clement, is, that he was acquainted with and esteemed by the apostle Paul, as we learn from Philippians iv. 3; that he lived and labored, for a time, at Philippi; that he became the third bishop of Rome, and held that office after Linus, between A. D. 92 and 101; that he wrote the First Epistle to the church at Corinth, in the name of the church at Rome; and that he was held in universal esteem by the Christians of his day. No confidence whatever can be placed in the romantic account of his descent, conversion, labors, and sufferings given by the Clementine Homilies and other writings of the class. Various deductions, too, from expressions of his own, as for example that he was a Jew by birth (vid. cc. 4, 31, 55), are equally uncertain.

§ 2. *The Genuineness of the First Epistle.*

That Clement wrote an epistle to the Corinthians seems undeniable. The only questions are: Is the present Epistle

to the Corinthians that epistle? And do we possess it in an authentic shape? Both these questions are susceptible of so satisfactory an answer that Thiersch felt justified in saying, "with the exception of the books of the primary Canon (Urkanon), no ancient work is so well accredited as this"; words which are quoted with approval even by Hilgenfeld.[1] The first supposed reference to it has been discovered in the Epistle of Polycarp; but the coincidences noted by Hefele do not seem to us to have much weight. The testimony, however, of Irenaeus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Eusebius, Cyril of Jerusalem, Epiphanius, Jerome, and other later writers, can only be deemed inadequate by those who either have a preconceived theory to serve, or make unreasonable claims on historical evidence. Do we possess the epistle now in its original form? Several writers, as for example, Jer. Bignon, Ed. Bernard, Clericus, Mosheim, have maintained that parts of the epistle are spurious; but their subjective reasons do not stand ground against the objective evidence to the contrary and the arguments of Grotius, Wotton, and many others.

§ 3. *Early Opinions regarding Clement and his Epistle.*

The epistle, as well as its author, was held in high esteem by the ancient church. Clemens Alexandrinus even styles Clement an apostle. Irenaeus speaks of the epistle as *ἱκανωτάτη γραφή*; Eusebius, as *μεγάλη τε καὶ θαυμασία*; to its having been publicly read in churches on Sunday, testimony is borne by Dionysius of Corinth, Eusebius, Jerome, and Photius. Several modern writers, too, have bestowed high encomiums on its style. Some passages have a flow and breadth worthy of all recognition; but, like the other productions of the so-called apostolic Fathers, the unity of the epistle is more that of an exhortation than of a treatise.

As the second epistle that bears Clement's name is acknowledged to be spurious, no use has been made of it in the course of the present inquiry.[2]

[1] See Hilgenfeld, "Die Apostolischen Väter, etc."

[2] The prolegomena to Dr. Hefele's valuable edition of the apostolic Fathers

II. Contents of the First Epistle to the Corinthians.

From some cause or other, violent discussions had arisen in the church of Corinth, and this letter was written, in the name and at the instance of the church of Rome, to the church of Corinth, to exhort to the termination of a state of things both opposed to the good name of the Corinthian Christians and prejudicial to the cause of the Christian religion in general. The supposition that they were a revival of the disputes referred to in Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, ch. iii., would seem to be unsustained by Clement's words in c. 47. Clement himself gives no particulars regarding the cause of the quarrel. All that can be gathered from the nature of his exhortations is, that there were some, one or two in particular, who had contentiously risen in opposition to, and caused the removal of, officers of the church, who had been duly elected by the people and had discharged the duties of their position blamelessly (c. 44).[1] The exhortations bearing on this state of things

and Prof. Dr. Hilgenfeld's work, "Die Apostolischen Väter, etc.," contain an exhaustive examination of the arguments for and against the points touched upon in the foregoing outline.

[1] Various views have been taken of the disturbances which gave rise to the present epistle. Rothe and Thiersch think it was a dispute about the episcopate; Schenkel, a revival of the controversy referred to by Paul in his Epistle to the Corinthians; Hilgenfeld thinks the disturbers were men who made pretension to peculiar wisdom and spirituality, and on that ground were haughty and indisposed to submit to any authority, however reasonable. Much that the last-mentioned writer advances is quite to the point, but he fails to explain several features. To our mind, the nearest approach to an explanation of the entire matter is furnished by disputes that have repeatedly occurred in Congregational churches.

Several points seem directly to warrant the supposition that the constitution of the Corinthian church was essentially identical with that of the Independent churches of the present day: 1. The words *συνευδοκησάσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης*, which imply the co-operation of the church to an extent allowed by none but Independents. That there was not a complete identity we allow; but why? because the first churches were still in the hands of inspired apostles, or of those whom they had appointed. If the apostles were to appear again, Independents would concede them the same privilege. 2. The word *ἀποβάλωμεν*. How could there have been a casting out, a setting aside, a forced resignation, if the church had not had a democratic constitution? It is worthy too of note, that

constitute the connecting link of the Epistle; but Clement takes occasion to inculcate general principles, and to adduce high examples, by the way. This circumstance, while giving it a digressive character, adds to its interest, and furnishes an insight into the mind both of Clement and the church of his day. Any attempt to introduce a precise method miscarries, owing to passages like those which treat of the resurrection, in cc. 24 to 26. The train of thought is briefly the following. In the first three chapters he describes the good name previously possessed by the Cor-

Clement does not blame the ἀποβάλλειν in itself, but merely the ἀποβάλλειν τοὺς λειτουργήσαντας ἀμέμπτως τῷ ποιμνίῳ Χριστοῦ; not that they had required and effected the resignation, but that they had driven away men who had served the flock of Christ blamelessly. 3. Clement speaks throughout as to brethren — to erring and faulty brethren, — not *ex cathedra;* which is most natural on the supposition we are supporting. 4. His references to the reverence and obedience due to the ἐπίσκοποι or πρεσβύτεροι are just such as might and do occur in connection with Congregationalists, but are not so fully in harmony with other theories.

We will now describe such a dispute: It not infrequently happens that among the members are some who lay great stress on the doctrine of election; who are thoroughly convinced of their own election; who in consequence are proud and overbearing, especially in their language; whose high pretensions are not confirmed by corresponding deeds; who claim to have a higher holiness and wisdom, while in reality they are very narrow, and often slaves to the flesh; who condemn every one not believing exactly what and as they do; and who on the least occasion go about stirring up mischief. These members are especially hard on the πρεσβύτεροι if they do not give the prominence to their favorite theme which they deem necessary; are particularly indignant if he exhort them to charity and good works; easily forget all respect and order, all the kindness they once showed and always owed; and not seldom succeed in driving away the τοὺς ὁσίως προσέχοντας τὰ δῶρα τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς.

If a sister church were to interfere, as sometimes happens, its warnings and exhortations would not be in an *ex cathedra* tone; it would admonish to φιλοξενία, in the wider sense, towards the πρεσβύτεροι; it would remind the disturbers of the true characteristics of the elect; would exhort to humility, penitence, submission to God; would say "we are all members of Christ," and it is better for you to go away than to disturb and rend the church, and so forth.

If this picture be compared with the hints, warnings, and exhortations of Clement, numerous points of coincidence will be discovered. In fact, while sketching from the church life of the present day, we have in most instances quoted Clement's own words. Some such quarrel, therefore, may have given rise to the present epistle. The more prominent features are contained in the following passages: cc. 35, and 12. 38. 46. 49. 47. 48. 51. 54. 57. 3. 29.

inthian community, and the sad state into which it had now fallen. Chapters four to six adduce various older and more recent examples of the evil effects produced by that quarrelsome and envious disposition (ζῆλος) which had been at work among them. Next follows an exhortation to penitence, sustained by assurances of God's readiness to forgive, and a reference to the examples of Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Lot, and Rahab,who found favor with God, through opposed conduct, through faith, obedience, hospitality (cc. 7 – 12). He then especially enjoins humility, and entreats the Corinthians to obey God rather than the authors of the sedition, to adhere to those who love peace in reality and not merely in appearance (cc. 13 – 15); seeing that Christ (c. 16), the saints, especially Job, Moses (c. 17), and David have set us an example of this virtue (c. 18). Imitating them, therefore, we ought to seek peace (c. 19), especially as the harmony of the world, and the glorious order of nature show that it is loved by God (c. 20). If we follow evil-doers rather than God, the divine blessings will be a source of condemnation (c. 21). To such conduct Christ exhorts us by his Spirit in the Old Testament (c. 22). God will accept those who come to him with simplicity of mind; but at the coming of Christ all shall be punished who are of a doubtful spirit and are puffed up by God's glorious gifts (c. 23). Chapters twenty-four to twenty-seven contain a digression on the resurrection, apparently suggested by the idea of Christ's second coming. Inasmuch as God sees all things, we ought to eschew sin, and approach him with sanctity of heart (c. 29). Seeing that we are the portion of the Holy One, we should seek what is holy, put on concord, abstain from quarrels, and seek to justify ourselves rather by works than words (c. 30); our praise should be from God, and not from ourselves. Such alone, and not the bold and proud, are blessed of God. For these reasons were the Fathers accepted by God, though, as they owed all to the grace of God, so too we are justified, not by any wisdom or piety or works of our own, which we may perform in sanctity

of heart, but *by that faith by which God has justified all from the beginning* (c. 32). But shall we therefore cease from good works? No, for God sets us an example thereof (c. 33). On the contrary, the reward of good works with God is great, and we shall obtain it by doing justly, walking in the way of truth, and renouncing all iniquity (cc. 34. 35). Here Clement sets forth in the strongest terms how it is through Christ, *the brightness of God's glory, that we attain salvation* and every blessing (c. 36). He is our Head, we are members of his body; we ought, therefore, like good soldiers and members, each to seek the other's good (cc. 37. 38). Seeing that all gifts are from God, we have no ground for being puffed up. Let us then observe the order instituted in the church; for, as under the old economy, so under the new, certain officers have been appointed for certain offices: Christ sent the apostles, and the apostles set over us overseers and deacons (cc. 39 – 42). It is not a new thing that opposition should arise against the constituted authorities, for even Moses had to allay a strife of the kind (c. 43). The apostles foresaw that dissensions would arise, and took measures accordingly; and it is wrong to set aside presbyters who have been duly elected and have discharged their functions blamelessly (c. 44). If you study the scriptures, the oracles of the Spirit, you will find that formerly it was the wicked alone who vexed the righteous, whom God glorified with exceeding glory. To these latter, to the just, we ought to cleave; they are the elect of God; but woe to those who rend the one body of Christ (c. 47). Your present dissensions are worse than those rebuked by Paul in his divinely inspired Epistle. Put away these things, then, quickly, return to the Lord, and walk again as before, remembering that to be useful to the brethren is more noble than the best gifts (cc. 48 – 49). Pray, then, that ye may live in charity (c. 50); and let the disturbers confess their sins (c. 51); for such confession is required by God. Consider how Moses loved Israel, how he was ready rather to perish himself than to see his people perish (c. 53). He,

therefore, who has true love will rather give way and leave, than disturb the peace of the church (c. 54). With a general exhortation to submission, and the usual benediction, the epistle closes.

III. The Doctrinal Views of Clement.

§ 4. *General Character.*

The Epistle of Clement shares the general character of the other writings commonly ascribed to his age — it attempts no formal treatment of doctrine as such; what of doctrine it contains is in the way of allusion, is advanced for a directly practical purpose, and not for its own sake. This is even more completely the case with Clement than with Ignatius or Barnabas. His references to what he deemed facts or conditions of spiritual life and redemption are plain enough; but his treatment of them is either not at all, or very slightly doctrinal. By this circumstance our doctrinal deductions must be guided. We must be on our guard against pressing his language in any one direction, whether for or against the orthodox system. At the same time, in view of the general character of his mind and of the position he occupied (to which we shall refer more fully hereafter), we must also guard against treating his words too lightly. We must allow that he felt in a broad manner the force of the terms he uses, even if we deny them to be the outflow of distinct doctrinal reflection. For though, as a man of a thoroughly practical turn, and living at a stage of the history of Christianity when there had as yet no palpable necessity arisen for a philosophical discussion of its doctrines, he advances his thoughts without scientific aim or precision, the culture, harmony, and masculine good sense which mark his epistle, force us to suppose that he, at all events, understood what he was about, and felt the weight of what he taught. Nor may we forget that, though the immediate successors of the apostles found no necessity for, and evinced no inclination to, theological speculation as

such, the fact of their standing in practical antagonism to Judaism on the one hand, and heathenism on the other, would compel them to weigh well the substance of the thoughts and the nature of the facts which they advanced, even where there was an absence of formal precision. Guided by these considerations, we will now examine the main doctrinal features of the Epistle of Clement.

§ 5. *Its Representations of the Person of Christ.*

Clement's references to the person of Christ may be classed under three rubrics : those which affect,

1. His relation to God,
2. His personal character and endowments,
3. His relation to men.

1. The references to Christ's relation to God.

The most important passage bearing on Christ's relation to God is contained in the thirty-sixth chapter. Translated, it runs as follows: "This is the way, beloved, in which we found our salvation, Jesus Christ, the High Priest of our offerings, the protector and helper of our weakness. Through him we gaze up to the heights of the heavens; through him we look as in a mirror on his [God's] faultless and most excellent countenance; through him the eyes of our heart are opened; through him our stupid and darkened understanding shoots up into his wonderful light; through him the Lord willed that we should taste of immortal knowledge; who being the brightness of his majesty is by so much greater than the angels as he hath inherited a more excellent name. For it is written thus: 'He who maketh his angels spirits and his ministers flames of fire'; but concerning the Son, the Lord spake on this wise, 'thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee; ask of me and I will give thee nations for thine inheritance and the ends of the earth for thy possession.' And again he saith to him: 'Sit at my right hand till I make thine enemies thy footstool.' Who then are the enemies? The wicked and those who oppose the will of God." The most weighty portion of

this remarkable passage is identical with part of the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and is, in all probability, a quotation from it. For our present purpose, however, it is a matter of indifference whether Clement be supposed to be quoting or not. Nor is it of consequence to justify his use and application of the passages from the Old Testament interwoven with his own words. All we have to do with, is his own conception of Christ, conveyed through the medium of quotation, or in his own language, as the case may be. Jesus Christ is *μείζων ἀγγέλων, τὸ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς μεγαλοσύνης* of God, Son of God, begotten by God, and his enemies are the enemies of God.

a. Christ is greater than the angels. In c. 34 he exhorts the Corinthians to "consider the entire multitude of the angels of God, how they do his will"; and in c. 29 he represents the boundaries of the nations as fixed "according to the number of the angels of God"; from which it would appear that he deemed them to be in some way superior to men, to stand nearer to God. And yet Christ is greater than the angels, greater in the measure in which he has inherited a more excellent name than they. But what other more excellent name can there be than that of angel, a term designating a very high, nay the very highest, order of created beings? The answer is given by Clement in the following words, quoted from Psalm ii., "thou art my Son."

b. Christ is God's Son, begotten by God. Angels, though higher than men, are yet still but servants; Christ is, by contrast, Son. What precise significance Clement attached to this term might be difficult to unfold, but we may be aided by the following considerations: It cannot designate a merely moral sonship, moral unity. If Christ had merely been, in Clement's estimate, a perfectly pure man, who for his eminent godliness was designated Son of God, why should he place him above the angels? It is true he approves, in c. 39, of the expression from Job iv.: "he charges his angels with folly;" but that he understood it

in an hyperbolical sense, and not as implying actual sin, is evident both from the words *ἁγίων ἀγγέλων*, in the same chapter, and from the praise bestowed on them in c. 34, where he contrasts them with men, and sets them before men as an example of obedience and harmony. Further, the employment of the word *γεγέννηκα*, "I have begotten thee." However indisposed we may be to press such a word as this, we can scarcely avoid supposing that Clement must have felt, to some extent, its force. Concerning man, in c. 33, he speaks, most distinctly, as *made*, *ποιήσωμεν*, *ἔπλασεν*; and in the passage above referred to, in c. 39, angels are ranked with the rest of creation; the sole difference between them and men being their purity and obedience. Conjoining, then, the two words *υἱός* and *γεγέννηκα*, and bearing in mind the considerations just advanced, we are forced to conclude that Clement, as it were spontaneously, if not with a full comprehension of what he was doing, placed Christ in, what we may term, a blood-relationship to God, such as pertains to no creature, not even to that "most excellent creature, man" (c. 33), nor to that still higher creature, the angel. It is very improbable that Clement had any notion whatever of the eternal generation of the Son, which was subsequently based upon, if not deduced from, the words *ἐγὼ σήμερον γεγέννηκά σε*,[1] though some writers have maintained it.

c. We may further notice, also, the expression *κεκληρονόμηκεν* in connection with Son. Christ has *inherited* the name — the name which indicates the nature, the name of Son, Son of God, born, not merely made. That which we inherit is ours by right, is ours by natural relationship; and to predicate of Christ a natural relationship to God of this kind, what is it but to make him divine?

d. There are still three remarkable phrases to be noticed in this passage: In Christ we look upon God's faultless countenance; we, who are ourselves the impression of the

[1] See Origen; and, in modern times, Treffrey on the "Eternal Sonship," and Clark on Luke i. 14.

image of God (c. 33), see in Christ God's faultless and most excellent face, i.e. the perfect expression of the inmost essence of God.

Again, he is the *ἀπαύγασμα τῆς μεγαλοσύνης αὐτοῦ*. Man is the "character (*χαρακτήρ*) of his image," i.e. of Christ: Christ is the "bright reflection of his majesty." Clement seems really to have sought out the strongest terms he could find, in order to express how fully Christ represents God to us, without exactly styling him God.

And lastly, we read that the enemies of Christ are the enemies of God, which enemies God promises to bring into subjection to Christ. This is a further identification of Christ and God, which, taken together with the entire passage, must be allowed to be weighty. In short, it is impossible to examine this thirty-sixth chapter without acknowledging that whatever stress may be laid on particular terms, Clement felt no hesitation in putting Christ into a position so close to God, that he only failed to style him God and divine. He has interwoven with his own words the strongest expressions from (probably) the Epistle to the Hebrews, indicating, by the fact of selection, that it was distinctly his design to set forth Christ with the utmost possible glory short of absolute identification with God himself.

The remaining clauses of this chapter we shall advert to in another connection.

e. The next passage that claims notice is the somewhat obscure one in the sixteenth chapter: "The sceptre of the majesty of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, did not come with pomp and boastings, nor with arrogance, although it was in his power, but in lowliness of mind." From the use here of the impersonal term "sceptre," it might be concluded that Christ stood to God in the relation of a mere instrument. At first sight it seems to be employed in analogy to the word "rod," in Isaiah x. 5: "Ah! the Assyrian, the rod of mine anger"; that as the Assyrian was God's rod, so Christ is the sceptre of his majesty. But apart from the

inanity of such a use in this connection, there are several positive grounds against it: (1) There is no instance in the Old Testament, on which Clement greatly leans, and from which he evidently derived the figure, in which a creature is called the "sceptre of God"; and that for a very natural reason. Sceptre is the permanent, distinctive symbol of regal authority and power, in their totality. Another may be a monarch's sword, or rod, or right hand, but not his sceptre, without having, *de facto*, the monarch's own power, without being, so far as possible, the monarch himself. In the Old Testament to take away the sceptre, is to reduce the holder thereof to the rank of subject from that of ruler. For example, in Zech. x. 11 we read "the sceptre of Egypt passes away."

(2) Men who are God's "rod" or "sword" or other instrument, are so designated in virtue of some one particular work or office intrusted to them for a particular time; whereas Christ is spoken of here as "sceptre," independently of any particular work, as though it were his natural, permanent position. And he who was and is the sceptre comes to redeem, humbling himself by undertaking his mission in the form of a servant. The dignity of God's messengers consists precisely in their being his messengers, whatever may be the outward circumstances of their activity. The fact that Christ "might have come in pomp and dignity," and that his not coming thus was an humiliation, implies clearly that he had a dignity arising from the sceptre, apart from even so glorious a mission as that of redemption.

The term has also been explained in analogy to *δωδεκάσκηπτρον* in c. 31, and *σκῆπτρον* in c. 32. These words are there equivalent to *φύλη*, as in several passages of the Old Testament, שֵׁבֶט signifies tribus. And as in c. 29 Jacob, to whom pertained the *δωδεκάσκηπτρον*, that is, from whom the twelve tribes, or *σκῆπτρα*, came, is called God's heritage, so Christ too is called God's *σκῆπτρον*, or heritage. Were this analogy admissible at all, the idea would have to

be considerably modified in view of the words of c. 32, where the derivation of the Lord Jesus from the flesh is adduced as one of God's marvellous gifts. Plainly, if an honor were conferred on God's heritage Israel, by the mere casual descent of Christ; and if, at the same time, Clement meant to represent Christ as God's heritage in employing the word σκῆπτρον, it must be in an extraordinary sense. Israel was privileged above all men, was God's son; and yet he is honored by the mere fleshly descent of Christ: Christ must then, surely, be God's Son, God's heritage, in an absolute sense. We are thus, by another route, led to a conception of Christ as lofty as could be desired, short of styling him God. But it is very unlikely that Clement should have employed the terms in this sense. Either his thought would have been similar to that just expounded, and that is very improbable, or he would have spoken with a confusedness which the general tone of his epistle does not warrant us in attributing to him. The most natural explanation is the one suggested by a preceding remark, that "sceptre" is the essential, permanent symbol of regal power and authority. Clement viewed Christ, accordingly, as the personal symbol, vehicle, organ, embodiment, representative of the majesty and authority of God, without whom God can no more be truly thought of, than a monarch without sceptre. Such a conception would be quite in harmony with the representations of the New Testament; for example, with Col. i. 16: "By him were all things created." If, then, Clement held Christ to be clothed with divine regal power, it is quite intelligible that he should have been able to appear in pomp; that his dignity was not derived from his mission; that he *could humble* himself in the manner described. We have here, in another independent form, the same thought as is expressed in Philippians ii. 6 – 8: "who being in the form of God humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross."

f. The next point bearing upon Christ's relation to the

Father, is Clement's use of the word κύριος, as a designation of Christ as well as God. It occurs in a great variety of connections. As a general rule, it is true, he uses the term δεσπότης of God, and never applies it to Christ; which might seem to imply that κύριος was a mere title of office, or was used loosely, as we use master, lord. But a more careful examination shows that he uses κύριος and δεσπότης interchangeably of God, and that consequently, in view especially of other circumstances, his application of κύριος to Christ is surprising, save on one supposition. That he draws no such precise distinction between the two words is sufficiently evident from cc. 33, 53, and 54, among many others. In c. 33, we read ὁ δεσπότης ἀγαλλιᾶται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ; and he subsequently says, plainly referring to the same subject, ὁ κύριος, ἔργοις ἑαυτὸν κοσμήσας, ἐχάρη. Now, either δεσπότης and κύριος are to Clement identical in force and meaning, or, supposing Christ to be κύριος, that creative activity which in the one case is predicated of God, is predicated in the other of Christ.

Again, in c. 54, also, κύριος is either used of God, or the earth and its fulness are said to be Christ's; which would be a plain transference of one of God's main characteristics to Christ. Further, the identity of κύριος and δεσπότης is clear from a comparison of cc. 36 and 53. In the former, quoting the Old Testament, he says, εἶπεν ὁ δεσπότης; whereas in the latter, quoting from the same source, he says, εἶπεν ὁ κύριος. It is, lastly, sustained by the circumstance that, in introducing his quotations from the Old Testament and in speaking himself of God, he generally, though, as we have shown, not invariably, uses δεσπότης (cc. 24, 33, 36, 40). If he had any definite reason at all for this procedure, it was a desire to secure variety of expression; for, with his general tendencies, it is exceedingly unlikely that he meant to be more accurate than the Old Testament. Nor have we any reason for thinking that δεσπότης was required by the usage of the time.

Now this application of the same term to Christ as is

applied to God in the Old Testament, which Clement deemed inspired, is of itself striking enough; but especially so when the two are designated κύριος almost in the same breath, as in cc. 13 and 16. From the "Martyrium Polycarpi," c. 8, where Polycarp is represented as refusing to say κύριος καῖσαρ, it would appear that, by the Christian church of that day, κύριος was regarded as, at all events to some extent, a distinctive title of Christ, a title indicative of his divine dignity. Taking this circumstance in connection with Clement's usage and the usage of the Old Testament, whose authority he recognized, divine dignity would appear to be ascribed to Christ.

There is a further incidental identification of God and Christ in c. 2, where we read, "content with the viaticum of God, and giving diligent heed to his words . . . . . and his [God's] sufferings were before your eyes." That Clement here had in view the sufferings of Christ, there can surely be no question; if so, is it not perfectly obvious that, even if in no precisely formulated shape, he must have connected Christ with God much as the orthodox church has always done? In all ages it has been common, in a popular way, to say interchangeably, "God has suffered," "Christ has suffered"; but solely because Christ was believed to be so one with God that what he did was done by God.

Other passages, as for example the doxologies in cc. 20, 50, 58, 59, might be adduced under this rubric, which, though not very important by themselves, all point in the direction of the clearer declarations just discussed.[1]

2. Christ's pre-existence, character, and endowments.

a. The existence of Christ prior to his appearance on earth is directly implied in c. 22, where he is represented as exhorting us, through the Holy Spirit, in the words of Psalm xxxiii. 11–18; and there is no reason whatever for

[1] The words τὸ κατὰ σάρκα, according to the flesh, in c. 32, are also significant. As to the flesh, he was descended from Israel; as to the spirit — as to his higher nature — from whom? The most natural reply is, from God. In what sense? Not as men may be said to be descended from God; otherwise, where the contrast, what the distinction, between Jesus and other Jews?

supposing, either that Christ had spoken these words on earth, or that Clement arbitrarily put them into his mouth. He clearly believed him to have spoken in Old Testament times. Here, too, is a conjunction of God and Christ of a remarkable character, seeing that the Old Testament scriptures are, throughout, represented as the word of God (see, for example, cc. 13, 45, 53); the word of Christ and the word of God are treated on the same footing.

The words *τὸ σκῆπτρον τῆς μεγαλοσύνης οὐκ ἦλθεν ἐν κόμπῳ καίπερ δυνάμενος κ. τ. λ.*, from the sixteenth chapter, already referred to, contain also a hint of his pre-existence. For, to speak of his being able to appear on earth otherwise than he did, if he then first came into existence, would be absurd; especially so, to say that he thus humbled himself. How could he humble himself, if he had not previously held a higher position?

b. There are several scattered allusions, from which we can very naturally deduce that Clement regarded Christ as sinless; this, at all events, is their most obvious explanation.

In c. 36 we are said to gaze, *in him*, on the *faultless* and most excellent countenance of God; and how could this be the case if Christ, even regarded merely as a medium, were imperfect? According to c. 39, even the angels are not beyond the reach of blame when compared with God; yet Christ is greater, higher than the angels. Again, in c. 16, the words of Isaiah liii. are applied to Christ: "there was no guile in his mouth; he suffered for *our* sins; he bore *our* sins, not *his own*," and so forth. Whatever view may be taken of the original application of these words, it is enough for our purpose to know that Clement deemed them to have been realized in Christ; and he could scarcely have indicated his perfect innocence and purity in stronger terms. Further, we are said to be "sanctified through our Lord Jesus Christ" (c. 1); he is "the gate of righteousness, and they are blessed who enter into it, and are found walking in holiness and righteousness." But he who was

himself sinful could never, surely, be styled the "gate of righteousness" to others. His righteousness is evidently conceived of as of the highest order and degree. Further, such expressions as, your *εὐσέβεια* is *ἐν Χριστῷ* (c. 1), *πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸ καθῆκον τῷ Χριστῷ* (c. 3), seem to involve, to say the least, a subordination of our moral state and life under his, that amounts to something very like sinlessness. Naturally, too, all the points referred to under the first rubric, and that will be brought forward under the next, point in the same direction.

3. The relation of Christ to men.

Clement's epistle contains a great variety of utterances bearing on this point. In the most natural way, and as if the matter were too obvious to admit of doubt, he represents men as dependent on Christ for every species of spiritual good. Grace is spoken of, in cc. 1, 8, 30, 31, 50, as *χάρις ἀπὸ Θεοῦ* or *χάρις Θεοῦ*; in cc. 16 and 59, on the other hand, we read *ὑπὸ τὸν ζυγὸν τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ* [*Χριστοῦ*], and in c. 59, *ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*; so that he was deemed by Clement to be, along with God, the source of *χάρις*; that is, to all appearance, of the same *χάρις*. Again, in c. 1 he is set forth as the medium through which men receive *χάρις*: *χάρις ὑμῖν ἀπὸ Θεοῦ διὰ Χριστοῦ*. The expression in the sixteenth chapter, *εἰ γὰρ ὁ κύριος οὕτως ἐταπεινοφρόνησεν τί ποιήσομεν ἡμεῖς οἱ ὑπὸ τὸν ζυγὸν τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ δι' αὐτοῦ ἐλθόντες*, "we who come, *through him*, under the yoke of *his grace*," is worthy of note. He brings us under his own dominion, under the dominion of *his own* grace, and is not merely the instrument or agent of bringing us under the dominion of God's grace; and yet, as we see from other passages, this same *χάρις* is identical with the *χάρις ἀπὸ Θεοῦ*. Again, in c. 20 a similar thought is expressed in different words: *ὁ μέγας δημιουργὸς — εὐεργετῶν τὰ πάντα ὑπερεκπερισσῶς δὲ ὑμᾶς . . . . . διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Χριστοῦ*. Through Christ we are sanctified (c. 1); he is the *ὁδὸς ἐν ᾗ εὕρομεν τὸ σωτήριον ἡμῶν — ὁ προστάτης καὶ βοηθός* (c. 36); *ἡ ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ πύλη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν Χριστῷ* (c.

48); there is *μία κλῆσις ἐν Χριστῷ* (c. 46); we are *κληθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ* (c. 32); *ἐκλελεγμένοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (cc. 50, 58); we are all members of each other and *τὰ μέλη τοῦ Χριστοῦ*; nothing, however, being clearer than that Clement does not mean that Christ bears the same relation to us as do our fellow men; we are *τὸ ποίμνιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ* (cc. 44, 54, 57); Christ is *κύριος ἡμῶν* (c. 20, et pass.); Christ's is the *βασιλεία* (c. 50); our *πίστις*, our *παιδεία*, our *ἀγάπη*, our *ἐλπίς*, are each and all *in Christ* (cc. 21, 22, 49, 57). Besides these, there are other allusions to the practical relation of Christ to humanity, which, though not of great significance in themselves, harmonize well with, and therefore acquire force from, the other features of the picture sketched by Clement.

In the passages just adduced, Clement plainly puts Christ into a relation to the spiritual redemption and life of man, such as no merely human being could occupy. Individual expressions might, indeed, be used respecting men, and sometimes are, relatively to external matters; but if we were to substitute the name of a human being, even though idealized, for Christ's name, wherever the latter is referred to, the incongruity would at once become obvious; it would at once be plain that the Christ of Clement was not a mere man. To discuss in detail every one of these utterances would lead us too far; nor is it necessary. What has been advanced by such writers as Gess, relatively to the teachings of the same class in the New Testament is applicable to the words of Clement, so far as they coincide therewith; and to a very large extent they do coincide.

Let us now sum up Clement's utterances regarding Christ, and see what conclusion we are warranted in drawing.

In the *first* place, Christ is placed in a relation to God such as neither angels nor men occupy, and is designated by names which are elsewhere used of God; in the *second* place, he pre-exists and is sinless; in the *third* place, he is assumed to be both the source and the medium of the highest spiritual, divine blessings. Evidently then, in

Clement's eyes, Christ stood nearer to God than is possible for any creature; so near that the outlines of the one fade away into those of the other. He does not, indeed, distinctly identify him with God; he does not, in so many words, style him divine; there is no good reason for believing that he held any definite *doctrine* regarding Christ's nature and attributes; but still Christ fills almost the whole of his horizon, and he implies a unity between him and God, such as can only be satisfactorily expressed in some such formula as that of the church. We are justified, then, in maintaining that if Clement had been compelled by antagonists to make the subject a matter of special logical reflection, he would unhesitatingly have adopted the doctrine held by the church throughout the ages. The reasons for the indefiniteness which marks his expressions regarding the person of Christ we shall have occasion to notice in another connection.

§ 6. *The Personality and Work of the Holy Spirit.*

Clement's allusions to the Holy Spirit are tolerably numerous, considering the length and design of his epistle; they are characterized, however, by the previously-noticed vagueness in a doctrinal point of view.

The expression *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* occurs, in all, eight times; in one instance we read *πνεῦμα κυρίου* (c. 21).

(1). His personality in general, and personal existence prior to the coming of Christ, seem to be implied in cc. 13, 16, 22, and 45, to which we shall refer separately. In the thirteenth chapter, a quotation from Jeremiah is introduced by the words *λέγει γὰρ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*; similarly also, in c. 16, a quotation from the prophet Isaiah. Now, in cc. 8, 10, 18, 33, and elsewhere, God is represented as thus speaking, or Jesus Christ; what, therefore, can lie nearer than to suppose that as they are personal, so the Holy Spirit, to whom the same act is ascribed, is personal? It is true, the bare expression *τὸ πνεῦμα λέγει* would prove little by itself; for we read in c. 13, *φησὶν γὰρ ὁ ἅγιος λόγος*, which, from a

comparison of c. 56, there can be little doubt is equivalent to ἡ γραφή, i.e. φησὶν (cc. 34, 35), or to τὸ γραφεῖον λέγει (c. 28); and it might be argued that as a personal act is attributed to ἡ γραφή, which is obviously impersonal, the attribution of a personal act to τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον does not prove it to be personal. But there are two other circumstances to be taken into consideration. The ascription of the same τὸ λέγειν to both πνεῦμα and γραφή neither requires both to be impersonal, nor both personal. That would be proving too much; for then we might argue that Θεός and Ἰησοῦς were also impersonal. Now it is, *a priori*, obvious that γραφή is impersonal; but it is by no means so certain that πνεῦμα also is impersonal. The question then arises: Are there any presumptions to the contrary? A personification of ἡ γραφή is intelligible enough, for it has a clearly-defined external existence; but as a mere personification πνεῦμα would lack all reality. What is this πνεῦμα? we should have to ask. That Clement should use spirit in any pantheistic sense is utterly improbable. Is πνεῦμα, then, another term for God or Christ — the Spirit of God, as we say the spirit of man? If this had been his meaning, it is likely that, with his realistic turn of mind, he would have said τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ or Ἰησοῦ. His addition of τὸ ἅγιον strengthens the inadmissibility of this supposition. Further, when he writes "the holy scripture saith," he means that "God or Christ saith," because he regarded scripture as God's word; but what of τὸ πνεῦμα? especially of τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον? If it mean anything, it must mean either God or the third person of the Trinity; and as we can see no reason why he should not have said God or Christ, as in other places, it is probable, particularly in view of the passages next to be noticed, that, even if in a vague way, the Holy Spirit hovered before his mind as a personal being. In c. 22 Jesus is represented as exhorting us through the Holy Spirit, in the words of Psalm xxxiii. The Holy Spirit is here conceived as Christ's agent in relation to man, in perfect agreement with the New Testament and the doc-

trine of the church. In c. 46 we find the remarkable words, "have we not one God and one Christ, and one Spirit of grace which is poured out upon us?" To conclude, here, that as God and Christ are personal, so also is the Spirit, would not surely be putting too great pressure on Clement's words; on the contrary, the conclusion seems necessary. That the personality of the Spirit may have been indistinctly present to his mind, is suggested also by his use of πνοή in c. 21, instead of πνεῦμα: "for God is a searcher of the thoughts and desires; whose breath is in us; and when he wills he takes it away"; for he says πνοὴ αὐτοῦ, and not τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ. The passage τὰς ἀληθεῖς ῥήσεις πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου is not quite so clear as some already referred to, but still points in the same direction. Such expressions as ἔκχυσις πνεύματος ἁγίου, in c. 2, though apparently impersonal, are, rightly understood, not inconsistent with the church doctrine of the Spirit. Further evidence that Clement viewed the Holy Spirit as a person is derivable also from the operations attributed to him.

2. Three operations are ascribed to the Spirit: the *inspiration* of the scriptures, the influencing of *sinners*, and the strengthening of *believers*.

The passages quoted above, from cc. 8, 13, 16, 45, plainly teach that he inspired the writers of the Old Testament. In c. 22 Christ is described as remonstrating with and persuading men to seek the Lord, through the Holy Spirit — a decided hint towards the doctrine of the Spirit's work in the conversion of sinners. And in c. 42 the apostles are said to go forth to their work of evangelization with the full certainty of the Holy Ghost. Now, notwithstanding the vagueness which must be allowed to be characteristic of Clement's allusions to this subject, what impression do we receive on the whole? The answer will depend considerably on the point of view of the individual inquirer; but still one thing must be conceded, that his utterances are thoroughly compatible with a recognition of the personality of the Holy Spirit in the church's sense; nay more, that

they permit us to suppose that, had occasion called for it, he would have received the church's doctrine as the substantial expression of his own unformulated thoughts.

For the late Dr. Baur's assertion, that the Son of God, so far as the apostolical Fathers speak of him as a pre-existent being, is identical with the Holy Spirit, there is not a shadow of reason, at all events in Clement's Epistle. One might with much greater propriety maintain that the Spirit is identical with Jesus Christ; though neither position is tenable.

It is unnecessary to add that, if the acts attributed by Clement to the Spirit in Old Testament times involve his personality, they equally involve Clement's belief in his pre-existence. In short, his manner of alluding to the subject harmonizes best with the supposition that he held, in a concrete form, the church's view of the person and work of the Holy Spirit.

§ 7. *The Trinity.*

Our judgment as to whether there be any distinct preparations for, or anticipations of, the doctrine of the Trinity as subsequently developed in the history of the church, will depend on the conclusions arrived at relatively to the two points last examined. If Christ be really represented by Clement as the pre-existent Son of God, who discharges divine functions and performs divine works; and if the Holy Spirit be personal and pre-existent; then the foundation is clearly laid for the doctrine of the Trinity, however far Clement may be from a formal recognition thereof; and we may reasonably say, as in previous cases, that, had he found opportunity, he would have accepted the church's doctrine as the natural, if not fully satisfactory, expression of his own belief. There is only one passage which can be deemed, in any sense, to hint at the doctrine of the Trinity; it is in c. 46: *Ἓν οὐχὶ ἕνα Θεὸν ἔχομεν καὶ ἕνα Χριστόν; καὶ ἓν πνεῦμα τῆς χάριτος τὸ ἐκχυθὲν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς;* but it is too slight a foundation on which to build; though it would be a very

natural course to refer to the New Testament baptismal formula as furnishing an analogy to, and perhaps an explanation of, Clement's words.

§ 8. *The Atonement of Christ.*

An impartial examination of his epistle can leave little doubt that Clement believed the death of Christ to have effected for men something outside of them, as well as produced a spiritual effect in them. The strongest words bearing on this subject are found in cc. 7, 16, and 49. They run as follows: c. 7, "Let us gaze intently on the blood of Christ, and let us see how precious to God is his blood, which, having been shed for our salvation, has brought the grace of repentance to the entire world;" c. 49, "Because of the love he had towards us, Jesus Christ our Lord gave his blood on our behalf by the will of God, and his flesh for our flesh, and his soul for our souls;" in c. 16 the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah is quoted as a prophecy of Jesus Christ and his sufferings, and is plainly considered to express their significance. As Dr. Dorner remarks in his Christology, regarding one of these passages in conjunction with others to be adduced afterwards: "Every explanation is forced which does not find in them the idea of substitution, and that both in a subjective and objective sense — subjective in Christ's substitutionary spirit or disposition, and objective in that his substitutionary spirit and deed had their correspondent objective result." Several other more or less distinct allusions to the efficacy of the blood of Christ occur. For example, in c. 12 the red thread hung by Rahab in the window of her house, as a sign to the invading Israelites, is treated as a type of the redemption to be wrought out by the blood of Christ for all who believe and hope in God. Whatever opinion we may entertain as to the typical value of this thread of Rahab's, Clement's view of the death of Christ is plain enough. Again, in c. 21 we read: "let us pay heed to Jesus Christ, who was given for us"; in c. 2 the Corinthians are praised for keeping

the sufferings of Christ before their eyes, to wit, not merely as an example, though this is included, but as a principle of self-sacrifice in them, and a source of great blessing, Further, in cc. 36 and 58 Christ is designated our high-priest, a term which first acquires full force, especially as taken in connection with *βοηθός*, *προστάτης* and the remarks made above, when we apply it in the sense of the church. The death of Christ would thus seem to have been regarded by Clement as having taken place to redeem men from penalties otherwise inevitable, and to bring to them blessings otherwise inaccessible. A clearly worked-out doctrine there is not; but there certainly is a recognition of that concrete basis on which the church subsequently built its doctrine of the atonement.

§ 9. *Justification by Faith.*

Clement's clearest utterance concerning the nature and significance of faith is contained in c. 32, where we read: "All these, then, were honored and magnified, not through themselves or their works, or the just deeds which they wrought, but through his will. We also, therefore, called by his will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, nor by our wisdom or intelligence or piety or works which we have wrought in sanctity of heart, *but by faith*, by which the omnipotent God hath justified all from the beginning." Nothing can be more distinct. We are justified by faith, not by works. The coincidence with the fourth and fifth chapters of the Epistle to the Romans is very obvious and complete.

Clement alludes to faith as a moral and spiritual force, in eight passages. In four passages God is plainly its object; in one clearly, and in three others it may, perhaps, without force be maintained to refer to Christ. In c. 3 we read: "each quits the fear of God, and is dim-sighted in his faith;" in c. 10: "for his faith and hospitality a son was given to Abraham in his old age"; in c. 12 the faith and hospitality of Rahab are praised; and in c. 31 we read that

Abraham was blessed because he wrought righteousness and truth through faith, that is, in God. Of these passages, the last is the only one that can be said to have any special force; and the context forbids basing any definite judgment on it. Clement's immediate object seems to have been to enumerate *αἱ ὁδοὶ τῆς εὐλογίας*, and he apparently ranks faith as one mode among others of attaining to blessing. Abraham wrought righteousness and truth *διὰ πίστεως*; Isaac, *μετὰ πεποιθήσεως ἡδέως ἐγένετο θυσία*; Jacob, *ἐξεχάρησεν μετὰ ταπεινοφροσύνης*. In this case, however, any seeming inconsistency is attributable to the practical character of what he writes, and to vagueness in the use of language. The section in which the above expressions occur, finishes with the strong declaration regarding the nullity of everything but faith quoted above; as though Clement had intended by the close to obliterate any ambiguity occurring in the course of his exhortations. We must here observe the rule of explaining obscurer by clearer passages. Where Clement meant to treat of the relative value of different principles, he leaves no doubt as to the position due to faith. We must further remember that owing to the purely practical purpose of his epistle, Clement naturally gave full prominence to each particular moral or spiritual force as it came into view.[1]

Clement never quite distinctly teaches that we are justified by faith in the blood of Christ; but that a connection existed for his mind between faith and the death of Christ in the justification of sinners may be concluded on various

[1] This is a very simple principle, which has been greatly neglected by too many interpreters of our canonical scriptures. The sacred writers were not so fearful of speaking strongly, now in one direction, and then in another direction apparently incompatible with the first, as we are now. We stand in constant awe of being misunderstood by some weak brother or sister. Thoroughly examined, there is scarcely a proof of the inspiration of scripture stronger than these formal, logical inconsistencies; for the man of spiritual insight feels and sees these very inconsistencies to be living truth — truth drawn directly from the overflowing wells of life, and given to the thirsty without being first disintegrated and recompounded, and thus deprived of freshness and vigor. Life is light, and light is life.

grounds: first, from the universal significance attributed to πίστις in c. 32; secondly, from such expressions as πίστις ἐν Χριστῷ in c. 22; thirdly, from the words referring to Isaac in c. 31, where he is said to have freely become a sacrifice, *knowing what was to come*, to wit, what Christ would do; and lastly, in connection with the foregoing, from the stress elsewhere laid on Christ's death as the salvation of the entire world and the source of such virtues as repentance. For with his ethical and practical tendencies, Clement must have conceived salvation to have been appropriated through the medium of some such human act or organ as faith. In the light of c. 32 it is impossible to suppose that Clement should have recognized any other principle by which this salvation is mediated, save faith. The words βεβαίαν πίστιν ὑμῶν in c. 1 may also be taken to involve the presupposition of Christ as the object and content of faith, particularly as viewed in connection with the next clause τὴν ἐν Χριστῷ εὐσέβειαν.

Roman Catholic writers, indeed, endeavor to show that Clement places works and charity on the same level with faith, as principles of acceptance before God. But the passages on which they rely for proof are, to say the least, very feeble. One is contained in c. 30, where we read: "let us put on concord, being humble-minded, continent, removing far from all whispering and slander, *justifying ourselves by works, and not by words*." That the opposition here lies between *works* and mere *words*, and not between deeds and faith, as a principle of justification, is as plain as possible, especially from what follows: "He who speaketh much shall hear in reply, Does a man of many words think to be just? Do not be great in words!" The contrast is between reality and pretence, not between works and faith, which are equally realities and equally important in their relative positions, in Clement's estimation. The other passage is c. 50: "Blessed are we, beloved, if we have fulfilled the commands of God in concord of love, in order that our sins may be remitted to us through love (δι' ἀγάπης)." The following

considerations will set aside any difficulty that may be occasioned by these words: first, that as it would be unwarrantable to base a doctrine of justification by faith on any single passage, in face of a number of other passages of a different tendency, some very clear and some indistinct; so in the present instance. Secondly, Clement never uses the strong and decided language regarding love that he uses regarding faith. Thirdly, his *experience*, we do not say his *conception*, of faith was not of that dead thing to which Roman Catholics oppose love; to him, faith was the root of love, love the ripe outcome of faith. Fourthly, the idea of love as a source of merit before God would clash with the passages quoted above, and with the present context. Fifthly, δι' ἀγάπης here signifies, probably, "through love," i.e. in God or Christ, and not "on account of love," which would be δι' ἀγάπην. This meaning is suggested to an unprejudiced reader by the very next words: "for it is written, Blessed are they whose sins are covered." And, lastly, as we have observed in another connection, Clement's practical tendency led him to lay strong emphasis on each spiritual principle or virtue as it presented itself to his view. In short, the foundation supplied to Catholics by Clement is as feeble as that supplied by the writers of the New Testament.

§ 10. *The Resurrection.*

On this point Clement's testimony is more clear and precise than on any other. He devotes to it three entire chapters, cc. 24, 25, and 26, and alludes to it in cc. 27 and 42. He assumes, first, the fact of the resurrection of Christ; speaks of his resurrection as the first-fruits, to be followed by ours; and refers, in illustrative support thereof, to the fable of the phoenix and to various analogies of nature. In c. 26 he quotes the words of Job xix.: "Thou shalt wake up my flesh again," in confirmation of the resurrection. Into the mode and time of our resurrection, and other questions connected therewith, he does not enter at

all. From his use of the words of Job, however, he would appear to have assumed the resurrection of the body. So that his references to this point, though clearer than usual, contain little or nothing of a properly doctrinal character. That his allusions to the resurrection should be unusually distinct, is plainly attributable to its being something tangible and objective; besides, that was most probably (see c. 42 where the apostles are said to have been inspired with confidence by the resurrection of Christ) the chief support of Christian belief, and the main argument in the conviction of heathen.

Such, then, are the main features of the theology of Clement, so far as we may speak of his having a theology at all. The question next to be considered is: What relation does the theology of Clement's epistle bear to the theological views current in the Christian circles of his day? Does Clement here fairly represent the state of theological thought, both as to form and substance? Our answer is, Yes; and on the following grounds:

§ 11. *The Position and Character of Clement.*

1. Clement occupied a position which gave him ample opportunity of becoming directly conversant with the theological thought of the church of his day. He was acquainted with the apostle Paul (Phil. iv. 3), even if he did not accompany him on his journeys, as some have supposed. Origen, Eusebius, Epiphanius, Jerome, and other early writers testify to his being the same as the one mentioned in the passage just quoted. He was probably a citizen of Philippi, and after his conversion to Christianity labored there, in conjunction with others. This must have been prior to A.D. 63 or 64; and from that time onwards till about A.D. 92 to 101 he continued, so far as we know, to serve Christ, either in Philippi or other cities. Between A.D. 92 and 101 he held the office of bishop of Rome, and, as the high value set on the epistle which bears his name sufficiently proves,

was greatly esteemed by the Christian churches in general. Now a man of his age and intellectual and moral character, even though he had held no prominent official positions, must have contracted a wide acquaintance with the belief of his contemporaries; much more if he had held the positions commonly ascribed to Clement.

2. His intellectual and moral qualities fitted him for reflecting the general average thought of his contemporaries. So far as we can judge from his epistle, and it reads like a true expression of his inner being, Clement's mind was precisely of that order from which we expect and receive the most accurate testimony.

He was of a practical, unspeculative turn; his judgment was sober and well balanced; he evinces culture and susceptibility to beauty in nature and style; and while not possessed of striking force, cannot by any means be charged with feebleness.

To his predominantly practical turn of mind, we have had frequent occasion to refer. The entire epistle bears testimony thereto: there is not a single feature of an opposite character.

That his judgment was sober and well balanced appears from his mode of treating the entire dispute in question; from the absence of extravagant ascetical ideas and exaggerated notions about martyrdom; from his abstinence from allegory and from his treatment, to single out one matter, of the fable of the phoenix. There is scarcely an exhortation, a practical judgment, a general observation, that is not as applicable now as it was then. With what wisdom does he commence his exhortations! With what mingled severity and tenderness does he treat the offenders! In praise he is not too full; in blame, not too harsh. And he seeks throughout to accomplish his design rather by warning examples of contention and encouraging examples of concord and obedience than by direct exhortation and reproof. How wise and discriminating are the following words from c. 38: "Let not the strong man neglect the weak, but let the weak

esteem the strong; let the rich give to the poor, and let the poor thank God that he hath given him one through whom his wants are supplied. Let the wise evince his wisdom, not in words, but in good works. He who is humble should not bear testimony to himself, but should leave testimony to be borne by others. He who is chaste as to the flesh, let him not be puffed up, knowing that another hath given him the gift of continence."

Who that reads his praise of the Corinthians, in c. 2; his description of the concord and harmony of the universe, in c. 20; his impassioned encomium of charity, in c. 49; and notes the spirit of love and harmony which breathes through many other passages, can call in question his culture and his sense of beauty?

And, finally, though not distinguished for force, his mind is by no means chargeable with weakness. Sometimes he exhibits considerable energy, as, for example, in c. 46; his mode of treating the matters he touches, though in a formal respect very loose, is substantially firm and self-consistent; sometimes, through sheer, earnest common sense, he approaches to a broad philosophical view, as for example, of faith as a spiritual force, in c. 32; in c. 49 we have an independent expansion of a thought derived from the apostle Paul.

In short, an unprejudiced examination of the epistle reveals an author whose mind is marked by the sobriety, practicalness, harmony, freedom from idiosyncracies, which warrant the expectation that his references to matters of belief and life, will be a fair reflection of the spirit of his age.

§ 12. *The Circumstances and Character of the Epistle.*

1. The epistle is addressed, according to the salutation in chapter 1, by the church in Rome to the church in Corinth; and, according to Eusebius,[1] was written by Clement in his official capacity as bishop of Rome. Here, then,

[1] Eusebius, Hist. Eccl. III., 16, 38.

we have a double testimony: 1. to the authority enjoyed by Clement; 2. to the authority of the epistle itself.

An official communication from one church to another would naturally touch only such points and urge such considerations as were generally accepted. Whatever, therefore, occurs in it, may be safely assumed to have been commonly recognized as constituent elements of Christian belief.

2. Throughout the epistle there is no attempt whatever to demonstrate any doctrine, or prove any fact;[1] all is taken for granted. And further, doctrines and facts are introduced in the way of allusion — two peculiarities, which consist alone with the supposition that the Epistle reflects truly the substance and form of theological thought in Clement's day. As to substance, anything new or peculiar would have demanded proof, even between churches; especially when written by one individual in the name of a community. As to form, had it been customary to employ a more ratiocinative form, we must surely have found traces thereof even in an official letter. In similar letters written at a later period there is a marked difference in this respect, due unquestionably to the different character of the thought of the age.

This character of Clement himself, and of his epistle, viewed in connection with other considerations, is further a strong testimony to his having labored and written at the era we have supposed. Had he lived later, from the prominent position he occupied, we should have expected a tone and turn of mind more after the type of later writers, such as Justin Martyr, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, and others. And a few years later, an epistle that abstains so completely from theological controversy, that is occupied so exclusively with the practical aspects of Christianity, and that breathes so convinced, so harmonious, so peaceful a

[1] Roman Catholic writers might say that this was because Clement wrote authoritatively, as the head of the Church on earth. But there is no trace whatever of such authority in the epistle. Clement writes as a brother to brethren, and all his reproofs and appeals bear this character.

spirit, could not have been written from a Western to an Eastern church. The scanty and vague reference to points of ecclesiastical order are natural enough, if our supposition be correct; completely unnatural, on a contrary view. If Clement had held the more distinct and developed ideas set forth, for example, in some of the epistles commonly ascribed to Ignatius, there was occasion enough for advancing them.

We conclude, then, from the mental and moral characteristics of Clement that he was fitted to represent to us the form and substance of the theological thought of his day, and that, from the tone of his epistle, he actually does it.

§ 13. *Contemporary Christian Writings.*

In support of the testimony thus borne by Clement's epistle, we may adduce, further, the other works ascribed to his age; whether truly ascribed, or not, does not greatly affect the present argument. We refer to the epistles of Ignatius (particularly the shorter recension), of Barnabas, of Polycarp. These all bear the same general character as the epistle of Clement, though they betray, in a higher degree, the idiosyncracies of the several writers. At the same time, however, we must observe that these idiosyncracies relate principally to practical questions, such as martyrdom and church government, while in relation to doctrine all are substantially at one.

The circumstance that no writings of any very decidedly different character were ever attributed to the orthodox circles of the post-apostolic age, is a confirmation, *e silentio*, of the position that the extant works were then written, and that the belief and life of the church were then substantially such as we have indicated. Whether we accept the generally assumed age of the writings in question or not, this is certain, that antiquity believed the post-apostolic age to have been such as we have assumed; and until good positive reasons are adduced to the contrary, this consideration must have weight. It is true the Tübingen school has

labored to spread the canonical and other early Christian writings over the first and part of the second century, in order thus to show that the general character of the so-called post-apostolic age was by no means that which such productions as the epistle of Clement would imply. But the arguments adduced are either exceedingly feeble or purely negative, and owe their existence entirely to the necessities of their general philosophical theory of history. But we shall return again to this matter.

§ 14. If such, then, were the character of the immediately post-apostolic age — on the one hand non-speculative, non-productive in an intellectual point of view, almost exclusively devoted to great practical questions; and yet, on the other, actually possessed of a rich store of lofty and, for the time, unusual thoughts relating to the highest questions of existence, both speculative and practical, all set forth with a directness, certitude, and an informality, to say the least, remarkable — what conclusion are we, not merely warranted, but compelled, to draw respecting the age which preceded? We answer, first, that age must have been marked by great, startling productiveness, both in thought and deed. The historical phenomenon that numerous, and in some instances large, communities of men, themselves not at all remarkable for culture, and whose leaders give no signs of having been productive, should hold, and that too so firmly, a number of thoughts and principles which, whatever judgment we may form as to the abstract truth of many of them, are distinguished by a grand and moral beauty hitherto totally strange to the greater part of the world, requires some explanation. If these first Christians had been comparatively few in number, and possessed of high culture, then we might deem it possible that they were the outcome of a slow and gradual spiritual movement, whose initiator was Socrates, and main factors Jesus, Paul, Peter, and John. But as the first Christians were mostly heathens of the lower classes, we see no mode of accounting for the existence of the facts adduced, but by assuming that the

preceding age had been marked by unusual, or as we believe supernatural, productiveness. Secondly, an age of this remarkable character must have *immediately* preceded the phenomenon in question. For this assumption there are both historical and general grounds. Those who live and work under the direct impression of such thoughts and deeds as had then been produced, are seldom capable of entering into speculative investigations; they are too much possessed by them reflectively to dream of possessing them. But when the second generation has passed, reflection begins; the thoughts and facts have to be communicated to those whose interest can only be awakened by reflection; doubts arise, objections have to be met; and so the teachings assume a totally different stamp — they become indirect and ratiocinative. This latter is the general character of the ages of Christianity which succeeded that of the apostolic Fathers. We find also a similar course of things, even if in a less degree, during the entire history of the church. When there has been a great revival of Christian life, those who have written under the direct impression created by it, have produced, for the most part, works bearing a concrete, direct, practical character. So far as they have borne a different character, it is attributable to the difference of circumstances; to wit, in the latter case, we have to do with a revival of truths to which contemporaries have become relatively hostile or indifferent; in the former case, totally new truths are brought into direct contact with a generation groping after light. But the law, in its general features, holds good. We find too, as a matter of fact, that later writers never did, because they never could, treat Christian doctrine and fact in the same assumptive, undemonstrative manner; though in proportion as Christian books have been the direct outflow of revived life and manifest divine interferences, in that proportion have they been of the same stamp as the epistle of Clement.

§ 15. In the canonical writings we have the record of deeds and thoughts precisely such as account for the phe-

nomenon in question. Any one candidly and carefully observing the phenomena of the post-apostolic age, even supposing he knew nothing whatever of the canonical scriptures, must be forced to ask: In what have they taken their rise? The men themselves are not, in any sense, their originators, for they appeal to something already existing and recognized; they make no attempt to justify what they advance, as they must if it were new. If to such an observer the canonical scriptures were presented, and he were told: These record the deeds, thoughts, and life of men who immediately preceded the age you are studying, he would reply: Yes, here are the roots, here is the obvious explanation; the two are correlatives. And to deny such events their appropriate practical results, would be equivalent to denying their reality; and practical phenomena of the kind under consideration are inexplicable save by such events.

If this be the case, then the coincidences between this epistle of Clement and the other writings of the apostolic Fathers on the one hand, and the several books of the New Testament on the other, even where not distinctly stated to be such, may be deemed quotations; and we are thus supplied with a strong argument for the truth and authority of the canonical scriptures.

§ 16. *Recent Objections to these Views.*

Against the supposition that the Christian contemporaries of Clement have in him a fair representative; that, both formally and materially, his epistle reflects the state of theological thought among them; that the church then must be described as exclusively devoted to the practical aspects of Christianity, holding its facts and doctrines in a concrete, immediate, non-reflective form; and that consequently, in a scientific point of view, they not only did not continue, but to a certain extent went back from, the productive process of their predecessors, — against this supposition, the loudest protest has been raised by the school of Dr. Baur in Tübingen. Such an evident interruption in the theoretical develop-

ment of the "idea" as the ordinary view of the immediately post-apostolic age involves, conflicts too strongly with their general theory of history, and is too favorable to the supernatural origin and character of Christianity to be left unassailed. Accordingly, all the weapons of history, criticism, and theory have been brought to bear on this particular era. No stone has been left unturned, no nook has been left unsearched, in order to effect a reversal of the long-formed judgment of the Christian church. Heretical works have been raised to the position of true representatives of the state of belief; the orthodox works have been assigned to a later period and an inferior position; and, finally, the canonical books have been distributed over a time nearly double that usually allotted for their production. If, as is maintained, the first form of Christianity were Ebionism; if it then threw off its Judaistic limitations in Paul; and if, at the commencement of the second century, it first rose to its full philosophical height in the Gospel of John, which was the result and reconciliation of the antagonism between the Pauline and Petrine parties — then undoubtedly the ordinary view of both the apostolic and immediately post-apostolic writings must be false. But the evidence is inspired by the *a priori* theory, instead of the theory being constructed on the evidence; and in consequence the evidence is, naturally enough, to say the least, very far-fetched and feeble. For example, Dr. Baur's own treatment of Clement and other apostolic Fathers, both in his work on the Trinity and elsewhere, is scandalously defective, considering the attention he bestows on others of far less importance. Our intention here is, not to discuss the critical questions at issue; this has been done, in a masterly manner, by such writers as Dr. Dorner.[1] But we shall add a few general observations designed to show that the theory of the Tübingen school is opposed to, while the ordinary view harmonizes with, both the genius and mission of Christianity and the usual course of human history.

[1] See his Entwickelungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi. Vol. I. on Clement.

1. The primary aim of Christianity is practical; it seeks first of all to influence the life, the conduct; its action on the intellect, as such, is secondary, and, though inevitable, not a necessity of the first order. This was particularly the case at its first appearance. The Jewish and heathen worlds were sunk in utter corruption, and cried out, not so much for new intellectual activity, as for a new moral life. The first Christians, therefore, with the correctness of instinct, devoted their thoughts and labors to Christianity as a redemption from sin and as the principle of a new, righteous social order. They themselves had found deliverance, peace, harmony, and their first impulse was to propagate these blessings in the enslaved, troubled, and discordant world around them. Christianity can never be introduced on a wide scale, or get firm footing among men, unless it be first viewed and proclaimed in its purely practical features. To take its theoretical aspects as the starting-point is equivalent, in fact, to a complete reversal of its essence and mission. If this be the case, then Clement and his contemporaries deserve the praise of having done precisely the work which required immediately to be done — a praise they would not have merited had they been productive in the manner deemed necessary by the Tübingen school.

2. Christianity is undoubtedly intended to assume the form of a system of truth in the intellect of man; but it can only do so by first taking root in his moral and spiritual nature. Even now it is not communicable as a mere intellectual system, apart from certain spiritual conditions; and yet we have grown up under its influence, and it has determined both the form and substance of our thought. He who would truly understand — intellectually, scientifically understand — the Christian system, must have felt the power of Christ's redeeming love. Till then he stands outside of it; and, as such, may perhaps have some inkling of its inner beauty and self-consistency; but a vital comprehension, never. How much truer must this have been at its first appearance in the world! What folly to have pre-

sented it as a system of truth glorious though it be, to the corrupt and sceptical contemporaries of the apostles! The way to its intellectual appreciation lay through the heart and life. Not only was it natural, therefore, that those who had experienced the power of the new Gospel should be absorbed in the praise, meditation, and diffusion of its practical effects; but even in relation to the development of the truths of Christianity as an intellectual, as a scientific, matter, their course was the only one appropriate to the circumstances of the case. Any such immediate attention to the doctrinal aspects of Christianity as is demanded by the Tübingen school would have defeated its own ends. Instead of a generation of men being prepared for taking up the work in a living manner, the existing thinkers would have wasted their efforts on each other, and, like all systems predominantly and permanently theoretical, Christianity would shortly have become a dead letter, instead of being a living power in the world.

3. If the central feature of Christianity be Christ and the deeds he wrought for the redemption of men, then we can fully account for both the vagueness as to form, and the loftiness as to substance, of the utterances regarding Christ and other matters contained in the apostolic and post-apostolic writings. The doctrinal distinctness we now demand would have been unnatural. How was it possible for those who had come into personal contact with Christ, and had experienced his marvellous saving power, to enter at once into those investigations which are presupposed by a formal doctrine? They all — and for our present purpose we may include the generation to which the apostles preached — believed in the person whom they had felt and handled; their conversion to Christ had been brought about by personal contact or by news from the lips of such as had themselves seen. They had not, like us, previously received cold, formal instruction; the gospel came, simultaneously, as news for the head and news for the heart.

In illustration of these remarks, let us adduce one point:

Was it to be expected that all who had lived with Christ and heard of his life, as a human being, should at once be prepared distinctly to designate him God? His immediate disciples and their converts — for example, Clement — did indeed employ the most manifold terms to exalt him and express his dignity, short of styling him God. We find, however, in confirmation hereof, that precisely those books which were written latest, bear the strongest traces of a doctrinal, a speculative, estimate of the person of Christ; and why? because as time elapsed, the direct, personal impression wore off, and the mind became more free to inquire into the nature and constitution of the marvellous being who had revealed God and redeemed their life from death. We have here only repeated in another form, what theologians long ago expressed, to wit, that though the canonical books contain all the concrete materials out of which the doctrines of the church may be fairly formed, they do not give us the doctrines themselves, as such. And this holds as completely good of the post-apostolic writers.

From this point, also, light is thrown on the question of Ebionism, of which so much has been made by the Tübingen school. They assert, namely, that Ebionism was the first form of belief regarding the person of Christ, and that the higher forms of belief are the result of the conflict, marriage, and development of the original and of new elements. It may be true that it was one of the first forms of belief, especially after reflection had begun; but it is by no means so clear that it was the only form, or the truest form. That some of the first disciples might have been, or at any rate became, Ebionites, may be safely allowed by him whose impression of the glory of the only begotten of the Father is even now as profound as possible; and for the following additional reasons: The disciples of Christ were content at first simply to believe in him who had lived before their eyes; he had occupied the highest possible position in their minds; few if any of them had found it necessary to undertake a more precise definition of his position in rela-

tion to God and man; in other words, they had formed no doctrine of his person. But in course of time, especially when it became incumbent on them to give reasons why others should believe in Christ, who had never seen him, many found it necessary to come to some decision. The simple-minded would then, as now and ever, rest satisfied with saying, I have experienced this and that. Those of higher intellectual force and culture would divide into two classes: such as were of a more spiritual, meditative, speculative cast of mind, would take the step recognizing Christ to be the Son of God — a step logically and practically inevitable to all who fairly weigh the facts and have proper insight into their own needs; such, on the contrary, as were of a colder, more matter-of-fact cast of mind would at first desire to remain where they were, but afterwards fall back, recognize merely the man in Christ, and thus constitute the Ebionitical party.

4. It is in harmony with the ordinary course of history that the development of religious life and thought under the apostles should be unusually full and varied, and that there should be a comparative falling off immediately afterwards.

Great eras in the history of mind are seldom such in merely one aspect. The rich life that has been accumulating manifests itself in many directions almost simultaneously. So was it at the age of Socrates; so at the age of the Reformation: poetry, philosophy, art, theology, suddenly attained a height to which the majority of men have never since been able to climb. Indeed, every nation that has borne a part in the culture of humanity has had its golden age; in other words, an age when it evinced unusually profound and varied productiveness, and gave an impulse to coming generations.

Why, then, should it be otherwise at that great crisis in the religious history of humanity, the appearance of the Son of God on earth? It is true, neither this nor any other golden era has appeared without preparation; but all experience is against the Tübingen position, that the work done

in less than one century must have extended over nearly double the time; and experience is equally favorable to the supposition that, within the life of the first apostles, seeds of systems were sown, antagonisms were brought to light, and reconciliations effected, for whose full development long centuries would be necessary. Had it not been the case, we might fairly doubt whether a new divine life had been really poured through the perishing organism of humanity.

History, too, equally teaches that such extraordinarily fruitful eras are usually followed by periods of comparative calm and sterility. It is so in the inner life of every earnest thinker and earnest believer; he has his times of sudden manifold growth and expansion, followed by times of dearth and seeming relapse. There is not a real falling-off in either case; but time is required to bring the great mass of humanity up towards the point which its heroes have reached, as it were at a single bound; this, in fact, is the specific mission of such heroes; they appear, not for their own sake, but for the sake of others. In other words, a productive, is, and must ordinarily be succeeded by, a digestive and reproductive age. But for this the history of humanity would present the spectacle of a series of brilliant flashings forth of intellectual and religious life, but would not be marked by a steady progress of all classes from a lower to a higher state.

Religious revivals, also, are generally followed by seasons of apparent relapse; but the relapse is not real. The suddenly-received convictions and life have to be incorporated with the entire man, and the new power for influence acquired has to be brought to bear on others; both which are slow and gradual processes. Humanity as a whole may be likened to a traveller wandering towards the highest point of a mountain-range. Sometimes he plainly and rapidly rises, for the scenes on which he looks back grow suddenly wider and grander. At other times he pursues his path along level plateaus, or even descends into vallies, and then it is as though he were losing ground and going back; but

this is only seeming; for in reality he is constantly progressing; and, once arrived at the goal, he will see how the sudden ascents, the repeated descents, and the even plains were each and all so many steps lying between him and the summit he had purposed to surmount.

The sudden and, as the Christian church to its consolation and strength believes, supernatural leap taken by the apostles produced at once great practical results; but these results have required, and will still require, many, many ages for their intellectual appreciation. And we can only rejoice that their successors carried on the work begun, not indeed in the manner which the wise of this world deem glorious and good, but still in the very manner necessary to the salvation of men and the glory of God.

Let us now briefly recapitulate. Our object has been to draw from the Epistle of Clement an indirect argument for the reality of the events, and the authenticity of the books, on which the Christian church bases its existence. The following are the steps in our argument:

1. The Epistle of Clement is a work whose authorship and authenticity are critically established.

2. Its teachings, notwithstanding their formal vagueness, are substantially identical with all the orthodox creeds and with the canonical writings.

3. The character of its author, its own tone, and the tone of similar writings ascribed to the same period, warrant the belief that these teachings reflect, both as to form and substance, the spirit of the then church.

4. If such be the case, when we consider, on the one hand its intellectual unproductiveness, and on the other its grand ideas and deeds, we are compelled to assume that an age of unusual life and activity immediately preceded.

5. On examining the canonical writings, we find just such deeds and thoughts as furnish a key to the phenomena of the post-apostolic age.

6. We accordingly conclude that these deeds were

wrought and these thoughts recorded at the time and in the manner commonly supposed.

7. We have, lastly, added a few observations intended to meet the latest objections to the church's view of the apostolic and post-apostolic ages.

ARTICLE II.

THE FIRST ELEVEN CHAPTERS OF GENESIS ATTESTED BY THEIR CONTENTS.[1]

BY PROF. HORATIO B. HACKETT, NEWTON, MASS.

A DISTINGUISHED writer, Max Duncker, begins his excellent History of Antiquity with a general remark respecting

[1] The following Article consists mainly of a free translation of a portion of Professor Auberlen's "Die göttliche Offenbarung: Ein apologetischer Versuch." Erster Band, pp. 123–163. The volume which contains this extract was published in 1861, and is regarded as the ablest production of that eminent scholar. The second volume has just come to hand, entitled "Zur Lehre vom Menschen als religiösem Wesen," but proves, alas! to be a fragment only, in consequence of the death of the author, and appeared as a posthumous work, in July of the last year. A friendly hand has prefixed to the unfinished treatise a brief sketch of the writer's life and character. It is a beautiful picture, and portrays to us a man who was thoroughly in earnest, whose religious convictions were heartfelt, who had received the word of God into his soul as a source of life and power, was a faithful worker for the cause of his Lord and Master, and when the last hour came could say, with a full consciousness of its solemnity: 'God be thanked, of death I have no fear; the Lord Jesus is my light and my song'; and in the joy of that faith passed quietly away.

It is proper to state that some parts of the essay, as presented here, are an abstract of the original, rather than a version. It was the more necessary to be thus free in some passages, because the author's style is unusually terse and idiomatic, and has so many expressions borrowed from the philosophical phraseology of the Germans. A few additional notes and references have been inserted and two or three paragraphs abridged, but nothing, of course, has been added or omitted which affects in any way the argument or ideas of the writer. After having been occupied so much, in the course of recent criticism, with the historical and philological grounds on which the claims of the Pentateuch are vindicated, it may be profitable, and serve to augment the force of other considerations, if we turn our thoughts to the internal argument, which Dr. Auberlen has so ably unfolded in the pages here laid before the reader.

the lands of Africa as divided by the equator; and then, on the second page, proceeds to speak of the lands and people of Egypt. He passes over, without a single word, the fundamental preliminary questions which pertain to ancient history, and brings us, by a single step as it were, into the presence of the various nations of which he writes. It is certainly, in many respects, a wise and commendable reserve which excludes the obscure domain of first causes and effects from the sphere of history. But it is a characteristic sign of our times that we consider it so wise to confine ourselves here to the middle of things, and not to inquire after their beginnings and ends, while in other studies the investigators who have most repute for wisdom are those who search most deeply for ultimate reasons and principles. In truth, it is hardly correct to speak here of a history of antiquity, in any proper sense of the term; at least it is antiquity more as an aggregation of separate parts, than as the representation of a world's common origin and growth. A more correct designation would be a history of the ancient nations. It is the style of history of which Herodotus is father, not that of which Moses is father. Herodotus has written for us a history of antiquity according to this idea, since he leads us, in his narratives, from one nation to another. It corresponds with the point of view of the Greeks, those coryphaei of heathendom, to addict themselves, with love as well as labor, to single objects and detached investigations, and to set forth the results of such study with artistic skill. The historic art, the plastic representation of single forms, reaches here its crowning point. But something different from this is the philosophy of history, a thoughtful, scrutinizing survey of the whole order of life, as it unfolds itself in space and time, therefore not of single nations only, but of the race, and not of the middle only, but also of the beginning and end, of the idea of the world, and its realization in history. It is only such inquiry, extended to the entire range of history, that satisfies the wants of an inquisitive spirit; for such scrutiny, all those works of his-

toric art are, in the end, only preparatory labors. This highest form of history is at present one of our philosophical wants, as Schiller's well-known Academic Inaugural, for example, has shown. Such a view, indeed, does not accord with the tendency of man's fallen nature. The example of Herodotus proves this, and the example of the Greek philosophers, as well as of the Greek historians, proves this. They were not able to raise themselves to the idea of mankind — the idea of humanity. It is only where the true idea of God is, that there can be a true idea of mankind and, consequently, a true idea of history. Hence, also, in this deeper sense the Israelites are the people among whom the genuine feeling of history shows itself, and Moses is the father of history. In this point of view an immense importance belongs to the first eleven chapters of Genesis.

It is a distinguishing peculiarity of the Israelitish people, that their historical recollections have this universal background and circle of view; that their traditions are not only those of a single people, but of a primitive history of the race. In the case of the heathen nations it is not so. As, in general the world, before the Christian age, was rent into separate nationalities, so every nation, at the utmost, goes back merely into its own past existence.

The most cultivated heathen, as the Athenians, regard themselves as autochthones, sprung from their own soil. In this fact the national limitation and the operation of natural and physical laws are abundantly manifest. The people have no idea of any other antecedent of their existence than their own land: the nation is born of the earth where they dwell. About the other nations, upon which they look as barbarians, they trouble themselves but little or not at all, as we find to be true of the Chinese; and if at any time a wider commerce with the world awakens a more general sense of the relationship of nations, they concern themselves with them, as remarked already, only as separate communities. The consciousness of the original connection of the nations, the idea of the human race exists among them only

in a faint degree. If they seem to have any old, primeval recollections, any views concerning heaven and earth, gods and men, which reach beyond their own national history, such imaginations are nothing more than theogonic and cosmogonic myths ; myths into which they have transfused some notions of their own origin, and out of which, in turn, they have drawn some of the notions themselves.

Israel also, though in a different way, holds an attitude of strict separation from the other nations. The opposition between people of God and nations of the world is a similar one to that between Greeks and barbarians. Not only so, but the result of the political connections into which this people were drawn in the course of time, was to increase rather than diminish the consciousness of this difference between them and other nations. Israel had no Herodotus, who has written a history of the Egyptians, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Persians, though the Jews were brought so much into contact with all these nations. General history in this sense, or that of the world, is more strictly a worldly science, and not one of a religious people, like the Israelites. The peculiarity of Israel lies, not in their culture, but in their sense of the primitive relations of men to each other. They have not only a clearer and more complete knowledge of their own origin since the time of Abraham than any other people, but a knowledge which goes back, beyond their own origin, to that of mankind, and recognizes the unity as distinctly as the separation : the lineage is Abraham, Noah, Adam. It has been justly pointed out as a noteworthy fact, that Genesis represents the ark as landing, not on Lebanon or Sinai, but on Ararat, a locality entirely foreign to Israel; while the heathen, for the most part, in their traditions of the flood, place that event on their own mountains, and convert the patriarchs of the deluge into the original men of their respective lands, and the progenitors of their nation. In the book of Genesis, therefore, the national barrier is broken through from the very outset; the people of Israel, with all their *particularism*, are

the most human, the most universal, people in the world. This fact stands connected, manifestly, with their religion. Since the people to whom the light of revelation was given, lift themselves above nature and the world to God, their range of view rises above the natural limits of their position, and surveys the broad field of humanity. Jehovah is Elohim, the national God of the Israelites is the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth. From the beginning it is declared as explicitly as possible that God has established the particularism in their case upon the most universal foundation, and for a most universal object; so that the distinction between Israel and the heathen world is one of principle, and not accidental, and transcends infinitely that between Greeks and barbarians. Israel, therefore, has from the beginning what may be termed a consciousness of the universality of history; it sees relations in its past and its future, which concern man in general, and which are fraught with blessings for all the races of the earth. That which Hellas reached, after a long time, and only in a very weakened and limited degree as the fruit of culture, the people of Israel possessed from the first, in all its universality and fulness, by means of their religion. Here, again, we have disclosed to us another and deeper insight into the original connection between religion and history. The chosen race, with their true knowledge of God, and in virtue of it, have preserved the primitive recollections of mankind, and with these recollections have preserved the true knowledge of God. The two go hand in hand with each other; and hence the truth respecting the knowledge of God which we find in Genesis is a guarantee for the truth of its traditions, as the truth of the history is a guarantee for the truth of the religion.

Had we not the information contained in the first eleven chapters of Genesis; had we only the myth of the heathen or the speculations of philosophers and the observations of naturalists, to instruct us concerning the beginning of the world and of mankind, we should be in the deepest darkness

on these subjects. These chapters and the prophecies of scripture supplement and illustrate each other: there we have the true explanation respecting the first things, here respecting the last; there respecting the principles, here respecting the ends of history; there respecting the original cause, here respecting the object of the world. Without this twofold knowledge, past and prospective, a universal history, a history of philosophy, is impossible.[1] But prophecy is not only thus correlative, but has its roots also in these chapters, since upon them all later revelation in general is founded. Fortunately, the primitive recollections of our race contained in them have pervaded our entire modes of thought to a much greater extent than we ourselves are aware, and even control the views of those who think they must reject the historical character of those documents. These chapters uphold and perpetuate the consciousness of mankind concerning their own nature, formed after the image of God, concerning their original nobility and their eternal destination.

This high purpose the first eleven chapters of Genesis fulfil in the most simple form. They do not display, it is true, the historic art of the Greeks; but what they relate groups itself around the genealogy which appears so dry to us in occidental lands. Yet this peculiarity itself impresses the stamp of internal truth and of the remotest antiquity on the record. Genealogical registers, transmitted orally or by writing, are the simplest, most original expression of the historical feeling, which attaches itself, in this instance, to the first form of human relationship, to wit, the family, and this at first takes up history only on the side of its natural basis, founded in the law of derivation or descent. Hence genealogical registers are, without doubt, the oldest medium through which history was handed down among men. We find them existing among the nations of the east, as they begin to elevate themselves from that mere consciousness

[1] Perhaps the History of Redemption by President Edwards, in its idea and plan, recognizes this conception of history as perfectly as any similar work from human hands.

of the natural relations to the wider consciousness of history, as, for example, among the Arabs. At the same time they serve as a means of adjusting the chronology, especially when, as in the fifth and eleventh chapters of Genesis, the year when the patriarchs had sons, and the duration of their lives are preserved with them. Thus tables of genealogy furnish the casting or framework of history, in their names and numbers; but these data are to the oriental living things; they are to him as a gallery of family pictures, with which an ever-fresh remembrance and oral tradition may connect many particulars which are not recorded.[1] The case of the Table of Nations, so called, in the tenth chapter of Genesis, shows how readily the genealogical register advances to historiography: the genealogy becomes ethnography, and the ethnography becomes history.[2] Scattered through this Table are notices concerning the incipient organization of states and kingdoms, with which history in the narrower sense begins.

Hebrew antiquity also employs the genealogical form for the purpose of making it the vehicle of transmitting that higher view of human destiny which is derived from the light of revelation. It is the form specifically adapted to the design of a book which has to do with the earliest origin of the holy people as a distinct family, and then, still further back, as descended from the first human pair. Hence the principle of classification which pervades Genesis is that of the ten Tolethoth,[3] i.e. procreations, generations, and in that expression we have the ultimate idea of history.

The genealogical registers which are found in the first

[1] Of the transmission of such accessory facts we have an instance in Gen. v. 21–24: "And Enoch lived sixty and five years, and begat Methuselah. And Enoch walked with God, after he begat Methuselah, three hundred years, and begat sons and daughters. And all the days of Enoch were three hundred sixty and five years. And Enoch walked with God; and he was not, for God took him."

[2] See Acts xvii. 26: "And [God] hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth; and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation."

[3] תּוֹלְדוֹת

eleven chapters of Genesis, especially in the fifth and the eleventh, are without doubt extremely ancient, perhaps the oldest examples first of an oral, and then of a written tradition that there are on earth. They derive their importance from two elements, which belong to them: one is the Elohistic or general element, which relates to the past, and the other the Jehovistic or Messianic, which points forward to the future. The former has respect to the human race as God's creatures or offspring; the latter, to the goal or destination for which he designed them. Men were created by God in his image, and therefore the families of men are all regarded as of value in his sight, and deserve to have a place in the sacred tradition and record. But in consequence of the fall, the race have gone astray from the divine original, and become subject to death. Yet they were not doomed on that account to perish, but though smitten with death, might still exist and perpetuate themselves; yea, the perpetuation itself should be a means of deliverance from the corruption into which they had fallen. "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head,"[1] that the divine goal may yet be reached. Upon this great design in the perpetuation of the race as essential to the plan of redemption rests the peculiar biblical importance of the genealogical registers.

But men now sustain various relations to this object, of the continuation of human life after the apostasy. The divergence shows itself at once in the sons of Adam. Some of them, like the mother of the race,[2] hold fast to the divine goal; they are the proper children of this mother, the woman's seed, the true mankind. Others wander farther and farther from the goal, and exclude themselves, as the serpent's seed, from the true mankind. The latter class also, though they have gone astray from the presence of Jehovah,[3] are still enclosed within the power of Elohim;[4]

[1] Gen. iii. 15. [2] Gen. iv. 1, as compared with v. 29.

[3] Gen. iv. 16: "And Cain went out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod, on the east of Eden."

[4] Gen. iv. 27: "God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant."

but the former only have the future hopes of mankind entrusted to them; since they adhere to Jehovah, and Jehovah adheres to them.[1] In other words, those who not only enjoy God's gifts of creation, but cultivate personal communion with him, and the life which springs from it, are his people, and he is their God.[2]

Both directions, the religious and the irreligious, rest upon original acts of the ancestors, a Cain and Ham, Abel and Seth, Shem and Japhet.[3] These original acts, then, transmit their effects to the descendants, and give to the entire line of such posterity its characteristics; since after mankind have once fallen under the power of the flesh the religious moral principle, within certain limits, propagates itself from one to another naturally, i.e. through the operation of the family spirit. From the hereditary law or family spirit the primitive fathers, who are at the same time primitive children, may have been less exempt than we are, for whom the attribute of a freer personality has been won through Christ. While from this point of view a new light is thrown upon the significance of the genealogical tables, we learn also from this source an explanation of another fact: we see why the woman's seed only, the "generations" of Adam, on which the future welfare of mankind depends so much, are regarded as worthy of a continuous genealogy; while of the race of Cain, a few names only are mentioned, and the succession is broken off as soon as the wickedness of the race has reached a characteristic height in Lamech and his family.[4]

The Table of Nations, already mentioned, and the Semitic genealogy,[5] exhibits a similar relation in the period

[1] Gen. iv. 26: "And to Seth, to him also there was born a son; and he called his name Enos: then began men to call upon the name of the Lord"; and Gen. iv. 26: "And he said, Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant."

[2] Ex. vi. 7: "And I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a God: and ye shall know that I am the Lord your God."

[3] See Gen. iv. 3 seq., and iv. 22 seq.

[4] Gen. iv. 17–21.

[5] Gen. iv. 17–21.

after the flood. The Table is carried forward at all points only as far as certain individuals are concerned; and then, as Baumgarten very aptly remarks[1], the Old Testament dismisses the heathen from sacred history. Thenceforward they go their own way, but yet are written in God's book, as not forgotten by his grace, and as destined to share at length in his salvation. The Semitic genealogy, on the contrary, after having traced the line of Seth with so much care hitherto, still follows, in like manner, the holy Messianic race, from the beginning of the restored human family in Noah to the beginning of the people of God in Abraham, where the seed of Abraham and David connects itself, yet further with the seed of the woman.[2] But there is a difference in the two cases which is not unimportant. Before the flood only two lines, as it were, of light and darkness stand opposed to each other; but after the flood there comes forward an intermediate class between Ham, the slave of flesh and sense, and the Jehovistic Shem, through whom the spiritual life of mankind is borne along the ages; and that link is Japhet, the object of a special blessing, the father of a widely-diffused progeny, and representing the highest natural or purely intellectual culture known to the world's history. From Japhet are descended the Greeks, Romans, Germans, and others, who in the tents of Shem became partakers of the blessing.

Thus the Table of Nations, in its connection with Gen. iv. 20 seq., which sets forth Noah's relation to his descendants, illumines the entire history of the world in its moral aspects, as does Gen. iii. 15, where the key-note is first heard: "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." But as the fifth chapter, which contains the generation of the patriarchs, attaches itself to the fourth chapter, which treats of both classes, so

[1] Baumgarten, Theologischer Commentar zum Pentateuch, I. s. 134.

[2] The genealogy of Christ as given in Matth. i. 1 seq. and Luke ii. 23 is instructive here.

here also, in xi. 10 seq., the Messianic genealogy becomes distinct from the general or human genealogy, or, more correctly, the reverse: the former, or human history, appears at this point as manifestly subordinate to the latter, or Messianic, history. The Messianic genealogy forms properly the grand procession which runs through the old covenant, and so through the old world in general. The consciousness of the Israelite, being lifted above itself in its knowledge and aspirations to the divine height, embraces within its survey the wide circle of humanity, and does so precisely in the degree that this circle stands connected with the Messianic line of our race. It is in this same degree, also, that the families of the earth are deemed worthy to see their genealogy written in the sacred primitive records.

With this view of the genealogies, all is simple and natural; and all, at the same time, profound and suggestive. It is the union precisely of these two qualities, depth of meaning and simplicity of form, which constitutes the signature of divine truth. On these characteristics depends the spiritual power of the Bible over the human soul; a power, as all experience has shown, which no historic or poetic or any other art possesses in an equal degree; though there are always some of spoiled tastes who think heaven's manna should not be as coriander seed.[1]

Let us take now a closer view of our history. We learn, from this early age, of three great catastrophes connected with the fall and subsequent judgment, and associated with the three principal names of the genealogical registers; namely, Adam, Noah, and Abraham, which mark respectively the beginning, middle, and end of the series. The name of Adam connects itself with the fall and expulsion from Paradise.[2] The name of Noah connects itself with the flood,[3] and the name of Abraham with the confusion of tongues, the dispersion, and rise of heathenism,[4] resulting from the building of the Babylonian tower. These are the three great

[1] See Num. xi. 7.
[2] Gen. ii.–iii.
[3] Gen. vi.–ix.
[4] Gen. xi. 1–9.

catastrophes which form the presupposition of the present state of our world, since they represent a successive decline from the strength and purity of man's original life, with which also the gradual abbreviation of human life goes hand in hand. From the first catastrophe it arises that our world in general is a fallen world; upon the second depends the present condition of the earth in so many respects; and upon the third, the condition of history, which the diversity of races has so modified. History in the stricter sense, it must be allowed, is essentially a history of nations, and therefore presupposes the existence of the nations. From the eleventh chapter of Genesis, says Johannes von Müller, must begin all universal history.[1] In this sense, what we have here before us is to be termed ante-history, or better, primordial history. If all beginnings are wonderful, we must expect beforehand that these would be such. They are naturally beginnings on a mightier, more colossal scale than the later beginnings, because they lie at the foundation of the present system of things, and consequently have another and earlier foundation of their own. If any one stumbles here at the outset, let him call to mind the testimony of another book, the earth's internal structure, which also presents to us an original world, of more colossal relations than our present one. On the other hand, those who believe the testimony of scripture may not forget that we have not here what has taken place in history, but before history, i.e. something not less actual, but which occurred in a different way, under other conditions of life; as, for example, men nine hundred years old are yet men, but different men from those ninety years old. The further an event lies from the present period of our world, the less may we venture to measure it

[1] The celebrated geographer, Ritter, remarked that there are no ancient writings which the modern researches in history and geography so fully confirm as this eleventh chapter of Genesis and the works of Herodotus. Dr. Gesenius, though in the main so sceptical respecting the histories of the Pentateuch, acknowledged the extraordinary interest of this chapter, and in his lectures on Genesis was accustomed to dwell upon it longer than upon any other five chapters of the book.

by our present standard. This principle holds true especially of the events which relate to Paradise, and may be applied to other cases where it would serve to remove various difficulties. In like manner, we know little or nothing respecting the particular mode of our activity in the future ages of our existence.

If these three catastrophes are the original facts on which the present state of the life of mankind on earth depends, the effects must naturally be still apparent, and, as in other cases, we may reason back here from the effect to the cause. We proceed to some illustrations of this remark.

It has been suggested already, that the Old Testament expression *Gojim*[1] denotes, at the same time, nations and heathen, therefore embraces nationality and religion, and that this is significant and apposite; there are precisely as many heathen religions as there are nations, since every people has its own gods. The second element by which the nations differ from each other is language. Hence the confusion of languages and the dispersion of the nations connect themselves with the tower of Babel as one act.[2] Nationality, religion, language, are the three original elements in the historical life of nations; and it is a striking fact that, while the modern ethnographic, linguistic, historical researches are now causing these elements, in their proper relation to each other, to be more deeply recognized for the first time, the book of Genesis presents them to us already in their organic unity, on the ground of the early traditions. This circumstance may predispose us to look with favor on a record for which so impartial a witness appears.[3]

[1] גּוֹיִם

[2] Gen. xi. 9: "Therefore is the name of it called Babel, because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth: and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth."

[3] "The science of Comparative Philology," says Bunsen, "must present the supposition of such a separation of the nations in Asia as a postulate, especially on the ground of the relation of the Egyptian language to the Semitic languages, if the Bible had not preserved to us this great, truly historical event." — Bibelwerk, Band I. s. 3 a.

Schelling, it is well known, in his Philosophy of Mythology, has treated these questions more seriously than has been usual with writers of his class, and has directed interpreters here into new paths. He takes more positive ground in regard to the history in Genesis, and especially that part of it which relates to the Babylonian tower. In his introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology, he goes into a critique of previous theories concerning the origin of mythology, and he comes to the inquiry: How did nations originate? And, in answering this question, he lays down the following principles: nations were neither always, nor did they begin to be of themselves. All merely physical explanations of the separation of nations are insufficient. "The human race cannot have left the condition in which there were no nations, but only different families, without a crisis in man's spiritual nature which was radical, which must have taken place in the basis itself of human consciousness. It can excite wonder only, that what is so obvious has not been at once acknowledged. For we cannot conceive of different nations without the idea of different languages; and language surely is something that belongs to the soul itself. If the diversity of nations, then, is not something that has not been from the first, but has had an origin, this must be true also of the diversity of languages.

"At this point we find ourselves in harmony with the oldest document of the human race, the Mosaic writings, against which so many have a repugnance, because they know not how to begin with them, how to understand or to use them.[1] The book of Genesis places the origin of nations in connection with the origin of languages, but in such a way as to make the confusion of language the cause, the origin of nations the effect. This narrative has been derived from actual recollection, which has preserved itself, to some extent, also among other nations. It is impossible to

[1] It will be borne in mind that Schelling is led to these speculations as a philosopher merely, and not at all as an apologist for the credibility of the sacred writings.

conceive of a confusion of language without some internal event, without some disturbance of the mental organization itself. This disturbance must affect the soul in its deepest consciousness, its vital elements; and if a confusion of the language hitherto common to all is to take place, the disruption must occur precisely in that which before held mankind together; the spiritual power must be enfeebled which previously restrained every tendency that might be striving to urge men asunder. This power could be only a God who filled entirely the soul's consciousness, who was common to all the human race, a God who drew them, as it were, into his own unity. Polytheism, severing this tie makes a continued unity of the human race impossible. The operation of this innermost event is indeed not stated expressly in the Mosaic tradition; but when it names merely the next cause, i.e. the confusion of languages, it has at least intimated the remote and last cause, i.e. the origin of polytheism.

"Of these intimations one only may be mentioned now, viz. that Babel is represented in scripture as the scene of the confusion, the place of the future great city Babylon. An entirely independent testimony leads also to the result that the transition to polytheism, properly so called, took place at Babylon. The idea of heathenism, i.e. strictly, in other words, of the formation of nations, as such, is so inseparably connected with the name of Babel, that even to the last book of the New Testament it stands as the symbol of all that is heathenish, or that is to be viewed as heathenish. Babel is really, as the old narrative says, only a contraction of Balbel,[1] a word which is manifestly onomatopoetic. Singularly enough, the imitation of tone which has disappeared in the pronunciation of Babel, is still preserved in the Greek *βάρβαρος*, which signifies properly one who speaks unintelligibly,[2] and, by means of the familiar

[1] בַּלְבֵּל בָּבֶל

[2] Thus Ovid (Trist. V. 10, 37) says: "Barbarus hic ego sum quia non intelligor ulli."

commutation of *r* and *l*, is formed from the oriental *balbel*. By a similar imitation of sound has arisen the Latin *balbus*, the German *babeln*, *babbeln* (Schwabian), *plappern*, French *babiller*, *babil*, and English *babble*. The connection of religious susceptibilities with susceptibilities or affections of the faculty of speech, is not more mysterious than how, with a particular form of religion, certain peculiarities of the physical constitution also were connected. What else could the speaking with tongues in the Corinthian church be, than the effect of a religious affection or impulse? We are too little accustomed to recognize the principles by which the involuntary excitements of religious sensibility are determined as principles of general importance, and which consequently, under given circumstances, may become the causes of other and even physical effects.

"At all events, the origin of nations, the confusion of tongues, and polytheism are correlated ideas and accompanying phenomena, according to the Old Testament way of thinking. The origin of mythology will fall exactly at the point of transition, where a nation does not yet exist as a distinct nation, but is on the point of separating itself and becoming such. The same must be true of the language of every people; that, too, determines itself first and only when the nation assumes to itself a distinct position. From that period when the languages are not yet separated, but becoming separated, may be dated the names among the Grecian deities which are manifestly not Grecian, but belong to pre-historic times.[1] From that period also may be derived certain points of agreement in the material of languages, which otherwise are formed after altogether different principles. The language of no people arises without some connection with the original unity of languages, and that it seeks to maintain even after its departure from the common stock; for to such a unity, the power of which

[1] In his lecture, Ueber die Gottheitten von Samothrace, Schelling, in common with many others, assigns a Semitic etymology to many of the gods of the Greek mythology.

is never wholly lost, all the phenomena of philology point, as does likewise the conduct of nations, as far as this, notwithstanding the distance of time may still be traced through the mists of antiquity. It is not so much any external incentive as the thorn of inward restlessness, the feeling that they are no longer the entire humanity, but only a part of it; that they belong no longer to the absolute one, but have fallen under the power of a separate god or gods; it is this feeling which drove the wanderers from land to land, from coast to coast, until each nation saw itself alone with itself, and separated from all that is foreign, and had found the place destined for them and suited to them.[1] This fear of the entire disappearance of man's native unity, and, with that, of all truly human consciousness, suggested to them not only the first institutions of a religious kind, but even their first political organizations, the object of which was no other than to enable them to retain and secure against further destruction what they had rescued from the apostasy."

So far the words of Schelling. We quote them not because we would adopt them all as our own, but as showing that revelation and the philosophy of which some think so highly are not always in conflict with each other.

Before passing from this topic, we subjoin a few remarks upon it from the ethical point of view. The idea of humanity is one of the most beautiful and one of the truest ideas of our time, because in its genuine form it is a Christian idea, although some have often and greatly wrested it from its Christian foundation, and have misused and perverted it. But in its proper scope the idea of humanity is co-extensive with the unity of the human race. All men are brothers. It is the violation of this consciousness, the violation of man's dignity, which so shocks us in the slavery of the negro race, and which urged, for example, an Alex-

[1] Deut. xxxii. 8: "When the Most High divided the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel."

ander von Humboldt to exert himself against it to his life's end. The same principle of our nature, transferred from social to international relations, gives to noble minds such a passion for the idea of universal peace, for the fraternization of nations, and causes war, the mutual slaughter of nations, to appear, not in its consequences only, but in its very nature, as something horrible, and that ought not to be. And though peace congresses and schemes of that nature may be only chimeras now, yet a new age of the world will come, when men shall change their swords into ploughshares.

The contrast between this ideal of the unity of our race and the present reality is a painful one to contemplate. Humanity has been split into a variety of nations, each one of which forms an exclusive whole by itself; they understand each other neither externally nor internally, neither in language nor religion. Nay, for the most part, each nation despises all others in comparison with itself as barbarian, and treats them as enemies, and considers itself alone as the "middle kingdom." The egoism which we regard in individuals as the root of sin, is found among nations, in general, more sharply defined than in single instances. This fact agrees as little with the notion of a true humanity in the one case as in the other; it is something abnormal, but at the same time humiliating; it is guilt, but at the same time punishment. The great majority of the nations stand upon a step of existence so low that it hardly deserves to be called human. And who has not felt it to be like a curse resting upon the most cultivated nations, to find when he has been with "strangers," and was conscious of an inward harmony with them, that he could only imperfectly at best communicate his thoughts and feelings? Humanity at present fails to give scope and activity to the common life; instead of being a living organism, putting the parts into joyous sympathy with each other, it consists of disrupted members.

If we are really in earnest about these thoughts, as we

should be where the question concerns what ought to be and what is, we must infer that there was some original transgression of our race by which its organism became rent and divided. We are led, then, to interrogate history, to ask the old tradition if it knows of any such event in the infancy of mankind. Here Genesis presents to us the tower of Babel as the solution of the riddle. It shows us, in the case of Noah and his descendants, that the Creator's design at the beginning was, that men should unfold an organic unity of life though separated locally from each other; but the entire race conspired together to thwart this purpose. Instead of seeking an inner unity in God, they sought an outer one in a visible, colossal work of their own hands, and, in consequence of this, God, by confounding their language, caused the dispersion and disruption of mankind to take the place of the diffusion without division, which should have been their destiny. In tearing themselves away from God, in the heaven-daring act of the building of the tower, they lost God, but at the same time lost also themselves. Only in God, who, as the ground of life, is also the bond of life to all creatures, could they be one and duly manifold, according to their true nature. In tearing asunder the bond of unity with God, they tore asunder likewise the bond of unity which links the members with one another; for which reason, on the other hand, the reconciliation of men with God is their reconciliation with one another.[1] There was now strictly no mankind any longer, but only nations, which God left to go their own way.[2] But every falling away from God is, at the same time, a falling

[1] So we learn in Eph. ii. 14–16: "For he is our peace, who hath made both one, and hath broken down the middle wall of partition between us; having abolished in his flesh the enmity, even the law of commandments contained in ordinances; for to make in himself of twain one new man, so making peace; and that he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross, having slain the enmity thereby."

[2] Acts xiv. 15, 16: "That ye should turn from these vanities unto the living God, which made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein; who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways."

under the dominion of the world and its princes. So it is here. The nations, left to themselves, came under the controlling influence of the powers of nature, of climate, soil, and other physical elements, to which they could no longer offer a sufficiently strong countervailing energy from within. Out of this fact are to be explained the great diversities of races; the circumstance that only a small part of mankind, relatively, attain to historical importance, namely, the nations that dwell in the temperate zones, while the hot and cold regions hinder so much the development of the inhabitants that they are degraded to a half-brutish existence; and, finally, all the separations and exclusive limitations, egoisms, and hostilities of nations, of which we have spoken above.

We close this part of the subject, by mentioning the local tradition respecting the Babylonian tower, which M. Oppert, one of the most learned of the European savans, has recently brought to light.[1] It is one of the cuneiform inscriptions, as deciphered by him, found on a cylinder which Rawlinson discovered among the ruins of Babylon. The writing purports to be from Nebuchadnezzar, and, among other things, says: "The temple of the seven lights of the earth [the planets], the original edifice of Borsippa, was built by an ancient king; since then are reckoned forty-two generations; but the summit he did not finish. The men had abandoned it [the structure] after the flood, because they found their words confused. The earthquake and thunder had shattered the bricks, had torn down the casings of burnt tiles, and the materials of the walls were thrown together and formed hills. The great god, Merrdach, had put it into my heart to build it again; I have not changed the place, and have not disturbed the foundations. In the month of salvation, on the auspicious day, I have pierced the unburnt brick of the walls and the burnt brick of the casings with arches; I have inscribed the glory of my name on the frieze of the arches."

[1] He went to Mesopotamia in the service of the French government, and published the results of that journey in the Journal Asiatique, 1857.

If this interpretation of Oppert be confirmed,[1] then we have two points here in particular which are very important. Among the ruins of Borsippa, the castle of the ancient Babylon, which lay on the southwest of the city, between the outer and the inner circle of walls, is found still a hill of ruins, which the popular tradition calls Birs Nimrud (Nimrod's Tower), and also Tower of Languages, and concerning which it affirms that it is a relic of the ancient tower of Babel. Modern scholars have naturally rejected this as a myth, and have seen there only remains of the temple of Belus, built by Nebuchadnezzar and described by Herodotus. This inscription now, if reliable, would show that both views are correct, inasmuch as Nebuchadnezzar built his temple purposely on the site of the ancient tower. The architectural document — for so we may term that inscription — gives the local tradition respecting that famous structure of ancient times, as still well known on the ground itself. This tradition of the country relates the substance of the matter in accordance with Genesis;[2] it is a vast edifice, which, in consequence of a great catastrophe, remains unfinished; and from it dates the confusion of tongues. But not less remarkable is the chronological indication. King Nebuchadnezzar reigned B.C. 604–561, and the building of the tower, according to the biblical chronology,[2] is to be placed in the twenty-third century before Christ; the intervening period is about sixteen hundred years, which agrees very well with the forty-two generations of the cylinder, if we allow thirty-five or forty years to each. This result is not unimportant, in view of modern objections, which charge the chronology of Genesis with errors of centuries.

We proceed to speak, next, of the flood. As an event in

[1] Our understanding of the cuneiform character is still imperfect, and we must wait for additional light before we can be sure of every item. Ewald has raised serious doubts as to some of the conclusions. It is certain, at all events, that no one has so deciphered these monuments as to find any contradiction between them and the Bible.

[2] See Gen. x. 25; xi. 16.

nature, this catastrophe, of course, shows its effect not in the condition of mankind, but that of the earth only. Such effect it does show abundantly, as geology proves to us. This science indeed, as it appears, testifies in an undoubted manner to a series of earlier great catastrophes of this nature, on our globe; but this fact naturally does not exclude, but includes, a confirmation of the flood as the last of such revolutions. As there have been so many creative epochs, some have more frequently used geology as a weapon against the truth of Genesis. On the contrary, it is to be observed that these changes, as to the principle which they involve, furnish a strong proof of the biblical view of the world, as opposed to the modern one; inasmuch as they disprove, most decisively, every supposition of the eternity of the world's present state, and of a constant sameness of the conditions under which life exists. It should be added, that as far as regards the particular theories and the particular periods of geology, this science is still too young and too unsettled to allow us to draw so hastily from them any certain conclusions either for the confirmation or the refutation of the Bible. The case is similar to that of Egyptology and its centuries. We should leave these sciences, and also theology, to unfold themselves, free and unopposed, by the side of each other; in the end, the harmony between them will make itself evident, as certainly as the God of revelation is no other than the God of nature and history.

In addition to the geological evidence, there may and must be another evidence for the flood, if, as we read in the book of Genesis, the father of the renewed human race was a witness of that event. This supplementary evidence is that of the traditions found among all nations. A stupendous catastrophe like this must have left traces of its remembrance everywhere. So it is in fact. Alexander von Humboldt says: "The old traditions of the flood which we find scattered over the earth, like the ruins of a great shipwreck, are highly interesting in the philosophical study of

our own species. Like certain families of the vegetable kingdom, which, notwithstanding the diversity of elements and the influence of light, retain the impression of a common type, the traditions of nations respecting the origin of the world display everywhere the same physiognomy, and present features of resemblance that fill us with astonishment. How many different tongues, belonging to branches that appear totally distinct, transmit to us the same fact! The traditions concerning races that have been destroyed, and the renewal of nations, scarcely vary in reality, though every nation gives them a local coloring. In the great continents, as on the smallest islands of the Pacific ocean, it is always on the loftiest and nearest mountains that the remains of the human race have been saved; and this event appears the more recent, in proportion as the nations are uncultivated, and as the knowledge they possess of their own existence is not remote. After having studied with attention the Mexican monuments anterior to the discovery of the New World; after having penetrated into the forests of the Orinoco, and seen how insignificant and disconnected are the European settlements, and in what condition the independent tribes have remained, we are compelled to say that it is impossible to ascribe this coincidence to the influence of missionaries and of Christianity on the national traditions. Nor is it at all more probable that the discovery of sea-shells on the summit of mountains gave birth, among the nations of the Orinoco, to the tradition of some great inundation, which extinguished for a time the germs of organic life on the earth."[1]

Of these traditions, which point so significantly to the past, it is proper to mention here a few examples. Humboldt himself relates the following, which he found among the South American Indians on the Orinoco: "The natives of this region entertain the belief that at the time of the great waters, when their fathers were forced to have re-

[1] Travels to the Equinoctial Regions of America. See Bohn's Scientific Library, Vol. II. p. 183.

</transription>

course to boats, to escape the general inundation, the waves of the sea beat against the rocks of Encaramanda. This belief is not confined to one nation singly, the Tamanacs; it makes part of a system of tradition, of which we find scattered notions among the Maypures of the great cataracts, among the Indians of the Rio Erevato, which runs into the Caura, and among almost all the inhabitants of the Upper Orinoco. When the Tamanacs are asked how the human race survived this great deluge, the 'age of water' of the Mexicans, they say: 'A man and a woman saved themselves on a high mountain, called Tamanacu, situated on the banks of the Anveru; and casting behind them, over their heads, the fruits of the Mauritia palm-tree, they saw that the seeds contained in those fruits produced men and women, who repeopled the earth.' Between the banks of the Cassiquiare and the Orinoco, hieroglyphic figures are often seen at great heights, on rocky cliffs which could be accessible only by constructing very lofty scaffolds. When the natives are asked how these figures could have been sculptured, they answer with a smile, as if relating a fact of which a white man only could be ignorant, that at the period of the great waters, their fathers went to that height in boats."

We follow the sun still further west, and find like traces of a primitive fact on the islands of the Pacific. As the English missionary, Mr. Ellis, was preaching in Owhyhee, one of the Sandwich islands, on the subject of Noah and the flood, his hearers remarked that they had received from their forefathers an account of a general inundation which overflowed the land except a small point of the mountain Kea. Two men, they said, escaped the universal destruction which overtook all others; but of a ship and of Noah they had never heard. The inhabitants of Tahiti, one of the South Sea islands, say, in explanation of their origin, that "the supreme God, a long time ago, being angry, dragged the earth through the sea, when their island was broken off and preserved."

The American explorer, Wilkes, found that even the Fí-

jís had been reached by this great terror of mankind.[1] They say that, "after the islands had been possessed by the first man and woman, a great rain took place by which they were finally submerged; but before the highest places were covered by the waters, two large double canoes made their appearance. In one of these was Rokora, the god of carpenters, in the other, Rokola, his head workman, who picked up some of the people and kept them on board until the waters had subsided, after which they were again landed on the island. It is reported that in former times canoes were always kept in readiness against another inundation. The persons thus saved, eight in number, were landed at Mbenga, where the highest of their gods is said to have made his first appearance. By virtue of this tradition the chiefs of Mbenga take rank before all others, and have always acted a conspicuous part among the Fíjís."

The American aborigines in the extreme north are familiar with the same tradition, modified, as is natural, by their location and habits. The Dog-rib Indians heard from their fathers, as they say, that "the first man was named Chapewee. He lived with his family on a strait between two seas.[2] Having there constructed a weir to catch fish, such a quantity were taken that the strait was choked up, and the water rose and overflowed the earth. Chapewee embarked with his family in a canoe, taking with him all manner of birds and beasts. The water covered the earth for many days, but at length Chapewee said: We cannot live always thus, we must find land again; and he accordingly sent a beaver to search for it. The beaver was drowned, and his carcase was seen floating on the water; on which Chapewee despatched a musk-rat on the same errand. The second messenger was long absent, and when he did return, was near dying with fatigue, but he had a

[1] Exploring Expedition.

[2] Manifestly Beering's Straits, which the tribe crossed at some remote period. That the aborigines conceive of America as an island, is a remarkable testimony to their migration thither from Asia, beyond the water.

little earth in his paws. The sight of the earth rejoiced Chapewee, but his first care was about the safety of his faithful servant, the rat, which he rubbed gently with his hands and cherished in his bosom until it revived. He next took up the earth, and moulding it with his fingers, placed it on the waters, where it increased by degrees until it formed an island in the ocean."[1]

In the Mexican city of Cholulu is found a wonderful pyramidal temple or Teocalli (house of God), which was consecrated to the first man, Quetzalcoatl. With this temple is associated a tradition which connects the flood and the building of the tower in a very remarkable manner. Alexander von Humboldt relates it thus: "Before the great inundation, in the year 4008 after the creation of the world, the land of Anahuac (Mexico) was inhabited by giants. All those who did not perish in the great inundation were, with the exception of seven who had taken refuge in caves, changed into fish. When the waters had subsided, one of these men, named Xelhuar, the architect, went to Chololltun (Cholulu), where he erected an artificial hill, of a pyramidal form, in memory of the mountain Tlalok, which had served him and his six brothers as a place of shelter. The bricks for this purpose he caused to be made in the province of Tlamanalco, and in order to bring them to Cholulu, he placed a row of men, in line, who passed them to each other from hand to hand. The gods saw this building with displeasure, and, enraged at the audacity of Xeluhar, hurled fires against the pyramid. Many laborers perished; the work was not continued, and they afterward consecrated the structure to the god of the air, Quetzalcoatl (the first man of the golden age)."[2] This history, adds Humboldt himself, reminds us of the ancient traditions of the East, which the Hebrews relate in their sacred books. The Cholulanians still preserve a stone which, as they say, fell out of the clouds like a ball of fire, on the pyramid. This aerolite has the form of a turtle.

[1] Franklin's Second Expedition to the Shores of the Polar Sea, pp. 291, 292.
[2] Ansichten der Cordilleren (Vues des Cordillères), I. s. 42 f.

In order to show the age of this story, about Xelhutzs, father Rios (who had previously, viz. about 1566, communicated the tradition according to hieroglyphic pictures) remarks that it was contained in a song which the Cholulanians were accustomed to sing at their festivals, while they danced about the Teocalli, and that this song began with the words "Tulanian hululaëz," which occur in no one of the Mexican languages. Everywhere on the globe, upon the summits of the Cordilleras as on the islands of Samothrace in the Aegean sea, fragments of the original languages have preserved themselves in the religious usages of men." So far Humboldt.

It is especially noticeable, as Humboldt points out, that the pyramid of Cholulu has the same formation as the tower of Belus at Babylon, according to the description of Herodotus. This agrees fully with what has been ascertained from the inscription of Nebuchadnezzar respecting the tower of Belus. That temple, as appears from the remains of the edifice, and as affirmed in the still living tradition, was a restoration of the ancient tower of Babel, and would be constructed naturally according to the original model. Lücken extends the comparison still further. He finds a significant similarity between the Babylonian tower and the pyramidal structures which are found not only in Mexico, Babylon, and Egypt, but appear in all parts of the earth as the oldest buildings and monuments of the nations, such as the Indian pagodas, the Buddhist stupas, the Chinese thas, the morais in the South Sea islands.

In the same sense, Schelling says: "The nations sought to hold themselves together externally, by means of these monuments, evidently of a pre-historic age, which are found in all parts of the Roman world, and, by their size and mode of construction, afford evidence of an almost superhuman strength; and by which we are involuntarily reminded of that fatal tower which the oldest narrative mentions when it speaks of the dispersion of the nations. The builders say to each other: 'Come now, let us build us a city, and a

tower whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the earth.'"

"Such traditions of a flood," says Lücken, "are, if possible, more common in the new world than in the old. The form in which the natives relate them, agrees in such a striking manner with the traits of the Bible history, that we cannot blame the astonished Spaniards if, on their first discovery of that continent, they believed, on account of these and similar traditions, that the apostle Thomas must have preached Christianity there. Truly we must regard it as a work of Providence that this new world, which, perhaps for centuries, unknown to the rest of mankind and separated from them, followed their own course of training, when suddenly discovered in the midst of the light of historical times, shows at once an agreement with the traditions of the old world, which must convince even the most incredulous that all mankind must originally have drank from the same common source of intellectual life."[1]

The Asiatic nations give their testimony to the same effect: "The history of a general inundation of the earth," says Bopp,[2] "as it is related to us in the Mahâbhâreta and several other Indian writings, affords an unmistakable and most remarkable agreement with the Mosaic tradition of the flood." In the preface to his translation of parts of that work out of the Sanscrit, he states the substance of the story as follows: "The Lord of creatures, Brahmâ, the highest existence, appeared to a pious king named Manus, and announced to him the impending deluge, which was to destroy everything. He commanded him to build a ship, and in the time of danger to enter it, and to take with him seeds of all kinds, as they would be named to him, separated from one another. Manus obeyed the command of the

[1] H. Lücken, die Traditionen des Menschengeschlechts oder die Offenbarungen Gottes unter den Heiden.

[2] Die Sündflut u. s. w. aus der Ursprache übersetzt von Franz Bopp. Berlin: 1829.

deity, and brought all seeds into the ship, which he himself then entered. But the ship, guided by the deity, swam many years upon the sea, until it finally settled upon the highest summit of the mountain Himawân (Himalaya), where it was bound fast at the command of the deity. This summit is therefore still named, at this day, Nau-Bandhanam (i.e. ship-binding); and from Manus descends the preserved race of mankind."

It was doubted, at one time, whether the Chinese had any knowledge of a flood. It is now well known that the Chinese form no exception in this respect. Dr. Gutzlaff, for example, states that he saw, in one of the Buddhist temples, "in beautiful stucco, the scene where Kwan-zin, the goddess of mercy, looks down from heaven upon the lonely Noah in his ark, amidst the raging waves of the deluge, with the dolphins swimming around, as his last means of safety, and the dove, with an olive-branch in its beak, flying towards the vessel."[1]

It is sufficient to allude merely to the opinions of the ancient Hellenic and Semitic races. The existence of such traditions among the Greeks and Romans, and the Egyptians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Phoenicians, Persians, were so notorious that the Christian apologist Lactantius,[2] early in the fourth century, could say:[2] "Factum esse diluvium ad perdendam tollenadmque ex orbe terrae malitiam constat inter omnes. Idem enim et philosophi et poetae scriptoresque rerum antiquarum loquuntur, in eoque maxime cum prophetarum sermone consentiunt."[3]

At this point, again, we might pause and ask, as a reason-

[1] As quoted in the Bible Dictionary, Vol. II. p. 672.

[2] De Falsa Religione (II. 10).

[3] It is to be remarked that the diffusion of such a belief in all parts of the earth proves nothing as to the universality of the Mosaic deluge; for if the races were scattered from a common centre, the impression would be the same whether the flood was universal or confined to the region inhabited at the time by man.

Among the sources of fuller information are Smith's Sacred Annals; Calcott on the Deluge; Harcourt's Doctrine of the Deluge; Bryant's Analysis of Ancient Mythology; Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae (Book III. 4); and the summaries in Dr. Smith's Bible Dictionary, Vol. II. p. 571 seq.

able act, that men should reflect on these traditions actually found among the remotest nations. It seems, to us at least, that a common reminiscence of something that has really taken place presents itself as the only rational explanation of this striking agreement, especially as exemplified in so many details. He, indeed, who has his mind preoccupied with certain views of modern mythicism,[1] and measures everything according to his "critical principles respecting mythology and the origin of religions," will seek to escape here also, or find it most agreeable not to regard these things, at least not in a proper manner. But he to whom facts are something that demands attention and consideration (and of such thinkers there are some still, as ever), will perhaps prove the truth of Plato's words: "Wonder is the beginning of knowledge." He will perceive that these primeval traditions of the human race illustrate as much the historical credibility of the Mosaic writings, even in their minute recitals, as they do their essential purity and elevation, in contrast with the heathen myths. In this latter respect it will be seen especially how Israel only, together with the fact, maintains, at the same time, the innermost divine idea of the fact; while the heathen preserve the external forms remarkably enough, but clothe them with fantastic and national costumes. There is a difference here similar to that between the canonical and apocryphal gospels.

Thus it is ever with the truth; and perhaps science will yet, in a still higher degree than the genial man himself thought, bring to recognition what Herder says in reference to the "oldest document of the human race," as he terms it: "Its sound is gone out into all the world, and even into all lands its words! Whence is it that the remotest nations of the earth knew it? How could they build upon it entire systems of religion and mythology, yea, the simplest foundation of all their arts, institutions, and sciences? But if from that source precisely things may be made plain as the

[1] By "mythicism" is meant the science (as some would term it) of finding, understanding, and explaining myths.

sun-light, which otherwise lie there as chaos, a riddle, night itself, where nothing is heard but denial or the jargon of mere hypotheses; if, in general, from this source precisely an entire antiquity may be reduced to order, a thread of light be drawn through the most confused beginnings of nations, which manifestly, as in Corregio's night, spreads itself from the cradle of the human race,— then ye inventors of mythologies, and desecrators of the revelation of God, what say ye then?"[1]

We now go further back, to the first of the three catastrophes, that is, the apostasy or fall. This is, in one respect, but too much like the third, viz. that it has left behind it the deepest traces in the moral condition and life of mankind. What the building of the tower is for the life of nations, the fall is for the human race in general, as well as for the experience of each individual. The evil which exists in us as a matter of fact, if this fact be correctly analyzed, demands for its explanation such an original act and transgression as we find related to us in the book of Genesis. As we look within ourselves here, we find that our moral consciousness involves an apparent contradiction. On the one side, we feel ourselves to be accountable for sin; on the other, we know that the susceptibilities of our nature, which form in us the proper incentives to sin, are involuntary; and this same conscience which holds us accountable for sin, says to us that we have nothing to answer for which is not an act of our own freedom.

In the solution of this contradiction, we must first of all duly consider the difference adverted to in what has just been said — the difference between the sinful act and the sinful state, by which latter term we mean, here, our natural constitution as the source of the sinful propensity. It is clear that we have an accountability for our sins resting upon us, so far as they are deeds, free acts by which we assist the sinful propensities, instead of checking them,

[1] Aelteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts Sämmtliche Werke, Religion, und Theologie (Carlsruhe, 1827), V. s. 187 f.; V. s. 12; VI. s. 4 f.

to break forth and obtain the mastery. Hence the question can only be, whether, and how far, we are accountable for the sinful state itself? This state is our natural constitution; it is innate; we brought it with us into the world, before a free decision was possible for us; and hence theology terms the sinful state the hereditary sin, in distinction from actual sin. For something inherited now, we cannot be accountable, at all events in the same sense that we are for something done by ourselves.

Yet the circumstance that we feel ourselves accountable for the actual sin, leads us to form a remarkable conclusion as to the hereditary sin. There results from this fact at least as much as this, that the hereditary sin does not serve to excuse a sinful act. But this would be the case if we had to recognize in the act a pure natural necessity; for we cannot speak of guilt where there is no freedom. If we felt ourselves absolutely and altogether innocent in reference to hereditary sin, we could hardly charge ourselves with any guilt in reference to actual sins, since we know that these always spring from the hereditary sin—from our carnal nature. Perhaps it itself, would be only the degree of our sinfulness, not the sinfulness that would then appear to us as matter of self-inculpation. On the whole, we could then say, with reason: "It is, after all, my nature; so I cannot otherwise; and as to what I do under a natural necessity, I need not reproach myself for that, or fear that I shall be punished." Spinoza would then be right, when he declares that repentance is unphilosophical; and Carl Vogt, when he combats the rightfulness of punishment. Unless we could recognize also hereditary sin as something that should not be, and yet could be, it would cease to be, and with it all sin of every kind would cease to be, wicked. In some way, therefore, hereditary sin must have a criminal origin, from which I cannot pronounce myself free, although it lies out of me personally. I am involved in an act of guilt which I myself have not committed. But this is only a new contradiction, which demands its solution. Just here, however, this hereditary law, this

idea of something inborn, transmitted, comes to our help. Man is not an isolated, an independent being. The roots of his existence lie in his relation to the species; generation is the mysterious origin of individuals. Each single one stands in organic connection with family, people, mankind. A degraded father leaves shame to his children; a bankrupt leaves debts which rest on the entire family. Thus we cannot take ourselves out of the corruption of our race. Though it is not an individual guilt, it is a collective guilt, in which we all have to bear our part together. In this sense, too, every one among us must say: "homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto." This organic partnership in guilt expresses itself in various ways, inasmuch as every one feels himself concerned in the sins of his family, his native city, his people, though personally he may have no immediate participation in them. Upon this principle depends the profound meaning of a day of general humiliation and repentance. So, therefore, the fact of hereditary sin does not suffice for an exculpation, but deepens and sharpens the consciousness of our sins, so that we know we are born of a perverted race; the aggregative life to which we belong is an unclean one. David well understood this when, in a penitential (not self-justifying) psalm, he says: "Behold, in iniquity was I begotten, and in sin my mother conceived me." But because the entire race of mankind now, as experience shows, are found in this pollution, we are compelled to go back to the first man. If the race, as such, exists in a perverted state, one inherited, and yet accountable in the sense described, then the first man, the progenitor of the race, must have sinned freely. Man must have been originally pure and good; the apostasy must have been his act, his personal guilt. He could and should have actually avoided sin; his sphere of freedom must have been greater than ours, and he must have had a full choice between good and evil. Only where the sinful state is no physical one merely, but ethically conditioned, product of a free act, so that the act with its accountability still trembles through the entire

range of man's existence, then only does the hereditary sin not serve as an excuse for the actual sin ; then only is the contradiction between the "terrible necessity for sinning" and freedom and accountability solved. My sin says to me that Adam has sinned in a different way from my own sin, that is, as one entirely free.

Hereditary sin, i.e. the sinful state in general, as an attribute of mankind, furnishes also a proof of the derivation of the human race from a common parentage. If there were several progenitors, there must have been several acts of apostasy like each other, and the diffusion of sin would be something accidental; whereas the aggregate condition of mankind and nature shows itself to be affected by the same malign power. "Through one man," says Paul, briefly and directly,[1] "sin has come into the world."

Thus a true analysis of our moral conciousness serves as an essential confirmation of the biblical narrative of the fall; and we see also here, again, that Genesis alone takes up the actual fact, and explains it in an adequate manner. If we have only once learned to put correctly the questions of our experience, the Bible constantly furnishes to us the correct answer. That which it positively transmits to us will ever prove itself more and more to be the rational account, the alone *ratio sufficiens* for that which experience places before us in the most diverse relations. Robespierre once said: "If there be no God, we must then invent him"; and that remark we may apply also to God's word and its explanations. If there be no such history of the origin of sin, one should then invent it — if he could; for indeed we learn first to interpret experience aright when the divine light falls upon it. The heavens must illumine what is earthly if one is to see it. The holy scripture is the genuine word of the Spirit; it speaks the genuine language of the Spirit. It is in this sense the scripture κατ' ἐξοχήν, the only actual writing of the Spirit in the world, to which all other writings approximate only in endless gradations. The

[1] Rom. v. 12.

more, now, we elevate ourselves in the Spirit to a truly spiritual contemplation of things, the more the scripture will reveal itself as nearest and most kindred to us, as clearest and most transparent. There it then becomes to us *Θεῖα πάντα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα πάντα.*

But the narrative of Genesis respecting the fall sustains itself still further under this regressive scrutiny. If the sin of mankind rests upon a free act of Adam, then that sin cannot yet have its ultimate ground in that act. Every existence, and especially the personal, is linked by an inner bond to its origin. So, then, the first man also must have been bound to God through a natural attraction of the deepest piety. As Melanchthon so beautifully says, in the Apology for the Augsburg Confession: "They had a fine, good, joyous heart towards God and godly things; they lived in and out of God, as the child lives in and out of the mother." If, now, the thought of the disruption from God, of the first soul-murder, had arisen in their hearts, they then would have determined themselves against God in their own innermost individuality; the evil would be nothing foreign to the human being; the man himself would be evil, he would have satanized himself. In that case, too, the evil could no longer be removed from human nature; mankind would no longer be capable of redemption. Exactly on that account, therefore, because that man is no devil, there must be a devil. The evil in human form, since it does not constitute the substance of a creature's personality, and leaves room still for redemption, admits of explanation only as the result of temptation.

The two ideas, therefore, which have given most offence to the natural reason, because they belong to the sphere of mystery, the ideas of hereditary sin and a devil, prove themselves to be rather the true vindicators of humanity. How much declamation has there been about the unworthy, degrading view concerning our race contained in the doctrine of hereditary sin! But who consults better for the dignity of man, he who takes the present condition of

flesh and death as the normal and only possible one, or the other, who teaches that we were born and created to something better, and that our present state is only a period of the fall which has supervened? No one has ever discoursed more sublimely respecting man's true dignity than Genesis, with its doctrine of the formation after God's image, and the fall of the first-created. And no one has judged human sin with greater lenity, and, also in the doctrine of conversion, with more energy maintained still the better I, the good substance in man, than the book of Genesis, with its narrative of the temptation of our first parents.

While, now, the origin of evil in man admits of no other explanation than that in Genesis, viz. by an act of freedom on the one hand, which lays the foundation of guilt, and by a temptation on the other, which affords a possibility of redemption, it is also true that the Mosaic narrative, in its account of this origin, describes at the same time the nature of sin in a way never surpassed, and confirmed by all experience as true. The first act is, that the tempter seeks to loosen the bonds of child-like confidence which attach man to God; that he sows unbelief and then disobedience in the human heart. He must, first of all, tear away the sure ground beneath the feet of man, on which alone he stands morally, by exciting suspicion against his Maker's eternal love, as if he were capable of jealousy and envy.[1] Upon the relation of man to God depends the difference between good and evil; the one is coincident with the other. Scripture knows no morality without a religious foundation, no moral law to which man is bound, apart from God, merely in his own individual nature and attributes. But man himself is bound to the living, holy God in his inmost being; God's will and

[1] Gen. iii. 1–4: "And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden? And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die. And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die: for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.

command, as it was revealed at the beginning, to the first-created of the race, is the rule and condition of the highest good, the law of morality;[1] as, on the other hand, turning aside from the order of life fixed by God and in him, is sin, the *ἀνομία*.[2] If a person should think to define the difference between good and evil, without any reference to God, he is in danger of losing all conception of the difference itself; for without God, the highest the immutable standard of good is wanting; and we comprehend sin in its true nature and full extent only when we recognize it as treason against the majesty of the living God. The first act of sin, therefore, is a breaking away from God, god-lessness, unbelief, which shows itself first as mistrust which allows itself to suspect the person of God, to obscure the sense of his fatherly love, and after that a disobedience which does not regard his command as holy. In our relation to God, as well as in other connections, the religious element in the stricter sense, the inner position of person to person, the disposition of the heart gives to our conduct its moral character, and precedes it. Upon this principle, again, rests the reciprocal relation of justification and sanctification, faith and works.

But this first assault does not succeed at once,[3] and the tempter follows it up by another. He instils into man the poison of pride, self-elevation, by holding out to him that he may rise above his dependent condition as a creature, and even become as God, knowing good and evil. We have here, now, a masterly stroke of Satanic art. In denying, so falsely, that God would inflict the threatened death, he knew how to interweave a lie and the truth together. It is

[1] Gen. ii. 16, 17: "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.

[2] 1 John iii. 4.

[3] Gen. iii. 2, 3: "And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden: but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die." How finely is man's better character disclosed here, in contrast with Satan's.

really the will of God and the destination of man that he should ascend to the higher step of a consciously free life. It is the will of God and our destination, as a result of having been made in the divine image, that man should become like God. There is a sense in which all our nature, in virtue of that spirit of God breathed into us, longs for the perfect life for which we were designed.[1] But as a creature, man, in order to reach this goal, has to pass through a course of development, under God's discipline. It is only in the state of subjection to God which corresponds to man's nature; only through a free acknowledgment of his position as a creature in an act of obedience, which God therefore before all else demands, and must demand, that progress to a higher stage of life is possible; only as as a reward for fidelity towards God can the creature who is free receive the crown of eternal life.

While God, now, has at first shown to men the way only, and not as yet the goal, because they are required to trust him, to exhibit fidelity; the tempter, on the contrary, shows to them immediately the alluring prize, and promises to spare them the way, in order to bring them to it by a false path, which makes the actual attainment of the goal impossible. Satan promises likeness to God in a moment, without the toil. Man has only to cast away God, to transgress his command; then his eyes are opened, he finds himself at once in a new, higher sphere of existence; he awakes, as out of a sleep, to self-consciousness, to a free knowledge of good and evil, and therein he is like God. It is this thorn of self-exaltation which the serpent has planted in the human heart, exciting man to wrest as under the connection between knowledge and obedience, to seek to be at once what he is to become by degrees, to put his own will and

[1] Thus Rom. viii. 29: "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren"; 1 John iii. 2: "Beloved, now are we the sons of God; and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is"; and Matth. v. 48: "Be ye, therefore, perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

caprice in the place of obligation and doing the will of God. Man has indeed, as a personal creature, a principle of independence and of self-activity in himself. This power he exercises in a normal way when he devotes himself freely to God. The tempter says the reverse: "Thou needest not trouble thyself about God; only be independent, take the fruit, and be wise, live according to thy own will, and so thou art God." He puts forward the personality, the egoism, but thrusts aside the dependent nature; he perverts man's being formed in God's likeness, into his making himself a god. Selfishness, which deposes the Supreme, which makes man himself supreme, the centre of all things, is the second element in the nature of sin.

To this is added, as the third element, after the sepent has thus loosened the ground, what takes place in Eve herself, viz. desire, love of the world, gratification of the senses.[1] The prohibitory command has its importance in this, that by means of an external object to which man is attracted by no want whatever, the renunciation of which therefore was easy, it may become known whether man will decide for God or the world, for the higher or the lower, for the spirit or the flesh, for good or evil. The question was put altogether abstractly: the tree had no importance of any sort by itself, but came into account merely as a means of bringing our freedom into activity. This its name imports: tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But this tree in particular, the one forbidden, beyond all others unforbidden, now acquires a charm and interest in the eyes of the woman. God has now lost his reality for her; the world also allures with magic power, though what it offers is, in itself, most insignificant; the tree seems to the senses so sweet. The appetites obtain the control, and sin is committed. The flesh has conquered, and life's course is changed. Since the

[1] "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her; and he did eat."

higher powers, out of God, their proper ground and support, have yielded, the lower ones become the masters.

Men have now, it is true, as to their knowledge, strode forward.[1] But they would have done that also, in the event of a normal decision; for not sin, as Schiller, Hegel, and others think, but the trial of liberty, the power of choice, is the condition of progress from a state of childhood to one of higher spiritual development. But in the case of a normal or right decision there would be connected with the progress in knowledge a corresponding progress in the entire existence of man, physical as well as ethical. The actual change, however, was very different from that which the tempter held out to him to excite and delude his hopes. He became actually a prey to the death with which he was threatened. The spirit was henceforth subordinate, the flesh ascendant. The knowledge which he gained was the sense of this degradation, of the loss of his innocence, of subjection to matter; so that, instead of being like God, he is drawn toward the level of the grovelling serpent, the instrument of his ruin. It is impossible not to be struck with the singular simplicity, not to say irony, of the words of the sacred writer, in allusion to those of the serpent: "Then were the eyes of both of them opened, and they knew—that they were naked."[2]

[1] Gen. iii. 7: "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked"; and vs. 22: "And the Lord God said, Behold the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil."

[2] The following sentences belong here, and are intelligible enough to the German scholar; but it would be a useless travestie to attempt to put them into English: "Das jene drei Momente des Sündenbegriffs nicht zufällig sind, zeigt sich prinzipiell darin, dass sie den drei Grundelementen des menschlichen Seins und Bewustseins, Geist, Seele, Leib, Gottesbewustsein, Selbstbewustsein, Weltbewustsein entsprechen. Das Gottesbewustsein ist zur Gottentfremdung, das Selbstbewustsein, zur Selbstsucht, das Weltbewustsein zur Weltlust geworden. Das erste, höchste Element des Menschenwesens, das pneumatische, ist verneint, getrübt, kraftlos; die beiden andern, untern sind auf falsche, krankhafte Weise bejaht und gesteigert: der Mensch ist psychisch und sarkish geworden. Der Mensch will nicht mehr Gott, er will die Creatur nach ihren beiden Seiten, der geistigen und natürlichen, der subjectiven und objectiven, er will sein eigenes ich und die Welt."

In the foregoing analysis the factors are unbelief, selfishness, lust of the senses. The selfishness is, as it were, the soul of sin, and the senses the body of sin; the former, the inner root of evil, while the latter is the external medium through which the "I" or egoism, now separated from God, would seek its end of life in the world. The progress of sin, as exemplified in a man's actual experience, accords with this view of its origin. Thus Genesis combines and harmonizes the conflicting theories of human speculation respecting the nature of sin: the theory of selfishness, represented in recent times by Julius Müller, and that of sense represented by Schleiermacher and Rothe. But Genesis carries back both ethical theories to a religious foundation; and here we all still have much to learn in our modern ways of thinking. In correspondence with this, the scheme of redemption opposes belief to unbelief, love to selfishness, the hope of a new world to the pleasures of this world.

I think we may say that Genesis, with its narrative of the fall, will bear examination. There are vouchers for its truth not less important than those which accredit the accounts of the flood and the building of the Babylonian tower. As the actual condition of Israel, their history, and their experience serve to confirm the Pentateuch, so the actual condition of the world and life of nations, the human consciousness of sin and of relationship to God, as well as the traditions of all nations, serve to confirm "this oldest record of the human race."

Shall I speak now still further of that which the first three chapters of Genesis announce to us concerning the creation of the world, of mankind? A "rational" theology, cosmology, psychology lie here in *nuce*. Some things we have already intimated. At the outset the first verse moves like a saving ark over the waters of heathenism, and presents to us correct ideas of the deepest import respecting God and the world, and their mutual relation to each other, such as we seek in vain elsewhere in the whole ancient world. In inditing the word, Gen. i. 27: "God created

man in his image; in the image of God he created him," as Ewald finely remarks in reference to the repetition in the parallelism, the hand of the narrator seems to have trembled with joy — a word which describes the position and dignity of man, with which nothing certainly in the ancient or modern world can be compared. That other word respecting man's creation: "And the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul,"[1] will ever preserve its place in the foundation of all sound anthropology; for the extremes which for centuries have been contending with each other in this science, materialism and spiritualism, sensualism and idealism, are here in principle combined together in a deeper, more suggestive manner than appears to every one at first sight.

Where such stars glitter, there we discern the heavens, although obscure places also still lie between them. Written monuments, like the first chapter of Genesis, to the third verse of the second chapter (Elohistic, so called), and from the third verse of the second chapter to the end of the third chapter (Jehovistic, so called), have a right to present to us also difficulties; and difficulties there are, whether we consider the two portions by themselves or in their relations to each other. The obscurities lie, in part necessarily, as has been suggested before, in the entirely pre-historic character of the records, — as to the general relation which the two sections bear to each other, modern researches have cast no small light upon it, so that what is now intelligible even here, and seen to be grand and magnificent, far exceeds that which is still unpenetrated, — of which, in truth, exegesis and theology have not more to encounter than all other sciences involve. The first, the Elohistic portion, shows us what nature is, and what man's relation to it is; what history is, and man's position in it is. Man in his connection with nature, and his elevation above it, in his moral attitude as contrasted with it, is described there in a style

[1] Gen. ii. 7.

so lofty, pure, grand, that modern pantheism and materialism might much better learn from it than mock at it. How simply and pertinently, for example, is the distinction drawn between man and beast, so nearly obliterated by some modern theorizers, by the two traits that men were created with such solemnity in God's image, and as a single pair, while the beasts always come forth out of their elements at the Creator's word, and at once in a countless swarm. Man appears as the key-stone, and lord of nature, but his entire importance centres in his relation to God, in whom he was destined to enjoy the sabbatical rest. Then follows the second part, in which Elohim appears as Jehovah, and connects himself with man as accountable and holy at first, then fallen, and the object of measures for his rescue. He assigns to him, in accordance with his earthly nature, a special place of revelation, the garden of Eden (Gen. xi. 2–14). There, at first, Adam is with God alone. He receives from him the command which should bring his freedom into action, and make him a factor in the world's development (Gen. ii. 15–17). This is the beginning of history. Man's relation to God is the original one, which precedes every relation of man to man, even the most intimate which attaches itself most closely to it, that of man and woman (Gen. ii. 18–25). Here the connection which meets us so often presents itself to us again, that of religion and history, which corresponds in the universal sphere to that of religion and morality in that of the individual; and human history unfolds itself out of and through this relation of man to God. Sin, judgment, and grace (the promise)[1] could have no place without this antecedent. That all history — all life of men as persons and as a race — has its root in religion, is a fundamental idea, on the apprehension and application of which we have yet long to learn and labor.

Thus we meet here, in detail and in general, points of light which are not only clear and distinct of themselves,

[1] The contents of chapter iii.

but shine far away into the whole range of man's history and experience. Hence he who makes the truth an earnest thing, though he may find perplexities which are not to be cleared up in a moment, will not, at least rashly, condemn and cast away the whole; but remember that beautiful remark of Socrates concerning the writings of Heraclitus, the obscure, which has often cheered me in reference to these chapters: "What I have understood," says the wise man, "is genuine and solid; but I think what I have not understood is so too: only this needs a Delian diver."

Our investigation has become unintentionally dogmatic; and there is truly no better apology for the first chapters of Genesis than that which lies in this simple fact. If a person will speak of them, he must touch the fundamental questions concerning sin, the nature of God and men; and so also the reverse: whoever will discuss these questions is led back to those chapters. So true is it that they assert everywhere their character as the pillars which support the foundations and principles of all inquiry. Nay, these primitive testimonies must strike more and more fully through all our modes of thought, if our ideas of God and creation, man and sin, are not to become derogatory to the character of both God and man. Our believing theology, too, has yet to lift itself up to the full height of that chapter, the want of a due recognition of which casts broad shadows still over systems which contain even now much light. But especially can we learn from them not to confine our theological ideas to too narrow a circle, and not to limit them to the usual field of dogmatics, but to give to them that philosophical universality which theosophy has sought for and foreshadowed. For in the first eleven chapters of Genesis lies the foundation of all that relates to man's entire life: marriage and family, labor and raiment, city and state, the relation of mankind to nature and the world of spirits, to nations, languages, religions, and the like. For ethics, too, rich and fruitful hints are to be found here. These chapters, so fundamental, so wide in their scope, would teach

even Christians as well as Israelites : "homo sum, nihil humani a me alienum puto."

"A thing of wonder," exclaims Herder," to which the men of reason still venture to give no name, is the story of the fall of the first man. Is it allegory, history, fable? And yet there it stands, after the account of the creation, a second pillar of Hercules, beyond which is nothing further! All subsequent history of the human race begins there. And then what a piece-work follows, made up of the murderous hate and mark of Cain, the little song of Lamech, a row of names of the hundred-years-old, cedar-like men, giants, the flood, and an ark! Ah, the philosophical wits must have so much trouble about the swaddling bands of our race and must be ashamed of them; must wish the waters of the flood had swept them away, or at least left them to appear only in the juggler's commentary. And yet ye are, dear, oldest, and eternal traditions of my race, kernel and germ of its most hidden history! Without you, mankind would be what so much else is, a book without title, without first leaves and explanation; with you, our family acquires foundation, stem, and root, back to God and father Abraham. And they are all taken in so simple, child-like a tone, from the mouth of the first tradition among the trees of the eastern land, and are set forth by Moses, so true and one by one, as if he found them there, the echo of eternal times." And Herder writes to Hamann : "Believe me, my dear friend, the time will come when the revelation and religion of God, instead of criticism and politics, as now, will be the simple history and wisdom of our race."

ARTICLE III.

RELIGION AND CHEMISTRY.[1]

BY REV. ANDREW P. PEABODY, D.D., HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

No one who is acquainted with Professor Cooke's habits of thoroughness, accuracy, and fidelity as a teacher and lecturer will doubt that on the scientific side this volume is the best that it could be within its compass and for its purpose. As a compendious and lucid statement of the chemistry of the atmosphere, combining a precision worthy of the lecturer and a simplicity of illustration adapted to a popular audience, it merits our highest encomium. We cannot but admire the subtile skill and the comprehensive grasp with which he not only gathered up, but assimilated, a wide diversity of facts and laws from every realm of nature, intimately, but not obviously, related to the structure and functions of the atmosphere and its constituents, and has so colligated them that they must henceforth retain in the reader's mind the grouping into which they are here brought. This mode of treatment at once serves as a system of mnemonics for the learner, and, what is of immeasurably higher importance, leads his thought easily and naturally to that unity of plan and purpose in nature which revelation teaches, which true science postulates, and toward which the progress of scientific discovery constantly tends.

But it is as a treatise in the department of natural theology, that this volume claims to be judged. This is its prime purpose, and its value must rest on the author's success in this aim. It cannot, indeed, be claimed for him that

[1] Religion and Chemistry; or, Proofs of God's Plan in the Atmosphere and its Elements. Ten Lectures delivered at the Brooklyn Institute, Brooklyn, N. Y., on the Graham Foundation. By Josiah P. Cooke, Jr., Irving Professor of Chemistry and Mineralogy in Harvard University. 8vo. pp. 348. New York: Charles Scribner. 1864.

he has approached the subject from the attitude of indifferentism. His lectures breathe throughout a believing and devout spirit. He has firm faith, not only in the primal truths of natural religion, but in the equally fundamental truths (and equally natural, as we believe) of the gospel, — in revelation, miracle, inspiration, redemption. The heads of his argument are well condensed in the following statement, near the close of his last lecture:

"In the first place, then, I believe that the existence of an intelligent author of nature, infinite in wisdom and absolute in power, may be proved from the phenomena of the material world with as much certainty as can any general truth of science. In the second place, I am of opinion that the facts of nature also prove — although the arguments adduced may be less convincing — that the author of nature is a personal being, and the one only and true God revealed to us in the Bible. Lastly, I think that the relations of the human mind to the material world, viewed in the light of modern science, give us strong reason to believe, on scientific grounds alone, that the universe is still sustained, in all its parts, by the same omnipotent and omniscient Will which first called it into being. . . . . .

"Moreover, I am persuaded that science confirms and illustrates the priceless truth which Christ came on earth to reveal; but I do not believe that the unaided intellect of man could ever have attained to certainty in regard to even the least of these truths, independently of revelation."— pp. 345, 346.

It has become almost a fashion to sneer at "the argument from design." We confess that we do not feel disposed to set it aside; on the other hand, we doubt whether Paley and his followers have made as much of it as they might. It rests, indeed, on the subjective consciousness; for that "design implies a designer," is an intuition of the human intellect; but because it is an intuition, we can no more question it than we can question the fact of our own existence.

It is, indeed, objected to the argument from design that it presupposes a knowledge of final causes, and that this knowledge can be confidently affirmed of no finite mind. We admit that we can, at most, only hazard plausible conjectures as to final causes in the creation. With the growth of intelligence and science, there has been a progressive

unifying and enlargement of man's conceptions as to the ends subserved by the universe, visible and invisible. In earlier periods, when incidental exceptions and evils occupied as large a space on the retina of philosophic vision as was occupied by beneficent provisions and uses, and when the comprehensive laws of nature had hardly begun to be registered, it was impossible to discern in the creation any higher purpose than its own continued existence and the perpetuation of its races of organized being. With the identification of general laws, the promotion of happiness came to be regarded as the ultimate end of nature. With the growth of Christian sentiments and culture, even happiness seems but an inferior good, and many devout minds refuse to recognize in all things that are, and that take place, any predominant or ultimate purpose other than holiness, — its manifestation in God, or its creation in man. But when we consider the immensity of the universe and the comparative littleness of our world and system, how can we rest even here? May not even holiness, human holiness at least, be not an end, but a means? May not man himself, though "crowned with glory and honor" as the head of the terrestrial creation, bear a relation to higher orders in other realms of being, somewhat analogous to that borne to him by the tribes of animated nature made subject to his sway? May not even his eternal salvation and blessedness — ends so far as he is concerned — be means to immeasurably more vast and glorious ends than he is now capable of conceiving? Or, on the other hand, how know we that there may not be a multiplicity of final causes? May we not have already carried our unifying process too far? It is at least conceivable that the final causes of many portions of the creation may be very near, for instance, that the desert may be made to blossom, with no reference to the contingent aesthetic or spiritual revenue which may accrue to intelligent beings, but merely to enshrine that undoubted attribute of the divine character, which is the infinite correlative to the love of beauty in man; or that many of the

lower orders of animals may have been created, not to minister to man's skill in subduing, or his comfort in using them, but with no purpose ulterior to their own enjoyment. In fine, we do not hold a position in which we can pronounce dogmatically as to final causes; and the highest wisdom resolves itself into the simplest utterance of Christian faith: "Of him, and through him, and to him are all things."

But the knowledge of final causes is not needed in order to prove design. The spinning-jenny would impress us none the less strongly with a sense of its inventor's genius and skill as applied to the production of cotton yarns, if we had no experience or knowledge of the manufacture of those yarns into cloth. Design is legitimately inferred from adaptation to a proximate end. From *adaptation*, we say, using the word in its active sense, as distinct from *adaptedness*. Between these two words lies the entire controversy between Lucretianism, ancient and modern, and Christian theism. The fitness of certain portions of nature to subserve certain proximate ends is admitted by all. The question is: Are these ends results or purposes? To take our illustration from processes of human industry, the teazle is employed to raize the nap on broadcloth. Here is a case in which the *adaptedness* is perfect; yet we cannot infer *adaptation* in the purpose of the Creator. The use may have resulted from the existence of the teazle, and yet not have been the object of express design on the part of the Author of nature. The use is, perhaps, not even an actual use, but a mere caprice, and the plant may subserve substantially useful purposes to us unknown. But no such questionings arise, when we contemplate the complex machinery of cards, spindles, looms, and vats, by which the fleece is converted into cloth. Here is conscious and designed *adaptation;* and it can be accounted for on no other hypothesis than the choice and collocation of a great diversity of means for the production of a definite end. In this case we should infer intelligent design, in the absence of all

historical evidence to that effect. Thus, did we find full sets of machinery in successful operation among a people utterly ignorant of mechanical principles, or (if we may be permitted the supposition) in a community of monkeys, capable of performing routine movements, but not of invention, we should have no doubt whatever that the machinery was devised by the cultivated intellect of a higher race of men or order of beings. Still more, could we make our explorations in another planet, and did we find there no race of beings capable of scientific thought, mechanical invention, or constructive industry, and yet saw woollen machinery in operation, we should conclude without hesitation, that intellectual forces from some other part of the universe had wrought in that planet.

But it may be said that in the case supposed we know *ab extra* the proximate end, and that it is only from our previous knowledge of the end that we can infer design as to the means. We deny this. We may legitimately infer the end from the uniform tendency of means to produce a specific end. Thus, were a thermometer placed in our hands without our previous knowledge of its purpose, and did we observe the uniform rise and fall of the mercury by the nicely graduated scale with every change of temperature, we should feel no less assured of the design with which the instrument was made, than if we had presided over its construction. In human affairs, wherever we discern the adaptation of selected and artificially arranged means to a definite end, we infer indifferently the designed end from the means, or the intent of the means from the end, and from both the action of designing mind.

The chemistry of the atmosphere furnishes numerous instances of the adaptation of means to subserve definite ends. Prominent among these ends is the sustenance of animal life, in all whose processes the atmosphere performs essential functions. The simple act of respiration represents one of the least of these functions. The circulation of the blood is sustained by the chemical action and inter-

action of the elements of the atmosphere and the fluids of the body. It is the atmospheric oxygen that consumes, and the atmospheric azote that supplies, the constantly-wasting and replenished tissue by which alone the organs and functions of the body are preserved in healthy activity. It is by the translucency of the atmosphere that we receive the light of the sun, and by its radiating properties that the light-beams are diffused and their calorific power made availing. The hydraulic properties of the atmosphere alone maintain the circuit of the waters from and to the ocean in vapor, mist, cloud, rain, and dew, through torrent, brook, and river, thus distributing the aqueous nourishment which in some form every living creature must have, and at the same time dissipating pestiferous agencies, which would nestle equally in unwashed air and in stagnant water. Then, again, all animals feed on vegetable substances, either directly or indirectly (for animal food is but vegetable substance transmuted into flesh and bone), and the atmosphere is the prime agent in vegetation at every stage. We must not forget, here, the office of the winter's snow, over a large portion of the earth, in preserving from else inevitable destruction the means of animal subsistence, — an office not incidental, but due to the presence of aqueous vapor as a constituent element of the atmosphere — the only one of its elements that can be liquefied or congealed by change of temperature. In fine, the trite, yet most felicitous, figure of Dr. Watts, "the harp with thousand strings," falls far short of representing the multiform conditions on which animal life, reproduction, the continuity of species, and the preservation among them of relations not internecine, but mutually helpful, depend; and there is not one of these conditions which could be fulfilled independently of the atmosphere, — not one which would not fail, were there even a slight change or deficit in the constituent elements of the atmosphere, for instance, in the absence or the essential diminution of the very small proportion it contains of aqueous vapor or of carbonic acid.

Now, were atmospheric air the simple substance it seems,

or the element, incapable of analysis, which for many centuries it was supposed to be, we might not clearly infer design from its adaptedness to the purposes of animal life. But here there is an evident selection of materials, a careful apportionment, a system of checks, reactions, and compensations, a nice adjustment of atmospheric conditions and phenomena, if to no other purpose, to the use of sentient life. Of the two principal constituents of the atmosphere, oxygen would, indeed, seem the natural pabulum of life, as it forms the larger proportion of the substance of every living being; while nitrogen serves, so far as we can perceive, no other essential purpose in the economy of creation, but seems expressly devised to dilute and temper its associate element, and thus to convert into the breath of life that which else would waste like a consuming fire. Then, too, these elements are mixed and reciprocally interfused, under conditions which interdict their chemical combination, —a combination antecedently probable from a great variety of causes in a chance-created world, and the result of which would be blighting, murderous showers of nitric acid, — a substance, the occasional creation of which in minute quantities in thunder-storms, may well direct our attention to the balancing of the fearful force of atmospheric electricity by laws which cripple and confine its action. It is worthy of emphatic notice, too, that these gases are among the very few that are absolutely incapable of solution or congelation, so that as long as they remain intermixed and not combined, there must be, under all conditions of temperature, an elastic pabulum for the respiration and medium for the motion of living beings; while we can easily conceive of an atmosphere generally healthful and serviceable, which might be condensed in extreme cold, and fall in rain, snow, or hail. But a dry or an over-humid atmosphere would parch and wither, or *waterlog* and putrefy, the living tissue. Mark, then, the provision by which the air is kept always moist by aqueous exhalations, yet has only a limited capacity for vapor, so that it must always discharge

its superfluous moisture, — its capacity, however, increasing rapidly with the elevation of temperature, so that the hot breath of summer comes to us fraught with its own refreshing antidote. Equally, perhaps even more clearly, do we recognize a provident purpose in those elements which occur uniformly in the atmosphere in exceedingly minute proportions, which seem to be found there in consequence of no antecedent chemical relation or necessity, yet which have their essential functions in the animal economy. Carbonic acid constitutes in the air but one part in twenty-five hundred, yet in the present order of nature it could no more be dispensed with than oxygen, furnishing, as it does, not only the framework of all vegetation, but the fuel for the incessant combustion which sustains life, and entering largely into almost every form and process of nutriment for man and beast. The same might be said of ammonia, which is never absent from the atmosphere, is never found in open spaces in a proportion sufficient to be injurious or annoying, yet is never wanting for its indispensable services in the functions of vegetation, and through these in its ministry to sentient life.

The marks of design become still more manifest and impressive when we consider the atmosphere, with its constantly fluent and convertible elements, as a self-perpetuating system. Man has dreamed in vain, for centuries, of perpetual motion. No skill or genius can supply forces which will not exhaust themselves in their application, and renew themselves in a diminishing ratio. But here are vast quantities of oxygen, carbonic acid, ammonia, daily consumed, fixed, solidified, abstracted from atmospheric uses, and yet nowhere in free space can the slightest deficit be traced; nowhere is the balance disturbed; nowhere are the proportions deranged. So closely is the equilibrium of chemical action adjusted, that from day to day, from moment to moment, as much of each element is disengaged and restored to its gaseous state as is absorbed by the myriad mouths of animal, plant, and mineral that are open to consume it.

Unceasing waste, and yet unceasing fulness, a spending without exhaustion, a replenishing without excess,—is this supposable in an automatic system? If the remotest approach to this, the humblest and most awkward imitation of it in a human invention, implies conscious design, can the perfect realization of it imply less?

We thus discern in the atmosphere, not only *adaptedness* to the support of animal life, but a choice and collocation of means, and a system for their continuous and perpetual working, which can admit of no hypothesis other than conscious *adaptation* by a designing mind. Here, however, the development theory, in one or another of its Protean forms, is urged in rejoinder to the argument from design. The atmosphere, we are told, was not created to subserve the ends of animal existence; but it holds a foremost place among the proximate causes of life and of organized being. Let this be proved, and it only strengthens our argument. We admire the genius that spins and weaves our cotton; but we should almost worship the inventor of machinery which from certain chemical elements, in their crude state, could first make cotton, and then convert it into cloth. If in the former case we recognize one of the noblest triumphs of the human intellect, in the latter we should be prone to trace a more than human intelligence and inventive capacity. By parity of reason, if the atmosphere is adapted, not only to the continuance, but to the creation of organized being and sentient life, or fitted to bear a large part in the work of creation, we can only repeat all that we have said concerning design with tenfold emphasis, and with a conviction too profound to be either shaken or strengthened.

But while on this ground we have no quarrel with the development theory, and find ourselves raised by it to the contemplation of the one "Builder and Maker," no less than when we receive with the simple faith of an unreasoning child the cosmogony of the Bible, we cannot here trace the alleged relation of cause and effect, or even an approximation to it. True, the materials of which organized bodies

are made are most of them elements of the atmosphere, and all of them component parts of the substance of the earth; but equally so are the materials of which knives, coats, and hats are made; and if supplying the material involves creation, then is earth, air, or nature the universal cutler, tailor, and hatter. Historically, we cannot ascertain that terrestrial or atmospheric forces have ever created a single species (for of late we have heard nothing of the *acarus crossii*), or transmuted one species into another. There has been, indeed, sometimes an improvement of species; but the new varieties thus produced have not only, in every instance, retained the distinctive peculiarities of their own species, but have always manifested a strong tendency to revert to the normal type, insomuch that all the cases which have been cited to establish the doctrine of the improvement and elevation of species by "natural selection," are cases in which the spontaneous course of nature has been modified by the intervention of human breeders and cultivators. Then, again, we can trace no organifying power in nature. Suppose the world a *rasa tabula*, with all the existing elements *in situ*, nay, with all the inorganic combinations and processes that now compose its structure and mark its course, — air, ocean, mountain, plain, river, wind, rain, tempest, — we can detect no agency that could create a fern or an animalcule, not to say a tree or a man. Organized nature does not lie visible in inorganic nature, as a possible effect in a potential cause, as a plant in the seed, or an animal in the ovum. Moreover, had this energy ever resided in nature, there is no reason why its exercise should have wholly ceased. There are still improvable, or rather there are no unimprovable races; why then should the upward *nisus* of all created beings have terminated before it could leave a record of itself? There is still sand-waste, rock, and reef on which the creative process might be renewed; why are not the generative forces of nature now at work in those regions? or how is it that when such desert domain is reclaimed, it does not clothe and people

itself with autocthonous plants and animals, instead of awaiting its seed and stock from other soils?

But while we can discern no creative capacity or tendency in nature, organic existence and animal life in all their forms manifest creative purpose. True, we know not the final cause of being as to any class of plants or animals; but with regard to every class with which we are conversant we can trace or imagine some proximate use or purpose, while, were there no other end to be subserved, well fed and sheltered sentient life is alone so great a boon as to be in itself an end worthy of omnipotent goodness. We have in the composition and laws of the atmosphere a system adapted with perfect precision to that of animal life, — a provision for the sustenance of a life to whose beginning the atmosphere bears no causative relation. In fine, the atmosphere and animal life are, as regards their origin, mutually independent. Neither can be shown, by any real or supposed analogy, fact, or law, to have been the creative cause of the other. Yet the adaptation of the one to the other is so close, manifold, and invariable, that we can no more resist the inference of provident design, than we can deny such design in those creations of human skill which bear visible tokens in their structure, their working, and their products, of the artificer's purpose.

We have said that in assuming the development theory we cannot escape the evidence of creative design. This theory, however, does not postulate the personality of the divine Being, as distinct from and independent of his works. Though not absolutely incompatible with theism of the Christian type, it has a strong proclivity toward pantheism. If brute matter by necessary laws has evolved order, organism, life, instinct, reason, soul, polity, love, religion, there must be an *anima mundi*, but it may be an *anima* inherent in and co-eternal with matter. It may be pervading intelligence, and yet not sovereign will. It may be a conservative principle, and yet not a controlling power. It may be the object of confidence as to the wise and benefi-

cent course of nature in its entireness, yet not as to the details which concern individual happiness and well-being. It may exercise no discretionary providence, may be impervious to prayer, may stand in no conscious relation to intelligent beings. Widely different from this is our view of the divine nature, when we substitute creation for development; when we trace mutual adaptation between portions and systems of the universe unconnected by any law of necessary causation. If there was no *a priori* necessity for the existence of things as they are, then the cause of their being must be extraneous to, independent of, other than the material forms or chaos which preceded them. If the first man, beast, bird, tree, fern, or animalcule did not come into being in accordance with laws coeval with and inherent in finite matter, the only alternative hypothesis is that of a non-material, freely-willing Creator, whose all-comprehensive and continuous purpose is the order and harmony of the universe.

The development theory (for it is one, though manifold) rests chiefly on the fallacy which confounds adaptedness with causation. Its formula, stripped of superfluous verbiage, and reduced to plain terms, is: "Because organized and sentient beings are so made and endowed that they can utilize the inorganic creation, therefore the inorganic creation is the sole cause of their existence," — a truncated syllogism, whose suppressed major term is, "Whatever can avail itself of any utility is created by that in which the utility resides." This major term is equally absurd with its opposite, or even more absurd; for experience might suggest some cases in which the utilizer creates the utilities, — none in which the utilities create the utilizer. The carpenter may build the house, but the house cannot build the carpenter.

The phenomena of nature give us, then, not only luculent evidences of design, but equally clear proof of the existence of the designing mind, independently of the material universe. The unity of this designing mind, also, is a truth of

science, no less than of revelation. The filaments of a general plan may be traced in every department. Analogous numerical laws govern the grouping of the planets around the sun and of the leaves around the stem of a plant. Similar analogies are traced in the proportions in which elementary substances enter into chemical combinations. The same gravitation governs the world in its orbit and the stone in its fall. The telescope, as it probes inconceivable vastnesses and depths of space, and the microscope, as it brings to our cognizance the infinitesimal mysteries of creation, coincide in their revelations of order, harmony, mutual adaptation, benignant purpose. All seeming dissonances, when traced and analyzed, resolve themselves into a more sublime accord. Yet it is a multiform unity, one which often would fail to be discerned, were it not first believed; and this, not because there is any room for doubt, but on account of the breadth of the expanse and the multitudinousness of the subordinate systems, through which we are permitted to follow out the divine handwork, ever discovering new correspondences, analogies, and harmonies. Therefore is it, we believe, that the unity of God the Creator is announced in the opening sentence of revelation, while its development is evidently the prime purpose of the introductory chapters of Genesis, in which the inspired author strikes at the root of the prevailing forms of idolatry, first by specifying as the works of Jehovah the very objects that had received the adoration of the early races, and then by giving in detail the human parentage, age, and death of the founders of tribes, and the inventors of useful arts, who had also been deified. We doubt whether, without this revelation, man would have risen to the conception of the divine unity; but, this truth assumed, the entire progress of science has been toward its verification. We look upon the new doctrine of the correlation and mutual convertibility of force as the culmination of this prime truth of religion in the philosophy of nature. Our faith had prepared us to welcome this doctrine. Twenty years ago we

wrote: "In astronomy, it [science] has already belted the vast globe, the stars, the universe, with the inscription, 'God is one'; and now it is seeking marks of identity in heat, light, gravitation, the electric, the magnetic force, the vital principle, the medium of sensation and of voluntary motion, and will soon draw forth from these hidden powers, pervading all space and being, the echo of that sublime truth with which it has girdled the heavens." Meanwhile, there has been no retrogression on this route of discovery, no detection of unsuspected deficiency, of cross-purposes, thwarted aims, defeated ends; but more and more has man been enabled to discern how "one thing establisheth the good of another," to reduce diversities to unity, and discords to harmony.

At the same time, the progress of science has tended to establish, as a principle of sound philosophy, the truth that "all power belongeth unto God." Causation is, by common consent, resolved into antecedence and consequence. Efficient causes, that is, causes which have the inherent and underived power to produce their so-called effects, are no longer recognized. Even force is but a name for our ignorance; and the identity of the forces of nature only simplifies what we cannot explain.

"Names are not things," says Professor Cooke, "and we know nothing more of the cause which brings the apple to the ground because Newton has called it the force of gravitation, than we did before. He gave us the law of the motion, and predicted how every apple would fall, and how every planet would move throughout space, but the cause of the motion is as closely hidden as ever. In regard to the law of gravitation we know a great deal; but in regard to the force of gravitation — whatever we may think or believe about it — we know absolutely nothing, and the same is true of every other force." — p. 325.

What, then, is force but the omnipresence of God in nature? Where does our philosophy land us, but in the simple, unsophisticated faith of the Hebrew poets, to whom flames of fire were his messengers, who heard the voice of Jehovah upon the waters, who saw in the winds his chariot, in the depths and mysteries of creation the hidings of his power?

We cannot, then, elude the tokens in the universe of an Author of nature, intelligent in design, and possessed of competent power to embody his design in material forms. But this conception falls far short of infinity and eternity. Why may not a finite universe, which began to be, have had its origin in the will of a being himself subjected to the limitations of space and time? Machinery proves the prior existence of a mechanician, but it tells us nothing about him, except that he was a mechanician. We reply, as regards space, that *infinity* is a negative and a relative term. It denotes that in which we are incapable of imagining bounds or limits. Now in this sense the universe itself is infinite in the light of modern science. When in the field of the telescope worlds become countless as sand on the seashore; when the astronomer ascertains distances and orbits which our arithmetic cannot express; when we learn that rays from systems coeval with the human race may not yet have reached our planet,— we cease equally to conceive of actual limits, and to believe that there can be necessary limits, to the things that are made. We can conceive of no space beyond the verge of creation; we cannot belive that there is space beyond that verge which is not, equally with the space within it, subject to the Creator's control, and liable to be annexed to the created universe by his fiat. We cannot, indeed, comprehend infinity, any more than we can comprehend other negations; but we can apprehend in the universe a wisdom, skill, and power, the norms of which lie in our subjective consciousness; we can take these attributes, as displayed in creation, into our own conception, till they have filled, and tasked, and strained our apprehensive powers to their utmost tension and limit; and then, when they still exceed and overflow our ability to grasp them, and their reality sensibly surpasses our imagination, we call them infinite.

As regards eternity, the tokens of design in the universe lead us necessarily to the recognition of an intelligent First Cause." Had that First Cause a beginning? If so, there

must, *a fortiori*, have been an intelligent cause for his being. That there should ever have been a time when he sprang from nothingness into underived existence exceeds our power of belief, inasmuch as he would, in that case, be an effect without a cause, and the laws of mind preclude our conception of an effect without a cause. But if he had an intelligent cause of being, we are involved in the same trilemma with regard to this latter cause: either he sprang from nothing, which is inconceivable; or he had an intelligent cause of a still more remote order, which only carries the difficulty a stage further back; or he exists uncaused and eternally. To this last hypothesis we must resort, sooner or later; for an infinite series of finite causes does not meet the logical demand for an ultimate cause of the universe, each member of the series being an effect, and thus presupposing a cause. But here *eternity*, though not like *infinity* a negative term in its form, becomes a negative conception. The mind cannot contemplate existence except under the category of time; the theological counterpart to time, technically called the "eternal now," conveys no apprehensible idea; but we can in our thought take down the bars from time at either extremity, — ignore its beginning and its ending; and this *infinite*, boundless time is our only conception of eternity, — a conception which we, by logical necessity, attach to the existence of the designing First Cause.

We have thus seen that from the evidences of design in nature (not, we gratefully admit, without light from revelation, but using that light only to read what nature teaches), we rise to the belief of a sole, infinite, eternal, self-existent First Cause. Does natural religion go further than this, and verify also those moral attributes of the Deity, for which as Christians we resort, not so much to the mere words of revelation, as to the divine life in the flesh which those words record? We think that it does. To the eye and ear which Jesus has opened, nature manifests the same fatherhood, holiness, and perfect providence of God which are incarnated in Jesus.

The progress of physical science has been the perpetual disclosure of utilities and beneficent adaptations. There is no general law which is not benignant in its operation. There is no incidental evil which has not its disciplinary office for a race of free agents, — none which man may not evade by his forethought and discretion, or overcome by the healthful exercise of his powers, or utilize for the culture of his moral and spiritual faculties. Given, a race of beings to be trained, by voluntary obedience, to the highest condition of blessedness, we can find nothing in the universe which is not adapted to their education individually and collectively. The whole system is fatherly, — analogous to that adopted by the judicious parent, whose aim for his children is not ease and self-indulgence, but development and growth; not satisfaction in being, but joy in well-being; not the gratification of the appetites and susceptibilities, but the strengthening of the hardier sinews of the moral nature. The home guarded and governed by wise, paternal love is full of restraints, rebukes, annoyances, mortifications, to the wayward, disobedient, vicious child, while to the dutiful child it proffers all its endearments, privileges, and comforts. In like manner, the universal house of God is, more or less, a prison-house and a place of torment to his stubborn and rebellious child, while "all things work together for good to those that love God."

In this view of nature, as in the Christian revelation, the fatherhood of God is identical with his holiness. If there be any one aspect of man's relation to the universe which is patent, unvarying, and ubiquitous, it is the adaptation of the things that are made to cherish and reward goodness and virtue, and to bring failure, loss, and misery on vice and crime. To be sure, the reward is often deferred, yet is certain; retribution often seems lame, yet always overtakes its victim. But this interval, doubtful and contingent, is adapted to man's condition as a free agent; for without it there would be only a constrained conformity to law, no

deliberate choice of the right, no voluntary virtue. "The misery of man is great upon him," says the jaded sensualist, whose autobiography forms so instructive a portion of the sacred record; but human misery is solely the result of human guilt. Abject poverty, loathsome disease, suffering without comfort, offset, or remedy; war, with its Pandora dispensation of wretchedness; slavery, with its dire reaction on the dominant races, — these, and all other forms of widespread calamity, are the fruit of sin. The resources of the soil and of human industry would suffice for the sustenance and comfort of our race for millenniums of peaceful growth. The earth need not be refitted to be the congenial residence of renovated humanity. Now this condition of things indicates holy, equally with benevolent, design on the part of the Creator. It manifests his preference and love for moral goodness. It reveals him as a being who cannot look upon sin without abhorrence. It echoes from every department of nature the ascription of the ransomed host in heaven: "Holy, holy, holy Lord God Almighty."

Moreover, goodness in man is harmony with nature. All God's other works stand in their order, move on their appointed orbits, fulfil their uses. Human guilt strikes the only discordant notes in the universal lyre. In this orderly universe the supremely holy God is instructing, admonishing, and rebuking man, — manifesting his own eternal "beauty of holiness," and "calling on all men everywhere to repent." We cannot therefore but regard the nineteenth Psalm as profoundly true to the religion of nature. Unspiritual German critics have maintained that it has received its present shape by the awkward conglutination of two widely different psalms. They say that there is no poetical connection between the first part, which celebrates the glory of God in the universe, and the latter part, which relates to the law of God and the light it sheds on man's secret faults and presumptuous sins. But to him who has ever marked the signature of the divine holiness in nature, and been humbled by the faintness of its reflection in his own

soul, the psalm seems entirely homogeneous, and its flow of thought perfectly natural. What is deemed a harsh and abrupt transition is not even a transition, but the development of a continuous train of meditation. The glorious harmony of the material creation suggests the more exceeding glory of God's perfect law; the obedient courses of the heavens remind the devout observer of that which alone mars the symmetry of God's works — man's waywardness and guilt; the harp-note that strikes accordant melodies from bound to bound of the universe recalls the discordant strains of human passion, lust, and violence; so that nothing can be more consonant with the heart-logic of one who profoundly feels what he sings, than the passage from the sublime burst of adoration: "The heavens declare the glory of God," to the cry of the contrite soul: "Who can understand his errors? cleanse thou me from secret faults," and the lowly petition: "Let the words of my mouth and the meditation of my heart," like the beautiful order of creation, "be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength and my redeemer."

We now inquire: Is the divine providence an article of natural religion? And here the question is not whether man would have attained a satisfying faith in providence without revelation, but whether this truth is logically deducible from the phenomena and processes of the outward world. It cannot be denied that there are in nature numerous cases in which a general law is subjected to a specific modification, when the unmodified law would operate injuriously. To cite one well-known instance, in lieu of many, substances in general are expanded by heat and contracted by cold. Water obeys this law, except when near the freezing temperature. But if, in freezing, water occupied less space than in its liquid state, the superior specific gravity of ice would cause the sinking of each layer as it was formed, in well, river, lake, and ocean. The consequence of this in our latitude would be so profound a freezing during a single winter, that the suns of a score of summers would not restore any large body of water to its

liquid condition. But water expands as, from the temperature of 40°, it descends toward the freezing point, so that the exposed surface-water does not sink as it freezes, but forms a protecting crust for the water beneath. With reference to this and the other peculiar characteristics of water, we entirely agree with Professor Cooke, who writes :

"It is true that in the present state of science the anomalous expansion of water near the freezing point seems to be an exception to the general laws of nature ; but hereafter this very anomaly may appear to be the natural result of a more general law not yet discovered, or, like the perturbations in the orbits of the planets, may prove to be the strongest confirmation of the very law it now seems to invalidate. Moreover, I do not share in that indefinite dread of natural laws which troubles so many religious minds. To me the laws of nature afford the strongest evidences of the existence of a God, and in their uniformity I see merely the constantaction of an omnipresent Creator, who acts with perfect regularity because he acts consistently and with infinite wisdom. I believe that all parts of nature are correlated by laws, and that the wider our knowledge becomes, the more universal these laws will appear. I do not, therefore, regard the constitution of water as something apart from law, and as the evidence of a power coming down, as it were, upon law to make an exception to it. This is making altogether too much of law. God is not bound by law. He acts wisely, beneficently, and with a definite plan, and the most we can claim for natural laws is, that they are our imperfect human expressions of this divine plan. Moreover, that is a far nobler view of God's wisdom which supposes him to be able to harmonize special adaptations with general laws. What I find so remarkable in the constitution of water is, not that it is an exception to the general laws of nature, but that, while filling its place in the general plan, it has been endowed with such extreme properties, and that in each case the peculiar property has special adaptations at once so complex and so important. Not only has water this exceptional property of expanding when other liquids contract, but moreover, of all known substances, it has the greatest capacity for heat; so also, when changing into vapor, it absorbs more heat than any other liquid ; again, it is far lighter in the solid than in the liquid state; and lastly, it contains the largest amount of the heat of fusion as yet observed in any substance. All this may be in harmony with general laws. I have no doubt that it is; but the existence of the law does not in the least impair the significance of the fact, that in each of these respects water has been peculiarly constituted. This one liquid of the globe, which covers more than three fourths of its surface, which circulates through all its channels, which percolates through all its pores, which constitutes three fourths

of all organized beings, has been endowed with these four pre-eminent qualities, on each of which the whole order of terrestrial nature may be said to depend. I cannot conceive of stronger evidence of design than this; and if these facts do not prove the existence of an intelligent Creator, then all nature is a deception, and our own faculties a lie."— pp. 160–162.

Now we have here, in the constitution of things, the perfect analogue of the Christian doctrine of providence. No intelligent Christian believes in the occurrence of hourly miracles in behalf of individual men, — in the setting aside of God's wonted modes of administration in answer to prayer, or for the special benefit of needy or deserving mortals. What we do believe is, the harmony of "special adaptations with general laws" in the government of human affairs. While the physiology of water seems an exceptional case in natural philosophy, it probably is not so to higher orders of intelligent beings. But it is an instance in which God has so adjusted the economy of nature as to subserve special uses, which could not be subserved under the laws which (with this one exception) seem to be universal; and, if we may apply to him our own inadequate terminology, he does this in accordance with more comprehensive laws, which man does not as yet, and perhaps may never, fully understand. In like manner when, by what appears to be an abnormal coincidence or succession of events, or by an unaccountable impression upon the mind of the person interested, impending peril is averted, or some blessing which was not to be anticipated is bestowed, whether in answer to prayer, or seemingly in recognition of some service or sacrifice, or to enable one man to confer essential benefits on his community, nation, or race, — we do not believe this to be an exceptional act in the divine administration. We have no doubt that it occurs under law, so far as that term (whose use, no doubt, savors of anthropomorphism) can be applicable to the divine Being. But it takes place under laws, physical, psychological, or both, which we do not yet, perhaps never may in

this world, comprehend in our philosophy, yet which may to superior beings, or to the redeemed in heaven, seem as natural as sunrise or the growth of the tree. And we submit that the cases of special adaptation in nature, of which the phenomena of water furnish striking, but not solitary examples, render corresponding special adaptations, that is, a discretionary providence in the administration of human affairs, antecedently probable.

We should reach the same conclusion from the very attributes of the Supreme Being as manifested in the universe. His omnipresence is a corollary from his existence, and equally from our non-discovery of efficient forces in nature. But his cannot be an inert presence. It is too absurd an hypothesis to be entertained for a moment, that the Will which called the worlds into being became otiant when they commenced their revolutions; still more so, that the sovereign Love which has provided for the sentient enjoyment of unnumbered races, and for the social, moral, and spiritual happiness of one, is indifferent to the beneficent ends to which all created things minister; and most absurd of all, that the Power and Wisdom which could organize the multitudinous whole of nature cannot so adjust its course, so determine and administer its laws (to speak after the manner of men), as to meet individual cases, and to secure an amount of enjoyment and happiness immeasurably greater than could result from general laws without "special adaptations." A God without providence is to us inconceivable. We say nothing of "particular providence,"—the term seems to us both unphilosophical and irreverent, — nor yet of "general providence," which, in the common acceptation of the phrase, denotes the absence of providence. But universal providence is as inseparable from rational theism as it is from the teachings of psalmist and prophet, apostle and Saviour.

As regards doctrines appertaining solely to man's spiritual being, — immortality, pardon, mediation, atonement, redemption, — it is entirely aside from our present purpose

to inquire whether we have an adequate intution of the truth independently of revelation, or whether we are primarily and chiefly dependent on the written word even for what we call our intuitions; though we would ask, in passing, how it is, on the former hypothesis, that clear and lofty views of spiritual truth are never found except on Christian soil, and that, with hardly an exception, men who have professed to hold such views on other grounds than those of Christian faith have been nurslings of the Bible, the children of the church, under her watch and ward till, in the conceit of wisdom, they spurned the mother that bore them. But our present concern is with external nature, not with the inspiration which is, or is not, in man. Now it is manifest that truths like those named above cannot be expressly included in or deduced from the phenomena of the visible universe; yet we should antecedently expect that spiritual facts and laws would be more or less distinctly typified and prefigured in material forms; and though types and analogies have no validity as positive proofs, they are often of inestimable worth in guiding inquiry and in answering objections.

Thus throughout all nature we mark the tendency of "mortality to be swallowed up of life." In numerous cases, what seems death is but a passage of the life into some more noble or more ample mode of being, — birth into another sphere, — an enlarged or multiplied vitality. And even when we cannot trace the continuity of life, death is its feeder, and every stage of dissolution and decomposition is prolific in vivifying energies, insomuch that wherever death abounds, life much more abounds. Phenomena of this class are well suited to suggest the possibility and inspire the hope of the continued or renewed life of man after death; but so far are they from furnishing satisfactory grounds for this belief, that they do not even give it a definite shape. They lend their aid equally to the hypothesis of conscious immortality, to that of metempsychosis, and to that of the reabsorption of the individual life into its source.

But when revelation assures us of a literal resurrection and a personal immortality, these phenomena silence our scepticism, hardly leave room for the mingling of wonder with our adoring gratitude as we stand in faith by the broken sepulchre, and bring the most transcendently glorious miracle in the gospel history, with the eternal life which it authenticates, into the order of nature.

In like manner, we find in the outward universe numerous analogues of pardon and redemption. Nature is full of remedial functions, restorative agencies, curative processes. Lesions that seem fatal are survived by plants and animals. The wounded deer can find the healing herb. The maimed tree renews its truncated limbs. New members shoot from the bisected polyp. "There is a sin not unto death," might seem a pervading law of creation, to an unfallen or an obdurate soul. But he who bows in remorse and dread under the burden of his own guilt would find equally numerous and strong analogies to drive him to despair; or if not, nature would fail to point him to the specific balm for his wound, or to the physician that can heal the diseases of the spirit. But when he appears who alone "has power upon earth to forgive sin," then the hopeful analogies of nature cluster around his mission, and the grace of God incarnate in him has its multitudinous attestations in the benignant laws that renew blighted, diseased, and imperilled life through the whole realm of the divine providence.

Mediation, too, and vicariousness have their types in nature, — mediation, in the mutual offices by which God constantly ministers to his children and his creatures through one another, — vicariousness, in the many instances in human and animal physiology in which one part of the system suffers all the pain occasioned by the lesion of another part, and in which the healthy action of one organ replaces the suspended, or supplements the impaired, action of another. None of these provisions, indeed, could help man in his approach to God, or give him hope in his spiritual needs and liabilities. But they group themselves as illustrations

and confirmations of God's method with the sinner. They give a naturalness, and therefore an intrinsic probability, to the office of the "one Mediator between God and man," and to the divine appointment by which he "bore our griefs, carried our sorrows, and was bruised for our iniquities," so that "by his stripes we are healed."

Were we willing to transgress our proposed limits, we should here present the natural religion of the soul as bearing its emphatic testimony to the peculiar doctrines of Christianity. The soul's natural religion, however, is one, not of intuitions, but of questions, yearnings, and needs; not of dogmas, but of postulates; and the adaptation of the positive religion of the gospel to meet and satisfy this interrogative religion of the soul, constitutes the most valuable, convincing, and edifying portion of the internal evidences of Christianity. But we must not even enter on this rich field.

We beg leave to make an important discrimination with reference to what we have here written, partly for the truth's sake, and partly for consistency's sake, lest we may seem to have contradicted what we have written elsewhere. *Natural theology* or *religion* bears two widely different meanings. It may denote such knowledge of divine things as man could attain without revelation; or it may denote, in addition to this, what man can see in nature by the light of revelation. In the former sense our estimate of the contents of natural religion is exceedingly low. We believe that mankind would reach, with the progress of knowledge, the conception of Deity, that is, of creative intelligence, but not of a personal God; still less, of the moral attributes which the Bible reveals. It is of the actual contents of nature,— of the truths of which the material universe bears the clear and ineffaceable record,—not of man's power to peruse that record unaided, that we have spoken in the present Article. The book was "in the right hand of him that sat upon the throne," and men might read the writing on the covers, or catch a word here and there on the margin of the leaves; but until Christ came, "no man was able to open

the book, and to loose the seals thereof." In fine, with reference to almost all the fundamental truths, which are commonly, and, with the qualification indicated above, rightly regarded as within the province of natural religion, we would adopt, *mutatis mutandis*, the following statement of Professor Cooke with reference to the proof of the divine goodness in nature :

"I do not believe, in any sense, that nature proves the goodness of God. When the heart has been once touched by the love of God, as manifested on Calvary, the tokens of God's goodness are seen everywhere; but before this, nature, to one who has seen its terrors and felt its power, looks dark indeed; and the pretence that the material universe, unexplained by revelation, manifests a God of unmixed beneficence, not only does harm to religion, but places science in a false light. The most superficial observation shows that this is not true. Lightning and tempest, plague, pestilence, and famine, with all their awful accompaniments, are no less facts of nature than the golden sunset, the summer's breeze, and the ripening harvest; and who does not 'know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now'? It does not change the terrible fact to say that nature has been disordered by man's sin; for sin is, itself, the greatest evil in the world, and its ghastly forms meet us at every step. So prominent, indeed, is the evil in nature, and so insidiously and mysteriously does it pervade the whole system, that an argument to prove the malignity of God could be made to appear quite as plausible as the arguments which are frequently urged to prove his pure beneficence; and wherever the unaided human intellect has attempted to make to itself a beneficent God, it has always made a malignant Deity as well. Nature manifests God's wrath no less than his love; and it is a false and sickly philosophy which attempts to keep the awful fact out of sight. God is our Father; but nature could not teach it, and 'the Word was made flesh' to declare it. God is love; but nature could not prove it, and the Lamb was 'slain from the foundation of the world' to attest it."— pp. 347, 348.

We have thus cursorily surveyed a large part of the field of argument and illustration opened by the admirable book which gave us our text, and to which we have constantly referred for the facts in physical science that we have adduced. It remains only to give a brief analysis of the work before us.

The author commences by defining the separate provinces and mutual relations of science and revelation, pointing out

the offices and the limitations of natural religion, and showing the competency of even inanimate nature to bear authentic testimony to creative design. He then adduces successively the testimony of the atmosphere as a composite whole, and of its several constituents, oxygen, water [aqueous vapor], carbonic acid, and nitrogen. He next considers the "argument from special adaptations,"—an argument which his subject enables him to urge with peculiar pertinency and power, so very numerous are the characteristics and phenomena of the atmosphere which fit it expressly for vital uses, and which, however successfully science may force them into line with the whole constitution and course of nature, seem at first sight somewhat anomalous and abnormal. Then, as the essential complement and counterpart to this, Professor Cooke presents the "argument from general plan," showing the filaments of unity and continuousness of purpose, the tokens of the same mind, the vestiges of the same shaping thought, as they pervade, with mutual correspondences, all departments of nature. The work terminates with a lucid and explicit statement of the different methods of scientific and religious thought, of the inadequacy of the former to grapple with the great themes which appertain to man's interior and everlasting life, and the inadequacy of the latter, at the same time, to issue *ex cathedra* judgments in the realm of pure science, or on merely physical and material subjects, except in their psychological and religious bearings. We close by quoting from this part of the volume the following paragraph, to which it were well for both scientific men and theologians to give heed:

"I cannot but believe that the appearance of clashing between science and religion would be wholly avoided, if the teachers both of God's unwritten and of his written word would pay more regard to the necessary limitations of scientific and religious thought. On subjects where the methods of acquiring knowledge are so utterly unlike, where the relations of the knowledge to the human understanding are so different when gained, it is in vain to expect literal accordance. Science, both in its methods and its results, addresses the understanding exclusively; Christianity appeals

chiefly to the heart. Science aims to instruct; Christianity aims to persuade. Science is attained by study, and is possible only for the few; Christianity is a free gift from God to all men who will receive his Son. The results of science are fully comprehended, and can be expressed in definite terms; the truths of Christianity stand on a level above man's intellect, and can only be shadowed forth in types and symbols. The forms of science are constantly changing; the types and symbols of Christianity are permanent. Lastly, while the language of science may be so varied from time to time as to express accurately the current ideas, Christianity necessarily retains the forms under which it was first revealed. Under such conditions how can it be expected that the language of revelation should agree with the letter of science? You might as reasonably find fault with nature because its crystals are not perfect, as criticise the Bible because its language, although embodying divine truth, is not free from the necessary limitations and imperfections of the human medium of thought."—pp. 341, 342.

ARTICLE IV.

NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

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[This is the Thirteenth of the Series of Articles representing the peculiar views of different theological sects or schools.]

THE doctrinal system termed "New England Theology," is a modified form of Calvinism. It originated in connection with that remarkable religious movement in our country, a little more than a century ago, called "the great awakening." Among the men who have contributed to its development and elucidation may be mentioned the two Edwardses, Bellamy, Hopkins, West, Smalley, Spring, Emmons, Griffin, Dwight, Woods, Taylor, and Beecher. It has been variously designated. At first it was called "new light," or "new light divinity"; sometimes "Berkshire divinity" (from the fact that several eminent men who adopted it resided in Berkshire county, Mass.); often "Edwardean," or

"Hopkintonian," or "Hopkinsian divinity"; or simply "Edwardeanism," or "Hopkinsianism." In England, where it was embraced by many distinguished divines, it was called "American theology," to distinguish it from European systems. But since its general prevalence in New England, and especially since the beginning of the present century, it has been, in this country, more commonly denominated "New England theology," to denote its origin, and to distinguish it from other systems that have more or less extensively prevailed here. Some persons have questioned the propriety of this designation. The term "New England theology," it is said, should be applied to that system of doctrines which the Puritans brought with them to this country, which was almost universally prevalent here for more than a century, and which has always been held by many of the New England ministers and churches. But why does that system need a new name? It is "Calvinism"; it is the "theology of the Reformers"; it is "Old School theology"; and if this is not enough, let it be christened "Puritan theology." But why should a system which did not originate in New England, and which has not been the predominating system here more than half the period since the settlement of the country, be called "New England theology?" and especially since it has to a great extent been displaced by another system which did originate here, and which needs some appropriate name, not only to discriminate it from the old system, but also to indicate its local origin?

Some object to the term, that it is too narrow, seeming to imply that the theological system which it denotes is limited to the comparatively small territory included in the New England states. But it implies no such limitation, any more than the term "Genevan theology" implies that the system of Calvin is limited to the city where he taught it, or than the term "Old School Presbyterian theology" implies that the system thus designated is limited to the Old School Presbyterian church. What we call New England theology, we are well aware long ago passed beyond the limits of New

England, and has been extensively adopted in other parts of this country, and in England and Scotland; but this fact seems to be a reason why the name by which it is now known should be retained, rather than laid aside, so that this theology may never forget, nor be tempted to disown, the place of its nativity.

But why not, it is still asked, allow it to bear the name of some of those eminent men who have done much to develop and mould it? Why not call it Edwardean? Because Edwards only laid the foundation of the system, contributing little to the form of the superstructure, while he retained some views inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the system which he founded. "Why not, then, call it Hopkinsian?" In part, for the same reason. Hopkins advanced upon Edwards, that is, applied more fully and consistently the principles of Edwards, but he left much for his followers to do in shaping the system; while some of his own peculiar speculations have not been permanently adopted into it. His name however was for a time attached to the new system, at first in reproach by his enemies, afterwards in honor by his friends.[1] But, aside from the fact that the name of no one man can properly represent the system in its present form, it is contrary to the very spirit of it to give any such prominence and honor to a mere creature, whom it sinks into utter insignificance before the dread Sovereign whom it so greatly exalts.

There seems to be no valid objection to the name which this system of doctrines, by very general consent, has borne

[1] Dr. Hopkins, in his Autobiography, writes: "Soon after [about 1770] there was a small pamphlet published, which was doubtless written by the same Mr. Nast, in which the doctrines I, and others who agreed with me, had published, were misrepresented, and set in a ridiculous light; and, with a particular design to disgrace me before the public, he called them Hopkintonian doctrines. This is the origin of the epithet; and since that time all who embraced the Calvinistic doctrines which were published by President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, Dr. West of Stockbridge, and myself, have been called Hopkintonians or Hopkinsians. Thus, without designing it, I became the head of a denomination, which has since greatly increased." — Prof. Park's Mem. Hopkins, p. 194.

for half a century. But it is with the system itself, more than with its name, that we are at present concerned.

We have already implied that this system, as a system, is new; that it differs, in some respects, from the prevailing type of Calvinism which preceded it, and which is still held by large bodies of Christians in this and in other countries. It certainly has some new features, which have characterized it from the beginning. Its early names clearly imply this. It has long been opposed by its enemies as "new," and admired and defended by its friends as "new." The supposition that it is only a revival of old Calvinism is inconsistent with every page of the history of the times in which it originated, and of the discussions which have attended its gradual development. The distinguished divines whose names have been most intimately associated with it, in the spirit of the charge which John Robinson gave to the first settlers of Plymouth when they were about to leave Leyden, have believed in the possibility of progress in theological science, and were animated with the hope of themselves contributing to that progress. Thus President Edwards says: "They therefore who bring any addition of light to this great subject, and the nature of true religion, and its distinction from all counterfeits, should be accepted as doing the greatest possible service to the church of God. And attempts to this end ought not to be despised and discouraged, under a notion that it is but vanity and arrogance in such as are lately sprung up in an obscure part of the world, to pretend to add anything on this subject to the informations we have long since received from their fathers, who have lived in former times in New England and more noted countries. We cannot suppose that the church of God is already possessed of all that light in things of this nature that ever God intends to give it, nor that all Satan's lurking places have already been found out."[1]

In the same strain wrote the younger Edwards: "Improvement is by no means at an end; and those men err

[1] Preface to Dr. Bellamy's True Religion Delineated.

exceedingly who lament that they live in this late period of the world, wherein improvement and science have been anticipated, and there is no room left for further discoveries. There is abundant room for discovery and improvement in every science, especially in theology." "Though the canon of scripture is complete, and we are to expect no further revelations, yet many new truths will break forth from the word of God, which, although now contained in it, for want of attention and comparing spiritual things with spiritual, are not yet seen. Further discoveries, even in moral and divine subjects, are also to be expected from the candid disquisitions of unbiassed reason."[1]

Dr. Hopkins, in reply to the charge that his doctrines were new, wrote: "I now declare, I had much rather publish *new divinity* than any other. And the more of this the better, if it be but true. Nor do I think any doctrine can be 'too strange to be true.' I should think it hardly worth while to write if I had nothing *new* to say." "It is at least *possible* that there is some truth contained in the Bible which has not been commonly taught; yea, has never been mentioned by any writer since the apostles; and whenever that shall be discovered and brought out, it will be *new*. And who knows but that some such *new* discoveries may be made in our day? If so, unhappy and very guilty will be the man who shall attempt to fright people, and raise their prejudices against it by raising the cry of '*new* divinity.'"[2] The successors of these independent and progressive divines cherished the same convictions, and thought and wrote in the same spirit, and fully justified Dr. Woods in saying: "Great improvements have been made in the structure of theological systems since the Reformation. Those written by Calvin, Turretine, Knapp, Dick, Hill, Dwight, and other distinguished divines, though not free from imperfections and error, have contributed much, and are adapted to contribute still more, to the advancement of theological

[1] Works, Vol. II. pp. 63, 66.
[2] Prof. Park's Memoir of Hopkins, pp. 178, 179.

knowledge. And I hope the labors of *younger divines now living* will be yet more successful, and will result in the framing of systems which will exhibit the principles of Christian theology more truly and ably, and in more just conceptions and proportions, than any which have preceded."[1] These men not only believed in the possibility of progress in theology, but believed themselves to have contributed to that progress, by developing a system of doctrines which in some respects was new, and an improvement on all systems previously received.

But this system, while presenting some peculiar features which justly entitle it to be called *new*, is yet in many respects *old*. It is Calvinism in a new and improved form. It does not claim to be original as to its great cardinal truths; but, on the contrary, it insists that these truths are the very same which are found in all the generally recognized symbols of the church. New England theology never disowned Calvinism; it is Calvinism, only better explained, systematized, made more coherent and self-consistent. It excludes some of the unessential and repellant parts of the old system, which Dr. Emmons called the "gross absurdities, or mere wens and protuberances, which must be pared off from *true* Calvinism, in order to make it appear consistent with both reason and scripture."[2] Even Dr. Stiles, who had no sympathy with the new divinity, acknowledged that its preachers were "very sound and clear and full" on the "good old doctrines." By many it was opposed as the most extreme and uncompromising form of Calvinism.[3] Its advo-

[1] Works, Vol. I. p. 88.

[2] Prof. Park's Memoir of Dr. Emmons, p. 430.

[3] "Hence it was a maxim when I entered the Association, that Hopkinsianism was only Calvinism up to the hub. A consistent Calvinist was a true Hopkinsian."—Dr. Withington's Contributions to the Ecc. Hist. Essex North, p. 387. "In their way of thinking, those great New England divines [the Hopkinsian founder's of Andover Seminary] of that and the preceding age, who, by the exactness of their definitions and the fearlessness of their deductions, had improved upon the theories of their predecessors, were the most consistent of all Calvinists."—Dr. Bacon's Commemorative Discourse, p. 96.

cates gloried in being Calvinists, and regarded their own efforts as only an attempt to put forth a new and revised edition of the Genevan faith. They professed to be defenders and improvers, not destroyers, of the doctrinal system in which they and their fathers had been educated. Says Dr. Hopkins: "I believe that most of the doctrines, if not all, I have published are to be found in the doctrines of former divines, viz. Calvin, Van Mastricht, Saurin, Boston, Manton, Goodwin, Owen, Bates, Baxter, Charnock, the Assembly of divines at Westminster, Willard, Ridgley, Shepard, Hooker, etc. These, indeed, did not fully explain some of those doctrines which are asserted or implied in their writings; and many, if not most, of them are, in some instances, inconsistent with themselves, by advancing contrary doctrines."[1] Of the large number of ministers who had become Hopkinsians, he says that he believes they "are the most sound, consistent, and thorough Calvinists."[2] Dr. Emmons says: "I had no intention of starting any new scheme of divinity; for I was early and warmly attached to genuine Calvinism, which I believed to be built upon the firm foundation of the gospel itself. This system I have thought, and still think, is the very form of sound words which the apostles and their successors taught long before Calvin was born; and which has been constantly maintained by those who have been justly called *orthodox*, in distinction from *heterodox* Christians, ever since the first propagation of the Christian religion. But Calvinism has lost much of its purity and simplicity, by going through so many unskilful hands of its friends."[3] The aim of New England theologians since the day of Edwards, has been to restore "genuine Calvinism" to "its purity and simplicity." "It is evident," says Dr. Spring, "that Hopkinsian sentiments are only the genuine, flourishing, and fruitful branches of the Calvinistic tree." The broad foundation which supports our superstructure was long since deeply and most firmly

[1] Bib. Sacra, Vol. IX. p. 185.
[2] Memoir, p. 195.
[3] Memoir, p. 429.

laid in the first principles of Calvinism." "The first principles of Calvinists I heartily approve and avowedly adopt; but the inconsistencies with which some of them are chargeable, by denying several of the most interesting consequences of their theory, I wish to escape." [1]

This system of theology, *old* as to its substance, *new* as to its form, Calvinistic in its principles, Hopkinsian in its consistent statements and adjustment of parts, originated, as we have said, in the days of the "great awakening." Religion was at a very low ebb throughout the country. It was an age of formalism, when more was thought of converting ordinances, and half-way covenants, and "unregenerate doings," than of sound doctrine and vital godliness. Arminian, Pelagian, and Antinomian tendencies were rife. The current of public sentiment was setting strongly away from a pure gospel. Then, by the signal favor of God, began that remarkable series of revivals in which President Edwards bore so honorable and conspicuous a part. He had been educated in the old Calvinism of his day; but as a profound thinker and an earnest revivalist he was led to grapple with some of the practical errors which had grown out of that system; and in so doing, he advanced views which logically necessitated the new Calvinism of his pupils and followers. In an important sense he is justly called the father of New England theology. His intimate friends, Bellamy and Hopkins, felt that they were only carrying out and applying more fully and consistently the principles they had learned from him. His son wrote an essay on the "Improvements made in theology by his father." [2] He specifies not less than ten "improvements," most of which were subsequently wrought into the system now under consideration. The fact that this system was early called, indiscriminately, Edwardean or Hopkinsian, shows that the peculiarities of it were then traced from the pupil up to the teacher. Its enemies have from the beginning been wont to hold Edwards

[1] Disquisitions, pp. 44, 45.
[2] Works, Vol. I. pp. 481–492.

responsible for it.[1] The history of theological discussions, in his day and since, clearly show the decisive influence of his gigantic mind in originating and shaping the new system, which some think should still bear his name. "Without subverting the creeds, he gave to theology the illumination and discrimination and precision of his powerful mind, guided by as great an amount of meekness and holiness of heart and sound discretion as were ever, probably, entrusted to man. In his train arose successive generations of ministers, men of powerful and discriminating minds, who sustained the light and kept up the impulse which the great master-spirit had given, and superintended the revivals which everywhere characterized the Edwardean school, whose theology, though shaded by circumstantial differences, has been comprehensively denominated New England divinity."[2]

This system of theology has been gradually becoming more and more complete and systematical. Some features of it, which were pressed into undue prominence by the hostile influences it once encountered, have assumed their

[1] Dr. Stiles calls Edwards one of the "pillars" of the new divinity. — Memoir of Hopkins, p. 234.

Dr. Ely, in his "Contrast," says: "I use the word 'Hopkinsianism' to denote that system of doctrine, whose foundation was laid by President Edwards, whose superstructure was principally reared by Dr. Samuel Hopkins, and whose top-stone has been carried up by a multitude, shouting Grace, Grace, unto it!" — p. 4.

"In America, the earliest school of metaphysics was founded by the followers of Locke; and with the clue of this great inquirer in his hand, Jonathan Edwards ventured into a labyrinth from which no English theologian had ever come out safe. By the just influence of his eminently patient, discriminating, and conclusive research, this greatest of modern Christian metaphysicians put his contemporaries and their descendants upon a sort of discourse, which will perhaps characterise New England Calvinism as long as there is a fibre of it left." "Taking the premises of the great Edwards, they [his successors] deduced a system of false theology, which, under its first phase as Hopkinsianism, and under its second phase as Taylorism, has been to our church the *fons et origo malorum* which, in union with the Episcopalianism of the Paley school, has assumed the name of Calvinism to betray it to its enemies." — Princeton Essays, 1st series, pp. 608–610.

[2] Dr. Lyman Beecher, in Spirit of the Pilgrims, Vol. V. p. 394.

proper proportions. Some of the paradoxical statements and erratic speculations once associated with it have been dropped. The union of its advocates with "moderate Calvinists,"[1] in founding Andover Theological Seminary, had a modifying influence upon it; though its influence in modifying and assimilating to itself the views of the Calvinistic party to the union was more manifest and decisive. In process of time it became, in a softened and modified form, without the loss of any of its distinctive features, the prevailing theology of that institution.[2] For a time it was called "Andoverian Calvinism," or Andoverian theology; but ere long acquired its present more appropriate designation, "New England theology."

This system, it has been said, is characterized by "metaphysics of the hyperborean sort, exceedingly cold and fruitless. But no fact of history is better attested than that the whole tendency of it is eminently practical and spiritually

[1] It is to be borne in mind that the party that united with Hopkinsians in founding the seminary was composed of "Moderate Calvinists," and not of that type of Calvinists which once prevailed in New England, specimens of which have always been found here, and which still prevails extensively in our country, out of New England. Our opponents are not always reliable witnesses in regard to ourselves; but we can see no reason to question the substantial correctness of the following testimony, given, in 1813, in the General Repository, a Unitarian work, No. 6, p. 360: "The reformed, amputated, and enlarged state of the Westminster creed, as received at Andover, is quite a different orthodoxy from the standards of Princeton. It may reasonably be doubted whether there be a Calvinist in New England who would agree to the explanations of the New York Calvinists."

[2] "In consequence of the union here spoken of, not only did the old division of Hopkinsians and Calvinists disappear, but, in reference to the mass of our clergy, the names themselves were no longer distinctively used. All were Calvinists in a modified sense, while all had felt the influence of Edwards and his followers, and had adopted, more or less, the Hopkinsian explanations." — Dr. Enoch Pond, in Congregationalist, Nov. 12, 1852.

"So carefully and conscientiously did he [Dr. Woods] cherish the spirit of the compromise; so judiciously did he avoid those extreme conclusions in which some Hopkinsians delighted, that in a little while the Old Divinity leaven was quietly purged out, and Andover theology had become (quite to the discontent of a few extremists on both sides) a moderate Hopkinsianism. The same Andover theology is substantially the New England orthodoxy of the present day." — Dr. Bacon's Commemorative Discourse, p. 106.

vivifying. Born in the heat of a great revival, it has been eminently promotive of revivals. In 1799, Dr. Hopkins, writing to his friend Andrew Fuller of a remarkable revival of religion then in progress in this country, says: "And it is to be remarked that this revival has taken place in almost all, if not in every instance, under the preaching of those ministers who have embraced Edwardean principles."[1] It unquestionably was largely owing to the inspiring and stimulating influence of this theology that there sprang into being in New England, about a half-century ago, that bright constellation of missionary and benevolent societies which have done so much to plant the institutions of the gospel in this and in other lands, and are rapidly encircling the earth with the light of a pure Christianity. So far from being a system of frigid and fruitless metaphysics, its very genius is that of impartial and universal benevolence. It moves, by its own native impulse, along the track of revivals and missions, with its eye ever steadfastly and hopefully fixed on the coming glory of the millennium.

We now proceed to a statement of some of the peculiar and more important doctrines of this New England theology.

The Nature of Virtue.

There are few topics more fundamental in theology than this. The views which a consistent thinker adopts on the nature of virtue or holiness, will necessarily determine his views on many other points, and, to a great extent, shape his whole theological system. "If a man tells you," says Professor Hodge, "his theory of virtue, you need ask no questions about his theology."[2]

So thought the fathers of New England theology. They were profoundly impressed with the importance of correct views on this subject, and clearly perceived their connection with correct views in regard to the character and government of God, the depravity of man, and the whole scheme

[1] Memoir of Hopkins, p. 237.
[2] Hodge's Essays and Reviews, p. 2.

of redemption by Christ. Dr. Hopkins expressed his conviction that "wrong conceptions of the distinguishing nature of holiness lead to all kinds of delusions in religion"; that "there has been too little attention to the nature of holiness among divines in general, and that a proper and intelligible definition of it is not easy to be found in bodies of divinity or elsewhere"; that "the controversies before us turn chiefly on this, and will be decided, the shortest and best way, by determining what holiness is."[1] The views which he and Edwards advanced were early seen to be the foundation of new divinity, by those who opposed that system. Says Mr. Hart, who wrote against both Edwards and Hopkins: "This doctrine of Mr. Edwards seems to be the foundation on which several doctrines in the *new* scheme of divinity are built." "His notion of virtue is new and strange, and the scheme you have built upon it is new. Both must stand or fall together."[2] In an important sense the system of docrines once called New divinity, and now New England theology, *is* built upon President Edwards's theory of virtue, and they "must stand or fall together." This theory was most carefully elaborated by the President, and set forth in a treatise, which, in point of originality, ability, and intrinsic value is not inferior to his Treatise on the Will. It was, in its main features, adopted by his successors, and led logically to the adoption of nearly all the other peculiarities of their theological system.

According to this theory, "true virtue consists most essentially in benevolence to being in general; or, perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity, and union of heart to being in general that is immediately exercised in a general good will." "No affections towards particular persons or beings are of the nature of true virtue,

[1] Works, Vol. III. pp. 5, 6.

[2] Memoir of Hopkins, p. 196. Mr. Moses Mather, who also controverted the views of Edwards and Hopkins, regarded the theory of virtue advanced by the former as "a great error, and of a very bad tendency, it being the source of a set of doctrines, which he calls 'new divinity,' which are surprisingly spreading in the land in the present day."—Hopkins's Works, Vol. III. p. 106.

but such as arise from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind wherein consists a disposition to love being in general." [1] Virtue, as consisting in general love, is of two kinds: the "love of benevolence and the love of complacence."

"The love of benevolence is that affection or propensity of the heart to any being which causes it to incline to any being, or disposes it to desire and take pleasure in its happiness." [2] True virtue consists *primarily* in this: its object is not *character*, but simply *being*. It is exercised towards beings, not as holy or virtuous, but as sentient, capable of holiness and happiness, and is exercised towards them in proportion to their susceptibilities and capacities; so that "that being who has the *most* of being, or has the greatest share of existence, other things being equal, so far as such a being is exhibited to our faculties or set in our view, will have the greatest share of the propensity and benevolent affection of the heart." [3] Hence God is the principal object of this benevolent love, because he "has infinitely the greatest share of existence and is infinitely the greatest being; so that all other being, even that of all created things whatsoever, throughout the whole universe, is as nothing in comparison with the divine Being." The *secondary* form of virtue, or "love of complacence," is love for beings on account of their holiness or benevolence. Its object is not simply being, but "*benevolent* being." "When any one under the influence of general benevolence sees another being possessed of like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him than merely his having existence." God is the principal object of this complacent love, as he is not only infinitely the greatest, but infinitely the most benevolent being. Hence "all true virtue consists radically and essentially, and as it were summarily," in supreme love to God, both of benevolence and of complacence. That virtue does not consist,

[1] Edwards's Treatise on the Nature of True Virtue, Chap. I.
[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

primarily, in love of complacence, but in the love of benevolence, Edwards thus conclusively argues: "If virtue consists primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue; so that virtue must consist in the love of the love of virtue." And if it be inquired what that virtue is, which virtue consists in the love of the love of, it must be answered, It is the love of virtue, "and so on *in infinitum*. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation."[1]

As implied in this general statement of Edwards's theory of virtue, a few points should be more particularly noticed:

1. According to this theory, all virtue is resolvable into love, or impartial benevolence. It is conceded by all theologians that a large part of virtue consists in love. This theory claims that there is nothing of the nature of true virtue which does not consist in love. On this point Edwards is explicit. "*All* virtue primarily," he says, "consists in that affection of the heart to being which is exercised in benevolence, or in an inclination to its good." And after showing that this primary benevolence, or choice of the general good, will produce a secondary love of complacency towards all holy or benevolent beings, making them to appear morally beautiful or excellent, he adds: "And in these things consists *all true* virtue, viz. in this love of being, and the qualities and acts which arise from it."[2] The assertion is repeated by him too often, and in too many

[1] Treatise on the Nature of True Virtue, Chap. I. It is not affirmed that virtue may not be an object of benevolence, only not the direct and primary object; and only as it gives more worth or existence to beings who possess it. "It is true, indeed, that moral excellence, or the love of benevolence and complacency, may be the object of benevolence as well as (of) complacency, for the more excellent any being is, the greater is his importance and worth, and his interest so much more valuable, and, indeed, the more existence he has; for excellence is real existence. Therefore there will not only be more complacence and delight in such a being, but he is more the object of benevolence, in wishing him well, prosperous, and happy, and doing him good if he stands in need and there is opportunity, and in being friendly to his existence, prosperity, and happiness, and rejoicing in the same."—Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 50.

[1] Treatise on the Nature of Virtue, Chapter I.

forms, to be misunderstood, or to leave room for a shadow of doubt that he held that nothing is virtuous which cannot be resolved into the love of being, or the love of the love of being, i.e. into love to God as the supreme good, and love to his children for their moral likeness to him; and love to sentient beings for their capacities for happiness and holiness. Gratitude, submission, justice, and like qualities, are virtuous when, and only so far forth as, they are animated by, and arise from, a virtuous benevolence of heart." As mere natural affections or instinctive sentiments they are not holy. As virtues they are only different forms or expressions of benevolent love. "Benevolence or goodness is mercy, grace, compassion, patience, long-suffering, etc. And the same benevolence is wisdom, justice, truth, faithfulness, complacence, displeasure, anger, wrath, in different views, and as it respects different objects."[1]

2. According to this theory, virtue or holiness is of the same nature wherever found, whether in God or his creatures. "From hence it is evident that the *divine virtue*, or the virtue of the divine mind, must consist primarily in *love to himself*." "There is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it must be thus, on a supposition that virtue, in its most essential nature, consists in benevolent affection or propensity of heart towards being in general; and so flowing out to particular beings, in a greater or less degree, according to the measure of existence and beauty they are possessed of. It will also follow from the foregoing things that God's goodness and love to created beings is derived from and subordinate to his love to himself."[2] "Holiness is essentially, in nature and kind, the same thing in all beings that are capable of it. Holiness in God is not different in nature and kind from the holiness of creatures." "Divine love comprehends wisdom, justice, truth, faithfulness, and every moral perfection and excellence whatsoever. What

[1] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 55.

[2] Edwards's Treatise on the Nature of Virtue, Chapter II.

is called by these different names is but one most simple thing, even *divine love*." [1]

3. According to this theory, all virtue consists in voluntary acts or states. It consists in *love*, but not in an instinctive and involuntary love, but in a love which is a free choice or preference of the higher to the lower good, — of the general to the private good. It consists in *benevolence*, but bene-*volence* is certainly something that is voluntary. It consists in "consent and union of heart to being in general," but it is a consent that is "*exercised* in general *good will*," for "the very notions of *consenting*, yielding, etc., are, according to the meaning of the terms, *nothing but certain acts of the will*." [2] Edwards does, it is true, sometimes speak of virtue as lying in a "*tendency* of the heart to love," and a *disposition* and *inclination* and *propensity* of heart to virtuous acts. But it is evident that when he speaks thus he means, not a tendency or disposition or propensity, as distinct from and prior to states or acts of the will or exercises of the heart, but as identical with them, or as the genus of which they are the species, for speaking of such things as "humility, meekness, patience, gratitude," loving Christ, and universal benevolence to mankind, etc., he says: "all these things are *dispositions* and *inclinations* of the heart." [3] And all such dispositions and inclinations, he tells us, are voluntary acts or choices of the will: "Whatever names we call the act of the will by, — choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, *inclining* or being averse to, a being pleased or displeased, — all may be reduced to this of *choosing*. For the soul to act voluntarily is evermore to act electively." [4] When men of this school speak of a "disposition of heart," they ordinarily mean the heart voluntarily disposed; and of an "inclination of the will,"

[1] Hopkins's Works, Vol. III. pp. 11, 38.
[2] Edwards on the Will, Part III. sect. 4.
[3] Edwards on the Will, Part III. sect. 6.
[4] Edwards on the Will, Part I. sect. 1.

they mean the will voluntarily inclined. Inclination, heart, and will are used synonymously, as when President Edwards says: "This faculty is called by various names; it is sometimes called the *inclination;* and, as it has respect to the actions that are determined and governed by it, is called the *will;* and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is often called the *heart*." Hence a benevolent disposition is a benevolent act of the will, or exercise of the heart.

The voluntary character of virtue is further shown by Edwards, when he insists that the divine commands requiring holiness, are addressed only to the will. "The will itself, as has been observed, is all that can be directly and immediately required by command." "The being of a good will (benevolence) is the most proper, direct, and immediate subject of command."[1] That love, then, which is a fulfilling of the law, and is the essence of all virtue, is a "good will," which is, of course, a good act or state of the will. That this was understood to be the doctrine of Edwards by his early admirers and followers is abundantly evident from their writings. Dr. West, in an essay in which he endorses and defends Edwards's Treatise on the Will, says: "If the great and only moral beauty in the universe consisteth in *love*, in its several and different exercises (all which consist in certain *positive* exercises of affection), it is in vain to look for moral beauty where there is an entire want and negation of all mental, voluntary affection." And Dr. Hopkins, on the very same page where he refers approvingly to the treatises of Edwards and West on the Will, says: "Moral agency, *virtue* and vice, blame and praiseworthiness, consist wholly in *the exercise of will and choice* made in the view of motives, and *in nothing else* beside, or which is antecedent to, or consequent upon, voluntary action."[2]

There is a theory of virtue held by many divines which makes virtue consist primarily and essentially in something

[1] Edwards on the Will, Part III. sect. 4.

[2] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 87.

prior to benevolent choice, viz. in a taste or relish for holiness, or a complacency in holy beings on account of their moral beauty or excellence, from which complacence or taste benevolent love and all secondary virtue springs. This is the old theory; and some expressions may be found in Edwards's works, particularly in his Treatise on the Affections, which seem to favor it, as where he says: "Love to divine things *for the beauty of their moral excellency* is the spring of *all* holy affections." But this is the theory which he controverts in his Treatise on Virtue, and disproves by an argument which carries with it almost the force of a mathematical demonstration, showing that the supposition that virtue consists primarily in the love of virtue involves the absurdity and inconsistency of the endless circle. "Because it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or first motive of that love wherein virtue originally consists, or wherein the very first virtue consists. Which makes the first virtue both the ground and the consequence, both the cause and effect, of itself."[1] The Edwardean theory, beyond all question, is, that virtue primarily and essentially consists, not in an involuntary taste, nor in a complacential love of virtue, or of beings on account of their virtue, but in a benevolent love of beings on account of and in proportion to their amount of existence, or capacities for happiness and holiness, — a love which is a free, intelligent choice, or voluntary preference of the general or highest good.

4. According to this theory, virtue is the highest good in the universe, though the general happiness is the last or ultimate end of virtue. In making virtue a good in itself, and the highest form of good, it differs widely from all utilitarian theories. In making the general happiness the ultimate end aimed at, it differs from all theories which make virtue consist primarily, not in a benevolent choice, but in an involuntary taste or relish. It has sometimes, but most unjustly, been charged with being only one form of utilita-

[1] Treatise on the Nature of Virtue, Chap. I.

rianism. But all forms of utilitarianism make happiness the highest and only absolute good, and virtue only a relative good — good only as a means of happiness. But the Edwardean theory makes virtue a good in itself, and the supreme good. "That which is called virtue" (in the abstract, not concrete), "is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form, or quality that is observed in things. That form or quality is called beautiful, to any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears *in itself agreeable* or *comely* to him, or the view or idea of which is *immediately* pleasant to the mind. I say agreeable *in itself* and *immediately* pleasant, to distinguish it from things which *in themselves* are not agreeable nor pleasant, but either indifferent or disagreeable, which yet appear eligible or agreeable *indirectly*, for something else that is the consequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableness or eligibleness in things, not for themselves, but for something else, is not what is called beauty."[1] The things in which this beauty is seen are, benevolent love and the complacent love resulting from it. This beauty or virtuous quality of love is a good in itself, and is perceived to be good *directly*, and not "by argumentation on its *connections* and *consequences*," i.e. not because it is seen to be promotive of the general happiness. The general happiness is a great good, but the benevolence which seeks the general happiness is a greater good. Hence Dr. Hopkins, who fully agreed with Edwards on this subject, declares holiness to be "the greatest possible good," "the highest possible excellence in the universe," "that in which the highest and most perfect beauty and all real worth do summarily consist."[2]

This highest good secures, or is that in which consists, the highest happiness of the universe. In its primary form it has happiness for its immediate object; in its secondary form it has the love of happiness as its immediate object; and in its highest form it has the love of the love of happiness,

[1] Edwards's Treatise on the Nature of Virtue, Chap. VIII.
[2] Works, Vol. III. pp. 9, 10.

i.e. the love of complacency, for its immediate object. In one sense this last form of virtue is its highest form. Still this love of complacent love is virtue only as it is an emanation from, and so involves, benevolence or love of happiness. "If we leave benevolence out of our idea of the love of complacency, and so out of our idea of the love of the love of complacency, we have no idea of true holiness."[1] Hence happiness is the ultimate object of all virtue, i.e. in our analysis of the highest virtue we find, as its primary and most essential element, that benevolence which has direct regard to the general happiness.

This theory, then, is not to be confounded, on the one hand, with any utilitarian theory; not with that which makes happiness the only good; still less with that which makes the happiness of creatures the only good; and least of all, with that which makes the happiness of the individual agent the only or chief good; nor, on the other hand, with that theory which makes virtue the primary object of virtue, and makes it consist largely in something which cannot be resolved into benevolence.

It is not denied that some who have adopted the New England theology generally, have made virtue a relative good, its goodness consisting in its tendency to promote the general happiness. This departure from the Edwardean theory, however, has not extensively prevailed among the more eminent divines of this school. Most are content to accept the theory which Edwards so carefully elaborated, and which is the corner-stone of that system of new divinity which he and his followers reared thereon.

The Nature of Sin.

As sin is the opposite of holiness, the theory which a person adopts in regard to the nature of the one will of necessity, if he be consistent, determine his theory in regard to the nature of the other. And certainly it could not be expected that those eminent men who aimed to be, and

[1] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 50.

claimed to be, more consistent in their Calvinism than others, should adopt so peculiar a theory of virtue as the Edwardean without adopting a corresponding theory of sin. Accordingly we find that these divines did adopt views in regard to the nature of sin which are in some respects peculiar, differing from those of the old Calvinists. Agreeing with the latter as to the degree and universality of human sinfulness, they differed from them as to the nature of that sinfulness, or as to that in which is consists.

1. According to their theory all sin consists in selfishness or inordinate self-love. As all holiness consists in benevolence or disinterested love, it seemed clearly to follow that all sin must consist in the opposite of this, i.e. in interested or selfish love. All theologians hold that much of the sin that exists is selfishness, or springs from selfishness. One peculiarity of the New England theory is, that all the diversified forms of sin have their root in, and derive their character from, selfishness, just as all the diversified forms of virtue have their root in, and derive their character from, benevolence. Thus President Edwards expressly says, in his Treatise on the Nature of Virtue: "All sin has its source from selfishness or from self-love not subordinate to a regard to being in general."[1] So Dr. Hopkins reiterates the statement, that "Nothing but that which has the nature of selfishness is sin, and this is, in its own nature, and in every degree, a transgression of the law of God, and contrary to true holiness."[2] The language of Dr. Dwight is: "Selfishness consists in a preference of ourselves to others, and to all others; to the universe and to God. This is sin, and all that in the scriptures is meant by sin."[3] Dr. Spring thus reasons: "As disinterested love is holiness, self-love is sin. For holiness and sin are opposites, and the only moral opposites in the universe." "Self-love is the sum and total of all wickedness."[4] It is characteristic in Dr. Emmons to say:

[1] Treatise on the Nature of Virtue, Chap. VII.
[2] Works, Vol. I. p. 241. See also Vol. I. pp. 236–238.
[3] Dwight's Sermons.
[4] Spring's Disquisitions, pp. 15, 123.

"Selfishness, and nothing but selfishness, is the transgression of the law of love. For selfishness, and nothing but selfishness, is sin; and nothing but sin is a transgression of the law." "Selfishness is the only thing that the law forbids, and therefore the transgression of the law wholly consists in selfishness."[1] On this point there has always been, among theologians of this school, perfect harmony of views.

2. According to New England theology all sin is voluntary, consisting in exercises of the heart or will. As from the principle that all holiness consists in benevolence it follows that all sin consists in selfishness; so from the principle that all holiness consists in benevolent choices or benevolent exercises of the heart it follows that all sin consists in selfish choices or exercises of the heart.

This theory, then, makes sin consist neither in the consequents nor in the antecedents of voluntary acts or exercises. It does not consist in the *consequents* of acts of the will. (*a*) Not in external actions, for these "are virtuous or sinful only as they are connected with the heart, and are the expressions, fruits, or effects of inclination, design, and choice; and all virtue or sin consists wholly in the latter."[2] (*b*) Not in what are now usually called imperative or executive volitions. The early divines of this school did not so often and clearly distinguish between generic and specific volitions as their successors have done, nor had the modern terminology on this subject come into use in their day. Still they recognized the distinction, and attributed virtue and sin wholly to those generic or permanent choices from which all particular choices flow and derive their character. What are now usually called generic choices, or governing purposes, or supreme affections, Edwards called "immanent acts or states of the will."[3] He also calls them "dispositions," "inclinations," "propensities," "habits," and "affections" (which latter, he says, are "only certain modes of the exercise of the will").[4] What are now called spe-

[1] Works, Vol. IV. p. 533.
[2] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 236.
[3] Treatise on the Will, Part II. sect. 4.
[4] Ibid.

cific or imperative volitions, Edwards speaks of as "exercises and alterations of mind," which are the "consequences of volition."[1] But it is to the "immanent act" of will, and not to any acts which result from it, that he ascribes all holiness and sin: "If there be several acts of the will, or a series of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another, the first and determining act is properly the subject of command, and not the consequent acts only, which are dependent upon it. Yea, it is this more especially which is that which command or precept has a proper respect to, because it is this act that determines the whole affair; in *this act* the *obedience* and *disobedience* lies in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all subject to, and governed and determined by it. This *determining, governing act* must be the proper subject of precept, or none."[2] Dr. Woods, restricting the word "volitions" to those acts of the will which are the consequence of "immanent acts," denies that they are either holy or sinful, in themselves, "for it is ultimately the affection, the disposition, or the state of the heart, which has itself a moral nature, and which imparts a moral quality to the volition which follows it."[3] Sin, then, does not consist in anything consequent upon "immanent acts," or generic volitions, whether bodily actions, or the executive volitions which cause them.

And as sin consists in nothing which *follows* the voluntary exercises of the heart or acts of will, so it consists in nothing which *precedes* them. (*a*) Not in the faculty of will. When Edwards speaks of virtue and vice as "inherent in an evil will," he means an evil *act* or *state* of the will, and not a good or evil faculty of will; as is evident from the fact that he speaks of it immediately as a "sinful *disposition* or *act* of will," using "disposition" as synonymous with "act of will." He also speaks of it hypothetically, as something caused or occasioned by "another antecedent evil will." This class of divines never speak of holiness and sin as

[1] Treatise on the Will, Part III. sect. 4. [2] Ibid.
[3] Works, Vol. I. Lect. 48.

qualities of the will itself, belonging to its very nature. The will, as a faculty, may be *weak* or it may be *strong*, in itself, in consequence of its creation or of its apostasy; but it is not holy or sinful, except in its acts or exercises. (*b*) Not in a natural incapacity. Dr. Hopkins charges one of the opponents of the "new divinity" with making the total depravity of man to consist "primarily and radically in his incapacity of loving God." But he argues that such an incapacity is "not in the least degree sinful."[1] A natural weakness or incapacity, either of the will or of the soul generally, whether belonging to it by original creation or induced by the fall, is not in itself sinful. (*c*) Not in involuntary acts, from which voluntary acts or choices proceed. Having proved that all obedience and disobedience, holiness and sin, consist primarily in acts of the will, Edwards thus states the impossibility of any virtuous or sinful action prior to acts of the will. "If there be any sort of act or exertion of the soul prior to free acts of the will, or acts of choice in the case, directing and determining what the acts of the will shall be, that act or exertion of the soul cannot properly be subject to command or precept, in any respect whatsoever, either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to commands *directly*, because they are no acts of will; being by the supposition prior to all acts of the will, determining and giving to all its acts; they not being acts of the will, there can be in them no consent to or compliance with any command. Neither can they be subject to command or precept, *indirectly* or *remotely;* for they are not so much as the *effects* or *consequences* of the will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any obedience in that original act of soul, determining all volitions, it is an act of obedience wherein the will has no concern at all, it preceding every act of will. And therefore if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is wholly involuntary; there is no willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of the will, in the

[1] Works, Vol. III. p. 104.

affair; and what sort of obedience or rebellion is this?"[1] (*d*) Not in an involuntary disposition. If sin consists in no *act* or *exertion* of the soul prior to choices, *a fortiori* it consists in no *disposition* prior to all choices. The word *disposition* is used by divines in three senses. *First*, it is used to denote the voluntary affections, or immanent acts of the will; what are now often called predominant choices or governing purposes. *Secondly*, to denote that proneness, or tendency, or proclivity, of the soul which results from its immanent acts or predominant choices. *Thirdly*, to denote a certain *disposal* or relative state of the involuntary susceptibilities of the soul, which is the occasion, in connection with outward motives, of all acts of the will. The fathers of New England theology commonly use the word either in the first or second of these senses. By disposition they mean a voluntary disposition, a permanent choice; or a tendency to act in a certain way in consequence of such a choice. Edwards repeatedly uses the expressions "dispositions of the heart" and "acts of the will" as synonymous. He speaks of the most common, active, voluntary virtues, such as love and generosity, as inclinations and dispositions of the heart." Dr. Bellamy says of the sinful "tendencies," "dispositions," or propensities," which early manifest themselves in men: "they are not created by God with the essence of the soul, but *result from its native choice*, or rather more strictly, *are themselves its native choice;*" "they are not natural in the same sense as the faculties of our souls are, *but are our native choice*, and the voluntary, free, spontaneous bent of our hearts."[2] He also says, that "this evil bent of our hearts is the spontaneous propensity of our own wills,"[3] and says that "an involuntary inclination of the heart is a contradiction."[4] Dr. Nathan Strong says: "A temper, disposition, inclination, taste, or relish, which are right or wrong, mean the same as a heart or will

[1] Treatise on the Will, Part III. sect. 4.
[2] Works, Vol. I. p. 139.
[3] Works, Vol. I. p. 153.
[4] Works. Vol. I. p. 98.

that is right or wrong."[1] But occasionally these divines use the word *disposition* in the third sense, to denote something which lies back of the will, and is a foundation for choice or the exercises of the heart. But this involuntary disposition is not sinful, but only the occasion of sin. Dr. Hopkins says it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to form any distinct and clear idea of that in the mind or heart which is antecedent to all thought and exercise of the will, which we call principle, taste, temper, disposition, habit, etc.," but thinks that "when examined with true philosophic, metaphysical strictness," it is "wholly resolved into a divine constitution, or law of nature."[2] A divine constitution, or "law of nature," if called a disposition, is certainly not, in the view of these theologians, a sinful disposition, in any other sense than that it is the occasion or foundation of sinful exercises of heart or acts of will. They sharply discriminate between voluntary exercises and that which causes or occasions them; and insist that sin and holiness consist wholly in the former, and not at all in the latter, whatever it may be, whether an involuntary act, or disposition, or law of nature, or divine constitution, or direct divine influence. They affirm that there is as much impropriety in making sin and holiness consist in anything *antecedent* to exercises of the will as in anything *consequent* to them.[3] A volume might be filled with passages like the following, showing how clear and emphatic has been the affirmation of the doctrine by those who have shaped New England theology, that all sin is voluntary, and consists in exercises of the heart or will, and which is epigrammatically expressed in the formula: "All sin consists in sinning." "If a thing be from us, and not from our *choice*, it has not the nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, according to our natural sense. When a thing is from a man, in the sense that it is from his *will* or *choice*, he is to blame for it, because his *will is in it;* so far as the will is in it, blame is

[1] Sermons, Vol. I. p. 104. [2] Hopkins's Works, Vol. III. p. 553
[3] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 84.

in it, and no further."[1] "Moral agency, virtue and vice, blame and praise-worthiness, *consist wholly in the exercises of will* and *choice* made in view of motives, and in nothing else besides, or which is antecedent to, or consequent upon, voluntary action." "Virtue and sin consist in the exercises of the will or heart, *and in nothing else;* and men are sinful or holy according to the nature and quality of these."[2] "If moral evil is to be sought in anything wholly involuntary and undesigning, it will probably be difficult to give a reason why it should be sought rather in the *cause* than in the *effect* of volition, in something that goeth before it, rather than in what is consequent upon it."[3] "There is no morally corrupt nature distinct from free, voluntary, sinful exercises." "The heart consists in voluntary exercises; and voluntary exercises are moral agency. Willing is acting. Willing right is acting right; and willing wrong is acting wrong. All voluntary exercises belong to the heart." "All moral agency consists in the heart."[4] Sin, every one grants, whatever be the nature of it, is inseparable from volition. It is a wrong choice or volition. When a man sins, he *chooses* somewhat that is forbidden of God." "The heart of man, which is the sum or aggregate of his *moral exercises*, is totally evil."[5] "To me it is evident that *all* our notions of moral good and evil, and *all* our feelings of approbation or disapprobation, relate ultimately to what I here call affections. In these affections of the heart, and these *actings* of our inner spiritual nature, we find, if I mistake not, the elements and essence of holiness and sin." "I use the word *affections* to denote the *various exercises* of the heart, as love, desire, and their opposites, towards God and other moral and spiritual objects."[6]

[1] Edwards's Treatise on the Will, Part IV. sect. 12.
[2] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. pp. 87, 134.
[3] Dr. S. West's Essay on Moral Agency, Part. I.
[4] Dr. Emmons's Works, Vol. IV. pp. 490, 522.
[5] Dr. Spring's Disquisitions, pp. 14, 39.
[6] Dr. Wood's Works, Vol. II. Lect. 49.

That the foregoing extracts fairly represent the doctrine of New England theology, as to the voluntary and active nature of sin, is proved by the public and uncontradicted testimony of the editor of the Spirit of the Pilgrims, given in 1832. He says: "This sentiment [that moral character is to be ascribed to *voluntary exercises alone*], whether true or false, is certainly no novelty. It was maintained by Edwards, Bellamy, Hopkins, Witherspoon, West of Stockbridge, Spring, Fuller, Dwight, etc., and is still maintained by Emmons, Griffin, Woods, Wines, and by *a great majority* of the orthodox clergy of New England."[1]

That expressions occur in the writings of most of these eminent men which, at first, seem to teach the doctrine of a passive sin, or of a sin consisting in something prior to all exercises of the heart or will, cannot be denied. But these expressions, so interpreted, conflict not only with other and opposite expressions, such as are cited above, but with the general scope of the reasoning employed by these divines, and those great principles which they labored to establish.

Original Sin.

The views held by New England theologians concerning the nature of sin led by a logical necessity to some modification of the old doctrine of original sin. That form of this doctrine which generally prevailed in this country before the days of Ewards, was this: All mankind at the commencement of their personal existence, and prior to all active and voluntary transgression, have resting upon them a double guilt, viz. the guilt of Adam's first sin imputed to them, and the guilt of a corrupt nature, which is in itself strictly and properly sinful. The sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity on the ground of that natural and covenant headship (mainly the latter) which he, by divine appointment, sustains to them. Their hereditary sinful corruption is a penal consequence of that imputed sin. This theory teaches that men are sinners before they personally and actually sin; that

[1] Spirit of the Pilgrims, Vol. V. p. 165.

they are born with a corrupt nature, or disposition which is in itself sinful and ill-deserving, and is the source of all their actual sin. To account for this native sinful disposition, it is regarded as a judicial infliction for the sin of Adam, which is imputed to them, not literally *transferred* (though Dr. Edwards says this had been the common doctrine[1]), but so reckoned or made over to them as to become legally theirs, justly exposing them to punishment, which punishment is a sinful nature and all consequent sins and miseries. This imputed sin accounts for inherent native sinfulness; and the imputed sin itself is accounted for on the ground of a twofold union of Adam and his posterity; a natural union as between a father and his children, and a covenant or federal union, such as exists between a corporate body and its representative. It would have been unjust to impute Adam's sin to his descendants but for this covenant union, which renders such imputation just; and it would have been unjust to punish them with inherent sin but for this imputed sin, which renders such punishment just.

This theory of original sin is still extensively held; and is ably represented by the Princeton divines. But the principle that all sin consists in voluntary acts is manifestly irreconcilable with such a theory. Imputed sin is, as respects the person to whom it is imputed, involuntary sin; and inherent sin before moral agency is involuntary sin. Hence the "new divinity" was obliged to set itself to a revision of the current doctrine of original sin. Edwards began the work of revision in his defense of the doctrine against the assaults of Arminians. Holding fast the principle that sin is voluntary, and also believing that men are born with a voluntary sinful disposition, the great question with him was: "How came men to be born with this sinful will or disposition? And he answered the question by adopting substantially the Augustinian or realistic theory, which regards human nature as a unit, and as identical in all individuals of the race; so that the posterity of Adam, being

[1] Works, Vol. I. p. 486.

then in him, shared in the primal transgression; his act was their act; the common act of all. And as they voluntarily sinned in and with Adam, they became guilty and ill-deserving, precisely as he did, and were punished in the same way that he was. As he, by the first transgression, lost original righteousness and became corrupt, so did they. As that first sin was imputed to him, because it was truly and properly his; so it is imputed to them also, because it is truly and properly theirs. Thus Edwards distinctly repudiated that element of the old doctrine, according to which the sin of Adam is imputed to those who had no share in it. And the advocates of the old doctrine say that he thus "rejected all of imputation but the name."[1] He held not to a covenant, or legal oneness of the race, but to a real, numerical oneness, by "a constitution," or "established order of nature," analogous to that by which the branches and root are constituted one tree, or that by which the head and other members are constituted one body. By this notion of a literal oneness of the race, Edwards was enabled to hold the doctrine of native moral depravity, and yet not hold the doctrine of passive and involuntary sin, whether imputed or inherent. One or two extracts will show how widely he departed from that form of the doctrine of original sin commonly held in his day. "Therefore I am humbly of opinion that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into this world with a *double* guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first existence is one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostasy; the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God." "The *first existing* of a corrupt disposition in their hearts is not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them, *distinct* from their participation of Adam's first sin; it is, as it were, *the extended* pollution of that sin through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted *union* of the branches

[1] Princeton Essays, First Series, p. 151.

with the root; or the *inherence* of the sin of the head of the species in the members, in the consent and concurrence of the hearts of the members with the head in that first act (which may be, without God's being the author of sin). But the depravity of nature remaining an *established principle* in the heart of a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after operations, is a *consequence* and *punishment* of the first apostasy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The first being of an evil disposition in the heart of a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to *approve* of the sin of his first father as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam's heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation of his sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the order of nature. Indeed, the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam's posterity, or rather the *co-existence* of the evil disposition implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the *root* and *branches*, is a consequence of the *union* that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity; but not properly a *consequence* of the *imputation* of his sin; nay, rather *antecedent* to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union; but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is *first*, and the charge of guilt *consequent*, as it was in the case of Adam himself."[1]

Thus while the old theory said men begin existence with an involuntary sinful disposition, Edwards says: men begin existence with a voluntary sinful disposition; while the old theory says, this sinful disposition comes as a penal consequence of an involuntary imputed sin; Edwards says, it comes as a natural and penal consequence of actual sin committed in Adam; while the old theory says, Adam's sin is the sin of his posterity, because it is imputed to him, Edwards says, it

[1] Treatise on Original Sin, Part IV. Chap. 3.

"is not theirs merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them." While the old theory says, Adam sustained a covenant and legal relation to his posterity, and therefore his sin is justly imputed to them, though they did not commit it, Edwards says, Adam and his posterity, by a divine constitution, form "one complex person," so that his sin is "the common act of all," and therefore is justly imputed to all because they all participated in it; while the old theory says, Men are born with a double guilt upon them, viz. the guilt of imputed sin and the guilt of inherent sin, Edwards says, the guilt with which men are born is "one and simple, viz. the guilt of the original apostasy, their inherent guilt being only the extended pollution of that sin." This modification of the doctrine of original sin is the beginning of one of those ten "improvements in theology," attributed by Dr. Edwards to his father and his followers. It was a thing almost inevitable, that such a man as Hopkins, taking up the work of revision where his venerated teacher left it, should carry it forward. His was not a mind to be satisfied with a theory based on realism. No reasoning about personal identity could convince him that there was any such oneness of the race as made the posterity of Adam participators in his first sin, "so that in reality and propriety it became their sin" before they were born. Though he edited Edwards's Treatise on Original Sin, and never avowedly controverts his views, owing doubtless to his almost filial and reverential love for the man. Still, in several particulars he differed widely from his friend and instructor on this subject. He held to a certain kind of oneness of the race, but not such as to make the first sin of Adam the sin of his posterity, either by imputation or participation, or in any way except as they approve of it by sinning as he did. When he says: "By the constitution and covenant with Adam his first disobedience was the disobedience of all mankind," he adds immediately, by way of explanation: "That is, the sin and consequent ruin of all the

human race was, by this constitution, *infallibly connected* with the first sin of the head and father of the race. By the divine constitution, the appointment of God, if the head and father of mankind sinned, the whole race of men, all his posterity *should sin;* and *in this sense* it should be the sin of the whole."[1] They are not sinners because Adam's sin is imputed to them, nor because they shared in it, but because they sustain such a relation to him that, in consequence of his sin, they from the first do themselves sin. They sin as soon as they are capable of moral exercises, but are not sinners in any sense until they individually begin to sin. "And if the sinfulness of all the posterity of Adam was certainly connected with his sinning, this does not make them sinners before they actually are sinners; and when they actually become sinners, they themselves are the sinners, it is their own sin, and they are as blamable and guilty as if Adam had never sinned, and each one were the first sinner that ever existed."[2] Accordingly Hopkins held that "the sin which takes place in the posterity of Adam is not properly distinguished into original and actual sin, because it is all really actual, and there is, strictly speaking, no other sin but actual sin." "Original sin is that total moral depravity which takes place in the hearts of all the children of Adam in consequence of his apostasy, which consists in exercise or act as really as any sin can do, and therefore cannot be distinguished from actual sin."[3] Thus he differed from Edwards in denying the literal unity of the race and the identity of Adam's sin with the sin of his posterity, and in denying that men are sinners in any sense before they are born and actually sin in their own person. He differed also, and consequently, from Edwards in denying that the sinfulness of men from birth is penal to them. "It is carefully to be observed that sin does not take place in the posterity of Adam in consequence of his sin, or that they are not constituted sinners by his disobedience, as a punishment,

[1] Works, Vol. I. p. 211.
[2] Works, Vol. I. p. 230.
[3] Works, Vol. I. p. 224.

or the penalty of the law coming upon them for his sin."[1] Of course, it is not a punishment of their own sin, for prior to it they have no sin to be punished. Hopkins was content to account for the native depravity of men by a certain established connection between them and Adam, or a certain divine constitution, without attempting to say precisely what that constitution is, except that it is not a mere legal covenant nor a literal unity. This connection or constitution renders it certain that all men will begin to sin as soon as they are capable of moral agency; "their sinning is connected with his [Adam's] disobedience, or implied and involved in it, so that by his sinning they were all made sinners, or constituted sinners, as the Greek word properly signifies."[2] This phrase, "constituted sinners," a favorite one with Hopkins, meant, "became sinners," by actually sinning in consequence of a divine constitution. This phrase was for a time very generally adopted by Hopkinsians to denote the effect of Adam's sin upon his posterity. It appears in the Andover Creed, agreed upon by the two parties to the union, as expressive of that "substance of doctrine" contained in the Westminster Shorter Catechism, relating to this subject, which they both held in common.[3] Dr. Dwight adopted substantially the views of Hopkins on this subject. He denies that the sin of Adam is imputed to

[1] Works, Vol. I. p. 218. [2] Works, Vol I. p. 214.

[3] An eminent legal gentleman recently communicated to the writer the substance of a statement which Dr. Woods once made to him to this effect. The preparation of a creed, as a basis of union, was committed to Dr. Pearson and Dr. Spring. The great difficulty they experienced was in agreeing upon a form of statement relating to original sin, particularly the consequences of the apostasy to the race. Repeated interviews failed to remove the difficulty; and it seemed as if the plan of union would have to be abandoned. At length, one day after an ineffectual effort to agree, these good men proposed to spend a season in prayer together, then to separate, and each, by himself, draw up a statement of views on the topic under consideration, excluding from it the term "imputation," and any terms in the Catechism known to be objectionable to either party. They did so, and at the expiration of an hour came together, and submitted what each had prepared; and the result was, that the statement now found in the Creed was readily adopted. In the light of this fact it is instructive to compare that statement with the language of the Catechism.

his posterity; that they are guilty of his sin or punished for it. He contents himself with the general statement: "That in consequence of the apostasy of Adam all men have sinned." He does not refer this consequence to a divine constitution, and frankly says that he is unable to account for it, and that none of the theories adopted by others are satisfactory to him.[1]

Dr. Emmons, not content to leave so important a matter as the connection between Adam's sin and the native depravity of his posterity unexplained, and not content with so indefinite a term as "divine constitution," made it consist simply in a divine decree; God, in his sovereign wisdom, decreed, in view of Adam's sin, that the race should begin their existence as sinners. "God appointed Adam to be the public head of his posterity; and determined, in case of his disobedience, that they should begin to sin before they should begin to be holy. This determination God has executed by directly operating on the hearts of children when they first become moral agents. The native depravity of men *comes in this way*, in consequence of Adam's first sin." He does, indeed, speak of a "divine constitution, under which Adam was placed," as the "*occasion*" of all the future sinfulness of himself and his posterity; of a "constitutional connection between Adam and his posterity"; but still when he directly meets the question, why all men are sinful as soon as they are moral agents, he says he can give no better reason than the divine decree, and the divine agency executing that decree. He accordingly affirms that "the constitutional connection between Adam and his posterity neither made his sin their sin, nor his guilt their guilt, nor exposed them to the least degree of punishment on his account"; that Adam did not make men sinners "by conveying to them a *morally* corrupt nature," since "there is no morally corrupt nature distinct from free voluntary exercises. Adam had no such nature, and therefore could convey no such nature to his posterity."[2]

[1] Sermon 33. [2] Emmons's Works, Vol. IV., Sermons 35, 36.

Later theologians of this school, while adhering substantially to the views of Hopkins, Dwight, and Emmons, have endeavored to indicate, a little more definitely, how it is that all men, in virtue of a divine decree or a divine constitution, come to be sinners as soon as they are moral agents. Dr. Emmons gave such prominence to the divine agency, and to the idea that all sin consists in voluntary exercises, that he seemed to deny that there is anything between that agency and the first sinful exercises of men which is the immediate occasion of the latter, or the ground of certainty that they will exist. If he held that there is a soul distinct from its exercises, he seems scarcely to have held that it is in a disordered and vitiated condition in consequence of Adam's sin and prior to its own sin. His mind fixed upon the two points, that God determined, if Adam sinned his posterity should be sinners, and that they are sinners by actually sinning as soon as they are moral agents. Dr. Hopkins also failed to show how the "divine constitution" made it certain that men would sin in consequence of Adam's sin. He seems to admit, yet with some degree of hesitation, that there is a bias, disposition, or tendency of nature to sin in the children of Adam, consequent on his transgression, and antecedent to their own, and he preferred to say generally, that they were constituted sinners, or that the occasion and certainty of their becoming sinners was in a divine constitution. To this point the attention of Dr. N. W. Taylor and others was especially directed, and the result has been a more distinct recognition of the fact that "in consequence of Adam's sin all his posterity begin existence with a disordered and corrupted nature, prone to sin, and which in connection with the circumstances in which they are placed renders it certain that they will sin as soon as they are capable of moral agency." And a correct statement of the doctrine, as now generally held by those who adopt the New England theology, would be this: God, in his sovereign wisdom, so made Adam the head and representative of the race, that if he sinned the race would be constituted sinners.

He did sin, and they in consequence are constituted sinners, by receiving, through their natural connection with him, an impaired and vitiated nature, which nature renders it certain that, in all the appropriate circumstances of their being, left to themselves, they will sin in all their moral acts. It is a sovereign, and not a judicial, procedure on the part of God, by which mankind are so constituted and circumstanced that they all sin, and only sin, unless regenerated by the Holy Spirit. The aim of the eminent and godly men who developed this modified form of original sin was to vindicate God from the charge of imputing to men a sin which is not theirs, and then punishing them for it by giving them a corrupt nature, which is itself sinful and deserving of punishment, and is the cause of sins innumerable, each of which also deserves punishment; and furthermore to obviate the objection to the Christian doctrine of depravity, that it makes men blameworthy for sins which they did not commit, and for an evil nature which they could not avoid.

Natural Ability.

Previous to the days of Edwards it was the commonly received doctrine of Calvinistic divines that by the apostasy man "hath wholly lost *all ability* of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation," so that he is not only unwilling to do his duty, but is literally and utterly unable to do it.

The peculiar views concerning the nature of sin and holiness adopted by the "new divinity" men, could not be made to harmonise with such a doctrine; hence, as "consistent Calvinists," they must modify the old view; which they did, affirming that the ability which mankind lost by the fall is a *moral* ability, while they still have *natural* ability fully commensurate with obligation. This doctrine, that men though totally depraved and wholly averse to good, yet have full natural power to do all that is required of them, is one of the characteristic features of New England theology; and without it the system would manifestly be incomplete and incongruous.

To understand this doctrine, and see its relative position and value in the theological system to which it belongs, it is necessary to note carefully the distinction made and insisted on by New England divines, between natural ability and moral ability, and between natural inability and moral inability.

Natural ability is ability in the strict and proper sense of the word. It is that power, inherent in the faculties of man's nature, which is or may be exerted or used in willing and doing. "Natural ability is the intellectual and bodily strength of man to perform every action which God requires of him."[1] It is often denoted by such phrases as "natural capacity," "natural strength," "physical power," a "power which lies in the physical faculties of a rational soul."

Moral ability is ability "improperly so called." It is not the *natural* ability of the *moral* faculties. It is not the *natural* ability of the will to put forth *moral exercises;* but it is itself a disposition or act or exercise of will, which makes certain other acts or exercises. "As moral ability belongs to the heart of man only, and not to his natural faculties, it is obvious that moral ability to obey God consists in a man's loving his commandments. Accordingly, when we say that a good man is the subject of moral ability to love God, the import is this, that he actually loves him and keeps his commandments. For, as natural ability consists in having intellectual and bodily strength to perform every action required of man, it is evident that moral ability must consist in a willing mind."[2] These are the only kinds of ability recognized by New England divines. They know nothing of a third kind of ability compounded of these two, or distinct from them.

Natural inability is inability in the strict and proper sense of the word. Edwards defines it as "an ability arising from want of natural capacity or external hinderance"; "some defect or obstacle, not in the will itself, but extrin-

[1] Dr. Spring's Disquisitions, p. 172.
[2] Dr. Spring's Disquisitions, p. 173.

sic to it; either in the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circumstances."[1] Dr. Smalley says: "Natural inability consists in, or arises from, want of understanding, bodily strength, opportunity, or *whatever may prevent* our doing a thing when we are willing and strongly enough disposed to do it."[2]

Moral inability is inability only in a figurative or technical sense. It *is not* a *natural* inability of the faculty of will, nor of any of the *moral* faculties; but only, negatively, a want of willingness or disposition; or, positively, an unwillingness or indisposition. According to Edwards: "moral inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination."[3] Dr. Smalley says: "Moral inability consists *only* in the want of a heart, or disposition, or will, to do a thing."[4] Dr. Dwight says: "The nature of this inability to obey the law of God is, in my own view, *completely* indicated by the word *indisposition* or the word *disinclination*."[5] This moral inability, wherever it exists, renders it certain that the subjects of it will not do what is required of them.

These are the only two kinds of inability known to New England theology. "There is no third kind of inability which is neither natural nor moral; nor can natural and moral inability be blended to afford a different case, for they are not congenial." "And to attempt to blend and compound natural inability and moral, to get a third kind of inability, is going upon unwarrantable and forbidden ground."[6]

These distinctions, carefully drawn by divines of this school, must not be overlooked by those who would understand their doctrine of ability.

1. These men held, and made a prominent article in their theology, that unrenewed sinners have no *moral* ability, but

[1] Treatise on the Will, Part III. sect. 4.
[2] Doctrinal Tracts, No. 26, p. 6.
[3] Treatise on the Will, Part I. sect. 4.
[4] Doctrinal Tracts, No. 26, p. 6.
[5] Theology, Vol. IV., Sermon 133.
[6] Dr. Spring's Disquisitions, pp. 177, 178.

are the subjects of a *moral* inability, to do what God requires. They are not in the least degree inclined, disposed, or willing to love and obey him. On the contrary, they are, from the beginning of moral agency, wholly and fixedly averse to good. Their hearts are fully set in them to do evil. They are governed in all their moral actions by a deep-seated and persistent selfish purpose, which Dr. Beecher characterises as "that terrific decision of the mind in favor of the world and against God, which never changes but under the special influence of the Spirit in our effectual calling." No class of divines have with greater emphasis affirmed the moral inability of sinners; that is, their total and unvarying and intense disinclination to love and serve God. It is a sinful and wholly inexcusable inability. It is not a misfortune or a calamity visited upon them prior to, and irrespective of, their own free, sinful choice. It *is* their own free, sinful choice, for which they are wholly to blame. It is their total depravity, voluntary alike in its origin and in its continuance.

2. It is the doctrine of New England theology that unrenewed sinners are the subjects of no *natural* inability, but have full *natural* ability to do what God requires. There is no want of faculties, or capabilities, or opportunities. They have everything needful for actual obedience, except a right will, or disposition of heart. Their natural ability is not destroyed nor impaired by their moral inability. They *can* do what they certainly *will not* do. And they are not under obligation to do what they literally cannot do. God requires of them no natural impossibilities, — nothing but what they can do with their present natural faculties, and which they actually would do if they were willing to. This truth is affirmed with almost endless repetition and variety of expression, by Edwards and his followers. Thus Edwards says: "If things good and desirable are absolutely impossible with a natural impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches that this wholly and perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them."[1] "We can give God no more than

[1] Treatise on the Will, Part. IV. sect. 3.

we have. Therefore, if we give him so much, if we love him to the extent of the faculties of our nature, we are excused."[1] And he teaches that the inward duties of love and faith are no more impossibilities than are the duties of external morality; and that the one class of duties are as much "within men's power as the other."[2] Dr. Bellamy affirms, that "All that perfection which God requires of any of his creatures, is a measure of knowledge and love, bearing an exact proportion to their natural abilities"; that "the law is exactly upon a level with our natural capacities"; that "as to a natural capacity, all mankind are capable of a perfect conformity to this law"; that "Paul was "as capable of perfect conformity to it when a persecutor, as he is now in heaven."[3] Dr. Hopkins declares that the sinner "is under no kind of inability that is in the way of his turning to God immediately, which the open profligate is not under as a bar in the way of his reforming his wicked conduct immediately."[4] Dr. Smalley says, that evidently the law of God "is level to some kind of capacity which men still have in the present fallen state," and that nothing hinders us from complying with it but "our unwillingness to exert the natural strength we have in the manner we ought"; that "the natural abilities of men is the measure of their duty, and not their moral ability."[5] Dr. Dwight says: "Our natural powers are plainly sufficient; our inclination only is defective." "It is self-evident," says Dr. Griffin, "that a man cannot be bound to perform natural impossibilities." "As the natural faculties constitute that capacity in which the obligation to serve God is founded, they bear the same relation to the obligation that the muscular strength of a slave does to the obligation to lift a weight when bidden by his master." "There exist in men physical faculties which constitute a natural ability to serve God,

[1] Treatise on Original Sin, Part I. Chap. 1, sect. 5.
[2] Inquiry concerning Qualifications for Communion, Obj. 20.
[3] Works, Vol. I. pp. 90, 93.
[4] Works, Vol. III. p. 296.
[5] Doctrinal Tracts, No. 26, pp. 24, 37.

and which, independently of their present temper, or their original righteousness, or any divine influence, and none the less for their dependence, form the proper basis of obligation." [1] The Works of Dr. Emmons abound with such assertions as these: "Every sinner is *as able* to embrace the gospel as a thirsty man is to drink water, or a hungry man to eat the most delicious food." "They need no other principle, power, or ability to do all that God requires than they *naturally possess*." "They are as able, therefore, to do right as to do wrong." "As able to obey any command of God as to disobey it." "As able to love God before they are regenerated as afterwards."

Some of the more important points wherein the new divinity differs from the old on this subject are the following:

1. The old doctrine was, that man by the fall *lost* his natural power to obey God. The new doctrine is, that man has precisely the same natural power to obey God that he had before the apostasy, or that he would have if not sinful, or that he will have in heaven, or that sinless angels have.[2]

2. According to the old doctrine, sinners need to be literally *enabled* to love and serve God, by some increase of natural power. But according to the new doctrine, such an increase of natural power is not only not needed, but if bestowed would be of no avail, "because whatever strength any one has, he always lays out according to his own heart, and not contrary to it. Consequently, all the strength of men and angels, yea even Omnipotence itself, if the sinner had the direction of it, would never make him good." [3]

3. According to the old doctrine, sinners are dependent on the Holy Spirit for all right moral action, because of their natural as well as their moral inability. According to the

[1] Treatise on the Atonement, Part II., Chap. 7.

[2] See Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 233; Bellamy's Works, Vol. I. p. 93; Dwight's Theology, Vol. I. p. 414; Beecher's Views in Theology, p. 30; Griffin on the Atonement, Part III., Chap. 6.

[3] Dr. Smalley, Doctrinal Tracts, No. 26, p. 22.

new doctrine, sinners are dependent on the Holy Spirit because of their moral inability alone, and in regeneration no natural ability, but moral ability only, is given.[1]

The question has been raised whether, after all, Edwards and his followers did not mean by natural ability merely the faculties or capacities of a rational soul, viz. understanding, conscience, and will; and by moral inability, a real and proper inability to use those faculties, resulting from a sinful disposition? That they meant more than this — meant that sinners have power to use their natural faculties, and are hindered only by their indisposition, not by a real inability resulting from, or growing out of, or in any way connected with, that indisposition, seems abundantly evident.

(*a*) The opposition which their views on this subject encountered, and the controversies to which they gave rise, show that they meant, and were understood to mean, that sinners had capacities or faculties capable of being used. Their opponents did not deny that fallen men have the natural faculties of understanding, conscience, and will. There never was any dispute on that point. The only ground of dispute was, whether these faculties implied a power to use them, or whether a sinful disposition implied a want of power to use them. Both parties agreed in believing that sinful men have all the essential faculties of moral agents, and that they are wholly indisposed to use them in actually obeying God. But one party held that a sinful disposition so disables these faculties, or so disables the soul, that it cannot exercise them; and unless the other party held that there was no such disability, what possible ground of difference was there?

(*b*) The carefulness with which these divines assert that moral inability — the only inability they held to — consists in want of will, or indisposition of heart, and nothing else, proves that by natural ability they meant more than natural faculties without power to use them. The language of

[1] See Dr. Bellamy's Work's, Vol. I. p. 108; Dr. Smalley, Doctrinal Tracts, No. 26, p. 30.

another school is, that the sinner's inability is "something more than an unwillingness," that he is both "indisposed *and* disabled" to all spiritual good. But New England theologians avoid such language, and insist that moral inability "consists *wholly* in want of a heart, or disposition, or will, to do a thing," and that the will is "disabled" only in the sense that it is "indisposed" to what is good.

(*c*) These divines affirm that natural inability and moral inability are "essentially different in kind"; that one is "properly," and the other "improperly" called inability. But if there is a real inability in addition to, and caused by, a sinful disposition, it must be essentially the same in kind, and is as properly called inability as that which results from want of faculties, or from impaired faculties. Want of power is true inability, and is always essentially the same, whether it result from a defective disposition, or a defective conscience, or a defective understanding. No such want of power do New England divines mean by moral inability.

(*d*) If the natural ability of New England divines were only a natural capacity which must be accompanied with a right disposition to make it a real ability, then their natural inability would be no real inability, unless accompanied by the want of a right disposition. But they assert, times without number, that there may be a natural inability without any want of right disposition. A person may be naturally unable to fly without wings, or to love God with the strength of angels, however much he may be disposed to do so. And as there can be a real natural inability without an evil disposition, so there can be a real natural ability without a right disposition.

(*e*) If by the sinner's natural capacity to love God these divines meant only an *incapable* capacity of love, then by his capacity to know God they meant an incapable capacity of knowledge. Edwards sometimes uses both expressions in the same sentence Thus he observes: "though it is not easy to fix man's capacity as to love to God; yet in general we may determine that his capacity of love is co-extended

with his capacity of knowledge; the exercise of the understanding opens the way for the exercise of the other faculty."[1] But does he mean by a capacity, or faculty of knowledge, one which the man cannot exercise? It certainly is exercised; man has some knowledge of God. And Edwards immediately adds that, though our knowledge of God's "infinite excellency" is imperfect, yet it may be indefinitely extended, and be superior to our knowledge of many other things; and "so the human *faculties* are *capable* of a real and clear understanding of the greatness, glory, and goodness of God." "And so we are capable of an esteem and love of God that is proportionable." The very point of his argument is to prove that men do not love God as they are capable of loving him. They are as capable of loving him as they are of knowing him. Their capacity of knowing him is not a capacity merely, but a capacity which may be, because it actually is, exercised to some extent; and if the capacity of loving God is not of the same kind — one which implies ability to exercise it — then the argument is futile and puerile.

We might multiply, if necessary, reasons for believing that the natural ability of New England theologians is a real ability, a capable capacity, a real power, to do what God requires, but what, left to themselves, it is certain they never will do.

By their views on this subject these divines felt that they occupied ground on which they could stand and consistently teach the sinner his dependence upon the Holy Spirit, and at the same time urge upon him the duty of immediate repentance. With their doctrine of *moral inability* they met Arminians and Pelagians who denied native depravity and held to a self-determining power of the will. With their doctrine of *natural ability* they met those who held that men have no power whatever to repent, and therefore should do the best they can in the way of using outward means; and should only be exhorted to "come to the

[1] Treatise on Original Sin, Part I., Chap. 1, sect. 5.

pool and there patiently wait for the moving of the waters," or to "come to the pipes through which the healing waters of salvation usually flow to the soul." Believing that the sinner, though totally depraved, is naturally able to obey God, they held that his refusal to do so is voluntary and inexcusable rebellion; and none the less so because he is using the "means of grace," and "waiting God's time." They believed that all "unregenerate doings" are sinful, and only sinful, and that continually. Hence this doctrine of *natural ability* was the two-edged sword with which they smote that system of formalism which they saw was subverting the very foundations of Calvinism; and which had sprung from the theory that the sinner, though he cannot repent, can with a moral sincerity use means which, perchance, God will some time make effectual. The days of half-way covenants were numbered when the New England divines established their doctrine of natural ability.

(*To be continued.*)

ARTICLE V.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

The Berlin University.

The following is the substance of a letter recently received from Germany:

If the University of Berlin was founded at any time in particular, Aug. 10, 1809, may be fixed as the date, the day on which the royal charter was signed. Yet as early as 1800, regular courses of lectures were delivered in the city on various scientific subjects by men of the highest culture; soon Schlegel and Fichte made their appearance in the same capacity; John Müller, Alex. von Humboldt, Schmalz, and Schleiermacher were also there before the university was opened. But the first regular term is reckoned to have begun in the autumn of 1810. It was in 1860 that the semi-centennial anniversary was celebrated. But no celebration took place at the opening of the university itself. The country was then suffering from the French occupation. It was enough, that through the indefatigable efforts of Wm. von Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and others, the institution had, in spite of the most depressing circumstances, been brought into life at all. It accorded both with policy and with the earnestness of the times to make no public demonstration.

It was the design of Frederick William III. and his advisers to make Berlin the first university of the land. Great pains were taken to secure the ablest men for the professional chairs. The philologian Wolf was one of the first to advocate the establishment of the university, and was fixed upon as future professor; and though he, conscious how indispensable he was considered, demanded an easier position and a much larger salary than any one else was to have, his demands were complied with. At the opening of the first term the whole number of instructors was fifty-eight. Among the theological professors were Schleiermacher, De Wette, and Marheineke. In the other faculties were Wolf, Fichte, von Savigny, Reil, and others of wide celebrity. At this time two hundred and fifty-six students were matriculated. In consequence of the war the number afterwards diminished, being in the summer of 1813 only twenty-eight. In the following year however it was two hundred and sixty-five, and continued to increase until about 1830. Since then the students have generally numbered not far from two thousand; in the winter usually more; in the summer less. Besides the students proper, about five hundred unmatriculated persons usually hear lectures. The present number of professors of all grades is about one hundred and eighty. Of these, sixteen belong to the theological faculty, seventeen to the juridical, fifty-one to

the medical, the remainder to the philosophical. The medical students have, with few exceptions, been from the first more numerous than any other class; next to them in number are the students of law. Comparing Berlin with other German universities, we find that in the number of professors and students Berlin and Vienna are nearly equal; the next largest are Prague, Munich, and Leipsic; each numbers about half as many members as Berlin. Göttingen has more professors than the last named, viz. one hundred and twenty-two, but fewer students, — seven hundred and eleven. Breslau and Bonn come next, presenting each about nine hundred and fifty students. Heidelberg has, like these, about one hundred professors, but one hundred less students. Tübingen and Halle follow, each with somewhat over seven hundred students, though Halle still holds the very front rank in respect to the number of theological students, showing a list of four hundred and twenty-five against three hundred and eighty-seven at Berlin, two hundred and seventy-six at Vienna, two hundred and seventy-four at Erlangen, two hundred and twenty-one at Tübingen, and two hundred and seventy at Leipsic. These numbers are taken from the statistics of the summer of 1863.

An earnest effort was made by Wolf, Fichte, and others, when the constitution of the university was under discussion, to break entirely loose from traditional usage. But conservatism triumphed, and essentially the same regulations were adopted as had prevailed in the older institutions. The four faculties — a division called by Wolf a relic of barbarism — were retained; and in each of these faculties the three ranks, ordinary professors, extraordinary professors and the so-called privat-docenten. Besides these are a few so-called sprachmeister, who are licensed to give instruction in the modern languages without going through the same examination and trial to which the regular professors must be subjected. Only the ordinary professors form what are strictly called the faculties, and have a part in the government of the institution. The affairs of the university are managed by a senate, which consists of twelve members: a rector (elected annually by the whole body of ordinary professors from their own number, which election, however, must in order to be valid receive the sanction of the king), the rector of the preceding year, the deans of the several faculties, the university judge (formerly called syndikus, a legal officer not belonging to any faculty, but vested with authority to decide legal questions pertaining to the university), and five of the ordinary professors. Each of the faculties elects yearly from it own number a dean, and has the independent control of matters specially concerning itself.

It is the duty of each faculty so to arrange the time of the lectures that each student, on the supposition that he receives his whole education at this university, may in three years have an opportunity to hear lectures on all the subjects which at his examination he may be expected to have studied. Towards the close of each term a schedule is published, both in

German and Latin, announcing on what topics each professer intends to lecture in the following term. At the beginning of the term further particulars are posted in the university building, as when the lectures begin, in what room they are to be held, etc. The law prescribes that the summer term shall commence on the Monday after the Jubilate Sunday, i.e. about the middle of April, and close on the Saturday after September 15. The winter term begins on the Monday following October 18, and closes on the Saturday before the Passion-week, i.e. near the end of March. In point of fact the professors usually begin their lectures later and close them earlier than at the prescribed time.

The range of subjects treated in the lectures may easily be conceived as very wide, when we consider the number of the professors and the fact that each of them delivers every term two or three different courses. Thus, in the year beginning April, 1864, Prof. Hengstenberg lectured on methodology, on Job, the synoptical gospels, the history of the passion and resurrection of Christ, Isaiah, and the introduction to the canonical books of the Old Testament. In the theological, law, and medical faculties the range of subjects is not so wide as in the philosophical, where everything is included which belongs nowhere else, and some things which one might expect to find appropriated to the other faculties. Thus, philology is one of the branches of philosophy, according to this division; accordingly Prof. Roediger, besides giving instruction in the various Semitic tongues, delivers courses of exegetical lectures on different books of the Old Testament. In the schedule for the winter term of 1864–65 we find announced a course by Berner, of the law faculty, on "jus naturae, seu philosophiam juris," and another by Michelet, of the philosophial faculty, on "jus naturae et civitatis, seu philosophiam juris, una cum juris historia universali." The list of subjects as given in the schedule of the philosophical faculty, where the names of the professors are printed in alphabetical order, presents a curious mixture. We find, following one another in quick succession, lectures on the Sanscrit language, Isocrates, botany, meteorology, modern history, political economy, logic, arithmetic, Egyptology, the Nibelungenlied (the German epic), zoölogy, crystallography, psychology, Goethe's Faust, mechanics, comparative geography, palaeontology, Arabic, astronomy, Greek sculpture, Greek philosophy, aesthetics, music, physics, noxious insects, chemistry, Schleiermacher, geology, climate of Italy, agriculture, etc., etc.: and in conclusion we are told, under the head of "Artium Exercitatio," that "artem arma tractandi docebit Hertel, hujus artis magister in universitate constitutus; artem saltandi docebit Hagemeister hujus artis, etc.; equitandi modos docet Fuerstenberg."

In addition to the regular professorships, there are over twenty establishments designed to assist those who desire to pursue the study of the several sciences further than the ordinary lectures take them. In point of number those which are connected with the medical department are the most

prominent. There are various institutions, provided with special boards of officers, where large numbers of persons afflicted with different diseases are cared for, students being thus enabled, under the supervision of the professors, to obtain a practical acquaintance with their intended profession. To one of these institutions is appropriated a particular district of the city, in which the sick poor are all treated by the members of the university. In another, a sort of hospital, eighty persons are cared for, a few of them gratuitously, the others paying according to their ability. Several of the professors in each of the faculties conduct a weekly exercise, in which a limited number of students meet for familiar discussion of certain topics connected with their course. Besides these are the so-called seminaries, the most important of which are the philological and the theological, both of which were established soon after the foundation of the university. The design of the latter, as expressed in the edict founding it, is to "guide and train talented theological students in undertaking special investigations and studies in theology, and thus enable them, better than can be done by the ordinary lectures alone, to cultivate themselves in their chosen field of study." There are two departments in the theological seminary, that of ecclesiastical history, now conducted by Prof. Niedner, and that of exegesis, conducted by Profs. Hengstenberg and Twesten. About four hundred thaler are annually given as prizes for essays to members of the seminary. Besides this and the philological seminaries there is now also both a mathematical and an agricultural seminary. Worthy of special mention is the Christian Archaeological Museum, established in 1849 by Prof. Piper, a most accomplished and enthusiastic scholar in the department of monumental theology. By visits to England, Italy, and other countries, he has been enabled to get access to original sources of information, and has collected a large number of casts, engravings, and impressions in paper of inscriptions, statues, and other works of Christian art of all ages. Biblical, ecclesiastical, and dogmatic history receive in this museum, through the aid of these symbols, explained by Prof. Piper, invaluable illustrations. The zoölogical museum is one of the best in existence. It contains specimens of nearly eighty thousand species of insects, four thousand five hundred birds, and one thousand mammals. Mineralogical, anatomical, and other such collections are of course not wanting. The amount annually spent in supporting and enriching these various branch institutions of the university is nearly seventy thousand thaler.

The salaries of the professors are far from being uniform. Of the ordinary professors, some receive 2500 thaler (nearly 1800 dollars), others only 400. Of the extraordinary professors none receive more than 1000; several have no salary at all. None of the privat-docenten have a salary. They get, however, as do the professors, five thaler a term from each student who hears one of their private courses. But each professor and privat-docent is obliged to deliver every term a public course of lectures,

occupying at least one or two hours weekly, for which they receive no pay. In 1861 the sum paid out for the professors' salaries, was 93,350, i.e. on the average less than 550 for each instructor. The receipts of the university amounted to 187,302 thaler. Of this 179,890 were from the state funds, 7,290 from students tuition fees and other direct receipts.

Every one who wishes to be matriculated as a student must present a certificate of graduation at some gymnasium or of regular discharge from another university. In the first case a fee of six thaler is required; in the other, three. He must have his name enrolled as a student in one of the four faculties, but is at liberty to hear lectures in any department. There is no compulsion in the matter of attending lectures. Even the courses which one voluntarily selects, he is at perfect liberty to neglect. During the first part of a term one may, without paying and without seeking special permission, hear whatever lectures he pleases. This is called hospitating. Indigent students, by presenting the requisite certificates, may be excused from paying the tuition fees for a period of six years. A professor may give any one special permission to hear his lectures gratis. Much assistance is given to poor and meritorious students by stipends providing for their board and rewarding successful competitors for literary composition.

Perhaps no one thing will better illustrate the genius of the German universities than the provisions relating to the conferring of degrees and the acquisition of the right to hold lectures. The medical and law faculties confer only one degree, that of doctor. No medical student can become a practising physician without the degree. Accordingly we find that in the first fifty years of the university, while only one hundred and twenty-one became doctors of law, four thousand five hundred and eighty-eight were made doctors of medicine. The theological and philosophical faculties confer two degrees, that of licentiate and that of doctor. Up to 1860, five hundred and sixty-eight had received the degree of Ph. D., sixty-two that of Lic. Th., and twenty-five that of Th. D. The method of obtaining the degree of licentiate of theology is prescribed in the laws of the Berlin University as follows:

The candiate must have pursued a regular course of three years' study. The application for examination must be made to the faculty through a dissertation composed in Latin, accompanied by a brief sketch, also in Latin, of the applicant's life. The dean delivers the dissertation to the several members of the faculty, who, after examining it, decide whether the applicant shall be admitted to an examination. If the decision is in the affirmative, the candidate is summoned before the assembled faculty, and examined in all the leading branches of theological science, but with special thoroughness in that branch to which he intends to devote himself. If he fails to satisfy his examiners, he can make no second application within less than a year. If he is not rejected, he receives a diploma, on which, according as he has displayed greater or less ability, is written

summa cum laude or simply *cum laude*. After this examination a public disputation in Latin must follow within six weeks, the subject of which must be a dissertation composed, and at his own expense printed and distributed by him to the ministers of state, to all the professors of the university, and certain other persons, especially to those who are to oppose him in the discussion. Of these opponents there must be at least three. After these have spoken, any member of the university may also join in the opposition. If the candidate by his defense fails to meet the expectations created by his examination, the "promotion" may be deferred. If otherwise, the dean delivers an address, presents a diploma to the candidate, who, after receiving it, briefly expresses his thanks, and so the promotion is completed. The licentiate must afterwards provide one hundred and fifty copies of the diploma for the register office of the university.

No one can become a doctor of theology without having acquired an acknowledged distinction in the department of theological science. Whoever seeks the degree must write a Latin dissertation on a theme approved by the faculty, and must satisfy the latter not only that his former examination was well sustained, but that he has since then, either as a preacher or as a scholar, evinced special ability. The act of promotion is in this case also of a ceremonious character. The faculty can, however, confer the honorary degree of Th. D. on any one who may seem to them to deserve it, without his making any application. In this case the consent of the ministry is necessary.

Every candidate for the degree of licentiate must pay fifty thaler, and for that of doctor one hundred thaler, — half of the sum before the examination; and this is not returned in case the examination is unsatisfactory; but it is reckoned to his account if he passes a second examination.

In order to become a privat-docent, it is necessary not only to have received one of the two degrees, but to pass through a process called habilitation. The applicant must present to the faculty a petition written in Latin, accompanied by the necessary certificates and documents concerning his life, character, and circumstances; in addition, written or printed essays, in Latin or German, on subjects belonging to each of the departments to which he purposes in his lectures to devote himself. Two members of the faculty are selected to examine the essays. After fourteen days they pronounce their judgment. The faculty then vote on the case, and if the applicant isaccepted, he must deliver, in German or Latin, before the faculty one or more trial lectures on topics approved by the latter. Four weeks are allowed for the preparation of each of these lectures. A debate follows between the candidate and the members of the faculty. At its close the candidate retires, and the faculty decide whether to receive him as privat-docent. If they vote in his favor, he is allowed three months in which to prepare a Latin lecture to be delivered in public. This closes the habilitation, and the faculty must then announce the result to the ministry.

ARTICLE VI.

RECENT GERMAN THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

DOGMATIC THEOLOGY OF THE LUTHERAN CHURCH, by Dr. Philippi, Professor of Theology at the University of Rostock.[1]

Dr. Philippi, the author of a valuable and detailed commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, is one of the principal theologians of the stricter Lutheran tendency. Those who wish for a thoroughly orthodox discussion of Christian doctrine will do well to refer to the work whose title we have given above. It is written, of course, from the Lutheran point of view, but harmonizes on fundamental matters with the great doctrines accepted by all the Protestant churches. The first volume contains the Prolegomena, and treats, in two chapters, of Religion, Revelation, Faith, Doctrine, the Holy Scriptures, the Canon, Inspiration, Interpretation. On the question of inspiration the author expresses himself as follows: "Inspiration, or theopneustia, is that act of the Spirit of God on the spirit of man by which the latter is so identified with the object to be revealed as to be able to apprehend and communicate it in unclouded purity; in other words, it is such a confluence of the mind of man with the Spirit of God that the revelation of the latter is received in full purity and completeness by the former." He distinguishes three stages or modes of inspiration — historical or legal, prophetical, and apostolic inspiration; and maintains the inspiration of the *word*, as opposed both to the mere inspiration of the matter and to that of the *words* of scripture. Much suggestive thought will be found in the first of the chapters mentioned above. Dr. Philippi's work is the best authoritative exposition of Lutheran theology, as distinguished from that known as Unionistic, whose chief representatives are Nitzsch, Twesten, Müller, Dorner, and from that of the Reformed church (Comp. Vol. XXI. p. 888).

APOLOGY FOR DIVINE REVELATION, by Dr. C. A. Auberlen, late Professor of Theology at the University of Basle.[2]

This is the second part of the lamented Auberlen's last, ripest, and most peculiar work. The present volume discusses the presuppositions of revelation; or, in other words, the nature, constitution, and condition of man as requiring, and presupposed by, revelation. The following extract

[1] Kirchliche Glaubenslehre. Von Dr. F. A. Philippi, Ord. Prof. der Theologie zu Rostock. I. Grundgedanken oder Prolegomena. Zweite, verbesserte und durch Excurse vermehrte Auflage. Stuttgart: G. S. Liesching; London: Asher and Co. 1864.

[2] Die göttliche Offenbarung: Ein apologetischer Versuch. Von C. A. Auberlen, Dr. der Philosophie und Theologie, der letzteren a. o. Prof. in Basel.

from the introductory remarks indicates, in a general way, the tendency of the work: "Man needs a revelation because he is a religious being, because he is an historical being, dependent on the race; he cannot, as idealism supposes, draw the truth out of his own inner being; to the development of his faculties in general he needs stimulus from without, education and culture by means of the spiritual forces already present in history. Of these forces, one of the principal is revelation." In the last section, which treats of religion and revelation, are some admirable observations, bearing on the question: How can man's spiritual life depend on historical facts, whose reality very few men have either the time, ability, or opportunity of proving? — a question which underlies almost all the scepticism distinctive of the present age. We cannot forbear giving the substance of one passage in particular: "If man is to have the fellowship with God which his nature demands, it must be brought about by free divine acts. But these acts of God are not something foreign to man, not something outward to and forced on him; on the contrary, they are the satisfaction of his deepest wants, the fulfilment of the holiest, profoundest demands of his conscience. It lies in the nature of things that these wants and demands can only be met *from without* and *above:* the conscience of man is never satisfied until the supra-mundane God condescends to it. Considered from this point of view, the outward is not merely outward, but also inward; the positive, ideal; the historical, natural; or, in other words, answers to our true, inmost nature. Nor is this relation the fruit of sin; no, it is the primal relation between God as the Creator and man as the creature — a relation which has been sadly misunderstood by modern thinkers, with their perverted self-satisfaction and deification of humanity. It is but one application of the universal law, that subordinate beings need stimulating and fructifying from those higher than themselves, if they are to have true life. The earth needs the rain and sunlight of the heavens," etc. We commend the book to the thoughtful attention of theologians and pastors.

THE HISTORY OF JESUS ACCORDING TO MATTHEW ITS OWN EVIDENCE, and other Essays, by Thomas Wizenmann.[1]

It is almost enough to recommend this History of Jesus, to say that, although a posthumous work, it is now republished after an interval of seventy-five

II. Band. Zur Lehre vom Menschen als religiösem Wesen. Mit einem Lebensabriss des Verstorbenen. Basel: Bahnmaier's Verlag; London: Asher and Co. 1864.

[1] Die Geschichte Jesu nach Matthaeus als Selbstbeweis ihrer Zuverlässigkeit betrachtet. Ein nachgelassenes Werk von Thomas Wizenmann, zum ersten Male 1789 mit einer Vorrede herausgegeben von J. F. Kleuker, zum zweiten Male mit einer Einleitung und dem Meisten und Bedeutendsten aus Wizenmann's Nachlasse von Dr. C. A. Auberlen. Basel: Bahnmaier's Verlag; London: Asher and Co. 1864.

years; for this is a very uncommon occurrence in Germany, where the best authors become antiquated in ten or fifteen years. But Wizenmann was not an ordinary mind. Kant remarked of him that he had an acute and clear head; Jacobi styled him a thinker of the first order. The design of the treatise is to ascertain how many internal arguments for the credibility of the history of Jesus can be gathered from the book of Matthew considered solely by itself. Wizenmann, we are told, wrote to Jacobi shortly before his death (he was carried away by consumption in his twenty-eighth year, in 1787), "If you would but study the Bible as you study Spinoza, you would find the truth of the Christian religion to be far more evident than any principles demonstrated by philosophy. In opposition to all *a priori* theories, he appeals to the grand fact of the existence and influence of the Bible; and demands an *a posteriori*, exact, really historical, and critical investigation of its substance and claims. He called to the opponents of revelation in his own day: "Look at the fact as it lies before your eyes; investigate thoroughly every detail of the Bible till you grasp it as a whole; collect the impressions made on your mind and reflect on them as rigidly, keenly, and acutely as you can; in a word, do with this book as you do with others, and I am sure the result will be that to which Christ refers in John viii. 47: "He that is of God heareth my word." Besides the History of Jesus, the work contains a number of shorter essays on the "Evidence for the Existence of a Higher Being"; "The Trinity"; "God and the World"; "The Knowledge of God from History" (peculiarly suggestive); "The Anthropomorphic Revelations of God" (a sound antidote to the philosophy, falsely so called, of such books as Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought); "The Simplicity and Truth of Divine Revelation"; "The Divine Economy"; "The Account of Creation and Paradise in Genesis"; "Miracles," etc. As a posthumous work it lays, of course, no claim to be a rounded and finished production, and in some respects it is behind the times; but it is full of profound hints and thoroughly original thoughts, expressed with great freshness and force.

History of Rationalism, by Dr. A. Tholuck.[1]

Dr. Tholuck has brought his "Vorgeschichte des Rationalismus" (*Fore*-history, one might translate it, if it were allowable to coin so clumsy a word) to an end, and now commences the history proper. If the main edifice were to bear any proportion to the portal, we should have a work almost as large as Macaulay's or Buckle's projected histories; but Dr. Tholuck, mindful of the uncertainty of time, has resolved to limit the present part of his undertaking to three moderate-sized volumes.

[1] Geschichte des Rationalismus. Erste Abtheilung: Geschichte des Pietismus und des ersten Stadiums der Aufklärung. Von Dr. A. Tholuck. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co. 1865.

A work more interesting for its liveliness and more instructive in its lessons than this, has seldom been published. Professor Tholuck gives its history and its philosophy in so piquant and living a form, that whoever begins to read will read to the end. The present volume comprises the following chapters: I. The Decline of Church Orthodoxy. II. The Biblical Orthodoxy of Pietism till its Decline: 1. Pietism in Halle; 2. In Wurtemburg; 3. The Moravian Brethren; 4. Pietism in its Degeneracy; 5. The Diffusion and Influence of Pietism. III. The first Stadium of Illuminism (from the Beginning to the Middle of the Eighteenth Century): 1. Foreign Influences; 2. Inner Factors: Thomasius, Wolff and his theological adherents, Pfaff, Mosheim, and others.

The chapter on Foreign Influences has a peculiar interest for English-speaking theologians. It shows us that Germany was once as slavishly disposed to borrow from and be led by England as our (American and English) theologians are by Germany now. German rationalism was to a considerable extent transplanted from England; just as our rising rationalism is an immigration from the "Fatherland." Locke in philosophy, and Tillotson, Burnet, and Watts in theology, were the patterns imitated by Michaelis, Mosheim, Sack, and others. Mosheim in fact gloried in the title of "the German Tillotson." And just as Germans then borrowed our worn-out garments, so are we adopting ideas and theories which have nearly had their day at German universities.

Dr. Tholuck's allusions to English forms of religious life, however, are seldom as just as one might expect from a man who has had so many opportunities of forming an accurate opinion. He speaks of Methodism, Puritanism, etc., just as our lofty-eyed Episcopal friends do; and seems to sanction modes of conduct which, in our judgment, decidedly clash with the biblical standard of life in Christ.

Neander's Lectures on the History of Christian Ethics.[1]

The design and tendency of these lectures are expressed by Neander in the following words: "The scientific investigation of the History of Christian Ethics will show us how closely connected is the entire development of humanity with the essence of Christianity; and that many efforts now directed *against* Christianity, would never have been possible but for the world-transforming influence wielded *by* Christianity. Many in our day think it possible to enjoy the fruits of spiritual culture after rejecting the stem on which they have grown; but we hope to show that the ideas, feelings, customs, in a word *the life*, of Christendom are outgrowths from the root of positive Christianity, which, though they may last awhile, must eventually wither and perish if historical Christianity itself, or Christ, be

[1] Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Christlichen Ethick. Von Dr. A. Neander. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co. 1865.

rejected. We shall see that many intellectual wants by which men are now stirred, and which, being misunderstood, they seek to satisfy by false means, find their true satisfaction in the influence exercised by Christianity on life; and that many a moral task which men seek to accomplish by cunningly-devised plans of their own, can only be accomplished by the aid of Christianity." After an introduction on the relation of a history of Christian ethics to the history of Christian doctrine, and to the history of philosophical ethics, etc., he proceeds to the discussion of the proper subject in hand, under four heads: 1. Christian ethics from the entrance of Christianity into the world till the change in the position of the church brought about under Constantine; in this section, the chapter on the relation of the ethical principle of Christianity to the ethical ideas entertained prior to the coming of Christ is especially noteworthy; 2. From the fourth century to Gregory the Great (seventh century); 3. From Gregory to the commencement of the Scholastic Period (twelfth century); 4. The Scholastic Period till Thomas Aquinas. The work, it will be seen, is not complete; but the torso here presented to us betrays the master-hand of the greatest church historian of the age. As a specimen of the kind of thought it contains, take the following on works of supererogation: "The notion of a perfection higher than that prescribed by the law arises primarily from a false view of the idea of law. The view we take of law will differ, according as we fix our eye on the Mosaic law or on the eternal moral law; according as we pay regard to the spirit or to the mere letter of the Mosaic law; according as we regard the special form or the eternal substance. From confounding these two very distinct things, many Christians fell into the notion that they could go beyond the law. Another root was the false asceticism which led men to regard the kingdom of God as consisting rather in opposition to, than in the appropriation of, the world. The mission of the kingdom of God is to permeate and manifest itself in the various possessions of humanity — in art, science, and so forth; not to flee away from them; the divine principle is the glorification of the human, not something solely superhuman. Such false ideas were a return, unawares, to the old heathen point of view, from which Christianity was meant to draw away the mind." With this very bare notice of its contents and character, we commend Neander's History of Christian Ethics to the attention of our readers.

Christian Ethics, by Dr. G. von Harless.[1]

The fact that Harless's Christian Ethics has gone through six editions since 1842, ought to be a sufficient guarantee for its worth; but as many of our readers may perhaps never have seen the work, we will give a brief account of its method and general character.

German methods of treating moral science are somewhat different from

[1] Christliche Ethik. Von Dr. G. Chr. A. von Harless. Sechste vermehrte Auflage. Stuttgart: S. G. Liesching; London: Asher and Co. 1864.

our own. Our standard works are a commixture of what Germans term philosophical ethics and Christian ethics, which they carefully and properly distinguish. Hagenbach, in his Encyclopedia of Theological Sciences, defines the two as follows: "*Christian* ethics expound the theory of the inward [disposition] and outward [actions] moral relations of man as growing out of living faith in Christ. Like dogmatic theology, its foundation is positive Christianity, from which it derives its principles. On the other hand, however, it is closely connected with general or *philosophical* ethics, from which it differs indeed in method, points of departure, and motives, but with whose essential features it can never clash." Schleiermacher (quoted by Hagenbach) gives the following definition: "What Christian ethics enjoin is binding alone on Christians; philosophical ethics claim to be binding on every one who is able to attain insight into the philosophical principles from which they are deduced"; but if we understand it aright, it is incorrect. It is the idea of Christian obligation which, in practical form, vaguely possesses many persons who shrink from becoming professed members of Christian churches, because they suppose that they then undertake new duties. The following words seem to be much nearer the truth — a truth which preachers should digest and urge on their congregations: "The more fully we understand the ethics of Christianity and the spirit they breathe, the more fully convinced shall we be that they are nothing but the most faithful reflex of the legislation interwoven with the very essence of the human mind itself"; or, more correctly expressed, a true Christian is nothing more than a true man. Dr. Wardlaw, Congregationalist minister in Glasgow, was, we believe, the first English writer to call attention to the distinction between Christian ethics and general or philosophical ethics. The work of Harless treats of Christian ethics alone.

It is divided into three parts, somewhat strangely designated Redemption as a Good; Redemption as a Possession; Redemption in its Manifestations; which are further subdivided as follows. Under the *first* head: I. Human life and its standards prior to, and apart from, the appearance of Christ in the flesh: 1. The natural form of human life; 2. Life under the law. II. The entrance of the gospel into the history of humanity. Under the *second* head, I. The entrance of redemption into the spiritual life of the individual; II. Our spiritual struggles for the possession of redemption; III. Personal fitness for maintaining the possession of redemption. Under the *third* head, I. Christian piety as the mother of all virtues; II. Modes displaying Christian piety; III. The fundamental, divinely-ordained forms of social life on earth in their relation to Christian piety. If space allowed, we should like to give our readers a glimpse of the fulness of beautiful and ripe thought which is gathered around the above skeleton; but this being impracticable, we must limit ourselves to commending Dr. von Harless's work as at once scientific, historical, practical, edifying, and as therefore pre-eminently adapted to the wants of ministers in active service.

Letters against Materialism, by Dr. F. Fabri.[1]

The author of this refutation of materialism gives the key-note of his work in the words of Goethe: "Strictly speaking, the one profound theme of universal history — that theme to which all others are subordinate — is the conflict between *unbelief* and *faith*"; not, be it observed, between reason and faith, science and faith, knowledge and faith; but between unbelief and faith. As this saying may perhaps seem enigmatical, we will explain it a little; we shall thus also set before our readers the central feature of Dr. Fabri's earnest book.

Hamann, the magician of the North, as he is styled in Germany, says: "Our own existence and the existence of all things outside of us must be *believed*, and cannot be established in any other way. Faith is as necessary to reason as reason is to faith." And here we have the key to the entire dispute. All knowledge, all science, is conditioned by faith, in one form or another. Modern writers on natural science profess to accept nothing on authority, nothing which they cannot prove, and yet they assume as certain their own existence, the existence of their own thought, and above all the truth of the substance of their thought. What is the basis of this certainty? We hear the reply: The basis of this certainty is the necessity of thought. But how do you demonstrate this necessity? By thought? Nevermore: that is reasoning in a circle, a fault with which believers may allow themselves to be charged, but which is unbearable in men who aim at demonstrating everything. We are obliged, therefore, to *assume* the immediate certainty of the *fact* of our existence and thought: and what is this assumption but an *act of faith?* Starting at this point, the author goes on to show that every important line of argument of the assailants of faith is reducible back to a beginning of faith, and that in reality the dispute is not one between faith and knowledge, but between more and less faith. In the course of the letters, the main principles, methods, and results of modern science, as expounded by such coryphaei as Carl Vogt, Moleschott, Feuerback, Nirchow, Humboldt, and others are subjected to a searching examination. We cannot, in conclusion, advance a stronger motive for the study of this subject in general, and of Dr. Fabri's book in particular, than what is contained in the words of Hamann: "A reason which confesses itself to be the daughter of the senses and of matter — behold! that is our religion; a philosophy which reveals to men their calling to go on all fours — that feeds our magnanimity; and a triumph of heathenish blasphemy is the acme of our genius."

[1] Briefe gegen den Materialismus. Von Dr. F. Fabri, Missions-Inspector. Zweite, mit zwei Abhandlungen über den Ursprung und das Alter des Menschengeschlechts vermehrte Auflage. Stuttgart: S. G. Liesching; London: Asher and Co. 1864.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Sprague's Annals of the American Pulpit.[1]

Each volume of Dr. Sprague's Annals exhibits a peculiar class of excellences. One volume surpasses the others in one particular, and is surpassed by the others in a different particular. The volume now before us excels each of the seven preceding volumes of the Annals in rhetorical grace and finish. It contains the record of clergymen, many of whom were noted for their pure English style, and their character is here delineated by writers many of whom are masters of a truly classical diction.

One of the deepest impressions made by the entire series of Dr. Sprague's "Annals" is this: Some authors are greater than their books, and some books are greater than their authors. There are men whose character entitles them to a smaller degree of influence than their published writings possess, and there are other men whose published writings give no adequate idea of their kingly character. These volumes illustrate the truth, that some men can be accurately known and fitly honored by none except their contemporaries, their perceptible influence dies with them, they live longer than their names, posterity does not know to whom it is indebted for the good which it has received from them. Some characters cannot be described, they can only be felt. "His action was so individual that every case involves a long story and many details, in order to be appreciated"; "I find I cannot tell you the details of his kindness to myself even; for in order to do justice to its genuineness and delicacy I should have to give you my own memoirs for the time"; — such sentences as these, which are written in regard to one man, may be written in regard to many; they are the most faithful portraiture which can be given of a beauty too etherial to be analyzed, or of a majesty too high to be brought down to the inspection of strangers. The "Annals" of Dr. Sprague contain, perhaps, all that it is worth while to say with regard to some of the really greatest men who have adorned the American pulpit; their writings fail to do them justice; they have left no permanent memorial of their worth; their good influence distilled itself through hidden avenues; they

[1] Annals of the American Pulpit; or Commemorative Notices of Distinguished American Clergymen of the various Denominations, from the early Settlement of the Country to the close of the Year 1855. With Historical Introductions. By William B. Sprague, D.D. Volume VIII. 8vo. pp. 578. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1865.

made an impression which abides yet, and perhaps will be felt for ages, but will not be fully measured until the day when the concealed goodness, as well as the secret sins, of men will be exposed to the universe.

Ellicott's Commentaries.

Mr. Warren F. Draper has published three volumes of Dr. Ellicott's Commentaries, which have not yet been noticed in this Journal. One is the "Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians." 8vo. pp. 171. Another is the "Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles." 8vo. pp. 265. Still another is the "Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Philippians, Colossians, and to Philemon." 8vo. pp. 278. We have previously noticed Mr. Draper's Edition of Ellicott's Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, also of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians. Each of these volumes is accompanied with a revised translation of the text which it explains. In the Prefaces to the Commentaries are found many judicious thoughts, gracefully expressed; as, for example, the remarks in the Preface to the Pastoral Epistles on the project of a revised translation of the Bible.

The great value of Dr. Ellicott's Commentaries consists in the fact that he strives to *explain* the Greek Testament rather than to *make* a *newer* Testament. This is the highest praise which can be bestowed on an exegete. It cannot be awarded to some of the English and American Commentators. The scholarly tastes and the Christian feeling of the student are alike gratified by the pure and concise style, the rare candor, the large erudition, and the evangelical tone of Dr. Ellicott's works, devoted as they are to the culture of a scriptural and elevated piety.

We would call the particular attention of our readers to the Commentary on Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon," as the last which has been republished in Dr. Ellicott's series, and therefore not yet noticed by the press.

Phrasis: A Treatise on the History and Structure of the different Languages of the World, with a Comparative View of the Forms of their Words and the Style of their Expressions. By J. Wilson, A.M., Author of Errors of Grammar and Nature of Language. 8vo. pp. 384. Albany: J. Munsell. 1864. — This is an elaborate volume. The author of it has made extensive and varied researches into the nature of language, and deserves high commendation for his diligence and perseverance. Every chapter of his work bears witness to his enthusiasm in his favorite studies. We regret that we have no space for an extended review of a book which has cost so many years of toil. To particularize its faults without stating its excellences would be unfair. To enumerate its merits without indicating its defects would be equally unjust. We will now only say, that it well deserves the study of English scholars who desire to obtain a

"comparative view of the history and idioms of the principal languages of the world;" and that the author merits the high respect of the literary public for his zeal, enterprise, and patience in the study of words, — a study which in our land has attracted too little attention.

Hymns and Sacred Pieces, with Miscellaneous Poems. "Let every thing that hath breath praise the Lord." By Ray Palmer. 12mo. pp. 195. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1865. — Many of the hymns contained in this volume are already familiar to our readers. Some of those which are less familiar, such as: "Lord my weak thought in vain would climb," etc., will have a lengthened life in the churches. It must gratify the author to be assured that some of his expressive stanzas will be read and sung long after he shall have been gathered to his fathers. The volume contains various "Sacred Pieces" and "Miscellaneous Poems" which we have never seen before, and which have rare poetic worth.

The Missionary Jubilee: an account of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the American Baptist Missionary Union, at Philadelphia, May 24, 25, and 26, 1864. With commemorative Papers and Discourses. "And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year" (Lev. xxv. 10). 8vo. pp. 500. New York: Sheldon and Company; Boston: Gould and Lincoln. 1865. — This volume contains an account of the Jubilee Services at Philadelphia; an excellent Discourse of Rev. Dr. Caldwell, preached before the Missionary Union; historical and biographical memoranda of the Baptist Missions and Missionaries; important Papers on Missions, in their relation to Denominational Growth, to Denominational Belief and Polity, to Educational Institutions, etc.; an interesting Essay on the Literature of American Baptists from 1814 to 1864, by Rev. William Crowell, D.D., Freeport, Illinois; and other useful Papers. A surprising amount of historical information is compressed into this volume, and it will retain for a long time its value as a thesaurus of facts in regard to the Baptist denomination.

Centennial Celebration of Brown University, 1864. 8vo. pp. 178. Providence: Sidney S. Rider and Brother. 1865. — The Historical Discourse of President Sears stands first in this volume, and is followed by an Appendix, which is full of valuable memoranda. To this is added an account of the Proceedings at the Anniversary, containing the Speeches of Dr. Wayland, Prof. Goldwin Smith, and others. The volume has not a merely ephemeral interest, but is a rich contribution to the history of the last century. We regret that we are compelled to omit some extracts which we had intended to insert from Dr. Sears's learned Discourse.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

WHAT IS THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIAN WORSHIP?

BY REV. J. O. MEANS, ROXBURY, MASS.

I. Importance of the Inquiry.

The question we propose to consider does not owe its importance to the special interest which this whole subject has awakened of late years; it cannot but be regarded as of vital moment for its own sake and its ultimate relation to practical piety. And no one can imagine it is a matter which may be left to take care of itself, when we notice how scrupulous the apostles of Christ were in discharging the offices of devotion: "There are yet but twelve days since I went up to Jerusalem for to worship," says Paul in his speech before Felix; and though mentioned incidentally, the fact is a fact of special significance. The apostle, who was the most enlightened, liberal-minded, spiritual of Christians, and who was sweeping away the dead forms of Judaism, went up to Jerusalem from distant parts of the world, making long and perilous journeys, for the purpose of worshipping in the temple.

Why could he not perform this service as acceptably in Macedonia? He was preaching the gospel there, he was living a pure and holy life. Was there not more genuine

piety in this than in withdrawing from his work, turning away from the bedside of the dying, leaving his people to weep at his departure, unclasping the hands that clung around his neck, and hastening to Jerusalem to lay a lamb or a pair of doves on the altar and to burn incense? Did not this clear-sighted man recognize the truth that "work is worship," or that "deeds of charity are the most acceptable offering"?

On one occasion the disciples of Ephesus were eagerly expecting a visit from their beloved teacher. They had heard of his great success in "the regions beyond," and news came that he was on his way to their city. The church was notified, and a meeting appointed to greet his arrival. As their expectations were raised to the highest pitch, word was brought at the last moment "that Paul had determined to sail by Ephesus; for he hasted, if it were possible for him to be at Jerusalem the day of Pentecost." So once before, in the midst of pressing labors, he broke off and left them. They prayed him to tarry longer time, but he consented not, but bade them farewell, saying: "I must, by all means, keep this feast that cometh at Jerusalem. But I will return to you, if God will. And he sailed from Ephesus."

We can easily imagine that some of the disciples may have thought this scrupulous regard for places and times and forms a melancholy token that the best men are but imperfectly sanctified; possibly they counted the weakness a remnant of Pharisaic prejudice. If there were none among the enlightened believers at Ephesus who criticized the conduct of the apostle, there are many now who think that unusual care about rites of worship is contrary to the spirituality of the gospel. Indeed, to not a few Christians, worship, as consisting in paying divine honors to God by methods devised purely to this end, savors of superstition. Religion is limited by them to that human side of which the apostle James speaks: visiting the fatherless and widows in their afflictions and keeping themselves unspotted from the world. It is conceded that there must be religious services,

but the design of them is the improvement of men, not the honor of God. The great, if not sole, aim is to convert sinners, and instruct, comfort, and sanctify believers. The sermon and the prayers are to this end; and the singing is in order to make the service more impressive, heighten the interest, and add force and impressiveness to the preaching.

We shall not be misunderstood as implying that it is not *one* great purpose of religious services to convert and sanctify men. But besides this, special honor is to be rendered to Almighty God; and the object of all our spiritual culture is to prepare us to worship him more suitably. The angels and saints in heaven perform grand ministries of worship. And if we needed neither preaching nor praying on our own account, the obligations of divine worship would be as strong as they are now.

II. Definition of Worship.

There is a distinctive duty of honoring God, not to be confounded with other duties, any more than lying is confounded with stealing. A thief is likely to be a liar; and all good actions may be associated with worship, and may enter into the service, without constituting it.

A precise definition of divine worship is: The expression of appropriate conceptions and emotions concerning God in appropriate forms.

The first and essential condition is, that there be conceptions and feelings in the mind and heart which ought to be entertained, such as reverence, love, penitence, and the like. There must be a pause and silence of the soul, and a lifting of itself upward; the dormant feeling must be working, by internal aspirations, or by outward, visible, audible manifestations.

The second condition is, that the form of expression be appropriate. It is not every manifestation of right feeling that is worship. Feeding the hungry, giving a cup of cold water to the thirsty, are acts of piety, but not necessarily of worship. There is an expression appropriate to the

nature of the emotions and of the being towards whom they are uttered. And in Christian worship the feelings must be such as the gospel requires, and the expression in forms which harmonize therewith.[1]

III. Duty of Worship.

1. A just conception of God and of our relations to him, of itself determines the propriety of worship. He is worthy of it; and it is not derogatory to his perfections to believe that he desires and is pleased with the homage of men.

There is a feeling that while it benefits us, adoration and praise are really of no account with God. He is supremely happy in himself, our homage does not increase his honor, he does not need our praise. The lamb which was sacrificed as a thank-offering, and the loaves of bread which were laid on the altar, were of no use to him. And our hymns and bowing in prayer, our sacraments and solemn ordinances are really of no greater value. The heart is what he regards. And the best proof of a right heart is an upright life.

True, the best proof to men of a right heart is an upright life. But he who searches the heart does not need even this token. And yet he is pleased with it. And he is pleased with services which have special regard to his honor.

It is an utterly unworthy conception of God to suppose that because of his greatness our worship contributes nothing to his happiness. Has God no heart? Is there nothing in his universe that can give him joy? Why, the very amplitude of his being, instead of removing, brings him into the closest sympathy with the lowliest of his creatures. He has avenues by which everything he has made can

[1] Vinet defines worship as "the interior or exterior act of adoration — adoration in act; and adoration is nothing less than the direct and solemn recognition of the being and presence of God, and of our obligations towards him." — Pastoral Theology, Part III. § 1. In the German Theory of Worship, as given in this Review, Vol. XIV. p. 791, it is defined as "the representation, by means of forms correspondent to the nature of the soul, of the inward faith of the believer."

approach him. Creatures do not affect each other so easily as every creature affects the Creator. The violet does not appreciate the fragrance of its sister lily of the valley. The rose does not enjoy the beauty of the violet. Man, a higher being, whose nature takes them into his own, watches over them and delights in the incense with which they repay his care. The flowers are far beneath us. Can we therefore have no enjoyment in the tributes they offer? And does the fragrance of a little flower give pleasure to the noble creature man; and cannot the infinite God perceive and enjoy the tributes which loving human hearts present to him?

There is no being so sensitive to whatever may give pain or pleasure as God. God is all heart. No one can so appreciate love; to no being is it so blessed. No creature has such feelings to be wounded by disobedience or grieved by neglect. He is alive to everything intended for his honor. He is sensitive to the slight which the most grovelling creature may show to its Creator. He recognizes the blind movements of matter in his praise, the dancing leaves, the flashes of auroral light, fire and hail, stormy wind fulfilling his word, mountains and all hills, fruitful trees and all cedars. The modest floweret gives more pleasure to the Creator than to all his creatures. And so far from being above noticing how men treat him, made in his image, designed to hold fellowship with him, lingering here a little while in order to be fitted for his society in heaven; what God has done to win us to love and honor him is the best proof how he values our homage. In literal truth, and not in any accommodated sense, "the Lord taketh pleasure in his people"; he loves to be honored by the worship of his creatures; he delights in the service of loving hearts.

Rites of worship are simply the language with which we express our thoughts and feelings to our heavenly Father. And that he is touched by them, so far from being derogatory to him, enhances his glory. The more sensitive we are to pleasure and pain from the most insignificant things, the more capacious does our nature prove itself to be. And

God would not be God if he did not desire and enjoy the worship of his creatures.

2. That it is necessary for our good is admitted by those who see no other propriety in it. They who lay the whole stress of religion on the office it holds in human culture, do not exaggerate the value of divine ordinances. There can be no spiritual life without worship. The soul is dwarfed, man is shrunk back into a lower type of being, when he is cut off from sensible communion with Heaven. The laws of human development seem to be, that a germ must be introduced into the lower from the higher. The civilization of nations has been by colonization, by the importation of a higher life from without, to leaven and elevate. And in worship the human race is brought into contact with him whose inspiration giveth understanding. There is, moreover, a philosophical basis for divine worship in the fact that there is a religious faculty in man which needs to find suitable expression in order to come to self-consciousness and to attain its power and fill its sphere.

3. The importance which the Bible attributes to this duty is seen in the very structure and contents of the revelation. The object of the holy scriptures is to give such a knowledge of God, and excite such emotions as shall flow out in worship, and to make known by what rites and in what methods service must be rendered. The commonwealth of Moses was little more than a grand ritual of worship. And while the Jewish economy has passed away, and its burdensome ceremonials are no longer in force, the fact that God so carefully instituted that complicated system has instructive lessons for Christians. It shows the necessity of great attention to the service we render, and the just ordering of it. It teaches modesty and diffidence in pronouncing that rites to which we are not accustomed are absurd or puerile, and that ceremonies which we do not see the reason of are superstitious. God set forth the system of Judaism. He knew the danger of superstition and formalism, and how liable forms are to be abused. And he was the same spir-

itual being to the Jew he is to the Christian. An attention to outward forms and to ritualistic ceremonies entered into the very warp and woof of the pure worship of David and of Isaiah, and of Peter and John and Paul, to an extent which would shock the notions of many good men now. Humility and modesty in judging those who differ from us in these things would be no serious injury.

Not only did our Saviour and his apostles scrupulously observe rites which many would be likely to judge, if they saw such things, frivolous, if not perilous; it is to be noted that after the resurrection and ascension of our Lord, and after the outpouring of the Holy Ghost, the disciples continued to go to the temple to worship. They were observing the feast of Pentecost when they received the great baptism of the Spirit. Paul, the most free from the trammels of the old dispensation, paid his vows at the altar. He discarded circumcision, but he shaved his head and performed lustral purifications.

All this took place after, and in complete harmony with, that conversation of Christ with the Samaritan woman, in which we have the pregnant sentence which sets forth spirituality as the sign and seal of true and Christian worship.

IV. Spirituality of Worship.

The gospel edition of Leviticus is comprised in a single verse which the Lord Jesus uttered as he sat on the mouth of Jacob's well. He was returning with his apostles from the temple worship of Jerusalem. The Samaritan woman claimed a higher sanctity for mount Gerizim than for mount Zion. Jesus saith unto her, Woman, believe me, the hour cometh when ye shall neither at this mountain nor yet at Jerusalem worship the Father. God is a spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.

The very conciseness and brevity of a law sometimes renders it liable to be misinterpreted and calls for copious explanation. Many have drawn the inference from this declaration of our Master, that in proportion as we dispense

with the forms we realize the spirit of worship; and that for the highest spirituality the formal elements must be wholly eliminated.

Now there is no better way of ascertaining what spiritual worship is, than by considering the worship of Christ and of the apostles and of holy men of old. The worship which our Lord rendered was spiritual. The worship of Paul, of Peter, and James was spiritual. The worship of Isaiah, of David and Moses and Abraham, was spiritual. Looking at the illustrations which the holy scriptures give, it is evident that modes, times, places, are purely circumstantial, and vary under varying conditions of society; and that the essential thing is, that there be real life, the spirit of living faith, in the service. Spiritual worship is the spirit worshipping. The error to guard against is, on the one hand, that of smothering the life by forms which God does not authorize, and attributing virtue to divinely authorized forms after the spirit has departed; or, on the other hand, of neglecting, as needless, forms which are scriptural.

1. Spirituality of worship does not imply that there is no sanctity to be recognized in special places and seasons. The true conception of Christian worship demands both sanctuaries and sabbaths.

Some have misapprehended the words of our Lord to the Samaritan woman, and have thought he intended to teach that it was wrong to make so much of Jerusalem and of the rites of the temple, and that one place was no more to be regarded than another.

Why then did Jesus himself go at regular intervals to Jerusalem? What aroused his indignation in seeing his Father's house made a house of merchandise; and why did he scourge the buyers and sellers out of it? Who established Jerusalem, who ordered the arrangements of the tabernacle and the temple? Did not God himself? And does the Son of God mean that this was all wrong, that it was a mistake?

So far from it, our Lord added new sanctity to the temple. He worshipped there. And he simply declares in his

discourse in the vale of Shechem, that the exclusive worship of Judaism is ended; that the observance of the Mosaic rites is no longer required; that the Father seeketh those to worship him whose hearts are right, not those who, as Samaritans or Jews, claim descent from Abraham.

Both scripture and reason teach that special seasons and special places are to be devoted to public worship. The sabbath and the sanctuary are hallowed by one and the same divine command: "Ye shall keep my sabbaths and reverence my sanctuary" was the original ordinance;[1] and the gospel has only modified the form, without abrogating the substance, of the law in respect to the one or the other. We are bound, under the Christian economy, to devote to God a certain portion of time as a sabbath. We need it. God requires it. It is one part of spiritual worship. There is no need of arguing this point. And so the Christian sanctuary is no less to be set apart for the special worship of our Redeemer and Lord. Our convenience and the honor of God demand it. Some think it unscriptural to imagine that God is more truly present in a house of worship than elsewhere. Was he not present in the tabernacle and in the temple in a special sense, and with a glory he manifested nowhere else? That notion of God which supposes that he cannot be in some special place would prove that he can be in no special place. And if he is in no special place he is nowhere. And God nowhere is no God.

We cannot conceive of God without giving him a definite locality. We are compelled, by the finiteness of our minds, to think of him thus. He gives this representation of himself. He is specially present in heaven. There is a place in heaven where the divine majesty most gloriously appears. The saints and angels worship before the throne. And there are places on earth where God draws nigh to men, in a special sense. As the patriarchs wandered through Syria the Lord Jehovah appeared to them, and they erected altars on the spot. Instead of worshipping in chance places, they

[1] Levit. xix. 30.

came back afterwards to these altars. They lingered around them. The encampment grew to a village, the village to a city, the city became the capital of the tribe, and the altar the temple. The temple of Solomon was where Abraham erected the altar to sacrifice Isaac.

When the tabernacle was set up in the wilderness a cloud descended and rested upon it in token of God's presence. And the temple, which took the place of the tabernacle, was visited by similar symbols. In the holy of holies God was pleased to show himself as nowhere else. The Lord was in his holy temple. It was not superstition which made David cry out: "When shall I come and appear before God"? David had enlightened conceptions of the spiritual nature of the Godhead. There are no nobler representations of the divine spirituality than the Hebrew scriptures present. They knew in those days that God was everywhere. When Solomon was dedicating the temple, he exclaimed: "Heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house which I have built!" But with the same breath Solomon invoked the special presence of God in that house; and in answer to his prayer, the Lord appeared; a cloud descended and filled the house, and filled every heart with awe. Was there no meaning in that sublime scene?

We do not look for such manifestations. But does the gospel remove God farther away? Does not the gospel give new assurances of the real presence of our Saviour among his worshipping people? Do we believe that God was present in the ancient temple, and shall we not believe that, in a literal and blessed sense, our Lord Jesus Christ keeps his sacred promise, and is where two or three are gathered together in his name?

It is a profound remark of Charnock, that in worship there is not only an approach of man to God, but "an approach of God to man."[1] He bows his heavens and comes down; darkness is under his feet. We do not see how he comes. He clothes himself with light as with a garment.

[1] Attributes, Discourse IV. head 3, reason 4.

Our Saviour was not more literally present on the Mount of Beatitudes, than he is present now in the mountain of the Lord's house set apart for his service.

The warrant of the scriptures for the Christian sanctuary meets the demands of our renewed nature. We are so constituted that it is easier to realize the presence of God in some places than in others. And wherever we instinctively recognize his presence, in whatever place vivid and solemn ideas of God are spontaneously and habitually excited, there to us God specially is. If we are accustomed to do certain things in certain places, we do them easier and more pleasantly there than elsewhere. There are habits of thought and feeling, moods of emotion which depend on outward conditions and associations gathered by age and silently hallowing a place of worship. There are styles of building which the mind comes to connect with places of prayer. It is a little thing. But a little thing may be a great help or a great hinderance. A solemn strain of music which is usually heard in devotion, if it falls on the ears of men in the busy streets, will interrupt them and render them thoughtful. It is wise to take advantage of these invisible influences which memory gathers about the sanctuary. Without chrisms and anointings, a hallowed incense is insensibly diffused; and the places which are consecrated by the least interference of our conscious wills may be the most truly sacred.

2. As the spiritual character of Christian worship does not dispense with set times and places, so neither does it abrogate set forms of worship. Spirituality is not measured by the character of the formal rites.

Many suppose simplicity and spirituality are the same thing. But the simple flowers on the platform of the Music Hall in Boston, and the baldness of the service, does not make the worship there more spiritual than the worship in the church of St. Mary of the Immaculate Conception. Neither simplicity nor complexity are gauges of spirituality. We cannot measure a feeling by a rule of gold any better

than by a rule of iron; and fresh flowers are as material as wax candles. The offering of prayer in words is no more spiritual than sacrificing a lamb and burning incense. It is a strange mistake to suppose that if worship is simple it is therefore spiritual, and that in proportion as rites multiply spirituality disappears. Dr. Payson would never be guilty of the presumption of imagining that, because he lifted up holy hands, and poured forth vocable sounds of prayer in the name of Christ, he was a more spiritual worshipper than Abraham, the friend of God. The father of the faithful arranged a heap of stones, killed a lamb, and, with careful rites, sprinkled the blood and laid portions of the animal in order, and burnt a sacrifice.

The nature of the rite has nothing to do with the spirituality of the service; this depends wholly on the state of the heart. In all worship material symbols are used, and must be used. Language is a symbol. And though certain symbols seem to us more delicate, less gross, more etherial, approaching nearer to the spiritual, God regards them simply as they express devout feelings.[1] Some of the most spiritual worshippers have had the most complicated rites. Thus it was with patriarchs and prophets. While those who have reduced rites of worship to the fragrance of fading flowers have dissolved the spirit into thin air. Without some formal rites there can be no worship. For worship, in its very idea, is a form. It is an *expression* of feeling, piety taking to itself a form; the embodiment of spiritual emotions. And the great question is: What is the appropriate expression of pious feeling now among Christians?

3. The forms of spiritual worship vary. They are adapted by God to the progressive changes of society. That which expressed the pious feeling of Abraham would not express the pious feeling of Wilberforce. More than three thousand years are between them; they stood on opposite sides of

[1] "The most delicate and fitting form which can be employed, that which approaches nearest to spirit, is speech." — German Theory of Worship, ut supra, p. 790. Approaches nearest. Yes; but how much nearer to Sirius is a man on a hill-top than a man in the valley?

Calvary. There was at first a patriarchal economy: Abel offered his first-fruits, Enoch walked with God, Abraham went to Moriah and sacrificed a lamb. There was an enlargement of this cultus in the Mosaic dispensation. Samuel and David, by divine direction, introduced other changes. Our Saviour came to fulfil the law and the prophets. He took up the ancient economy as it had grown to be, and instituted new rites, very different in important respects, less cumbrous and burdensome. But we make a great mistake if we suppose the gospel worship, because of its simplicity, is more spiritual than that of holy men of old. All the rites of worship which God ordained in the Bible are rites of spiritual worship. They have been precisely adapted to the circumstances of those to whom they were given. And the spiritual worship adapted to us is that which the Holy Spirit authorizes in the Bible; no more and no less.

4. In the New Testament we find certain new sacraments to be observed through all time. But there is no formal ritual of worship, such as the Old Testament contains. And for the reason that a new ritual was not needed. The New Testament joins on to the Old. It takes the Old Testament up into itself, and baptizes it with the name of Christ. Whatever in the old economy is not superseded, whatever is not out of harmony with the new, is of as much force now as ever. Many things had reference to the Jews as a nation. With the extinction of the nation, all this scaffolding fell at once. The sacrificial economy was superseded by the offering of the Lamb of God once for all. There is to be no more sacrifice for sin. With the end of sacrifices there was an end of the priesthood. Circumcision gave place to Christian baptism. But with these changes, which the gospel necessarily makes, and their accompaniments, all the rest remains. Our Saviour did not abrogate the system which he found, and which he indeed had previously framed. He worshipped according to it, and left his disciples to worship thus, substituting certain rites for others. It is

doubtful whether the apostles understood at first that they were no longer to keep the passover. The Lord's supper gradually superseded the old rite. And all other changes were by the spontaneous development of gospel doctrines through the Holy Spirit, modifying the previous cultus.

We are not, therefore, to look in the New Testament alone to see what Christian worship should be. All of the Old Testament not inconsistent with the New is equally important. The gospel takes for granted all it finds ready for it. The spiritual life of the first dispensation is perpetuated. We are not to consult our notions of what is expedient and what is frivolous and unimportant. We are to follow the pattern shown to us in the mount. The great characteristics of the service which is pleasing to God are impressed on the old economy. There are suggestions as to the mode of serving him which we are bound to follow. Reverence for the sabbath and for the sanctuary would be no more obligatory if the New Testament contained express directions in regard to them. Services which meet our necessities, and which are in harmony with ancient forms, and which are nowhere forbidden, are required of us. Concerts for prayer, jubilees of missions, fast days and thanksgivings, answer to similar seasons in olden times. The Christian church festivals are in place of the Jewish sabbath and pentecost, and the like. The Jews were bound by special ordinance what ones to observe, and how. We are bound by the same Spirit to observe some; but, within certain limits, we are left free to choose what ones, and how to keep them.

5. The danger to be guarded against is twofold: making too much of forms, as though that was devotion, and sweeping them away, as though that was spirituality. Superstition and scepticism are simply opposite poles of rationalism. And rationalism in worship judges everything by what it is supposed the necessities of the soul or the reason of the thing demands. Thus, instead of binding themselves by the letter and spirit of the Bible, men frame modes of wor-

ship according to their taste. Whatever conduces to the beauty of the service, and is fitted to impress the imagination, whatever is serviceable and has gained a place, though it be contrary to the essence of the gospel, is made a part of worship. On the other hand, the sceptic rejects every rite and service which does not commend itself to him as useful, or to which he does not happen to be accustomed. No matter that God authorized it, or the like to it. "That was the Old Testament!" As though God authorized in the Old Testament anything which we are entitled to pronounce frivolous and absurd. "True," says the sceptic, "the Jews were commanded to observe such ceremonies, and were held strictly to forms. But it is not safe. It savors of superstition. It is apt to be perverted." As though God allowed superstitious practices to the Jews; as though he did not see how good things might be perverted. And so the sceptic sweeps away what his judgment does not approve.

We are not to presume to honor God by services which his word interdicts or abrogates. But in guarding against this, which has seemed heretofore the chief danger, we are not to swing into the opposite extreme and neglect such rites as he has ordained, and has not abolished. We are not to demand an explanation of everything. It may be inexplicable to Abraham why God bids him go to a distant mountain to offer sacrifice. One place seems as good as another. But he does well to obey. The temple will one day stand on that mountain, the Son of God take the place of Isaac, and Abraham become the father of the faithful. The apostle Paul may not see the advantage of washing and shaving his head, and performing a vow. But it is not superstition for him to obey God in such a way. The Scotch Covenanters at Cambuslang may not comprehend the full significance of the sacraments. But they observe them because they are divinely ordained, and they do well to sing psalms and break bread and pour out wine in joyful remembrance of the Lamb of God whose blood was shed for man on Calvary.

The bowing of the head and the silent response in prayer may not seem of much account. The choral anthem trembling in the air is but a wave of sound that breaks upon the ceiling and is lost. But prayer and praise are required by God, and are not spending breath in vain.

Whatever forms we use or disuse, it is the spirit worshipping that is of consequence. A living dog is better than a dead lion; but if both be dead, it is undeniable that the dead lion is the more majestic corpse, and lies in state with greater dignity.

V. Conceptions and Emotions demanding Expression in Christian Worship.

As it is the nature of the emotion which underlies and gives meaning to worship, we cannot have the true conception of Christian worship unless we determine what emotions Christians ought to have and to express towards God. Brought into familiarity with the circle of truths which the gospel reveals, there are peculiar conceptions and emotions demanding expression and distinguishing the service we are to render. They all seem to be included under the classification of: (1) The recognition of God as manifested in Christ, (2) adoration and reverence, (3) homage, (4) gratitude and praise, (5) penitence and faith, and (6) love and joy.

1. The distinctive recognition of God in Christ is fundamental to Christian worship. The New Testament presents God in more glorious manifestations and in more winning attitudes than the Old Testament. The Son of God appears as the Saviour of the world, the King and Lord of all. Ascriptions of praise and divine homage are attributed to the Holy Ghost.

There can be no Christian worship where these vital truths are ignored or are not dominant and pervasive. They are the starting-point. They must give tone and color to every service. If Jesus Christ is not our God and Saviour, then we must not worship him, we must not associate him in every rite with God the Father. If he is

the Son of God with power, then he holds a peculiar position, as Redeemer and Intercessor, and must be met with peculiar homage.

In the ancient economy God appeared as Jehovah. By that name he demanded homage. He was jealous of any partition of his prerogative. But when he bringeth in the First Begotten into the world, he saith, Let all the angels of God worship him. This is my beloved Son; worship him.

The whole arrangement of our worship should be such as to bring out and emphasize and illuminate the blessed truth that we believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ, his only begotten Son, our Lord; and in the Holy Ghost, the Comforter.

In the Protestant churches of Europe generally, and in many churches in this country, the service of public worship begins with the doxology. And there is an obvious propriety in the custom. The apostle Paul almost invariably begins his epistles with ascriptions of praise to God in Christ: "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to the saints which are at Ephesus, and to the faithful in Christ Jesus; Grace be to you and peace from God our Father and from the Lord Jesus Christ. "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." Thus he proceeds. These epistles are of the nature of sermons, and indicate the style of apostolic preaching. A formal recognition of God in Christ may have constituted the opening doxology of the apostolic worship. Coming in again at the close of worship as it comes in at the close of the epistles, the whole service is bound together by the name of Christ, as by a golden band.

2. Under adoration we include awe, reverence, solemnity, admiration, and the like feelings, which arise in view of the grandeur and glory of the divine attributes. The propriety of adoration is so obvious that nothing need be said to vindicate it. The Psalms and other inspired models of prayer make adoration a chief element. It has a use many

overlook. We need to dwell on the attributes of God and to magnify and laud him. It is the means of presenting the Deity vividly to our minds. It assists us to think of him as a real and personal being. There is a tendency to vagueness in our ideas of God; we cannot comprehend his greatness, we diffuse his glory, and insensibly run into pantheism. Acts of adoration compel us to gather up and concentrate our thoughts on a personal Divinity.

3. The idea of homage underlies all worship. As adoration is the feeling which is due upon the simple perception of the divine character, homage is the feeling which is due upon the perception of God as sustaining certain relations to us as our sovereign Lord. The whole service indeed is an act of homage, an acknowledgment of dependence and responsibility, a confession that we belong to God and owe him obedience; a consecration of ourselves to his service. But homage in Christian worship takes up another feeling. We are the disciples of the Lord Jesus. He has redeemed us, and we belong to him and owe him special service. We are brought into a new relation to the Father; made sons of God, having received the spirit of adoption whereby we cry Abba Father. And our allegiance to our Redeemer must be expressed in our homage.

4. We need not speak of the large place which must be given to the expression of gratitude and praise in the worship of redeemed sinners. But,

5. Penitence and faith, the feelings connected with guilt and atonement, must give the chief character to Christian worship. Humility and self-abasement, sorrow for sin, confession, renunciation, supplication, the consciousness of the necessity of expiation, and the appropriation of the atonement of Christ, demand distinctive expression in our services. All worship among all nations has hinged upon sacrifices. The position of worshippers is that of prostration, as sinners imploring mercy and propitiating justice. The consciousness of sin is stronger in the heart of the Christian than it was in the hearts of men of old. We know that it is not in our

power to wash away guilt, but help is laid upon one who is mighty. The Lamb slain from the foundation of the world is our propitiation. We do not offer the sacrifice which was the great event in the worship of old. We appropriate by faith the sacrifice made in our behalf. We hold up the cross, and seek forgiveness through the blood of him who hath borne our sins thereon. In Christian worship the feelings which spring from our sinfulness, and which once dictated sacrifices, gather around the cross.

6. The key-note of the gospel is salvation. And the feelings which salvation awakens are love and joy. And thus the final and complete object of Christian worship is to manifest love and joy.

The Mosaic dispensation was pre-eminently a joyful service. Great strictness of obedience was required. The great day of atonement was a day of oppressive solemnity. Remembrance of sins was kept up by the victims daily bleeding on the altars. But the characteristic of Jewish worship was joyfulness. The sacrifices, with few exceptions, were at the same time feasts for the worshippers. The grandeur of the service, the gorgeous ceremonials, the music and singing, were to express joy: "My soul doth boast herself in the Lord." Boasting in the Lord, taking as it were personal pride in his glory, was a feeling the pious Jew cherished. He gloried in the Lord. As a poet chooses a hero for his song, the psalmist cries: "The Lord has become my song." There are, indeed, penitential psalms. No one has gone into lower depths than the depths out of which David cried. But the tone of the Hebrew Psalter is jubilant. Thanksgiving and the voice of melody ring through it.

Now if love and joy so abounded in the Jewish worship, what place should they occupy in Christian worship? The gospel is glad tidings: "Joy to the world, the Lord is come." Angels awakened the shepherds to praise him. Kings from the east brought gold and frankincense and myrrh. Have we nothing but sighs and tears to offer?

We are in no danger of feeling too much our guilt, and

of dwelling too much on the cross. This ought ye to do, and not to leave the other undone. The great tragedy of Calvary has cast a dark shadow forward. Contemplations of the sufferings of Christ and of our sinfulness have given a dirge-like tone to our worship. Plaintive tunes have been made the favorite tunes for chorals. The church music is chiefly on the minor key. We sing misereres in the choir, but oratorios are too jubilant, and are delegated to concerts and academies of music. But do we understand the fulness of gospel grace in making no more of the joyful emotions in our worship? Did ever God's people have such reason to sing loud anthems as Christians have? When Jesus was crucified the disciples stood afar off weeping. But after he had risen from the grave, when they saw the clouds parting, the King ascending, they returned to Jerusalem with gladness.

We worship a Saviour not now hanging upon the cross, but sitting upon the throne. He suffers no more. On his head are many crowns. And because of the happiness of God, as the Puritan Charnock well says, cheerfulness should give the tone to Christian worship.[1]

There do not seem to be any emotions demanding expression in Christian worship which will not fall under these classes. And unless all these find an appropriate place, something is lacking. We need not give utterance to all in every service, of course; at times, some, at times, others

[1] "God is a Spirit infinitely happy, therefore we must approach him with cheerfulness; he is a Spirit of infinite majesty, therefore we must come before him with reverence; he is a Spirit infinitely high, therefore we must offer up our sacrifices with the deepest humility; he is a Spirit infinitely holy, therefore we must address him with purity; he is a Spirit infinitely glorious, we must therefore acknowledge his excellency in all that we do, and in our measures contribute to his glory, by having the highest aims in his worship; he is a Spirit infinitely provoked by us, therefore we must offer up our worship in the name of a pacifying Mediator and Intercessor." — Ut supra, head 2, divis. 6, § 11. Charnock specifies, by enumeration, eleven "Spiritual habits to be acted in worship": faith, love, sense of weakness, spiritual desires for God, thankfulness and admiration, delight, reverence, humility, holiness, with raised aims at the glory of God, and, eleventhly, in the name of Christ.

will be predominant. But opportunity must be found for all in the circle of our services. There is a tendency to single out one, or a few, for exclusive manifestation. Some worship wholly towards love and joy. Many lay so much stress on the feelings connected with sin that joyful tones are smothered. It is a characteristic of some churches to make most of adoration and praise. There can be no question but the feelings which gather about the cross must give form and color to the whole. Everything is to work up towards Calvary, and everything to flow off from Calvary. But the strong feelings we are to pour forth in view of the body broken and the blood shed for our sins are not feelings of sadness, but of inexpressible love and trust and joy.

With such emotions demanding utterance, in what ways does the Holy Spirit indicate that we shall express them?

VI. Forms appropriate to express Christian Feelings in Worship.

The external forms of Christian worship now seem to be included in four particulars: (1) prayer and praise in vocal and musical expression; (2) the presentation of thank-offerings; (3) reading and meditating upon the word of God, and preaching; (4) the celebration of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper.

1. Prayer has a prominence in Christian worship it never had before. We use the word not simply to signify supplication, which is only a small part of prayer, but as including adoration and homage and ascriptions of praise, in which worship distinctively consists. Praise is a part of prayer, and prayer is a part of praise. Indeed, everything in divine service may be considered as only modifications and various expressions of prayer and praise.

If it were possible, all might join aloud in public prayer. But it is utterly impracticable and it is not necessary. Bowing the head, assuming a reverent posture, fixing the thoughts on God, responding in heart to the petitions and praises of the minister, is as truly joining in the prayer as

though we gave audible utterance. The closing of the eyes may be as true prayer as the opening of the lips. There is this significance in the position we assume; not merely do we shut out the world and show obeisance to God, but by our posture we express our participation in what is done in our behalf. If we stand up to praise the Lord, and make the psalm our own, following the words and adopting the music as the expression of our emotions, we sing, though our voices are not heard. God hears our hearts singing.

For the expression of adoration and praise, and the love and joyfulness of Christian worship, singing and music are needed in the largest measure. Music was a chief constituent in the worship of the Jewish church, and it is more important now. It is capable of filling, and is destined to fill, a nobler place and to make our pure and simple services more impressive and inspiring than the most gorgeous rites of baptized heathenism.

Much has been said, of late, of the participation of the congregation in the service of song; and it cannot be too earnestly insisted upon. But it must not be supposed that in urging congregational singing we lay less stress on the part which belongs to music, as such, in our devotions. Lest it should be thought, by making such a large collection of psalms, that only singing was to be used in worship, it was not enough that directions to praise God with the harp and and various instruments were distributed through the Psalter, but the Holy Spirit closed the collection with the resonant command: "Praise God with the sound of the trumpet, with the psaltery and harp, with stringed instruments and organs; praise him upon the loud cymbals, upon the high-sounding cymbals; let everything that hath breath [with every instrument capable of music] praise the Lord."

The spontaneous utterance of deep emotion is not in speech or in song, but in simple sound. Articulate language is not capable of expressing the utmost solemnity of feeling.

There are delicate shades of emotion which can only be breathed out in sighs and interpreted by music. And yet, instead of recognizing, as the scriptures do, that the highest praise cannot be uttered by the voice, some hesitate about making instruments even adjuncts to singing. That grand Christian instrument, the organ, is employed rather to aid our voices and produce emotions suitable for worship, than to give expression to them, as the only channel capable of pouring out in full volume the praises of the congregation.

Now in the service arranged by special divine direction music held a prominent part. The psalms were probably never sung by voices alone. Suitable persons were trained to "play skilfully and make a loud noise." Not a few psalms were composed music and words together, the music, it would seem, being written first, and the words adapted to it. Directions are given in the titles of many psalms for the instrumentation by which they were to be performed. And the notes which David composed were as truly inspired as the verses. He took his harp and struck off the sounds which expressed his spiritual emotions. And only when those sounds were again awakened was the psalm truly repeated. David, like Beethoven, could not express the spiritual thoughts within him by words. Music was to both of them the natural language.

In fact, to look at the philosophy of the matter, language is only an inferior sort of music. Words are sounds articulated; sounds with suitable joints and hinges, to turn this way and that. Musical notation is a universal alphabet. Letters are a kind of musical signs, signs what sounds to make; and speaking is simply making sounds. The value and meaning and expressiveness is wholly in the sound, not in the letters. And however the most exultant sound can be produced, by one word, by many words wrought into an eloquent period, by peculiar words rythmically connected and welded into a song or psalm, or by the melting of words together, the hinges and joints being loosened and the full volume of sound rol-

ling continuously along; however the sounds of praise can best be uttered, in that way they are to be uttered. We may employ our own voices, or call to our aid the more expressive vocal organs of others; or, if we can find no human throat sufficiently sonorous, we may go abroad into nature and discover what God has made for this purpose, and contrive in a grander organ all the possibilities of sound. The mightiest instrument is but a magnified voice; it is speaking through a thousand instead of through one windpipe. And the flexible muscles of a human throat are no more truly God's workmanship, nor more truly designed for praising him, than the organ constructed by the intelligence God has given to that end. God has established the laws of sound and the resonant qualities of certain materials, and taught man to combine them for the praise of his glory. And we might as properly be precluded from assisting the sight of our eyes by lenses as from assisting the music of the soul by instruments.

It is the heart which sings in praising God, not the voice; the value of music is value which the soul puts into the sounds and utters by them. And if our hearts cannot utter what they feel, because our instruments are too poor, if we are dumb of song as some are dumb of speech, we may sing with the fingers if we are cunning thereto, as the dumb man talks with his fingers; or we may invoke the aid of such as are divinely gifted with song or instrumental skill. And when our hearts respond to the strains of song and music, when we enter into the meaning of the notes, adopting them as our own and rejoicing in them, he who hears in secret detects the silent undertone in our hearts, and accepts the praises which are so jubilant that we are compelled to seek aid to utter them.

2. The presentation of offerings needs to be recognized as an act of the purest, most elevated Christian worship.

That we are to take the words of the Bible in a literal sense, and "bring an offering" when we come into his courts, as we bring a prayer and a psalm, many do not

understand. "That belonged to Judaism. We no longer make sacrifices." Yes; many no longer make sacrifices when they come to worship.

Under the ancient economy a large part of divine service consisted in presenting offerings. Of old, men used their tongues less in serving God and their hands more. There were fewer prayers and songs, less preaching, more oblations and sacrifices; they uttered their feelings by more emphatic language. Civilization has affected the speech of man chiefly — loosened the play of his tongue. The ancient notion was, that deeds speak louder than words, and that it was a truer way of praising the Lord to bring a costly treasure which could be used in the service, and lay it on the altar. They thought this was truer homage and heartier gratitude than simply lifting up the voice and pouring out volumes of sound.

The first worship of which we have an account was not by prayer, nor by singing, nor by sermon; and no sacraments were administered: "Abel brought of the firstlings of his flock. And the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering." And when, under divine guidance, the ritual of the ancient church was established, when inspired prophets preached and Aaronitic priests approached the throne of grace, while the smoke of sacrifices and odor of incense ascended, and when king David wrote the hymns and arranged the music for the choir, worship was not complete unless precious gifts were laid as offerings on the altar.

Is there anything in Christianity that changes this? The sacrifice is abolished, the priesthood has given way. Prayer and praise are as needful as ever. Are offerings no parts of Christian worship?

Then what a mistake those wise men made who came from the East when they heard Christ was born, and brought gifts, gold, frankincense, and myrrh. Christian worship was inaugurated with thank-offerings, and it is to be perpetuated with thank-offerings.

Our Saviour made almsgiving of the very essence of the

gospel. He received the most costly gifts presented in homage to himself. He commended the woman who brake the alabaster box of ointment, a gift that seemed needless and wasteful. He approved of the waste and absolved her sins therefor. And when he went to the temple to observe the sincerity of the worshippers, what position did he choose? He did not sit on the pulpit stairs and observe who was most melted by the preaching. He did not listen to hear who prayed loudest, or who sang most divinely. He sat over against the treasury, to see how they paid their devotions.

The act of the widow so commended was an act of simple worship. The treasury was a common collection for general purposes, for the support of the temple and the like. She did not give because a moving appeal had been made for starving people in some distant frontier. Her two mites hardly swelled the stream that flowed into a treasury already rich. Doubtless the widow needed the money more than the treasury. And the mites may have laid there till some Roman soldier, in the sack of the temple, got them and spent them for drink. It was not for charity's sake that the widow gave all her living; it was in worship of God, as an act of homage, of love, and thankfulness. Suppose the money did go into the pocket of a drunken soldier; she offered it to the Lord, and the Lord had regard to her and to her offering.

An offering expresses feelings with an emphasis no other mode of worship does. It is a symbolical act of acknowledging that God is entitled to all our possessions. It is a token of homage, a tribute of sovereignty. It is the most marked proof of love. In the gospel church offerings are more appropriate and are more needed than of old. God is now more glorified by gifts than ever. To overlay the temple with gold-leaf, to prepare rich vessels and vestments, was no such honor to God as to erect Christian churches, clothe the naked, feed the hungry, build hospitals, send Bibles and missionaries through the world.

The gospel has developed a spirit of benevolence which makes charitable institutions the characteristic of Christian civilization. Large sums are devoted to religious purposes. But there is a fault in the secular character which our charities have assumed. They are given more for the sake of relieving men than of honoring God. They are monuments of pity rather than of piety. They are not enough regarded as religious offices. It is well to give a cup of cold water to the thirsty, but it is a better act when the feeling that prompts is love to the Saviour, recognizing the needy as his representative, and doing it as unto the Lord. It is this reference to the Lord Jesus, making our charities tributary of worship to him, that needs to be emphasized. A one-sided notion of the truth that good works do not avail for salvation, a fear lest they might come to be regarded as propitiating God, has made many suspicious of looking upon offerings in the light in which the Old Testament, our Saviour, and his apostles speak of them. Things have come to such a pass that many feel it a disturbance to devotion to have the subject of money introduced and hear the rattle of money-boxes. They complain that their enjoyment in worship is spoiled by being called upon to give. Occasional contributions are tolerated as necessary evils. If what is needful could be procured in some other way the contribution-box should be abolished, and the Sabbath and the church be no more profaned by any allusions to giving. And yet these persons have no such horror of the prayers or of singing — that is devotional.

The Sabbath profaned by making offerings to the Lord! It is the day, and the church is the place, for this most imperative, most grateful and hearty, most acceptable and solemn, act of worship. While we are not to abstain from charity, as we do not abstain from prayers, on the other days of the week, there should be a more marked and thankful offering made on the sabbath, as a special tribute of praise to the Redeemer. It is hardly practicable to change our customs, especially in this direction. But there ought

to be a place for giving gifts in every service of public worship. It is not the amount given that is essential, as it is not the length of the prayer or the loudness of the praise that is of moment. But enough should be given to remind us that we belong to God, and to be a symbol of the consecration of all we have and are to him. In many churches the scriptural custom is preserved of making offerings as a regular part of the service.

3. Reading and meditating upon the word of God and preaching have come to fill a prominent part in public worship. The sermon, in fact, is making the other elements of worship subordinate and tributary. What is its true function? Has preaching any place in worship distinctively considered? Is it not an intruder that has forced itself in where it does not rightly belong, to crowd out more devotional ordinances? Not a few declare that such is the fact. And many who insist upon the pre-eminent importance of preaching, do not recognize it as strictly worship. They value it for the office of conversion and instruction, and not as a chief method of giving glory to the Saviour.[1] But if the preacher is nothing but a teacher or an orator he ought to be sent down to the platform. He is the ambassador of God, he speaks in the name of God, and is constituted an organ of communication from God. As a medium of divine communication in worship, the highest place belongs to the reading of the word. And the sermon is fitly made a chief

[1] Even Vinet says that preaching "is rather appended to worship than a constituent part of it. Only when we generalise the idea of worship, — make it embrace all that has God for its object, all that is by our intention related to God, — only then can we call preaching, or the teaching of religious truths, worship, and that not more nor less than every good work." "Adoration," according to Klopstock, as quoted by Harms, "is the essential element in public worship; the teaching and exhortation of the minister, notwithstanding their great utility, are not elements of so essential a character." "Die unterrichtende Ermahnung." "Preaching is an addition to worship, and is not itself worship. Harms is not wrong in proposing hours of worship in which preaching shall not be introduced. This would not tend to disparage preaching, but to set a higher estimate on worship." — Harms, Vol. II. p. 123; Vinet, ut supra, Part III. sect. 1.

part of divine service; for besides its great office of promoting our spiritual culture, it holds a place in the direct worship of our Redeemer.

We will say nothing of preaching as an ordinance of instruction, but only of that side of it which touches upon worship.

Now in spiritual worship, as has been said, two things are involved, the approach of man to God, and the approach of God to man. There can be no complete service unless both these conditions are fulfilled: if God is not sensibly present, all is vain. Draw nigh to me, and I will draw nigh to you. There must be this mutual action of God toward us, and of our souls towards God.

In ancient times the divine participation was by visible or audible tokens. When holy men worshipped a form appeared, a cloud seemed hovering, a lightness flashed forth, an angelic appearance was seen, words were heard. Abraham was sensible that God was before him, for he heard his voice and conversed with him. The communications he received were the most certain evidence of the real presence.

Are we left with no such tokens of God's presence? Does he speak no word of invitation and welcome and instruction and encouragement to us? Precisely this most assured communication with our heavenly Father we have, in the fullest measure. The Son of God became incarnate as the Word, and the holy scripture is given to fill in our worship the place which the miraculous manifestations filled in olden time. In the reading of the Bible and in preaching God comes near to us. When the scriptures are opened, the incarnate Word is before us. If we heard a voice responding when our prayers had been offered, if out of the depths there came words of promise, of warning, and reproof, of hope, should we not listen? Thus is he speaking when his ambassador repeats the message. So far from being an incidental thing, the reading of the Bible in our service is the act in which the Lord communicates directly with us.

And preaching, in its original purpose and legitimate character, is reading the Bible so as to give due emphasis, and make the meaning plain. A sermon is only such an expansion of scripture as will convey the sense fully. The preacher takes the truths which God reveals and translates them into the hearts of the hearers. Few would understand if he read the communication as it was given in the original Hebrew and Greek. He must transfer the meaning into other language. And a sermon is simply opening the plain English of the Bible. The various heads and illustrations and arguments and appeals are only tones and modulations of voice employed to emphasize the text.

While in one aspect preaching is only the emphatic reading of the Bible, it serves also to make the worshipper vividly sensible of the presence of God. The preacher may so present the character of God, and give such living portrayal of his glory, that while listening we may seem to see God. The preacher may so work upon us as to lift us into the conscious presence of the majesty of heaven. The Lord Jesus may be revealed while his minister is showing his death. Under the inspiration of some preacher whose lips had been touched with coals from the altar, men have felt as though God himself did beseech them to be reconciled to him. In prayer and in praise we have not succeeded, perhaps, in getting near to our Lord. But under the awe and pressure of some sermon we have said: How awful is this place. It is no other than the house of God and the very gate of heaven.

It is a great office of preaching to bring God distinctly to view, to dispel our vague conceptions and make us see him as he is. The main scope of the sermon is sometimes the illustration of the divine character, or the vindication of divine providence. The discourse may be a spiritual meditation, the utterance of truths which the Holy Spirit awakens in a thoughtful believer.[1] There is no exhortation,

[1] "There are also discourses, which in form are addressed to an audience, but which nevertheless have this character of meditational flow, such as the

but by the thoughts presented our souls are filled with emotions of reverence and love and praise. We are drawn near to God; the distance between us vanishes; he seems to be dwelling in our hearts; he is with us.

Now this is worship; this being in sensible contact with Christ is worship. And it is doubtful if any other rite so fulfils the prime condition of securing the sensible presence of God to the soul as the preaching of the word secures it. The soul is perhaps in a more devotional frame, more full of love and reverence and thankfulness and joy during the sermon, and flows out towards God in more ardent aspirations, and is offering more hearty vows of service during the sermon, than during any other part of the worship.

The silently-working influence which has brought preaching into the prominence it holds, is because in the new dispensation it is as the word that God has come to men. Under the old economy it was as sovereignty, as law, which employs material symbols, ensigns of authority, and formal demonstrations of power, that the Deity was manifested. Now it is as the word, speaking to the heart and working in the mind and will, as light and love and life, that he comes nigh.

The element of worship in preaching is not as well understood as it should be. The possibility and the necessity of it should be more regarded. It would make changes in the mode of preaching. More of this element is needed; it is the most effective element.

It is not true that we lay most stress on something which is intended as preparatory and introductory to worship; though if this were the object of the sermon, no less stress should be laid on the preaching of the gospel. But no rite in any service fulfils better the essential condition of worship, that of securing the sensible approach of God, than the preaching of the word. Only it should be remarked that, when securing this purpose, the sermon is not

writings of Leighton and Scougal."—J. W. Alexander, Thoughts on Preaching, p. 46.

so much preached to as preached by the body of worshippers. The most effective and true sermon is that which all join in preaching — the thoughts uttered by the minister, inwardly felt and responded to and truly experienced, and made the common expression before God, as the prayer offered by the minister epxresses thesupplications of all.

4. The culminating point of Christian worship is the celebration of the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper. They were instituted under the most solemn circumstances, with express injunctions that the one should be applied to all nations, and that the other should be observed to the end of the world.

The eucharist constitutes the heart of Romish worship, while preaching is thrown into the background. On the other hand, in many of our churches this sacrament is hardly a constituent part of public worship. It comes as an appendix at the close of the service.[1] And baptism is regarded as merely the door of admission to the Lord's supper. The relation of these solemn rites to divine worship does not seem to be justly apprehended.

In upholding and insisting upon certain meanings of the Christian sacraments, we do not maintain that there are no other meanings. One great cause of dispute and of misapprehension is in supposing that they express only one thing or only certain things. Because the Lord's supper is a memorial feast, it does not interfere with its being a symbolical representation of the sacrifice of the Lamb of God. Baptism may be none the less the rite of admission to the church because it is also an act of consecration to the Lord. On the one side the sacraments relate to men; they are tokens of discipleship and bonds of union; they are the marks by which we recognize our mutual relations; they are pledges of communion in life and labor. On the other side,

[1] Dr. J. W. Alexander makes this criticism upon some New England churches: "The absence of a spirit of worship in assemblies is very striking. Communion seasons are brief and perfunctory, and the ordinance is just an addition, as when we baptize a child." — Letters, etc., Vol. II. p. 200, Letter from Newport, 1854.

they relate to God: they are expressions of homage and tenders of service to him, and they are the channels for the communication of grace from him. It is only of this latter aspect, as being that in which they enter into worship specifically, that it is needful to speak.

Of baptism, the first thing to be remarked is:

(1) That this rite is a solemn recognition of God in his most endearing relations, and in his mysterious three-fold manifestation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and thus meets the fundamental idea of worship. It is the most explicit acknowledgment that God is our sovereign, that we belong to him, and owe him service; that he is our Father, our Saviour, and our Comforter. It is a most impressive act of homage and a pledge of fealty and of childlike submission, and a token of recognition of the lordship of Christ over ourselves and those we baptize into his name.

(2) It is a solemn act of consecration of body and soul to the service of God, a symbol of the voluntary giving back to God that which is his. The child baptized is dedicated to the Lord, named with his name, and sealed with his seal. "Into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost," as the true formula is; not as though the minister acted in the name and by the authority of Christ, but as indicating that baptism is into obedience to God, into the sonship and service of God. In the ancient economy vessels intended for the service of God were consecrated by sprinkling with blood; persons were dedicated by this sprinkling. And baptism is one of the most expressive and beautiful symbols by which we signify that we commit to our heavenly Father the charge of our life and the treasures of our love.

(3) A third meaning of baptism is that of a solemn confession of faith in the Lord Jesus and acceptance of his gospel. He instituted the rite, and we perform it because we are his disciples, thus proclaiming with an emphasis beyond language that Jesus is our Master.

(4) And hereby it becomes a token of the reception and

welcome of the Holy Ghost as our renewing Spirit and indwelling life. We are the temples of God, says the apostle. The material structure is consecrated and constituted the dwelling place of God's Spirit by appropriate rites: "Arise, O God, into thy rest; thou and the ark of thy strength." In response to the invocation, the Spirit draws nigh. And in baptism we thus welcome the Lord to abide in our hearts.

(5) As the rite of admission to the visible church little need be said of baptism. Some formal sign seems necessary. Of old it was circumcision. But it should be kept in mind that baptism does not confer or constitute the right of admission. It is simply a recognition of the fact that we are already members. Giving a name to a child is not giving him life, but only recognizing his birth and acknowledging his personality. And baptism is giving a legitimate position within the communion of the church. Baptism presupposes that the person is a Christian, and designates him by his Christian name, and authorizes him to assume it.

While it is the necessary form of admission to the church, this is the least significant part of baptism; and laying so much stress here is like laying stress on the naming of a child. The vital thing in baptism is the recognition of the sovereignty and fatherhood of God and of the redemption and lordship of Christ; the consecration of ourselves to him, and acknowledgment of faith in him, and of the reception of his Spirit.

(6) In a deeper meaning, baptism is the symbol of spiritual regeneration by the Holy Ghost, and of purification by the blood of Jesus. In the other particulars it is expressive of our feelings towards God. In this it is expressive of his feelings towards us. It is an exhibition of his grace and mercy. We are born anew by the Holy Ghost and cleansed from guilt by the blood of the Lamb, and thus become sons of God and heirs of heaven. And baptism is the symbol of the operation of this divine grace. An emblem has been chosen which illustrates the spiritual change.

The Holy Ghost is spoken of as poured upon us, and we are said to be sprinkled with the blood of Christ. And by the application of water this cleansing and new birth are represented.

A great mistake is made in supposing that baptism is the same to all recipients; whereas it does not signify the same to any two persons. Each one has as much meaning in it as it is possible for him to have; how much, depends upon the spiritual capacity of the individual. A child repeats the Lord's prayer as soon as it can speak. It is not the same service to him it is to the mother. He expresses almost nothing; she, almost everything. Because he is a child and does not understand all its significance, shall he not express all he can? And it is not necessary, it is impossible that all the meaning of a sacrament shall be understood in order to receive it. We see more and more in the Lord's supper every time we come to the table, and we never expect to know the whole blessedness of it till we sit down, if by God's grace we are permitted to sit down, in heaven. We are thankful now, as a child of God, to eat the crumbs which fall from the table. And so a child may receive as much of the meaning of baptism as it is capable of receiving. If a parent has consecrated himself, he must give his offspring the same consecration in baptism. The child is yet a part of himself, not severed by birth physically or spiritually, not indeed full born. He continues to be moulded and nurtured, takes shape and growth from the parent, in body and soul, as truly as when unborn. His life is dependent, his spiritual development is in the largest measure through the parent. It is the father's will and thought that direct him.

The only peculiarity of infant baptism is owing to the peculiarity of infants. They are mysterious beings. They have a separate existence, and yet they have not. The parental life flows on in them as it does in the body of the parent, like shoots growing around a tree, springing from the old root and drawing their sap from it, after they appear

above ground, and meantime sending out independent rootlets for their separate life, when they shall be prepared for it. The baptism of the children is a consecration of them in our own behalf, as a new development of our own lives, and as our richest treasure. And there is a higher privilege for those who are wise to know it. Acting for them, we may give them baptism in the highest significance in which we receive it ourselves. As we put the Lord's prayer into their mouths, we may put the Lord's seal upon their foreheads. And when, in maturity, they recognize and confirm it, it has the double sanction of our choice and of their own. For it makes no difference what space of time intervenes, whether moments, hours, or years, between the baptism and the confession of faith. In many churches there is a regular interval of a week between; in all, some moments elapse. The apostles had been baptized, if at all, months before they sat down in the upper chamber. And the act done in childhood, by one appointed of God to act for me in all solemn affairs, when acknowledged and assented to by me in maturity, is as valid and as truly mine as though my consent preceded the act.

The sacrament of the Lord's supper holds even a more distinctive place than baptism in Christian worship.

The fundamental idea of it is to be found in the ancient sacrifices. It represents and gathers up into itself the meaning of the sacrifices of expiation especially, and of the paschal lamb, whose body was broken and eaten at the passover. It is a memorial of many events, and a pledge of union with the Lord and of communion with believers.

(1) In the first place this sacrament is a solemn proclamation of the death of Christ as an atonement for sin. "As oft as ye do this, ye do show the Lord's death till he come." The service is of the nature of a scenic representation of the great sacrifice of the Lamb slain. The emblems are consecrated by special prayer, as the victim was set apart for sacrifice. The bread is broken, as was the body; the wine poured out, as the blood was poured forth. We offer all

before God. By these symbols we show to him the sacrifice in which we trust for the expiation of our sins. We do it in the sight of men, proclaiming that the sacrifice has been made which is our atonement.

Without shedding of blood there is no remission of sin, is the truth for all time. This truth of a sacrificial atonement is perpetuated by these solemn symbols. We do not seek out a spotless lamb for expiation. But the reason is not because a bleeding sacrifice is not a spiritual form of worship; it is spiritual; but because God hath chosen for us a lamb. And we employ these expressive symbols to show this blessed fact. By participating in the sacrament we appropriate to ourselves the atonement. It is a symbolical act of laying our hands upon the lamb as our expiation and of being sprinkled with his blood. Here is the inexpressible value of the service. "Unless ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye have no life in you." This personal participation in the sacrifice, as of a lamb slain, is what is so vital in the sacrament.

(2) The Lord's supper has a second significance as a solemn memorial. "This do in remembrance of me," recalls to mind our Saviour and all he has done; it recalls his teachings and his life. By faith we feed upon the bread which came down from heaven. As bread and wine are incorporated in our bodies, so the life of our Lord, his doctrines, his example, are received by us. We are symbolically united to him, and he enters into us.

This is a special memorial of the scenes of the suffering and death when it was instituted. We are reminded of what our Redeemer has endured in our behalf; of the garden, the hall of judgment, the scourging, and crowning with thorns, and nailing upon the cross.

The passover feast was in memorial of the deliverance from Egypt. The Jew was bidden to tell his children that story, as often as the feast was celebrated. And all the story of our wretchedness and free deliverance is called to mind as often as we partake of our paschal lamb. Of such, and of many other things, it is a great memorial.

(3) And then it is the symbol and pledge of personal discipleship. It is the token and public act of membership in his church. We do it in his name. By eating and drinking at his table we pledge our love and our lives to him. The most solemn sanction was given in the eastern world by breaking bread together. And this is the act by which our membership in the family of our heavenly Father is perpetually declared. It is the children's bread. Our Lord hath spread the feast; we come by his invitation, as his friends; and thus he gives himself to us.

Many lay chief stress on this sacrament as the token of church membership. This is only one, and one of the least significant, of its meanings. As the showing forth of Christ's death, as the self-appropriation of the sacrifice, as the memorial of him and of our redemption, it is more significant.

(4) And then it is a delightful pledge of union with Christ and of communion with believers. One of the most peculiar things in this service is the nearness in which it brings Christ to us. The Romish doctrine of the real presence is an attempt to express this vital fact of the eucharist. But Romanists grasp the shadow and lose the substance. The material body of Jesus was not the Lord. The change of the bread into that body, if such a change were conceivable, would not bring Christ to us. It was not the material body which the apostles shared. It is Jesus Christ present to their knowledge and present to their feelings; Christ conversing with them, and showing himself to their hearts. And we cannot, by preaching or by meditation or by prayer, have such vivid conceptions of a present Saviour, understand him so truly, and have our hearts so drawn out in fulness of worship and of communion as in this hallowed sacrament. "Handle me and see," said the Lord. We are handling the symbols of that which is peculiar, of the sacrifice and of the sufferings and of the life which is imparted.

And this as a feast with friends and kindred in Jesus. The sacrifice of old ended in a feast. The paschal lamb

was eaten. And the fellowship with those who hold the same Saviour is expressed by sitting together in heavenly places; Christ being at the head, and all being brethren.

It is not from undervaluing the two great sacraments, but it is rather unconsciously, that they are sometimes treated as incidental and subordinate, instead of being made the culminating point of divine worship. They are the most solemn recognition of God in his most glorious characteristics and most endearing relations. We offer no such prayer as when we give our lives to him in baptism. There is no such praise as when Christians consecrate their offspring to their Lord. Language cannot frame a doxology so sublime as when body and soul are thus dedicated into the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Our confessions of faith, our repetitions of creed, are as nothing by the side of taking the body broken and the blood shed, and showing them before God and angels and men as our propitiation, in remembrance of the Lord Jesus. The approach of God to men which, as Charnock says, is so essential in worship, is never so realized as at the table of our Lord. This, by eminence, is the communion. The glory which hovered over the holy of holies, the cloud which shadowed the presence of God in the temple, was not so real and intimate and precious a manifestation as Christ promises to those who come up to the feast.

While the four particulars we have named, of prayer and praise, the presentation of offerings, reading the scriptures and preaching, and the celebration of the sacraments, are the essential constituents of Christian worship, it is not meant, as has been said, that each of these must enter into every public service. But care must be taken that in the complete circle of worship each bears its part.

A mistake is often made in judging how largely the devotional element prevails in our churches by looking simply at the services on the Sabbath and in the sanctuary. The predominant element here is perhaps the sermon. But for a right estimate it is necessary to include the services

which are held for almost purely devotional exercises, the prayer-meetings and concerts of prayer. In these "conference meetings," what seems a deficiency in our public worship is so fully supplemented that one may safely say there is a greater preponderance of the elements of worship in our churches than in many churches in which worship is thought by casual observers to be more prominent. Yet it may admit of a question whether it is not desirable to bring something out of our prayer-meetings into the general service of the Sabbath; and whether there are not important parts of public worship which we should do well to make more account of. No instrumentality can be contrived so effective for the spiritual renewing of men as a true and complete service of Christian worship.

Unto him that loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father; to him be glory and dominion forever and ever. Amen.

ARTICLE II.

NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

BY REV. DANIEL T. FISKE, NEWBURYPORT, MASS.

(*Concluded from p.* 512.)

Regeneration.

All Calvinistic divines believe in the necessity of regeneration, i.e. of a radical change of character; and they believe that whenever it takes place, the primary efficient cause is the Holy Spirit. But this doctrine had to a great extent been lost sight of during that deep spiritual declension which prevailed previously to the "great awakening." The fathers of New England theology aimed to restore or give greater prominence to this cardinal truth of the gospel.

In doing so, they were led carefully to consider the *nature* of this great change, and to adopt views in regard to it which should harmonize with their views concerning the nature of holiness and of sin, and the natural ability of the sinner.

If there is a holiness prior to all holy acts of will, or exercises of the heart; and if there is a sinfulness prior to all sinful acts of will, or exercises of heart, then the change from sin to holiness must be an involuntary change, or a moral change in the involuntary disposition of the soul. But if all holiness and sin consist in voluntary exercises, then the change, so far as it is a *moral* change, is a change from sinful exercises to holy exercises. The latter is the doctrine of New England theology. As it makes all sinful depravity consist in a wrong will, a fixed evil purpose, an active evil disposition, so it makes regeneration, in so far as it is moral or implies a change of character, to consist in a change of will, purpose, inclination, from evil to good. But, as we find in the works of Edwards and some of his followers expressions which seem inconsistent with the principle that all sin is voluntary, so we find expressions which seem to teach that regeneration consists in imparting to the soul a new spiritual taste, relish, or principle, which is prior to, and which lays a foundation for, holy voluntary exercises. But they do not say that this change, considered as distinct from all the exercises which it precedes and occasions, is a *moral* change; and that the involuntary taste and disposition which is imparted or inwrought by the Spirit is in itself holy; but imply the contrary. Thus Edwards, in his Treatise on the Religious Affections, says: "This new spiritual sense, and the new dispositions that attend it, are no new faculties, but are new principles of nature. I use the word principles for want of a word of a more determinate signification. By a principle of nature, in this place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any particular manner or kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul. So this new spiritual

sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but it is a new foundation laid, in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding. So the new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of will."[1] But this foundation for new exercises of the understanding cannot be holy, for such exercises themselves, viewed as distinct from the heart or will, have no moral character. And if the foundation which consists in a "*new sense*" be not holy, why is the foundation which consists in a new *disposition* holy? Such a disposition is the mere cause or occasion of exercises of the will; and it is a fundamental principle of Edwards that the holiness or sin of all volitions or voluntary exercises lies in their *nature*, and not in their *cause*, whether that cause be a new disposition or a new sense, or God himself. Bellamy says we need to be "effectually awakened" by the Spirit to attend to the manifestations which God has made of himself in his works and word, and to have "imparted to us a spiritual taste," that we may have a sense of his infinite glory, "For these two will lay an effectual foundation in our hearts for that love which the law requires."[2] But *all* holiness he affirms consists in that love which the law requires, and of course does not, in any degree, consist in any *foundation* for love, whether laid originally in our nature by creation, or subsequently by regeneration. He does indeed call this foundation a "holy principle," but it is not holy in any such sense as constitutes fitness for heaven; for he says that the promises of the gospel are not made to it "passively considered, but to its acts and exercises; and to the objection that, if a person to whom this holy principle has been given, should die before it had been exercised in believing, he would not be saved; he replies, that such will never be the case; that God will preserve all to whom he gives this

[1] Treatise on the Affections, Part III.
[2] Works, Vol. II. p. 49.

principle, till it is actually exercised in that faith to which the gospel promises are made; thus virtually conceding the point that this principle, which is the foundation of holy exercises, does not, apart from those exercises, and "passively considered," involve any degree of true and saving holiness.[1] Hopkins, whom no one can suspect of believing in the possibility of any holiness or sin which does not consist in voluntary exercises, occasionally employs expressions similar to those used by Bellamy and Edwards. He speaks of a "good taste, temper, or disposition," which the Spirit begets in regeneration, and which "lays a foundation for holy exercises of heart." What this taste or disposition, which is antecedent to all right exercises, is, he says, "it is perhaps impossible to form any distinct and clear idea," but thinks that "it may be resolved into a constitution or law of nature."[2] But this "taste," or "law of nature," in itself, and viewed as separate from the exercises of which it is the foundation, involves no holiness, is no improvement of *moral character*, and does not commend the subject of it to the divine approbation, nor entitle it to the promises of the gospel which are made to those who have any, even the least degree of, holiness of heart. It is no compliance with the conditions of salvation; for these are holy exercises. If persons having it should die before putting forth holy exercises (which will never actually occur), they would die in an unpardoned and unjustified state.[3] By "law of nature," Hopkins seems to mean just what those philosophers do who define it as "an established and uniform mode of divine operation." This "divine operation" may be with or without the intervention of secondary causes. Dr. Emmons has generally been supposed to teach that it was without any secondary causes, a direct exertion of divine power, producing holy exercises instead of sinful exercises. He repeatedly affirms that in regeneration "the Holy Spirit produces only love or holy exercises." "Not a new taste

[1] Works, Vol. II. p. 634.
[2] Works, Vol. I. p. 553.
[3] Works, Vol. III. p. 564.

or relish or disposition or principle, but love and nothing previous to it, or the foundation of it."[1] But he was controverting the views of those who held to a *holy* taste antecedent to holy exercises. Such a taste, he argues on true Edwardean principles, there cannot be; for it would be the love of complacency; and the love of complacency cannot, in the nature of things, be an antecedent to the love of benevolence. "Benevolence will produce complacence; but complacence will not produce benevolence."[2] Whether he held to an *involuntary* taste or disposition which is not itself holy, but through which God produces holy exercises, is not certain. He emphasized the divine agency, and was jealous of allowing anything to come between it and those holy exercises which it produced. So much was this the case, that many have understood him to deny, not only any change in the nature of the soul, i.e. in its taste or disposition or life, prior to the production of holy exercises, but also the existence of the soul itself, as an entity, distinct from its exercises. But his last biographer declares this opinion to be incorrect; and attempts to show that Dr. Emmons did believe that the soul was something more than "a bundle of exercises," that he did believe in "the reality of second causes," in "the laws and forces of nature," but chose to say little of these, lest he should withdraw attention from divine, sovereign efficiency.[3] If this view be correct, then it is possible, yea probable, if not certain, that Emmons agreed precisely with Hopkins and Bellamy and Edwards in believing that the Holy Spirit, in regeneration, produces, not holy exercises of heart only and immediately, but also a change in the state or nature of the soul, which change gives to it a taste or principle, which taste or principle is not in itself holy, but is "a constitution or law of nature"; which "law of nature" is only "an established mode of the divine operation" in producing holy exercises. And this is the view which has been gen-

[1] Works, Vol. V., Sermon 51. [2] Works, Vol. V., Sermon 51.
[3] Prof. Park's Memoir of Dr. Emmons, pp. 385–387, 417–420.

erally adopted by those who represent New England theology. Some, on the one hand, have indeed, denied or seemed to deny, that there is any change of nature prior to moral action ; while, on the other hand, some have not only held to the reality of such a change, but have regarded it as holy and morally praiseworthy. But the generally received doctrine has been that the great change involves two things : a change of nature, i. e. a change in the disposal or adjustment of the natural powers and susceptibilities of the soul; and a change in the moral exercises or acts of the soul, consequent on this change of nature. This whole change, taken comprehensively, is to be attributed to the Holy Spirit, as its primary, efficient cause.

To the question, "*Is the sinner passive or active in regeneration?*" the answer of New England theology varies, according as the term "regeneration" is used in a broader or narrower sense. Usage is not uniform as to the meaning of the word. If regeneration is used to denote *the act* of God, which is the primary cause of the change, as it sometimes, though not often, is, then man is neither active nor passive in it. If it be used to denote that change of nature in man which is prior to all holy action on his part, then he is wholly passive in it. In this sense it is distinguished from conversion. The distinction is not always formally made. The terms "regeneration" and "conversion" are used interchangeably by Edwards, Emmons, and others. Hopkins carefully distinguished between them, confining regeneration to the change of nature which precedes choice and action, and conversion to the choice and action which follows that change. Generally this school of divines has, either expressly or by implication, recognized this distinction. In this change of nature, the sinner is not active, is not required to be, cannot be, but is wholly passive. But if the term "regeneration" be used, as it often is, to denote the whole complex change, a change of exercises as well as change of nature, conversion in the restricted sense, as well as regeneration in the restricted sense, then the sub-

ject of it is both active and passive. He is passive in the change of nature; and passive also as a recipient of those influences of the Spirit, which indirectly through a change of nature, and then directly, cause him to act aright. But in those exercises in which the change as a *moral* change consists, the regenerated man is active. He acts while and because he is acted upon. Thus Dr. Hopkins says: "So far as the Spirit of God is the cause or agent, the subject, the heart of man, is passive, being the subject on which or in which the effect is wrought. Though the effect be activity or the exercise of the new heart, in which the renewed person is the agent, yet in the operation which causes the effect to exist, and therefore in the order of nature is antecedent to the effect, the Spirit of God is the only agent and man is the passive subject."[1] Here, the only effect of the Spirit's operation spoken of is the soul's activity; no allusion being made to any change of nature prior to activity. And so far as the change is a change of moral exercises, the soul is active in it, and passive only in the same sense in which it is always passive, when influenced to act by motives or otherwise. Hence Hopkins not only teaches that man ought to renew his own heart, and has the natural ability to do so without the regenerating influences of the Spirit, but actually does renew his own heart under the operations of the Spirit. "Whenever and wherever God gives a new heart, the man makes himself a new heart, in that agency and those exercises in which a new heart consists. He renews and cleanses his own heart, circumcises it, by turning from sin to God." "The sinner's heart cannot be made a clean heart by the divine agency in any other way but by the sinner's cleansing his own heart; because a clean heart consists in those exercises of the man in which he does cleanse his own heart."[2] In very similar terms does Dr. Emmons speak of the sinner's activity in the change. "If the making of a new heart

[1] Works, Vol. I. p. 367. See also Vol. III. p. 554.
[2] Works, Vol. I. p. 138.

consists in the exercising of holy instead of unholy affections, then sinners are not *passive* but *active* in regeneration." "It has been the common opinion of Calvinists that a new heart consists in a new taste, disposition, or principle, which is prior to and the foundation of all holy exercises. And this idea of a new heart has led them to suppose that sinners are entirely passive in regeneration. But if a new heart consist in holy exercises, then sinners may be as active in regeneration as in conversion. Though it be true that the divine agency is concerned in the renovation of the heart, yet this does by no means destroy the activity of sinners. Their activity, in all cases, is owing to a divine operation on their minds."[1]

We must, then, first determine in what sense divines of this school use the term "regeneration," before we can know in what sense and to what extent they regard the sinner as active, and in what sense and to what extent as passive, in the change. They all agree, however, in denying that the sinner is passive in the sense that he passively receives a nature which, irrespective of all voluntary exercises is holy, in the place of a nature which, irrespective of all voluntary exercises, was sinful; and they all agree in teaching that the sinner cannot have a new, holy heart without himself actively putting forth those holy affections in which a new heart consists; and they all agree in teaching that he never does, though he has natural ability to, put forth those holy affections, except under the special influences of the Holy Spirit.

Does the Holy Spirit, in regeneration, act directly on the soul, or by means of the truth? If regeneration be used in the comprehensive sense, then all New England theologians would agree in saying God regenerates the soul by means of the truth, for holy exercises are holy choices, and choice always implies motive. "It is out of the power of Deity, therefore, to oblige men to act, without making them willing to act in the view of motives. Accordingly, when

[1] Works, Vol. V. Sermon 52.

he works in us to will and to do, he first exhibits motives before our minds, and then excites us to act voluntarily in view of the motives exhibited." [1]

If regeneration be used in the restricted sense, to denote the change of nature which precedes choice, then in effecting it the Spirit acts, first, directly, to excite attention to the truth, then makes the truth the means of exciting the sensibility, and then through the sensibilities causes the will to act in view of the truth. Edwards represents God as acting in the first place directly on the soul, communicating a "new perception or sense" of the truth, and then, through this, acting to excite the will or heart to put forth "gracious affections."[2] Hopkins says the change in this restricted sense is "wrought by the Spirit of God immediately," and "is not effected by any medium or means whatsoever;" "light and truth, or the word of God, is not in any degree a means by which this change is effected." Still he holds that "means are necessary to be used to prepare persons for regeneration." "Speculative knowledge" of the truths of revelation, "attention of mind to them," and such a sense of heart of them as an unregenerate sinner is capable of, are necessary to prepare a person to act when regenerated. Means are also "absolutely necessary in order to any exercise of the new heart," for there can be no holy voluntary exercise at any time unless there is truth before the mind as an objective motive.[3]

But he does not mean that the agency of the Spirit is confined to the presentation of the truth either before or after regeneration. The influence of the truth is necessary to voluntary action, but alone does not secure it. The Spirit acts directly to cause the sinner not only to attend to and perceive the truth, but also to yield to it or act in view of it. Hence Dr. Emmons, who said little or nothing about a change of nature, and much about a change of exercises in

[1] Dr. Emmons's Works, Vol. IV. p. 351.
[2] Treatise on the Affections, Part III.
[3] Works, Vol. III. p. 570, 571.

regeneration, declares that "no means nor motives are sufficient to produce benevolence in the heart of a totally selfish sinner," and that "accordingly the sacred writers uniformly ascribe regeneration to the immediate efficiency of a divine influence."[1] The manifest aim of these divines in their treatment of this subject, was to exalt the agency of God as the primary efficient cause of the comprehensive change, without excluding either the voluntary agency of the subject of it, or the instrumental agency of the truth. Perhaps the following general statement would be assented to by most or all of those who have adopted the leading views of these eminent divines on this vital article of religious faith. In regenerating men, God in some respects acts directly and immediately on the soul, and in some respects he acts in connection with and by means of the truth. He does not regenerate them by the truth alone, and he does not regenerate them without the truth. His mediate and his immediate influences cannot be distinguished by consciousness, nor can their respective spheres be accurately determined by reason.

Atonement.

As to "substance of doctrine," the New England theology is thoroughly Calvinistic on the atonement; but adopts a theory or philosophy of the atonement differing in some important particulars from that generally held by the old Calvinistic divines. That the atonement was necessary, that it has an efficacy God-ward as well as man-ward; that it is vicarious, i.e. is substituted for deserved penalty, and that it is the ground of pardon and salvation to all who are saved, are points in which the "new divinity" is in entire agreement on this subject with the old. But questions like these: Why was the atonement necessary? What is its nature? What its design? What its extent? suggest points of difference between the old theory and the new. The early fathers of New England theology, Edwards, Bellamy, and

[1] Works, Vol. V., Sermon 54.

Hopkins, did less directly towards developing and shaping those peculiar views on the atonement which have been held by their successors, than they did towards developing other parts of the system. In general they adopted both the views and favorite expressions of the old Calvinists on this subject. The atonement was not assailed in their day, so much as other doctrines were, nor so much as it was subsequently; hence they were not driven to any thorough original investigations in its defence. Their strength was mainly expended in defending those other parts of the evangelical system, which subtle errorists were then seeking to undermine. Still, the germs of the new theory are contained in their views of holiness and sin, and of natural ability and of divine sovereignty. And the general spirit and drift of their theological inquiries was away from the old and towards the new mode of stating and defending the doctrine of the atonement. The school which they founded, only carried out consistently to their logical results, and applied to this subject, certain great principles which they had elaborated and taught. But it was to the second generation of divines of this school that we are indebted for the formal, scientific statement of the New England doctrine of the atonement. The younger Edwards, Smalley, Dwight, Griffin, and Emmons, though not entirely agreed among themselves, have contributed more, perhaps, than any others to elucidate this doctrine, and set it in harmonious relations to other parts of the system to which it logically belongs. The more important features of the doctrine of atonement received and taught by this class of theologians, may perhaps be sufficiently indicated by showing how they answer two inquiries, viz. What is the *nature* of the atonement? and, What is the *design* of the atonement?

I. What is the nature of the atonement, or in what does it consist? It consists in the sufferings and death of Christ, and not in his holy life, i.e. in his passive and not in his active obedience. The old doctrine is, that the atonement consists both in the active and passive obedience. The new

doctrine confines the atonement to the latter, and makes it consist wholly in Christ's suffering. His active obedience was inseparably connected with, and an indispensable condition of, the atonement, but no part of it. "The atonement of Christ not only did not consist *essentially* in his *active obedience*, but his active obedience was *no part* of his atonement properly so called, nor essential to it."[1] "His [Christ's] obedience made no part of his atonement; it was only a prerequisite to qualify him to make it by his death."[2] This is one of the points of the new theory which Hopkins adopted. He says: "On the whole, the scripture represents the atonement which Christ has made, by which sinners are delivered from the curse of the law, — the wrath to come, — to consist wholly in his suffering unto death for their sins." "The obedience of Christ, though most excellent and meritorious, is not an atonement for the sins of men, or really any part of it."[3]

The active obedience of Christ answered many useful ends, and was an important part of his mediatorial work; but it did not in the least degree atone for sin.

II. What was the *design* of the atonement?

(*a*) It was not designed to satisfy *distributive justice*. According to the old theory, the distributive justice of God demands the punishment of the sinner; and that demand is met and satisfied by the infliction of the deserved punishment on Christ instead of the sinner. The advocates of the new theory say: "Distributive justice is not at all satisfied by the death of Christ." "If distributive justice were satisfied, it would have no further claim on the sinner; and to punish him when this kind of justice has no claim on him, is to treat him more unfavorably and severely than his personal character deserves."[4] "Though he [Christ] suffered in our stead, yet he did not suffer the punishment which we

[1] Dr. Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 41.
[2] Dr. Emmons's Works, Vol. V. p. 33.
[3] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 328.
[4] Dr. Edwards's Works, Vol. I. pp. 47, 48.

deserved, and which the law threatens us." "His sufferings were no punishment, much less our punishment." "Nothing, therefore, that Christ did or suffered here on earth can satisfy God's distributive justice, or pay the debt of suffering which we owe him."[1] "It follows from the foregoing reasonings, that the sufferings of Christ are not a literal satisfaction of law and justice, even in behalf of believers, much less in behalf of the unregenerate."[2]

(*b*) The atonement was designed to satisfy the *general justice* of God. General justice "comprehends all goodness." "In this sense, whatever is *right* is said to be just, or an act of justice; and whatever is *wrong* or improper to be done, is said to be *unjust*, or an act of injustice. To practise justice in this sense, is to practise agreeably to the dictates of general benevolence, or to seek the glory of God and the good of the universe."[3] This general justice or rectitude of God, which is that love in which all holiness primarily consists, prompts him to do what is fit and proper, and promotive of the highest good of the universe, including himself and all his creatures. The atonement was a provision or expedient, originating with and adopted by general justice, and therefore satisfactory to it, for promoting the highest good. It was a means to an end, and that end is the same which God has in view in all that he does.

But *how* does the atonement satisfy general justice? By being a substitute for the penalty of the law. The penalty was annexed to the law to answer certain ends. These ends are answered by the atonement. It was designed to take the place of penalty in regard to them. "The atonement is the substitute for the punishment threatened in the law; and was designed to answer the same ends of supporting the authority of law, the dignity of the divine moral government, and the consistency of the divine conduct in legislation and execution."[4] It was designed to be, not

[1] Dr. Emmons's Works, Vol. V. p. 32.
[2] Griffin on the Atonement, Part I., Chap. 7.
[3] Dr. Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 29.
[4] Dr. Edwards's Works, Vol. I. p. 17.

penalty, but a substitute for penalty; not punishment, but sufferings equivalent to punishment, i.e. equivalent in respect to the ultimate end of punishment, viz. the good of the universe through the support of law and government. The *immediate* end of punishment, viz. the satisfaction of distributive justice, is not answered, nor was designed to be answered, by the atonement, for this is impossible except by the punishment of the sinner himself; but the ultimate end of punishment, which is the ultimate end of all that God does, is answered by the atonement as well, or better, than it would have been answered by the infliction of punishment on the guilty. It is one of the fundamental principles of New England theology, as we have seen, that all virtue is resolvable into love, and hence that all the moral attributes of God are only so many different modifications or forms of love; and hence, that love is the controlling principle of action in all that he does; actuating him alike in creating and in governing the universe, in executing justice and in showing mercy, in punishing and in forgiving; in annexing the penalty to his law, and in providing an atonement as a substitute for that penalty. If distributive justice were the divine attribute to which all others are subordinate; or if it were an independent attribute not resolvable into love, nor subordinate to love, then the atonement, instead of being a substitute for penalty, must have been literal penalty, and instead of being a designed means of promoting the good of the universe, must have been only a designed means of expressing or exercising distributive justice; such exercise of justice being an ultimate end in itself. But by making distributive justice only a form of general justice, and resolving all holiness into love, New England divines hold that distributive justice exercised in the infliction of penalty, not being an ultimate end in itself, but only a designed means to an ultimate end, viz. the good of the universe, may be dispensed with, if anything can be substituted for it equally efficacious in sustaining law and government, and thus securing the good of the universe. The atonement, they believe, *is* such

a substitute, its *immediate* design being the same as that of threatened penalty, viz. the vindication of law, and support of government; its *ultimate* design being the highest good of the universe. But the atonement was not designed to promote the highest good of the universe directly, but indirectly, by what it should enable God consistently to do in consequence of it. First, by rendering it consistent for God to offer pardon and salvation to all men, thus rendering the salvation of all men possible. Without an atonement it would have been inconsistent for God to offer salvation to any, because he could not save any, even if they were penitent. But he does offer salvation to all; and it was the design of the atonement to render it proper and consistent for him to make this offer; and, in this sense, the atonement was general, designed for all, and not limited or designed for the elect only. It is not only sufficient for all, but was intended for all. Thus even Dr. Bellamy says: "And God has expressly declared that it was the design of Christ's death to open the door of mercy to all." "And, indeed, was not the door of mercy opened to all indefinitely, how could God sincerely offer mercy to all; or heartily invite all?"[1] Dr. Hopkins used similar language.[2]

The successors of these men reaffirm and emphasize their views on this point. Dr. Emmons says: "The atonement of Christ has the same favorable aspect upon the non-elect as upon the elect. It opens as wide a door of mercy to the one as to the other. It removes all natural obstacles out of the way of the salvation of either, because it renders it consistent with the justice of God to pardon and save a part or the whole of mankind, according to his sovereign pleasure and eternal purpose. The atonement of Christ has laid God under no obligation to save one of mankind, but left him at liberty to save a part or the whole of the human race. It is generally believed that God does, in the gospel, offer salvation to all; but how can he consistently offer salvation to

[1] Works, Vol. I. pp. 292, 294.

[2] Works, Vol. III. pp. 565, 566.

all, if Christ has not made atonement for all?"[1] Dr. Griffin asks: "What do we mean by *for*, when we say that the atonement was *for* all?" and answers: "We mean four things: 1. That in its actual influence it changes the relations which all, as moral agents, sustained to the divine law. 2. That it thus became, in relation to all who hear the gospel, a provision for moral agents and a real privilege. 3. That the provision and privilege were purposely intended for all. 4. That the atonement was expressly offered to all."[2] This design of the atonement to render the salvation of all men possible, and so render the offer of salvation to all consistent and proper, is the more readily admitted by these divines, because they hold to the doctrine of natural ability. If sinners could not accept the atonement, it could not properly be said to be for them; and the offer of it to all would be only a mockery. Sincere offers of salvation to all imply that all have natural ability to accept the offer; and if the offer be based on the atonement, and could not consistently be made without it, then the atonement rendered, and was designed to render, it consistent for God to make the offers of salvation to all men. Thus reason the men who believe the atonement is not penalty, but a substitute for penalty; designed to answer the same end for which penalty was threatened.

Secondly. The atonement was designed to promote the highest good of the universe by rendering it consistent for God not only to offer salvation to all, but also, by his Spirit to lead to repentance, and so actually save those whom he has chosen unto eternal life. In other words, the atonement was designed so to answer certain governmental ends as to render it consistent for God to regenerate and save those whom he, having the highest good of the universe in view, had elected to salvation. When it is said that the atonement was designed for all, but was designed to be actually applied only to the elect, the meaning is that it has,

[1] Dr. Emmons's Works, Vol. V. p. 23.
[2] Treatise on the Atonement, Part II., Chap. 19.

and was designed to have, such an efficacy that God can be just to himself and to the universe in promising salvation to all who will repent, while he can be just to himself and to the universe in giving repentance to those, and only to those, whom, in the exercise of sovereign love, he has purposed to save. The atonement is not the reason why he elects a definite number of the race, and no more and no less. His purpose of election is an exercise of that same benevolent sovereignty which always has in view as an ultimate end the good of the universe. The atonement enables him to execute that purpose without sacrificing that end. So that in providing an atonement for all, and applying it to the actual salvation of the elect, he acts simply as a sovereign, subject only to the law of love, having always one and the same great end in view, the highest welfare of the universe. It was by exalting the sovereignty of God in connection with the atonement, and by insisting that acts of sovereignty are acts of that love, which is the essence of all virtue, and by showing what was the ultimate end of God in creation, that Edwards, Bellamy, and Hopkins prepared the way for that theory of the atonement which now holds a recognized place in New England theology.

Decrees.

No theologians have given greater prominence to the sovereignty of God than those whose views we are endeavoring to set forth. One of the standing objections against them has been that they wrote and preached of nothing else; but the truth is, they gave this prominence to God's sovereignty because they held so firmly to those principles which secure man's freedom and responsibility. Their doctrine of the nature of sin and of natural ability made it safe for them to exalt sovereignty.

They accepted the ordinary statement of the doctrine of decrees found in the old Calvinistic symbols. Their only peculiarity in treating the doctrine lies in their method of meeting the objections brought against it. These ob-

jections refer to the relation of decrees to the existence of sin.

1. It is objected that it is inconsistent with the character of God to decree the existence of sin. Being in its very nature an evil, and infinitely hateful, how can a holy and benevolent God make its existence the subject of his immutable decrees? To meet this objection, it was natural for these divines who resolve all virtue into benevolence, and so make the highest good of the universe the ultimate end of God in creation, to take the ground that God decrees sin because it is the necessary means of the greatest good. It is consistent with the whole spirit of his system for Dr. Hopkins to say: "It is abundantly evident and demonstrably certain from reason assisted by revelation, that all the sin and suffering which have taken place, or ever will, are necessary for the greatest good of the universe, and to answer the wisest and best ends, and therefore must be included in the best and most wise and perfect plan."[1] Similar language is employed by most of the early fathers of New England theology. But they did not mean that sin is the direct and efficient means of the greatest good, but only that it is the occasion for God so to work as to secure the highest good. He does not decree the non-existence of sin, because the execution of such a decree would require action on his part inconsistent with the highest good. Hence he decrees the existence of sin rather than its prevention. It is better for the universe that sin should exist and be held in check and overruled, than that there should be such a change in the present system as would be necessary to prevent its existence. And as the benevolence of God moves him to decree what is for the highest good, he decrees to permit rather than prevent sin, so that its existence, viewed as decreed, proves rather than disproves his perfect benevolence. As Edwards says: "God does not will sin absolutely; but rather than alter the law of nature and the nature of free agents, he wills it. He wills

[1] Works, Vol. I. p. 90.

what is contrary to excellency in some particulars, for the sake of a more general excellency and order."[1]

Most divines of this school at the present day are not satisfied with the formula that "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good," though holding substantially the doctrine which it was intended to express. They would not say that sin is literally "necessary," nor that it is, strictly speaking, the "means" of good. It is for the best that sin exist, only in the sense that the non-prevention of it by God is for the best. His decree that it exist, is better than would be a decree to do what would be necessary to prevent it. He does not decree it because he prefers it to holiness in its stead, but because he prefers it to such a change in the system as would secure holiness in its stead.

Some New England divines have preferred to meet this objection against decrees, by the hypothesis that it *may be* God could not prevent sin in a moral system. This view, however, has not been generally accepted. If the statement were, that God could not prevent sin in the *best* moral system, it would be substantially the same as that given above, since he has decreed the best system, and this includes the permission of sin; therefore a change in this system which should prevent sin would make it another and an inferior system.

2. It is objected to the doctrine of divine decrees, that it is inconsistent with man's free moral agency. To this objection it is replied: (*a*) That the freedom of every moral act is as much decreed as the act itself.[2] God decrees that men shall act freely in whatever they do. (*b*) That there is nothing in the nature of decrees while unexecuted "to influence the actions of men, any more than if they did not exist."[3] If in any way they interfere with human freedom, it must be in the mode of their execution; i.e. in the divine agency consequent on the divine decrees. But whatever influence God exerts upon men in fulfilling his

[1] Works, Vol. II. p. 516. [2] Hopkins's Works, Vol. II. p. 88.
[3] Dr. Emmons's Works, Vol. IV. pp. 294.

decrees, whether directly by his Spirit, or indirectly by motives, our consciousness testifies to no interference with our freedom. We are conscious of no irresistible force necessitating our action. We have natural power to resist the influences to which we yield, and always feel that we act freely, whether we yield or resist. The divine agency, executing the divine decrees, may render moral actions *certain* without rendering them *necessary*. Certainty is consistent with freedom, else prophecy and foreknowledge were impossible. Men are not compelled to do what they certainly will do, and they can do what they certainly will not do. They act as freely as if there were no certainty in the case.[1] If the divine decrees were supposed, either in themselves or in their execution, to deprive men of power to act otherwise than as they do act, the objection that they destroy freedom would seem valid; but the doctrine of natural ability as held by these divines enabled them to turn the force of this objection. They would not all care to say, with Dr. Emmons, that "men always have natural power to frustrate those divine decrees which they are appointed to fulfil."[2] But the truth thus paradoxically stated they deem essential to a right conception of the doctrine of decrees, and to a successful vindication of it against the objections urged by Arminians and infidels.

There are several other Christian doctrines which have been treated in a peculiar manner by this school of New England divines; but as the peculiarities of views adopted in regard to them are less important than those already considered, and have less vital relations to the whole Calvinistic system, and as this Article is already unduly extended, no mention is here made of them.

Our aim has been historical rather than controversial, — to exhibit rather than defend or combat a peculiar system of theology, or rather a peculiar type of Calvinistic theology. In conclusion, we can but express the conviction that no

[1] Hopkins's Works, Vol. I. p. 76.
[2] Dr. Emmons's Works, Vol. IV. p. 304.

man can make himself familiar with this New England theology, its origin and history, without entertaining a profound respect for the piety and ability of many of those men whose names are intimately associated with it, however much and earnestly he may dissent from the peculiar views which they adopted.

ARTICLE III.

LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THEODORE PARKER.[1]

BY REV. HEMAN LINCOLN, D.D., PROVIDENCE, R. I.

NEWTON, an English painter of celebrity in the last generation, paid a professional visit to the United States, extending through several months. Much of this time was spent in Boston. On his return to England a London cockney undertook to condole with him on his long exile from good society. "Sir," was the indignant reply of the artist, "I met such people in Boston *every day* as I should be glad to meet here *occasionally*." The compliment was a generous one from an Englishman, but strictly just, as any one familiar with Boston society at the close of the last century can testify. The recent Memoirs of Choate and Prescott and Parker indicate that Boston has lost none of its celebrity in our generation. They moved in different social circles. They rarely met each other in private life, nor did they have mutual friends. But each of them had a large circle of friends of generous aims and high culture, in whose companionship they sought mental refreshment and stimulus. Three such men in a single city (in which Webster and Everett and Wendell Phillips were contemporaries) silence the sneers of foreign critics that American life is too young and

[1] Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker, Minister of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society, Boston. By John Weiss. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1864.

raw to nurture scholars of broad learning and ripe wisdom. We may challenge England to name from the living citizens of its great metropolis, or from the recent dead, three men of equal enthusiasm and conscientiousness in study, and as intimately connected with the life of their age.

Mr. Parker claims precedence among the three in mental and moral greatness. We should not have conceded this in his life-time, but the new light thrown upon his character by the correspondence published in these volumes constrains us to make the award. Mr. Choate had more genius; a keener insight, by intuition, into men and books; an imagination of imperial sweep; a subtile magnetism, flowing from heart or brain, to take individuals captive, or sway bodies of men at will; but with the gifts of genius he had more of its eccentricities and faults, a lower type of conscience, less sincerity of character, more selfish aims, and less sympathy with his race and the philanthropic movements of the age. Mr. Prescott was more exact in scholarship, more amiable in character, more humane in judgment, a more genial and lovable man; but, in spite of uniform cheerfulness in misfortune, and a devotion to literature under discouragements which would have chilled the enthusiasm of ordinary men, there was much of the Sybarite in his life, a cliquish narrowness in friendships, and an indifference to social and moral reforms which forbid the highest praise. Mr. Parker united the enthusiasm of the scholar with the unselfishness of the reformer. He touched life at every point, and sympathized with it everywhere. There was scarcely a department of knowledge his curiosity did not explore, nor a sphere of life into which his love of man did not lead him. He was a scholar of generous aims and large attainments, but the scholar was subordinate to the man; and if his mischievous theology is put out of sight, our generation furnishes no better type of the vigorous and many-sided life of New England, or of its broad philanthropies than Theodore Parker.

We wish it were possible to give honest praise to the

biographer. But we cannot. He seems vainer than Boswell, in playing the satellite to a great man; but has none of the true hero-worship which makes Boswell's Life of Johnson the best biography in the English language. He is evidently thinking quite as much of himself as of his hero, and uses Mr. Parker as a kite to hang a long string of gay-colored and worthless bobs on, for the admiration of the public. The reader is divided between pity at his ignorance of men, and contempt for his superciliousness; and is tempted to use, on almost every page, the criticism of the impatient Scotch hearer: "Prick him, prick him; he's unco' windy."

The arrangement of the volumes is bad, rejecting the chronological order in the general plan and in the separate chapters. He apologizes for this course by the plea that Mr. Parker's life was of extraordinary richness, and there was danger of confusing the subjects in which he was interested. But this plea only indicates a mechanical view of biography. What readers want is the unity of the man; they care nothing about a unity of subjects. They wish to see the natural development of Mr. Parker's personality and life. Amateurs often make artificial divisions in science, as a fancied help to study, but the great masters teach that the simplest classification conforms to the divine order in creation. The best biographers follow the divine order in Providence, and unfold the natural growth of the man in knowledge and character and influence.

His spirit is bad, with little reverence or humility or charity. He shows neither depth of manhood to comprehend Mr. Parker, nor breadth to understand his opponents; and a mixture of flippancy and abuse seems to constitute his ideal of earnestness. Mr. Parker indulged in great freedom of criticism in his familiar correspondence, but in the last year of life begged all his friends, "to erase from my letters everything which would wound the feelings of any one, should it meet an eye it was not meant for. In the flush and fun of letter-writing I may have said what would

one day give needless pain, should some *prying* eye see it, and some busy tongue prattle thereof" (II. 264). It is commonly taken for granted that a biographer will pay a decent regard to the wishes of a departed friend. But Mr. Weiss has "the prying eye" and "the busy tongue" which Mr. Parker deprecated, and has inserted scores of allusions to living men which a refined feeling would instinctively omit. These are great blemishes in the volume, and will keep open running sores which time and the grave ought to have healed.

Mr. Weiss's style is often inconceivably bad, a sort of amalgam of Hervey's floridness and Rousseau's garrulosity and Jean Paul's pyrotechnic flights. Its effect is the worse from the contrast with Mr. Parker's simplicity and directness. In passing from one to the other a pure taste is shocked, as if the daub of a village painter were hung by the side of a work from one of the great masters.

It may occur to many a reader to ask if the spirit of the biographer is not a natural result of Mr. Parker's teachings. Mr. Parker himself was trained in a different school, and his manly virtues sprung from a better stock. But a want of reverence for the Bible was his chief vice, and the flower has run to seed in Mr. Weiss, in a want of reverence for everything good and noble, and a dim insight into the character of earnest men whose views differ from his own. If the tree is known by its fruits, and Mr. Weiss is a legitimate shoot from Mr. Parker's system, we may comfort ourselves that the system will be short-lived; it will soon consist only of broken branches, which men cast into the fire and they are burned. It is a relief to pass from the biographer to the subject of his work.

Theodore Parker was born at Lexington, Mass., Aug. 24, 1810, and was the youngest of eleven children, all but one of whom he outlived. He was descended from a hardy stock, vigorous in frame, of great tenacity of life and strongly marked individualism of character. Most of his ancestors, on both sides, lived beyond eighty years, but consumption entered his father's family, as he thought, from

the location of their house near a large and spongy meadow, and the mother and nine of the eleven children were victims to this disease. Some of the male ancestry on the father's side were noted as independent thinkers and energetic citizens, filling important positions in social life. One was at the siege of Louisburg. Another commanded the company fired on by the British on Lexington Common, and was at Bunker Hill, though prevented by ill health from taking any part in the battle. One only in the whole line of his father's ancestry, so far as is known, was connected with the church, and he through the influence of a pious wife. His hostility to the church, therefore, may be regarded as an inherited trait.

Parental qualities re-appeared in the child. His father had a fondness for "metaphysics, psychology, and all departments of intellectual and moral philosophy, excelled in the mathematics," was a good talker, and full of frivolity and fun. He was an independent thinker, and had an utter hatred of Paley and Jonathan Edwards, and of Calvinists generally. Of his mother he says: "She was eminently a religious woman. I have known few in whom the religious instincts were so active and so profound, and who seemed to me to enjoy so completely the life of God in the soul of man. To her the Deity was an omnipresent Father, filling every point of space with his beautiful and loving presence. She took a deep and still delight in silent prayer. Of course it was chiefly the more spiritual parts of the Old and New Testaments that formed her favorite reading; the dark theology of the times seems not to have blackened her soul at all." The germ of the future man may be seen in the child, in a strange blending of opposite qualities, found in no other character we can recall in history, but inherited from his parents, or impressed in early years by parental training and example. We see in him the inordinate love of reading and talking of the father, the disbelief of the miracles, the hatred of Calvinism, and independence of the church, combined with the religiousness of the mother, and her unshaken

faith in a God immanent in nature. The unbelief ingrained by the father repelled him from the dominant faith of New England; the natural piety learned from the mother kept him from the gulf of atheism or pantheism, into which some of the finest intellects of the age have plunged.

His life in childhood was pleasant and healthful. Labor on the farm taught him industry. Walks in the fields and woods developed habits of observation. Frequent visits of uncles and aunts and cousins kept the affections in exercise; and the evening readings of the father quickened thought and strengthened memory. He knew little of regular school life, but was training in one of the best of schools. He says of his childhood:

"By father and mother, yes, even by brothers and sisters, great and unceasing care was taken to secure power of observation, that the senses might grasp their natural objects; of voluntary attention, fixed, continuous, and exact, which, despite of appearances, sees the fact just as it is, no more, no less; of memory, that holds all things firm as gravitation, and yet, like that, keeps them unmixed, not confusing the most delicate outline, and reproduces them at will, complete in the whole and perfect in each part; much stress was laid, also, on judgment and inventive imagination..... I was taught self-reliance, intellectual, moral, and of many another form; to investigate all things with my own eyes, and carefully to form opinions for myself.

"As my relatives and neighbors were all hard-working people, living in one of the most laborious communities in the world, I did not fail to learn the great lesson of personal industry, and to acquire power to work — to begin early, to continue long, with strong and rapid stroke. The discipline and habit of bodily toil were quite easily transferred to thought, and I learned early to apply my mind with exact, active, and long-continued attention."

His later life seems to have grown as naturally from the inherited traits and home discipline as the oak unfolds from the acorn.

He was a self-made man, like Franklin, and possessed many of the sturdy elements of character which made the printer-boy a philosopher and statesman. His school advantages were meagre: "eleven weeks each winter from 1817 to 1827, and two summer-terms from 1817 to 1819, and one quarter at the Lexington Academy, that was all." But the home reading and study made good all deficiencies. He says: "Homer and Plutarch I read before I was eight; Rollin's Ancient History about the same time; and lots of histories, with all the poetry I could find, before ten. I took to metaphysics about eleven or twelve. Father and mother always read the books first, and examined me in every book I read. If I could not give a good account of it, I must not have another till I could satisfy the rigorous demands of father."

At the age of seventeen his school-days ended, and he began to spend the winter in teaching, working on the farm for his father during the summer. At twenty, taking counsel with no one, he left home in the morning, and returning late in the evening, went to his father's bedside. "Father," said he, "I entered Harvard College to-day." The old man, in alarm, replied: "Why, Theodore, you know I cannot support you there." "I know that, father; I mean to stay at home and keep up with my class." He did it; for the lessons of self-reliance were early learned. Preparation for college had been made in his own room in late evening and early morning hours, and the whole college curriculum was gone over in the same way, after the day's hard work was ended, or before it had begun. The following winter he spent at home; the next year he taught in a private school in Boston, paying his father eleven dollars a month to hire another hand in his place; for two years succeeding, he had a flourishing school in Watertown. During the whole period of teaching, he gave ten hours a day to private study, and having gone far beyond the course prescribed at Harvard, he might have received a degree, but the college laws were inexorable in demanding the fees of instruction, and the

young man, rich in energy and learning, was poor in money and friends.

In 1834 he entered the Divinity School at Cambridge, and his insatiate greed for knowledge ran riot in the Harvard libraries. Sleep and exercise were held of small account, and reading and study occupied from twelve to seventeen hours a day. No severe taste guided his choice of books; he devoured everything that came in his way. The range of study proves its miscellaneous character and want of thoroughness; in the languages alone, he dabbled in "Italian, Portuguese, Dutch, Icelandic, Chaldaic, Arabic, Persian, Swedish, Anglo-Saxon, and Ethiopic." Harvard thought him a prodigy. He taught Hebrew to the Junior class, during Dr. Palfrey's absence in New Orleans, and Professor Willard is said to have consulted him on nice points in Hebrew and Arabic syntax. Outside labors too were numerous. He had private students in the town, taught Hebrew to a class in college, and was editor and chief contributor to a magazine called the "Scriptural Interpreter," whose bold attacks on the accepted beliefs alarmed the leaders of Boston Unitarianism.

It would have required a shrewd observer to predict his future eminence at this period. His genius was too erratic for healthy growth. His knowledge was large but undigested; it lay heavy on him, cumbering his mental movements. He was a good debater, but a poor writer and sermonizer; and the sharp criticisms of Professor Ware drove him often to tears, sometimes to despair. His irreverence was incurable. In a debate before the Professor, he called Paul "old Paul," and when admonished of the fault, changed the form to "the gentleman from Tarsus." It may be doubted if his divinity course was of much service in the way of mental discipline. Untiring energy was in him, and marvellous endurance, and greed for all kinds of knowledge; but no mastery of himself or his attainments. The chewing of the cud and digestion came later. His journal, however, contains some trenchant criticisms on the Christian Fathers, which he could not have improved in later years.

Study over, he looked for a field to work in. The openings were numerous, at Barnstable, Greenfield, Waltham, Concord, Leominster, but he accepted a call to West Roxbury, and was ordained June 21, 1837, having been married to Miss Lydia Cabot in the previous April. The parish was small, the labors light; and he gave himself with avidity to a wide range of study. The general plan was to allot five days to study, and Saturday to the writing of both sermons. For several years his life had few noteworthy events. His sermons attracted no special attention, and there was little life or enthusiasm among his people. He joined a club in Boston under the leadership of Dr. Channing, of which Dr. Follen, Dr. Hedge, George Ripley, Wendell Phillips, and others were members. They discussed religious and social topics with great freedom, and it was evident that young Theodore was drifting away from the old Unitarian anchorage. He gradually confessed a loss of faith in inspiration, in prophecy and miracles, and at last in the perfect character and authority of Jesus; and began to be looked on with suspicion by his clerical neighbors, and shut out of their pulpits. But there were no signs of coming greatness, and he might, perhaps, have grown to old age and gone to his grave in this quiet country parish, without knowledge of the power that was in him, if a sudden crisis had not put him to his mettle, and developed all his manhood.

This crisis was the ordination of Mr. Shackford at South Boston, May 19, 1841, when Mr. Parker preached his famous sermon on "The Transient and Permanent in Christianity." It was not a powerful discourse, nor original, being borrowed almost entirely from Strauss. It contained no greater heresies than he had been accustomed to preach. But orthodox ministers took advantage of it to press their opponents to the wall. They asserted that the doctrine of the sermon, followed out to its logical results, left no room for supernatural elements in the Bible, or in the person of Christ, and asked if the leaders of Unitarianism were willing to accept this platform. The Unitarian camp was in a fer-

ment. The old leaders repudiated the heresies of the young preacher. They tacitly withdrew fellowship, refused to exchange pulpits, and at length, by formal vote, shut him out from the Unitarian fold. In their extreme irritation at the trouble he had occasioned, they went further and determined to crush him socially. He was tabooed in public circles, and shunned on the streets by old friends. Respectable publishers declined to print his sermons or books, and his name was crossed from the list of lyceum lecturers. The ostracism felt confident of its power to crush a single man who had made himself odious to the public.

This was the turning-point of his life, and the way opened to greatness. As internal convulsions upheave a mountain range, and lay bare to the miner strata of coal and precious ore which might have remained hid deep in the earth's bosom, so this social ostracism brought to the surface a latent manhood, and made available for practical use stores of learning and character yet undeveloped. He was forced into celebrity, and compelled to maintain a position before the public. Sent into exile by the leaders of public opinion, he had no choice but to bow to their decree, or win his way to public favor by sheer ability and merit.

No opponent in looking back on that struggle can withhold admiration from his indomitable pluck. The martyr courage was in him, worthy of a better cause, and the gristle of youth hardened at once into the bone of manhood. The hills of New Hampshire were not firmer than he. A great change passed over him. The secluded student rushed into life before the public. The companion of scholars became a leader of the people. He determined to acquire a popular style of address, the power of gaining the ear of the masses and moving them. Looking forward to a life of conflict, and thinking he might be driven from the pulpit, he formed this purpose : "I will study seven or eight months in the year, and four or five months I will go about and preach lectures in city and glen, by the road-side and field-side, or wherever men and women can be found. I will go eastward and west-

ward, and southward and northward; and if this New England orthodoxy does not come to the ground, then it shall be because it has more truth in it than I have ever found." A Luther could not have been more resolute.

But the necessity was not laid on him. His church withstood the popular clamor. Prominent Unitarian laymen in Boston united to give him a hearing, and invited him to deliver a course of lectures in the Masonic Temple. He declined at first, but afterwards consented, and put into the lectures all his mental and vital force. They drew large audiences, stirred the public mind, were published, and widely read. A similar course was delivered the following winter, and repeated in neighboring towns. His little church became a centre of attraction, and strangers from miles about flocked to its pews, hitherto empty. The excitement of his new position kept mind and heart at highest tension, and the conglomerate acquisitions of early years were fused into a unique mass, and made available for instant use. But even his iron frame could not endure the perpetual strain, and, in the autumn of 1843, he was compelled to ask leave of absence from his parish, to spend a year of recreation in Europe.

Few men travel to such good purpose. Nothing escaped his sharp observation. Scenery, national and local peculiarities, social institutions, men, buildings, libraries, paintings, sculpture, agriculture, universities, social habits, attracted eager attention, and received wise comment. His letters and journals are racy and instructive, crowded with shrewd thought and humorous allusions, and never tedious or commonplace. We have never read a pleasanter correspondence.

He returned in the fall of 1844, recruited in health, and with a more resolute purpose to hold the field against all opponents. The Unitarian rancor against him did not abate. He determined to meet it at its fountain-head, and accepted an invitation from a number of gentlemen to form a new parish in Boston. He commenced his labors with the

Twenty-eighth Congregational Society, Jan. 4, 1846, preaching in the Melodeon till Nov. 21, 1852, when the Society removed to the Music Hall, just built, and continued their pastor till death.

In its outward aspects the movement was a brilliant success. The Melodeon or Music Hall could not seat the crowd that flocked to the new preacher. The pulpit of the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society was one of the lions of Boston. Strangers, of evangelical faith, were curious to hear the apostle of unbelief. The sermons preached on Sunday were published in the week, and found an audience in distant states. It became a centre of influence on the moral and social questions of the day. Impressible young men and women gathered there, to be beguiled from their faith in the Bible, and make shipwreck of character and life. Men in middle life came, to lose all fear of a judgment as a restraint upon their passions or their worldliness. Possibly old men strayed thither, whose lives had been darkened by scepticism and immorality, who were won to faith in virtue, and to reverence for God. One may charitably hope that some good was done, as a counterpoise to the evil which no finite mind can measure. But, whether for good or evil, it can hardly be questioned that Mr. Parker, for a series of years, exerted a wider influence than any man in New England, or any preacher in the land. Henry Ward Beecher, perhaps, has had a greater popularity, and addressed larger audiences, but his influence has never been so positive or sharply defined.

His position was not won by the power of his religious teaching. It was due to his generous sympathies, his love for man, and his unrelenting hatred to oppression and social wrongs. The poor never appealed for help in vain. The friendless wanderer was cheered by kind words and wise counsel. The fallen woman was not spurned. The trembling fugitive found shelter and sympathy and defence. If Mr. Parker's theology was vague, his philanthropy was sublime. He was indifferent to fatigue, or expense, or odium

in behalf of the hunted slave, for whose return to bonds the laws of the land were perverted, and its great men leagued with the oppressor. He will be remembered by future generations, not for his theology, which is narrow and incomplete; nor for his philosophy, which is strangely deficient in idealism and spiritual depth, and cannot outlast his age; nor for his learning, which will be talked of as among the doubtful traditions of the past; but his memory will be fragrant as a zealous preacher of "the higher law" in the state, when some preachers of a better faith denounced it; as a champion of the helpless, when many evangelical men, like the priest and Levite, passed by on the other side; as an uncompromising foe to slavery, when statesman, divine, and merchant joined in the cry: "Great is Diana of the Ephesians." It was a proof of manhood, that he was incorruptible, when thousands bowed to Baal. To his persistent efforts for the rescue of Craft, Sims, Shadrach, and Burns; to his anathemas against the oppressor; to his indignant appeals to justice and right, New England is largely indebted for that education of the conscience, and that unflinching moral courage which prepared her to act a leading part in the suppression of the rebellion.

The amount of work done by Mr. Parker was prodigious. Lecturing sixty or eighty times a year, preaching every Sabbath, maintaining an extensive correspondence, reading more than most men of leisure, and writing more than most men of letters, visiting in an extensive parish, and receiving visits at all hours from all sorts of persons, were more than any organism of flesh and blood could bear, and it is not surprising that his iron frame suddenly gave way under the intolerable pressure. Even his amazing vitality was exhausted; consumption, the fatal family disease, set in, and when it was too late to retrieve his error he gave up toil and went abroad to die. But his cheerfulness did not abate, nor his hope fail, nor his indomitable will lose its vigor. Travelling as a worn-out invalid, he formed plans of study that a scholar in vigorous health might shrink from, and did

hard days' work in London and Rome that few travellers would care to undertake. He hoped and struggled for recovery till the last, but the vital powers, exhausted by long abuse, could not rally; slowly and surely disease claimed its victim, and he died, without pain, in Florence, May 10, 1860, not having quite completed his fiftieth year.

It is not easy to define Mr. Parker's religious views or position. His scholarship, from its wide range, was wanting in accuracy and exactness; and his thinking, from its rapidity and breadth, was equally deficient in precision and completeness. He often contradicts himself. The views of to-day are modified or discarded to-morrow. He formed no system of theology, and had he lived twenty years longer and completed the great works in philosophy and religion he had planned, it is doubtful if they would have possessed any true unity.

He was no atheist, but had a profound horror of the tendencies of this form of unbelief. His spirit was catholic to fellowship disciples of the most ultra schools in religion and morals, but he publicly disclaimed sympathy with the followers of Tom Paine, and declared his antipathy to the principles and the character of that champion of atheism.

He disclaimed also any affinity with pantheism, and his sharp realism criticized remorselessly Mr. Emerson's poetic dreams. But he glides unconsciously into pantheistic thought and language. The following is a specimen:

"God is the soul of man, and gives us all the life we have. Reason is not personal, but is a great plane which cuts the centre of all souls — the larger the soul the greater portion of the one and indivisible God is intercepted thereby. The life of God is in my soul: it is vain that you tell me of a God out of me. The *senses* wish for such a God; they find him, for all they perceive is but the varied Deity. Light and beautiful forms are God to the eye, perfumes to the smell, and so of the rest."

This might easily pass for one of the "Orphic sayings" of Mr. Alcott.

He rejected the mythical theory of Strauss, arguing from well known laws of human nature that a real person must

always precede any marvellous accounts of such an one; and that unless Christ had made an impression on his age as an extraordinary person no one would have cared to invent miraculous stories about him. The historical person, he claimed, must go before the ideal person, and be large enough to carry the mythology invented for him.

He rejected, too, the bald deism of Tindal and Herbert, and the English freethinkers, though he agreed with them in a denial of inspiration, miracles, and a special providence. His own views were peculiar. He says:

"God created the world *out of himself;* so he is still in it, creating every day; not only working hitherto, but now likewise."—Vol. I. p. 153.

"I have dwelt often on what I call the immanency of God in matter and in spirit. His perpetual presence and activity in the world of matter and the world of spirit, the laws whereof are but the modes of his activity; and the results, forms of his manifestation."—Vol. I. p. 197.

There is ample room here for miracle, and special providence, and prayer; and on this platform Mr. Parker might have accepted, with a child-like faith, all the supernatural elements in Christianity.

He seems to have cherished a firm belief in the general providence of God. It was a cardinal point in his theology. The following passages are explicit:

"A part of the decision of these great questions rests with me; a part upon something exterior to myself — upon Providence."—Vol. I. p. 74.

"How much of our life rests upon accident, as it seems — Providence, as it is. Men would not see it; God knows it all."—Vol. I. p. 312.

"The ways of the All-wise Father you and I cannot scrutinize; we are only to submit. We feel that they are right, we know that they are good, and lead to a higher and nobler end than we had dared to propose to ourselves."—Vol. I. p. 354.

He prayed often, with apparent simplicity and devoutness, like Luther and the old reformers. The following are specimens of the petitions recorded in his journals:

"O God, wilt thou help me to become more pure in heart, more holy, and better able to restrain all impetuous desires and unholy passions; may I put down every high thought that would exalt itself against the perfect law of God! Help me in the intercourse of life to discharge my duties

with a more Christian-like fidelity; to love thee the more, and those with whom I am to deal."—Vol. I. p. 86.

"Father, help me to live better; more useful, more acceptable to thee. As the years go by me, may I grow in manliness and all noble qualities. Teach me truth, justice, love, and trust. Let me not be idle nor unfaithful. Give me a clean and holy life, and may each year bring me nearer to the measure of a man."—Vol. I. p. 56.

"I took Eichhorn's Introduction to the New Testament and prayed (kneeling) that I might not be led astray by one whom some called an infidel, while I sought after truth."

It is very noteworthy, however, that the recorded prayers are never offered in the name of Jesus, and that, as life advances, they grow less simple and earnest, and resemble more the utterance of an ecstatic frame than the petition of a yearning heart. One who has learned to wrestle with God, like Jacob, and to kindle the affections to a holy glow by closet communion, will feel sad at Mr. Parker's recipe for stirring devotional feeling:

"I have had a little time to gather up myself for the coming Sunday. I don't like to rush from a week of hard work into the prayers and hymns of the Sunday without a little breathing time of devotion, so I walk about the study, and hum over bits of hymns, or recall various little tender emotions, and feel the beating of that great Heart of the universe which warms us all with the life that never dies. I don't know that these are not the richest hours of my life; certainly they have always been the happiest."—Vol. I. p. 309.

This reads more like a leaf from Spinoza than from Paul or John.

It is instructive to trace the growth of unbelief in his mind, following an inevitable law of progress, and diverging more widely from the orthodox belief, till he rejected every distinctive doctrine of Christianity. In the Divinity School, he wrote to his nephew:

"I believe in one God, ... who will reward the good and punish the wicked, both in this life and in the next. This punishment *may be* eternal.

"I believe the books of the Old and New Testaments to have been written by men inspired of God for certain purposes, but I do not think them inspired *at all times*. I believe that Christ was the Son of God, born in a miraculous manner, that he came to preach a better religion, by which men may be saved."—Vol. I. p. 66.

This is a stronger creed than was recived by most Unitarian ministers at that time. He saw no moral difficulty in the extirpation of the Canaanites:

"If nations are, by the divine permission, visited by earthquakes and pestilences, why may not the sword be employed for similar purposes?" —Vol. I. p. 79.

He believed in the miracles:

"Dr. Dewey gave us the Dudleian Lecture this year. It was the best, perhaps, I have ever heard. He removed the presumption against miracles. The objections were not only met, but overturned."—Vol. I. p. 82.

But doubts soon began to trouble him, doubts relating to the prophecies, the miracles, to inspiration, and to the character of Christ:

"I am in a good deal of doubt upon the subject of the prophecies relating to the Messiah. Sometimes I doubt that an inspired prophecy was ever uttered concerning him."—Vol. I. p. 82.

In his first year at West Roxbury he writes:

"I wish some wise man would write a book on 'Vulgar Errors,' and show up the absurdity of some things commonly believed on the authority of the old Jews. To be plain, I mean the Old Testament miracles, prophecies, dreams, miraculous births, etc."—Vol. I. p. 102.

Doubts of inspiration soon follow:

"A man may have just as bright revelations in his own heart as Moses or David or Paul; I might say, as Jesus; but I do not think any man has ever had such a God-consciousness as he." — Vol. I. p. 110.

The scepticism grows bolder and strikes deeper:

"The inspiration of Jesus could not differ *in kind* from that of Socrates, only *in degree*. He had much inspiration; Socrates, little. So far as a man is true, virtuous, religious, so far he is *inspired*, no farther. This inspiration comes by the use of the proper faculties."—Vol. I. p. 115.

The authority of the Bible, as a whole, was gone, but he still held to the authority of Christ as a divine teacher, till the reading of Strauss loosed him from this last hold on supernatural Christianity. He was reluctant to part with the beautiful faith of his childhood, but it slowly faded away, as the twilight melts into darkness. He first surrendered the authority of Christ's office:

"I think Jesus Christ is to be reverenced and obeyed *solely* for the intellectual, moral, and religious truth which he brought to light by his doc-

trines and life. If sentences of his did not seem to be true, I should reject them."—Vol. I. p. 139.

Faith in the perfection of Christ's teachings remained after faith in the divine birth and mission was lost:

"For my own part, I cannot conceive of a being more good and holy and beautiful and true than Jesus of Nazareth. His words judge the world. The higher we think, the holier we live, the more we find in them, the more we admire in him."—Vol. I.

"In his own department of morality, religion, a divine life, perfect goodness, I think he was true, perfect, and complete. We can see no limitation to his perfection in this respect. He was all that man can be of goodness and religion. He was all of God there can be in a perfectly good and religious man."—Vol. I. pp. 446, 447.

But unbelief is relentless in its demands, and when one begins to sink in its quicksands, he cannot stay himself, but is slowly submerged in its depths. Having rejected the supernatural birth of Christ, it was inevitable that he would ultimately reject the authority of his teachings and the perfection of his character. Strong expressions soon appear on both these points:

"I think Jesus a religious genius, as Homer a poetical genius. I can't say there never will be a greater man in morality and religion, though I can conceive of none now. Who knows what is possible for man? If Jesus had lived now, I think he would have been greater; yes, if he had lived to be forty, fifty, sixty, or seventy years old: why not? I think him *human, not superhuman*, the manliest of men."—Vol. I. p. 355.

"I do not know that he did not teach some errors along with the truth. I care not if he did. It is by his truths that I know him. *That God has yet greater men in store I doubt not.*"—Vol. I. p. 429.

He soon goes further, and declares that Christ was limited and erring, like other men:

"I think a careful study of the Gospels will force us to the conclusion that he was sometimes mistaken. When he was a boy I suppose he stumbled in learning to walk; miscalled the letters in learning to read; got wrong conclusions in his thoughts. When he reached the age of thirty, he must have made mistakes in his intellectual processes, and in his moral and religious processes."—Vol. I. p. 399.

In this connection he adds that Jesus believed in eternal punishment, and *therefore* held great errors. The doctrine

of eternal punishment he rejected with bitter scorn, for the final salvation of all men was essential to his idea of the divine perfection; but in this idea of perfection the important attributes of holiness and justice were left out.

"Whoso does his possible best, never fails in *Leben*, but straight out of the deeps of misery and worldly ruin rises in his proper motion up to heaven. Even to the wickedest, I think life is no absolute failure."—Vol. I. p. 307.

"I doubt not many go out of brothels and jails, and from the gallows, with more merit than I have, and will take a higher place at last in heaven; for they have far better worn their birth and breeding than I have mine."—Vol. I. p. 355.

"So I doubt not that from the jail, the brothel, the gallows, from the murderer's den, from the kidnapper's office, from the hypocrite's pulpit, by many a long and winding slope, the soul shall go up into God's highest heaven; for though human charity fail, there is One whose love knows no beginning and no end."—Vol. I. p. 424.

Every doctrine peculiar to the Christian system was thus in turn rejected—inspiration, miracles, retribution, the divine mission of Christ, atonement, regeneration, and mediation. With such a destructive criticism, blotting out from his faith those truths which make Christianity the great moral power of the world, it is an interesting question: What gave him such an influence over his generation? In what lay this Samson's secret strength? The answers to these questions are both curious and instructive.

His influence, we think, did not grow out of his scepticism, but of his faith; not from his rejection of Christianity, but from his theism. He had little in common with Hume and Gibbon and the English unbelievers, or with Paulus and Strauss and the German rationalists. Their scepticism began in a dislike for some of the peculiar truths of the gospel, and ended in religious indifference and moral apathy. Mr. Parker's scepticism seemed to take its rise in his peculiar views of the divine perfection and God's uniform nearness to man. They denied that God would ever stoop to man, or the Infinite reveal himself to the finite, and rejected *a priori* the credibility of the Bible or of any professed reve-

lation. Mr. Parker belived that God was always condescending to men, eternally immanent in the race, revealing himself ever to pious souls; and he rejected Christianity because it seemed to limit the revelation to a few favored men in a past age. He was more of a Mohammedan than a Christian, and this faith in a living, ever-present God, governing the world and inspiring human life, was a mighty power with him, as with Mohammed, to elevate his aims, and give him mastery over men of weaker faith. This faith, though deficient in all the Christian elements, had in it something of the sublime energy which sustained Moses when "he endured as seeing him who is invisible."

In this faith in a loving and present God lay much of his strength. It gave the warp to his sermons. It is the golden thread running through all his correspondence. It sustained him when friends forsook, and good men denounced, and the world hated, him. Some of his utterances are worthy of the best Christian reformers:

"Duty, freedom, truth, a divine life, what are they? Trifles, no doubt, to the monk Tetzel, to the Leos and Bembos, and to other sleek persons, new and old. But to a heart that swells with religion, like the Atlantic pressed by the wings of the wind, they are the real things of God, for which all poor temporalities of fame, ease, and life are to be cast to the winds. He that feareth God, when was he not a prey? He must take his life in his hand and become a stranger to men."

"The human will is strong and excellent; but not the strongest and most excellent. When perfectly coincident with the will of God, I suppose we are not conscious of any personal will. Then the infinite glory flows through us, and we are blessed."

"I must confess that the chiefest of all my delights is still the religious. This is the lowest down, the inwardest of them all; it is likewise highest up. What delight have I in the consciousness of God, the certainty of his protection, of his infinite love! God loves me as my natural mother never did nor could, nor can even now, with the added beatitudes of well nigh two score years in heaven."

"I have unspeakably more delight in religion, more consolation in any private grief, personal or domestic, more satisfaction in looking on the present, or for the future, than ever before, when I trembled at an imperfect God."

This strong and cheerful theism gave him an influence

over some whose lives were gloomy through a universal scepticism. They were attracted to him by his sarcasms against the Christianity of the age, and were won unconsciously by his teachings to faith in God and in virtue.

His personal qualities were strongly marked, and gave him power over men. He was every inch a man, with an independence "to stand in a minority of one" (Vol. I. p. 351), and a courage to face a world in a good cause; an honesty that scorned disguises, and thought not of consequences in speaking truth and doing right; an earnestness that gathered strength from obstacles or failure; a faith in man that saw elements of good in the most vicious, and looked for the reign of righteousness on earth; and a self-confidence that in its coolness and daring was often sublime.

His nature had also a tender side, not often seen in union with such rugged strength. There lay in his heart a yearning for love, like a woman's; an exuberant love for others, ever going out after objects to fasten on, leading him to keep playthings in his closet for children who visited him, and to carry sweetmeats in his journeys to attract little strangers; a sympathy that looked into burdened hearts, and knew instinctively the word or look suitable to comfort; and an interest in life that embraced all classes. No one who recognizes in him such masculine and feminine qualities of character can wonder that he became a leader in his generation.

His mental health and intense activity were due, in large measure, to his physical organism. Its vitality was prodigious, impelling to work as a steam-engine with its fires kindled. It loathed repose. It gave strength to the will, aspiration to the intellect, and a full tide of sympathy to the heart. It inspired a positiveness which made weaker men look to him for support, and kindled a fervor which drew others as by a magnetic spell. He could not be an idler, nor a hermit, nor an imitator. His organism dictated the place he must fill in the world as an ambitious leader of men.

His love for the pulpit was wonderful. Not Knox nor Whitefield loved it more, or discerned more clearly its vast influence. He studied for it with enthusiasm, and made all his acquisitions tributary to its success. He lived for it, and drew from every element in his richly-endowed nature something to add to its power. He was not satisfied unless every Sabbath made a mark upon his hearers. His mind teemed with subjects; and plans for future sermons four years ahead were carefully drawn out. The idleness of vacation fretted him, and he exulted when working-time came again. The exile from his beloved pulpit gave him more distress than sickness; and in foreign travel for health, the return of Sunday carried his thoughts back to the flock he had so long fed, now bereaved of their shepherd. If all ministers of a better faith loved the pulpit as well, and were as enthusiastic in magnifying their office, there would be fewer complaints that preaching in our day has lost much of its power.

Mr. Ticknor, in his Memoir of Mr. Prescott, ascribes the charm of the historian's style to the personality infused into it by his peculiar habit of writing. He was accustomed to compose mentally, thirty and sixty pages at a time; to carry it for days in his mind, turning it over and over, trying it by the canons of a severe taste, adding, omitting, improving, and at last transferring to paper. By such an elaboration in the brain it was transfused with the author's own life, and a subtile magnetism pervaded it to attract others. The peculiar vitality of Mr. Parker infused a similar life into his style. It is a style of wonderful power for popular oratory. Destitute wholly of the higher qualities of imagination and spiritual insight; never reaching to the profounder depths of the soul; its stern realism, and pictorial skill, and playful humor, and pungent satire, and homely facts, give it an effectiveness rarely equalled. It is never cumbered with learning, though always enriched by it; nor sinuous or tangled, like the webs which many scholars love to spin. It is the transparent vehicle of thought. It

borrows little majesty from the Latin elements of the language, but delights in the short, strong, Anglo-Saxon words, which go straight to the mark, as the rifle-ball to the bull's eye.

We presume few people, outside of his parish, gave Mr. Parker credit for attention to pastoral duties. These volumes present him in a new light in this sphere, though we doubt if a few facts are not woven together to make a false impression. But if the reports of a few friends are trustworthy, he excelled in visits to the sick-room, and in words of consolation in the house of the dead. Other duties were cheerfully laid aside to obey such calls, and his death was hastened by a journey when an invalid, thirty miles into the country on a stormy day, to officiate at a funeral, rather than disappoint friends who looked to him for comfort.

It would be pleasant to dwell on his broad literary sympathies, and his criticisms of men and books, which are acute, and generally fair and just, and indicate a capacity for admiration of men like Jonathan Edwards and Dr. Judson, whose opinions were antipodal to his own; and on his correspondence, which for freshness, and breadth, and insight into men, institutions, and current questions, is unsurpassed in English literature. But we must hasten to a more important point — to an inquiry into the reasons of his failure to find the truth. How could a man of intense earnestness, combined with honesty, fall into scepticism? Why did one of sincere religious aspirations and humane sympathies reject Christianity? The causes, we think, are simple and intelligible, and may be easily stated.

Mr. Parker grew up from childhood, with imperfect and distorted views of the divine character. The God he worshipped was not the God of the Bible, nor the God revealed in nature and the human conscience. Neither father nor mother taught him *the holiness* of God; this attribute was not made prominent in the preaching he heard, nor in the books he read, nor was it believed in the society he frequented. The visions into heaven given to Isaiah and John,

where saints and angels trembled and veiled their faces in the sacredness of the divine presence, and cried without ceasing: "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts," never shone on his soul. He had no apprehension of such a style of worship, and no sympathy with those who paid it. His correspondence and sermons teem with fine passages on the power, wisdom, and love of God; we cannot recall a passage treating of the divine holiness. This attribute, so prominent in the Bible, so indispensable to completeness of view of the character and government of God, dropped out of Mr. Parker's theology, and the loss was fatal to his teachings and his life. It made inevitable great errors, for it rendered him incapable of apprehending the nature and guilt of sin, the penalties of the divine law, and the atoning work of Christ. It prepared the way for his hatred of Calvinism, and his incurable habit of misrepresenting the teachers of an evangelical faith. Some of the finest intellects in this country and in Europe, by a failure to understand the national character of our government, and to accept the black man's claim to brotherhood through the unity of the human race, have been blinded to the fundamental crime of secession and the guilt of rebellion. By a higher necessity, ignorance of the divine holiness, like Mr. Parker's, must vitiate all views of the divine government, and lead naturally to a rejection of the Bible, which exalts holiness to supremacy, and makes it underlie and direct even the love of God.

The evangelical believer will search these volumes in vain to discover evidence of personal conviction of sin, or of profound inward discontent and wrestlings, which he meets in the letters and journals of Augustine and Luther and Edwards. The only trace of such feelings belongs to early boyhood. He says at that period:

"I can scarcely think without a shudder of the terrible effect the doctrine of eternal damnation had on me. How many, many hours have I wept with terror as I laid on my bed and prayed, till, between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. . . . . For years, say from seven to ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and then continued to repeat: 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep came on me."—Vol. I. p. 30.

It is not easy to believe that an inquirer for truth was left to grope alone, and fall into grave errors, without the aid of the Holy Spirit promised to sincere seekers. How far these early impressions, profound and penetrating the whole nature, were the work of the Spirit; and how far they were revived at a later day, under the preaching of Dr. Beecher, which he attended for months; or at a still later period, in the great revival of 1857 and 1858, must be left to the revelations of the final judgment. They indicate, at least, that he had a day of grace, which unimproved, left him in spiritual blindness, and enforce the Saviour's warning: "Walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you."

Mr. Parker seems to have been quite as ignorant of his own infirmities as of the divine holiness. The latter defect may have given rise to the former. He had no profound sense of the evil lurking in his nature, no clear insight into the deceitfulness of his heart. He denied, with a sarcastic humor, Paul's analysis of human nature, in its relation to himself. "I know," he says, "there is much health in me, and in 'my body,' even now, when it really is not worth much, there dwelleth many a good thing, spite of consumption and St. Paul." He was perversely blind to his prominent faults, and could not be persuaded by his most intimate friends that he ever indulged in sarcasm. To their expostulations he replies:

"My dear friend, I never wrote a line with any ill-will or sarcastic humor towards man or maid. I should not dare write with such a feeling."

"I feel willing to stand up, before man or God, and declare that I am not conscious of having written one line with any unchristian feeling. I say to you that after writing some of those sentences for which I am most commonly abused, I have been obliged to pause, then throw myself on a couch, and get relief in tears."

He could not discern any unkind feelings in himself towards others, though crediting them with a liberal measure of bitterness, and making it a common boast that he was "the best hated and abused man in the land." If charity to enemies had been as conspicuous in life as in his journals

and correspondence, he would have furnished to moralists a fine illustration for the Saviour's precept: "Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you." His claim to magnanimity is a large one:

"I fear it will always be the fashion of the Boston Association to speak ill of me until the dust returns to the earth as it was. For myself I care not. *It never made me feel the smallest unkindness towards them. It has sometimes saved them from more severe strictures, for I do not like to speak hard against men that try to injure me, lest a little of the old Adam should appear in my own heart.*"—Vol. I. p. 256.

"I have but one resource, and that is, to overcome evil with good, much evil with more good, old evil with new good. Sometimes when I receive a fresh insult it makes my blood rise for a moment; then it is over, and I seek, if possible, to do some good *secretly* to the person. *It takes away the grief of a wound amazingly.*"—Vol. I. p. 260.

It falls to few men to attain such success in doing good secretly. He had little credit for thinking kindly of enemies or showing favors to them; nor is it probable that he broke the Saviour's command in letting his left hand know what his right hand was doing. One ought not to sin against charity in judging his fellow men, but the highest authority has said: "A tree is known by its fruits." A sweet fountain cannot send forth bitter waters. No American in our day, Wendell Phillips excepted, has dipped his pen in more bitter gall than Theodore Parker, or assailed with more rancor statesmen, scholars, and clergymen from whom he differed. The fact is undeniable: the letters, and journals in these volumes are a sufficient proof. How then are we to interpret his earnest disclaimers of ill-will and sarcasm? The most charitable judge is forced to one of two conclusions: either he was a shameless hypocrite, claiming to possess feelings which he knew had no existence, or he was profoundly ignorant of himself, and therefore an incompetent judge of others. We are willing to accept the latter alternative, and to find in this moral obtuseness a sufficient clue to his spiritual unbelief. It is a curious fact in the psychology of unbelief that Mr. Martineau and

Mr. Weiss, with Mr. Parker's writings in their hands, deny that he ever indulged in sarcasm.

Another illustration of self-ignorance is found in his bold words: "I am destitute of all ambition." Jefferson Davis or Robert Toombs might disclaim it as readily as he; and the language suggests unpleasant memories of the *'umbleness* of Uriah Heep, with a suspicion of insincerity lurking behind the words.

The failure of Mr. Parker to discover religious truth was inevitable from his vicious method of inquiry. A wrong road must lead astray, and, in spite of his inability to understand his own moral nature, he trusted in consciousness as the only safe guide to truth, and the ultimate authority. It was the final court of appeal. He says:

> "My head is not more natural to my body, has not more grown with it, than my religion out of my soul and with it. With me, religion was not carpentry, something built up of dry wood from without, but it was growth, growth of a germ in my soul."—Vol. I. p. 30.

Believers in human depravity, in the alienation of the natural heart from God, will need no argument to prove that any man must fail to discover the whole truth who seeks for it in an imperfect consciousness, distorted by sin. The whole truth is not there, and the search must fail. Those who deny original depravity will concede that the ultimate truth is to be sought in the consciousness of the race, not of a single man. The accidents of birth and training and bodily organism, habits of life, and reading, and social influences, are so many prisms to refract the pure light from heaven. Every man has peculiar mental and moral biases which make him an unfit representative of the race; and no one would select Mr. Parker as a proper representative. The quiet lake reflects in its clear waters the outlines of the sky and of the overhanging foliage. Ruffled waters give no true picture. So profound thinkers, who are secluded from busy life and its distracting cares, may trace in their calm hearts the outlines of a divine life reflected. Mr. Parker mingled too freely in the storms of life to attempt the

task. The personality that gave him such prodigious power over others, was a barrier to the discovery of truth. He could not go out of himself, or look with clear vision into human hearts. It was not in his power to understand or state fairly the views of others. When he attempted it, it became broad caricature. We will not charge him with dishonesty; the fault lay in temperament and habit. His intense personality colored everything he heard or read, and apprehended truths very differently at different times, in harmony with its changing moods. A simple illustration will show our meaning: When he wished to exalt the character of Christ, and present him as a perfect religious teacher, he denied that He taught the doctrine of future punishment (Vol. I. p. 458). When his object changed, and he wished to prove that Christ was fallible, and could not be followed as a Master having the absolute truth, he maintained that this doctrine was an important part of his teachings (Vol. I. p. 400). Few men could be honest in asserting both opinions; and it is not surprising that he incurred the charge of insincerity. We give him credit for honesty, and lay the blame on his intense dogmatism, which transmuted any truth or fact to suit the whim of the moment, and made him incapable of a calm inquiry after universal truth. That strong personality, growing out of his wonderful vital organism, which made him a leader in society, doomed him to gyrate around the orbit of his own consciousness, without power to cross the charmed circle. He appealed, indeed, to the consciousness of mankind, but it was his own consciousness expanded and transferred. And when, after the study of a life-time, he set up a god for the race to worship, it was still Theodore Parker, endued with infinite attributes, and exalted to the throne of the universe.

This personality made him a dictator declaring the truth, not an inquirer searching for it. He did not kneel in prayer, imploring to be led into truth; he claimed the power to teach it with more completeness than Jesus of Nazareth. He cared not to inquire what are the facts of nature and

consciousness; from his conceptions of an infinite God he deduced *what the facts ought to be.* He did not read the Bible to accept its teachings; he read it as a master, to correct its errors. Such an arrogant self-confidence is always dangerous; but when it was too blind to discover personal faults, like ambition and love of sarcasm and bitterness to enemies, it was proved to be unworthy of confidence. A man ignorant of himself cannot be trusted to teach others.

It is a curious fact, however, that a stern fidelity to his method of inquiry would have changed his theological system and laid a groundwork for justice and future retribution in the divine government. He found in his own consciousness qualities which he refused to transfer to God. He eulogized John Quincy Adams for his sense of justice, and wrote to a friend:

"As you say, he had more justice than kindness, and kindness is the more popular element; *but justice is far the more excellent.*"—Vol. I. p. 458.

One of his escapades in the Divinity School is noteworthy:

"Once he quarrelled with a friend who was reading 'Philip Van Artevelde' with him, and who could not bear the execution of Otto and Gilbert Matthew, at the close of the first part of that drama. 'It is a great blemish,' said his friend. 'Artevelde should have shown magnificent with mercy!' 'No,' said Theodore, 'it is just, it is good, it is Christian.' 'It is downright murder,' said the friend. 'Then get out of my room,' cried Theodore in wrath, because the measure meted to two villains was not recognized."

If the ideas of justice and punishment recognized in his own nature had been transferred to the divine character and government he might have escaped grave errors.

His philosophical views determined his religious heresies. His idea of God as immanent in matter and spirit made him incapable of discerning the evil or guilt of sin. It forced him unconsciously into pantheism or optimism. It led him to regard God as the source of all action and the spring of all thought. Disorder could not find its way into nature unless God designed to work some higher good by it.

Moral evil could not attach to spirit unless God created it as a part of a stupendous plan to whose perfection it was essential. He denied, therefore, the existence of a perfect free-will, a free-will capable of originating sin against the will of the Creator. For the same reason he denied the possibility of a devil:

"If there be such a devil, then God must have made that devil. If God made such a devil absolutely evil, it could only have been out of evil in God himself. Then God could not be infinite in wisdom or in justice, or in love and holiness; for a being perfectly wise, just, loving, and holy could not make a being perfectly unwise, unjust, unloving, and unholy. If God be absolutely perfect there can be no absolute evil in the world, no evil that does not come to serve a good purpose at the last. You and I stumbled in learning to use our legs in childhood, and got hurt in the fall; we stumble in learning to use our higher powers, and get hurt by the error or the sin. But the stumble of the child and the sin of the man must have been foreseen by God, and are alike accidents in development, requiring no devil as the author of the child's stumble or the man's sin. You and I have outgrown the first form of mistake, and walk erect; the little hurts we got in our falls made us take better heed. So shall we outgrow the moral stumbling, and the pain of our error and the smart of our sin will make us take better heed, and so the suffering be medicine."—Vol. I. p. 400.

It was a false philosophy which thus eliminated guilt from sin, making it a mere "accident of development," and removed from punishment all idea of penalty, making it only "healing medicine"; and asserted that "all physical evils are means of progress, all errors unavoidable steps in man's course to happiness" Vol. I. p. 148.

Mr. Parker was wholly destitute of that humility which goes before true wisdom. God has been pleased to make this quality essential to the discovery of hidden truth. "Whosoever receiveth not the kingdom of God as a little child shall in no wise enter therein." Humility holds the key which fits all complicated locks in the palace of truth, and speaks the "sesame" to which unseen doors open. "He that exalteth himself shall be abased, but he that humbleth himself shall be exalted." In such reverent humility he had no share. He could not understand its worth, and ridiculed it in others. His irreverence is painful to a man

of devout spirit. He alluded to the Bible with no more respect than to the Koran. He apologized, with a jest, for Catholic prayer to the saints: "The true God, I take it, would as lief be called St. Cecilia as Jehovah." The Lord's supper he openly ridiculed: "It is a heathenish rite, and means very little. Cast away the elements. Let all who will, come into a parlor, have a social religious meeting; eat bread and wine if you like, or curds and cream, and baked apples, if you will." Of the doubts of a struggling mind he says: "I have passed through the same stage, and regard it as I do the chicken-pox — something that must come, and which we are glad is well over, but which confines few persons for any length of time."

The mysteries of the kingdom of heaven will not reveal themselves to a spirit indulging in such mocking moods. When a finite man persuades himself that he stands on a higher plane of thought than prophets, patriarchs, and apostles; when he flatters himself that a greater religious revolution will spring from his teachings than from the labors of Luther; when he assumes to possess a higher wisdom than Jesus Christ, and to reject errors into which Jesus fell, — it will not be surprising if he is taken in his own craftiness, and finds truths hidden from him which are revealed to babes. So long as God fills the hungry with good things, and sends the rich in their own conceit away empty, men of Mr. Parker's spirit must fail utterly to discover "the truth as it is in Jesus."

His biography is to us a very sad one, and will teach important lessons to future generations. Such a brilliant combination of high gifts rarely falls to one man, and had they been united to a pure Christian faith would have made his name immortal, with the great leaders of the church and the race. A reader finds himself unconsciously wishing that certain controlling facts in Mr. Parker's life had been changed. If his mother had been rich in Christian faith as in natural piety; if his father had been a sturdy believer; if his childhood had been passed under a godly ministry;

if he had been thrown into intimate relations with evangelical scholars (it is singular how rarely he met such, and how kindly he speaks of them, as of Professors Stuart, Porter, and Woolsey); if a family of children had grown in his house, to draw out the tender and loving elements of a great heart; if he had not come into antagonism with the religious world at an early period of his ministry, and continued a gladiator till strength failed,—his whole life-history might have read quite otherwise.

But it was not so ordered. He was a religious outlaw, and hewed his way through opposition. No one will deny that he was a good fighter, and held the lists bravely against all comers, and wore his harness to the last. He did harm in his generation that a score of good men will not undo; and has gone to the tribunal of an omniscient God, who, understanding his character, his circumstances, and his motives, will award a righteous judgment.

We do not fear that his influence for evil will live. He was not a profound thinker, and his works hold no seeds of immortality. He had not the imagination or spiritual insight truhs which reach into the unknown, and bring forth new for the guidance of the race. He was a man of his generation, with qualities fitting him pre-eminently for leadership. He did a noble work in the social reforms which have given character to the age, and for such service deserves high honor. This, we think, will be his memorial in future time, when his contributions to spiritual thought are forgotten. He aspired to do what greater men have attempted, to overthrow Christianity and establish a new religion. Celsus was as proud and self-confident; and so were Tindal, and Hume, and Voltair. They have gone to the grave, and their works are fast going to oblivion. A similar fate awaits the works of Mr. Parker. He claimed to be wiser than Jesus; but Jesus had a deeper insight into human nature, and provided better for its wants. His words will abide forever, the light and comfort of the race, confirmed by the experience of millions in the future, as they have been by

millions in the past. But with the personal presence of Mr. Parker, the chief element of his power over men has passed away, and in a little time his works may be known only, as the works of Celsus are known, by the few fragments preserved in the writings of the defenders of the faith.

ARTICLE IV.

THE SON OF GOD.

BY REV. W. S. TYLER, D.D., PROFESSOR IN AMHERST COLLEGE.

It has been well said, that there are only two great subjects of human thought and inquiry. One of these is man, and the other is God. These two subjects meet in Christ, who was both God and man united in one person.

Ellicott has remarked in his Life of Christ, that in the portraiture of our Lord, the first Gospel presents him to us mainly as the Messiah; the second, chiefly as the God-man; the third, as the Redeemer; and the fourth, as the only-begotten Son of God. This distinction may, perhaps, be just, if it is not too rigidly applied. Certainly it is very interesting to a curious mind, and not a little encouraging also to the faith of the believer, to remark the different points of view from which the several evangelists observe and contemplate Christ, and yet how manifestly they all describe the same person; how wonderfully some of them diverge from others in the general track which they pursue, and, at the same time, how certainly, whenever they come together, they do not come in collision, but harmonize in their representations.

The express design of the apostle John in writing his Gospel, as stated by himself (xx. 31), is that his readers might believe that Jesus was the Christ, the Son of God. And in this Gospel he is called the Son of God more fre-

quently than in the others. Indeed in Matthew, Mark, and Luke the Redeemer never calls himself directly by this name, but it is chiefly in the testimony which the dispossessed demons and the wondering spectators are constrained to bear that he is spoken of as the Son of God; whereas in John he calls himself the Son of God and, in abbreviated but no less definite terms, the Son more frequently than by any other title. But in Mark also he is announced as the Son of God in the very first verse, as if the author meant to have it understood at the outset that this was the theme of *his* Gospel. And Matthew and Luke both record those words of Jesus touching his intimate knowledge of the Father, so strikingly similar in style[1] as well as in sentiment to many passages in John's Gospel, that the hearer can hardly persuade himself that he is not listening to the words of that evangelist: "All things are delivered unto me of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father save the Son and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him" (Matt. xi. 27; Luke x. 22; cf. Isa. i. 18; iii. 35; vi. 46 et pass.) This single passage lends the sanction of the other evangelists to all that the fourth has recorded of Christ's teachings concerning his mysterious relations to the Father.

Jesus Christ is not the only person who is called son of God in the scriptures. Angels (Job i. 6; xxxviii. 7), kings and rulers (2 Sam. vii. 14; Ps. lxxxii. 6), the righteous and their families (Gen. vi. 2, 4), and especially believers in Jesus (1 John iv. 2 et pass.), are all so called to express their high rank or their relation and resemblance to the Most

[1] This coincidence is sufficient to prove (what is denied by Renan and others) that John is true to the style in which our Lord spoke of these profound mysteries in the divine nature; while the other evangelists are no less true (as is generally conceded, even by writers of the sceptical school) to the style in which he discourses to other auditors on other themes. A single striking resemblance is admitted by all candid critics to outweigh many points of difference in proving identity of authorship. And why should it be thought incredible that the all-sided and all-comprehensive mind of the great Teacher should discourse in very different styles to suit widely different circumstances.

High. But Christ calls himself, and is called by the sacred writers, not *a* son of God, but THE *Son of God*, *ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*[1] (John i. 34; xi. 4 et al.), and what is, if possible, still more distinctive and complete, "THE SON." There is something altogether unique and peculiar in the way in which the title is appropriated to him. In most of the passages in which the title is applied to others, it occurs in the plural number, or, if in the singular number, without the article,[2] as when God says to Solomon: "I will be his father, and he shall be my son (2 Sam. vii. 14). The passages in which magistrates and angels are called sons of God, are not only plural and indefinite, but they are found only in such poetical books as Job and the Psalms, and are manifestly the language of poetry. Moreover these, and also those in which the title is applied to Adam (Luke iii. 38) and Solomon, are solitary passages, not only peculiar to certain writers, but occurring only once or twice in those writers. Christ, on the other hand, calls himself the Son of God, or the Son, habitually in the Gospel of John, and is frequently called by this distinctive name in all the writers, historical, doctrinal, and poetical, of the New Testament. Furthermore, these casual applications of the titles to men and angels in the Old Testament are often alluded to in the New as justifying and *foreshadowing* the appropriation of the name as the proper prerogative of him who was the King of kings and the Lord of men and angels. The occasional use of the titles "son of man," and "son of God," in a subordinate sense in the Old Testament, therefore, so far from militating against their appropriation in a peculiar and far higher sense in the New, was, in fact, only the *prepara-*

[1] The article is sometimes omitted in the Greek (e.g. John x. 36; Rom. i. 4; 2 Cor. i. 19) without any difference of meaning, because (according to the well-known law of the article) it is sufficiently definite in itself or in its connexion, and so does not require the article. So the article is sometimes omitted in the phrase "the Son of Man," e.g. John v. 27. And so with proper names.

[2] With the indefinite article, sometimes, in our version; e.g. 2 Sam. vii. 14, as quoted in Heb. i. 5: "He shall be to me *a* son."

tion of suitable language[1] to express that high peculiarity — only the type and prophecy of the coming of him who *was* truly and emphatically THE SON OF MAN and THE SON OF GOD, and so was a fit Mediator between God and man, even the God-man Christ Jesus.

THE SON OF GOD. What is the import of this title, expressed in the words themselves, illustrated by the usage of the sacred writers, and sustained by the general teaching of the scriptures?

1. This name, so emphatically and exclusively appropriated as the distinctive name of our Lord, imports peculiar nearness and dearness to God, a singular mutual affection, union, *oneness*, between him and the infinite Father. A son naturally has the same views and feelings with his father, the same aims and ends, one and the same interest. A son loves his parents, and is loved by them, beyond any other person. He stands to them in the nearest and most endearing relation, and that more fully and perfectly as he more fully and perfectly sustains the character and realizes the *idea* of a *son*. To say of a person he was near and dear to me as my own son, is to express the utmost intimacy and affection. The relation of an *only* son is especially near and endearing. An only child is the very symbol of affection, of union, of oneness of interests, and almost of life, in all languages and to all hearts. When, therefore, our Lord is habitually distinguished and emphasized in the scriptures as the Son of God, the only-begotten Son, or the Son, thus much at least must be expressed, his singular nearness and dearness to the infinite Father.

Much has been written and printed, and perhaps more preached and argued, of the sonship and the eternal gene-

[1] This we believe to be the explanation of very much of the Old Testament in its relation to the New, and of most of those passages which the old expositors interpreted in a double sense, and which many modern expositors explain as a mere accommodation. This principle underlies, for example, the argument of our Lord in John x. 34–36, and that of Paul in Heb. i. 5 seq., and in Heb. ii. 6 seq.

ration of Christ. Perhaps there is no theological topic in the discussion of which there have been more infelicities of language on the one side, and more flippancy in exposing and ridiculing those infelicities on the other. If, letting alone creeds and theological systems, we consult the scriptures touching the questions, for what reason, and in what respect, Jesus Christ was called the Son of God, we shall find that it was partly because of his miraculous conception by the virgin Mary without a human father. The angel gives this reason to the virgin herself at the annunciation: "the Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." In his human nature Jesus of Nazareth was the Son of God as well as the Son of man; for in his human nature God was his father in a different sense from that in which he is the father of any other human being. God was his only Father. God was the immediate as well as the ultimate author of his human body and human soul. As man, the Second Adam, as well as the first, was the Son of God.

But in a higher and yet more peculiar sense he was the Son of God in his higher nature and his pre-existing state. So we are expressly taught by the apostle Paul in the very beginning of his Epistle to the Romans — an exordium as comprehensive and sublime, and as instructive in regard to the person of Christ, as the introduction to the Gospel of John:[1] "Paul, a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated to the gospel of God . . . . . concerning his Son Jesus Christ our Lord, who was made of the seed of David *according to the flesh*, but declared [or determined] to be the Son of God with power *according to the spirit of holiness* [or as to his holy, spiritual nature]," that is, he was the Son of God even as to the miraculous way in which he

[1] The Epistle to the Hebrews opens with the same lofty theme, treated in a similar manner; and this resemblance, while it is most instructive in its doctrinal bearings, affords presumptive evidence of the apostolic, if not of the Pauline, authorship of that epistle.

was *made* the son of Mary and of the seed of David; but he was the Son of God in a far more sacred and mysterious sense in that holy, spiritual nature and existence in which he was in the beginning with God, and in which, after his resurrection, he returned to the glory which he had with the Father before the world was. Of course, when we speak of the Son of God, either as to his human or his divine nature, either before or after his incarnation, we cannot understand by sonship just what we do in human relations. We cannot suppose any literal *begetting* even of the human nature, still less any literal *generation* of the divine nature. But if divine things are to be revealed to men, they must be expressed in the language of men. And as there is no word which expresses the relation of Christ's human nature to the universal Father so nearly as the word "Son," so no other word could express so nearly, so clearly, that intimate relation and endearing affection which subsisted between God and the Word from eternity: "Thou *lovedst* me *before* the *foundation* of the *world*." Our Lord often refers to the mutual love and fellowship and the common glory of the Father and the Son in his pre-existent state (cf. John xvii. 5, 24) as essentially the same to which he returned at his ascension; and that state cannot be better expressed in human language, cannot be more perfectly imaged in human relations, than as that of a son in the bosom of his father.

In the beginning, when God began to create the worlds, the Λόγος, the divine and eternal Word, was already existing, and existing continually (ἦν) *with* God. With this lofty announcement, so strikingly in unison with the beginning of the most theological of the Epistles, does the most theological of the Gospels open in its very first verse. And so much importance does the evangelist attach to the doctrine that he repeats it in the next verse, thus emphasizing in the very annunciation of his theme the nearness of the Word who became flesh to God, as one who *dwelt* in his *presence* (πρός); his union and communion with God as one of like nature and attributes (for he "*was* God") through

all those ages of eternity in which as yet no creature existed. His forerunner announced him to the world as "the only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father" (John i. 18), that is, the Son of God in a sense in which no other person is, the only one of all his sons that fairly deserves the name, since he alone partakes of the divine nature, and whose very being always was and is and always is to be[1] in this peculiarly near and dear filial relation. The apostle Paul sets in a striking light this same eternal union and communion of the Son with the Father, prior to the creation, by calling him "his dear Son," literally the Son of his love or complacency (ἀγάπης), "who is the first-born of every creature," that is, who existed prior to the whole creation, and was nearer and dearer to him than the whole creation, which he made by him and for him.[2] The favorite epithet by which the relation of the Son of God to the Father is emphasized in the writings of John, is the only-begotten (ὁ μονογενής); in those of Paul, it is the first-begotten or first-born (ὁ πρωτότοκος, cf. Col. i. 15; Heb. i. 6). Taken literally, these expressions are inconsistent with each other, as well as contradictory to the divine nature. But the first-born son, and the only-begotten son, are alike in the pre-eminent honor and favor in which they stand with their father; and those otherwise contradictory expressions find their obvious and harmonious meaning, their highest spiritual significance, in that singular, nay sole honor and favor in which, in his pre-existence, during his incarnation, and since his ascension, the eternal Son of God has always been and always will be in the bosom of the Father.

The various ways in which this more than filial relation is expressed and manifested during his humiliation are truly

[1] ὁ ὤν in classic and in New Testament Greek denotes real, essential, perpetual existence.

[2] Thus only can this passage be interpreted consistently with the context and the constant teaching of the Scriptures, that "*all things* were created by him and for him, and he is *before* all things"; and this interpretation is corroborated, if not directly affirmed, by the subsequent clause: "that in all things he might have the *pre-eminence*," Col. i. 15–18.

wonderful: "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hands." "The Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things that himself doeth." "The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do; for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." "And he that sent me is with me: the Father hath not left me alone; for I do always those things that please him." "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work." What a sublime consciousness does such language indicate, not only of the entire approbation and complacency of his Father, but of perfect harmony, nay unity, of action and oneness of spirit with God. The same wonderful consciousness, so unlike the conscious imperfection and separation from God, or want of nearness to him, which has always characterized the greatest and best of human kind — the same wonderful consciousness is apparent in the whole doctrine and life of this mysterious being; and we do not see how any candid, thoughtful person can contemplate such a character and life without the conviction which, on more than one occasion, forced itself upon those who saw and heard him: "truly this is the Son of God!" In the earliest recorded manifestation of his conscious life and character, at the age of twelve, we see him drawn away from his earthly parents to the house and the business of his heavenly Father, and, in answer to their expostulations, expressing his wonder that that they should expect to find him anywhere else or otherwise employed: "Wist *ye* not that *I* must be *in* the places and the things of my Father" — ἐν τοῖς τοῦ πατρός μου; that is, found in the house of God and absorbed in the interests of his kingdom? At his baptism the Father, in turn, expresses his affection and complacency for his well-beloved Son. At his temptation the tempter assails him again and again at this very point of his filial relation: "If thou be the Son of God"; and he proves his claim to that sacred name by the truly filial spirit in which he answers the tempter wholly out of the word of God, and desires to feed and live on nothing else, trusts implicitly in the provi-

dence of God, cleaves to his worship and service alone, and resigns himself entirely to his will. Even while he weeps and prays at the tomb of Lazarus he retains the full assurance that his Father hears him always. When he agonizes in the garden and shudders at the bitter cup which he was about to drink, his will is never for a moment at variance with his Father's, but he says, over and over again: "Not my will, but thine, be done."

And how *like* a Son who had always been at home in heaven with God, and knew he was soon to return thither, he *talks* of his Father, and his home, and the glory which he had with the Father before the world was, and which awaited him again on his return home, and the many mansions in his Father's house, and the place there which he was going to prepare for his disciples, and his will that all who believe on him and love him should be with him where he was so soon to be, and behold his glory. How like a son absent from home, his thoughts and words centered in that home, hovered over it, revolved about it. How manifestly his treasure, his heart, his home, his kingdom, were all in heaven! And how he communed with God as with a Father who was absent, and yet ever present, like a son who was alone, and yet not alone in the world! Yes, that was no ordinary son of no ordinary father, a perfect Son of a perfect Father, without an interest, a desire, or a thought separate from his Father in heaven. And that Father, in turn, manifested and expressed the same entire sympathy and complacency with his Son, and, more than once, by a voice from heaven, acknowledged him as his "beloved[1] Son, in whom he was well pleased." Thus they walked and talked[2] and worked together, in the perfect, mutual

[1] This ὁ ἀγαπητός is doubtless the definition and the synonym of the ὁ μονογενής and the ὁ πρωτότοκος of John and Paul.

[2] It is worthy of notice that, in Mark and Luke, the words of approval spoken by the Father at the baptism are addressed *to* the Son: "*Thou* art," etc. So in John xii. 28 the Father responds directly *to* the Son. There is, however, a climacteric order in regard to the persons by whom the voice from heaven was heard. At the baptism it seems to have been heard only by himself, and per-

love and fellowship of Father and Son, while our Lord tabernacled in the flesh. And after his resurrection he ascended directly to the presence of his Father, and sat down at his right hand,— the place of honor and power, the place of favor and affection,— where he ever liveth and reigneth King of kings and Lord of lords; far above all the principalities and powers in heavenly places, the partner of the Father's counsels and of his throne, the co-equal, co-eternal Son of God.

2. The Son of God is the image of God. The same idea, essentially, is expressed in various forms in the scriptures. He is the Word of God. He is the personal revelation, expression, manifestation, of God. He is God manifested in the flesh, or Divinity embodied and revealed through humanity.[1] A son is not only near and dear to his father, but he is like him. He is a copy of him. When the resemblance is striking, we say, he is the perfect image of his father; and those who have never seen the father may see him in his son, and all who are acquainted with the son, know the father through him. So the sacred writers speak of Christ as the image of the invisible God (Col. i. 15), and that, not in the secondary and subordinate sense in which man is also said to be the image of God, but the express image of his person, or the impress of his substance (*χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ*), the form of his essence, the counterpart of his being, and the reflection of his glory (*ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης*, Heb. i. 3). And our Lord himself declares: "he that hath seen me, hath seen the Father," "and from henceforth ye know him and have seen him" (John xiv. 7, 10). God is invisible to mortal eyes, and he reveals himself, manifests himself, only in the person of his Son. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten *Son*, which is in the bosom of the Father,

haps the Baptist; at the transfiguration, by the disciples who were with him, and are commanded to hear him; and at his last public discourse recorded by John, by the multitude, some of whom mistake it for thunder.

[1] The Greek words for these various forms of expression are, *εἰκών*, 2 Cor. iv. 4, Col. i. 15, et al.; *λόγος*, John i. 1 seq., Rev. xix. 13; *ἀποκάλυψις*, Matt. xi. 27, etc.; *ἐξήγησις*, John i. 18; *φανέρωσις*, 1 Tim. iii. 16.

he hath *declared* or *expressed* him (ἐξηγήσατο, John i. 18). God is unknowable in his moral perfections by any personal acquaintance, or direct exercise of the human intellect: "No man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whomsoever the *Son* will *reveal* him" (ἀποκαλύψαι, Matt. xi. 27, etc.). We have some faint analogy to this in those courts, especially of the Eastern world, where the sovereign is too sacred, too nearly divine, to appear in his own person, and his will is made known only through his ministers; and if any communication of special importance is to be made, perhaps he sends his son to represent him, to speak and act for him, to impersonate his government and, as it were, himself: "last of all, he sent unto them his *son*." It is for this reason that Christ is called the Word of God, the Eternal Word, through whom, in all ages, he has been *expressing* himself in the creation and providential government of the world (John i. 3; Heb. i. 2), and speaking, living, shining, in the reason and conscience of every man that cometh into the world (John i. 45); the revealing Word, wherein God appeared in the theophanies and spoke in the prophecies of the old covenant, giving promise, in the very name by which he revealed himself to his peculiar people, of a future coming and a fuller manifestation in the latter days; and especially the Incarnate Word of truth and life to men lost in ignorance and dead in sin, living in human form on earth, speaking to the eyes and ears and sympathies of men as never man spake, warning, beseeching, bleeding, dying, that men might be reconciled to God, and all this with such authority and yet such tenderness that it is manifestly God beseeching us, through him, to be reconciled and live. What a revelation of the holy love of God! Or rather, what a perfect *image* of that God who *is* love; not blind and doting fondness, but pure, holy, sin-hating and yet sin-forgiving, law-sustaining yet self-sacrificing, love! How his discourses re-echo and interpret the voice of God in nature, in the rain and the sunshine, in the lilies of the field and the fowls of the air; how they re-affirm and en-

force with new sanctions the law of God in the Old Testament; how they transcend the light of nature in clearness and the law of Moses in strictness, while at the same time they discover vast realms of thought, lay open wide fields of vision, reveal profound mysteries in the being, providence, and grace of God, on which nature sheds not a ray of light, and the law and the prophets afford only faint shadows and promises of the light that was to dawn upon the world! How his parables gathered up all the analogies and harmonies which God has constituted between himself and man, between heaven and earth, between the material and the spiritual universe, and concentrated them as the truth and wisdom of God, the light of God's own countenance and the life of his own heart of infinite love, upon the understandings, the consciences, and the hearts of his hearers! In such miracles as the feeding of the multitudes, the turning of water into wine, walking upon the sea, and commanding the winds and the waves, we see imaged forth the creative power of God and his providential control over nature, so manifestly that the beholders were constrained to cry out: "Truly this is the Son of God"; while in healing the sick, raising the dead, casting out devils, and forgiving sins he demonstrated, or rather exemplified, God's forgiving love, *recovering* grace, and *new*-creating power. His very person, even in his humiliation, was at times radiant with divine glory, the glory of divine power and justice and holiness, as well as divine patience, love, and mercy. When he came as a refiner and purifier to purify the temple, at the beginning and at the close of his ministry, it was manifest to all that the Lord of the temple had come; and the traffickers who had made his Father's house a house of merchandise and a den of robbers could not abide the day of his coming. At his transfiguration his divinity shone through the veil of his humanity as the sun, and his very raiment was white as the light, and while the voice out of the cloud proclaimed him to be the beloved Son of God, he appeared to his disciples as the brightness of the Father's glory and

the express image of his person, and they fell on their faces and were sore afraid. When his enemies came upon him with an armed multitude to arrest him, in the full knowledge of all that awaited him, he presented himself voluntarily before them as the object of their search; and they, overwhelmed by the more than human majesty of his presence, went backward and fell to the ground. Through all the painful and humiliating scenes of his mock trial he seemed not so much a culprit as a king and a God who had power, to lay down his life and power to take it again, and who had only to speak the word, and twelve legions of angels would rush down from heaven for his deliverance. But, with that same patience and long-suffering with which *God* bears with a world of unbelievers and ungodly men, he would not speak the word, but chose rather to give himself an offering and a sacrifice for human sin, and thus to exhibit to the universe a new revelation of the stupendous self-sacrificing love of God. On the cross he opened the gates of paradise to the penitent malefactor who was crucified with him. "His death was the death of a God." In saying this, we only repeat the language of an unbeliever,[1] extorted from him by the moral grandeur of the sufferer himself, while the scene, as it is painted by eye-witnesses, shows us the sun darkened, the earth quaking, and the graves opening — all nature sympathizing with him as nature's God, and the very dead owning him as the Lord of life. His disciples felt that in seeing him they had seen God; that in seeing and hearing and touching him, they had seen and heard and handled that Word of life which was from the beginning, that Eternal Life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us (1 John i. 1, 2). The doubting Thomas beheld him after his resurrection, and cried out: "My Lord and my God." The beloved disciple lay upon his bosom, and, to the close of his long life, in his Gospel and his letters, he testified that "the Son of God is come, and that this is the true God and eternal life" (1 John. v. 20). The apostle Peter never

[1] Rousseau, in his "Confessions."

lost the impression of the scene on the mount of transfiguration: in his last Epistle, when he was just ready to put off his earthly tabernacle, the "honor" and "power" and "majesty" and "glory" of which he was an "eye-witness," still fill his vision (2 Pet. i. 16, 17). Paul saw him shining with heavenly light above the brightness of the midday sun, and ever after he conceived of him as "the image of the invisible God," and declared that "the same God who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, he it is [such is the emphasis of the true reading in the original], *he it is* that hath shined in our hearts to give us the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face [or person, προσώπῳ] of Jesus Christ" (2 Cor. iv. 6). And when we consider the wonderful analogies and harmonies which exist between his kingdom of grace and God's kingdom of nature and providence, when we contemplate the marvellous purity, beauty, grandeur, and glory of his character, and observe the supernatural power and progress of his religion, it would seem that no candid and reflecting mind could resist the conclusion that he is the image of God, and his kingdom is the kingdom of heaven. As the Son of man is the model man and the living exemplification of what man should be, so the Son of God is the image of God and the personal manifestation of what God is.

3. The Son of God is the representative of the Father. He is not only associated with God, or united to him, in the most intimate and endearing relations, he not only is the reflection of the Father's glory and the express image of his person, but he acts for him, and so represents him in the world. So the son of an earthly sovereign may not only resemble his father so fully as to be the perfect image of himself, but may also act as his representative in foreign lands, or in the administration of the government at home. The late Dr. Lyman Beecher once began a sermon which he preached in the Theological Seminary at Andover, by saying that Jesus Christ is the acting Deity of the universe. This statement seems to be justified by express declarations

of the scriptures, and is fully sustained by their general sentiment. As the Father is seen only in the Son, so he works everywhere by and through him. The work of creating, upholding, and preserving the universe is ascribed to his agency in the most explicit and emphatic terms: "All things were made by him," says John (John i. 3), "and without him was not anything made that was made." "By him were all things created," says Paul (Col. i. 16, 17), "that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones or dominions, or principalities or powers; all things were created by him and for him. And he is before all things, and by him all things consist [or continue in existence]." In other passages, God is represented as making the world, and creating and upholding all things by Jesus Christ (Eph. iii. 10; Heb. i. 2, 3).

The government is upon his shoulders (Isa. ix. 6): "Unto the *Son* he saith, Thy throne, O *God*, is for *ever* and *ever*." (Heb. i. 8). And this explains those numerous and striking analogies which are so often observed between the reign of Christ in the church and in the hearts of men and the realm of nature and providence. The realm of nature and the kingdom of Christ are only different parts of the same general administration. We cannot but infer that anonymous books which embody the same great thoughts in the same characteristic style have the same author, and the same laws and principles of government imply the same lawgiver and king. It were not difficult to draw out in detail a rational argument of this kind which would confirm and establish the doctrine of revelation which we are considering. The traditions or the intuitions of the old Greeks taught them to believe in a trinity of divine personages, and that the direct administration of the government, rested not upon the universal Father, but upon his son and daughter. And imperfect conceptions, obscure revelations, shall we call them, of this great truth, are found in scattered rays throughout the heathen world. There are indications not a few which have convinced the Fathers in all the best

ages of the church that it was the Son of God, the Eternal Word, who appeared to patriarchs and inspired the prophets, who went forth with the armies of Israel as the Angel of Jehovah's presence, and who reigned as King of the kings of Israel under that peculiar name which foreshadowed his future coming in the flesh. During his incarnation, as rays of divinity shone through the veil of his humanity, so acts of creative power and exercises of authority in the material and the moral world often revealed him as the Lord of both; and in all these acts and exercises he appears as the agent and representative of the Father. His works and words all proceed from the Father as their original source. Or they are the joint acts of the Father and the Son, and the Son is the acting partner. "The works that *I do* in my *Father's name*, they bear witness of me" (John x. 25). "The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth *in* me, he doeth the works" (John xiv. 10).

The same order is observed in the entire work of redemption. The Father is represented as the author or source, and the Son as the agent in the work. *Of* him are ye *in* Christ Jesus, who *of* God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption" (1 Cor. i. 30). And this agrees with our Lord's intercessory prayer: "As thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, that the world may believe that thou hast *sent* me" (John xiv. 21). "All things are of God [that is, *from* him as their original source, ἐξ τοῦ Θεοῦ], who hath reconciled us to himself by [or through] Jesus Christ." "God was *in* Christ reconciling the world unto himself" (2 Cor. v. 18, 19); this is the whole history of our world as related to the providence and government of God, a history of redemption and reconciliation to God, proceeding from the Father as its original source, and carried on through the agency of his Son Jesus Christ. The ministries of angels centre in his person. They all worshipped him as the Son of God when he came into the world (Heb. i. 6); they

were continually ascending and descending upon him as the Son of man while he dwelt on earth; and it is only through him that the heavens are opened for their ministrations (John i. 51). He shed forth the Spirit on the day of Pentecost (Acts ii. 33); and all heavenly influences have ever since flowed down to the church and the world through the same channel. The first Christian martyr fell asleep saying "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit" (Acts vii. 59); and dying Christians in every age commit their bodies and their souls to his keeping. It is the voice of the Son of God that is to raise the dead at the last day (John v. 25, 28); and in proof that this power is given him, he called Lazarus forth from the grave, and when he gave his life a ransom for many, many bodies of the saints arose and came out of the graves as the first-fruits of a general resurrection (Matt. xxvii. 52, 53). He is to judge the world at the final judgment; "for the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son; that all men should honor the Son even as they honor the Father" (John v. 22, 23). In short, all power is given to him in heaven and in earth (Matt. xxviii. 18). When God raised him from the dead, "he set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head over all things to the church" (Eph. i. 20–22). And thus he must reign, the *representative* of the church, the representative, in some sense, also of mankind, but more than all, and above all, the representative of the Father, till the church is triumphant, the world reconciled and redeemed, and all things subjected to his dominion (1 Cor. xv. 25).

4. The Son of God *is* God — really and truly God — very God, to use the language of some of the early creeds, clothed with all the attributes and prerogatives of proper Deity.

This is the natural import of the name. A son is usually

understood — is at least presumed — to be of the nature and rank of his father. We are surprised if in any case we find it to be otherwise. And when our Lord Jesus Christ habitually calls himself, and is habitually called by the apostles and sacred writers, the Son of God, as his characteristic name, this fact alone certainly creates a strong presumption that he is a truly divine person. If he is not so, we must learn it, in spite of this fact, from other facts and teachings of the scriptures.

But the facts in the case and the general teachings of the scriptures, so far from removing, greatly strengthen and confirm the presumption that Jesus Christ is truly divine. He is often called God in the scriptures (e.g. John i. 1; Rom. ix. 5; Heb. i. 8 et passim); and lest it should be supposed that this name also was to be understood in a subordinate sense, the attributes and works of God are ascribed to him in the same connection. Thus, in the oft-cited prologue to the Gospel of John, while he is declared to *be* God, co-existence with God from the beginning and the work of creation — the attribute and the work which especially distinguish the Eternal and the Almighty — are expressly affirmed of him who became flesh and dwelt on earth as the only-begotten of the Father. Nor is this a solitary or singular passage. On the contrary, the sacred writers, with one accord, with great frequency, and in a great variety of ways, ascribe to him the names, the attributes, the works, and the worship which are the characteristic and the prerogative of supreme divinity. And they not only assert this formally and dogmatically, but what is more remarkable and more convincing to some minds, they are constantly implying it, taking it for granted, acting upon it, showing practically that they look up to him and love and trust him as their Lord and their God, and actually honor the Son even as also they honor the Father. So that if Christ is a mere man, or even the most exalted of created beings, it is not easy to see what the sacred writers could have said or done more than they have said and done to

mislead the church into the idolatry which it has always practised in rendering to a creature the glory which is due only to the Creator, and which God has said he will not give to another.

Furthermore, while he dwelt in the flesh, with his divinity veiled in humanity, Jesus of Nazareth actually exhibited divine knowledge, exerted divine powers, exercised divine attributes and prerogatives. In his miracles, he not only healed sicknesses and forgave sins in the exercise of an authority which belongs to God only, but he controlled nature and imparted life; he *created* and *raised from the dead* by a word of power like that which in the beginning created the heavens and the earth, and which said: "Let there be light; and there was light."

If any choose to question the authenticity of these evangelical narratives, still the character of Christ, as it lies on the face of the Gospels, is not only too great to be exhibited by a mere man, but too pure and grand to be conceived by any human imagination, certainly by the humble fishermen of Galilee. He showed superhuman wisdom and virtue. His teachings were superhuman. His mission was totally unlike any one ever undertaken by any human being. He undertook and accomplished a superhuman work. Comparing him with the highest human standards, some of the greatest men that have ever lived, with the widest acquaintance with human capacities and attainments, — such men, for instance, as Webster and Napoleon, who were not predisposed to believe in the supernatural, and to whom nothing within the range of human possibilities would seem superhuman,— have declared that he could not possibly have been a mere man. He *was* a *man*, as we said in our Article on the Son of Man. He was the generic and absolute man. He was the model man, and the representative man. But there was something over and above all this. Beyond the utmost stretch of human capabilities and achievements there were divine powers and prerogatives. United in the same person with that universal comprehension of and sym-

pathy with man which proved him to be a complete and perfect man, there was an entire sympathy and absolute unison with God which proved him to be very God; and that, too, without resting the argument chiefly, or at all, on his frequent assertions of equality and oneness with the Father — assertions so strangely at variance with his remarkable humility and modesty if he were a mere man, but which so befit his whole character and life on the supposition that he was also God. When a being of such marvellous humility and meekness, yet such matchless purity and dignity of character, claims to be at once the Son of man and the Son of God, and calls himself habitually by the one or the other of these names, according as he contemplates his relations to God on the one hand, or to man on the other, the presumption arising from this single circumstance is strong that he *is* both God and man. And if our former Article showed him to be in the *truest* and *highest* sense man, after the loftiest ideal of humanity, the considerations brought together in this should suffice to prove that he is in the *truest and fullest sense* God, according to the best conception we can form of divinity. If the only-begotten and well-beloved Son of God, who always was and is to be in the bosom of the Father, in the nearness and dearness of an eternal fellowship and an eternal sonship; who is the manifestation, the expression, the perfect image of God, such a reflection of his glory and express image of his person, that whoever has seen the Son has seen the Father also; who is the agent and representative of God in the creation and preservation of the material and the spiritual universe, in the redemption of the church and the reconciliation of the world and the government of both, in the general resurrection of the dead and the final judgment of men and angels, in all divine attributes and acts, so that he is manifestly the acting Deity of the universe, — if he is not God, there is no actual or possible evidence that there *is* any God.

Behold, then, in conclusion of this whole discussion —

behold our perfect type and pattern, the Son of man and also the Son of God, the Son of man and the Son of God in one person. Behold the true ideal of humanity, the Son of God as well as the Son of man, man reconciled and united to God, man on his own scale and in his own sphere the image and representative of his Maker. This is what Christ is, and what man was made to be. He who was originally the Son of God, in his infinite condescension became the Son of man, that they who are by nature the children of men might by grace become the children of God. This is what every man should aspire to be — a true son of man in all his relations to man, a true son of God in unison and sympathy with the infinite Father. This is what every man who is united to Christ is destined to become. This is the paradise which was lost in Adam, and regained in Christ.

Behold also in the person and the religion of Christ the medium through which this ideal is to be realized, the means by which this end is to be accomplished. The idea of *religion* which is contained in the etymology of the word is, that it *binds back*, restores, reconciles, reunites, man to God. The religion of Christ answers exactly to that idea. That is its very definition. And that definition is fully expressed, that idea is embodied, in the person of Christ. He *is* himself the Son of man and the Son of God, the God-man, and thus, in nature as well as in office, the Mediator between God and man, the days-man for whom the nations and ages have so long sighed, who *can* lay his hand upon us both. He is the bond of union as between man and his fellow man, so also between man and his Maker, the blessed *at-one-ment* whereby God is reconciling all things unto himself, whether they be things in earth or things in heaven, wherein especially *men* of all classes and conditions, nations and ages, who believe in Jesus, shall become one in Christ and God, agreeably to our Lord's intercessory prayer, "that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may be one in us." He is the divine-human channel of communication between heaven and earth, reaching

up to the eternal throne, extending down to the lowest and remotest subject, through which every sigh of humanity may reach the ear and touch the heart of the infinite Father, and through which, in return, all heavenly and divine influences may flow down into the bodies and the souls of his earthly children. To deny either his human or his divine nature were to break up the communication, were to sever it in the very midst. The channel would then reach only half way from earth to heaven, or only half way from heaven to earth. The religion of Christ manifestly is, what any religion must be to deserve the name, a divine-human religion. Its central idea is the reconciliation of man to God, and its central life and power is in the person of a divine-human Redeemer.

Finally, behold in him the pledge of the ultimate realization of this grand idea, the final consummation of this blessed and glorious end: *see* divinity on the cross of reconciliation; *see* humanity on the throne of the universe. And is this stupendous sacrifice and this amazing exaltation all for nothing? Had it no object? Can it be of no avail? The Son of God has lived and died for men on earth; the Son of man lives and reigns for him in heaven. Heaven and earth are reconciled. God and man are united in one person, and that person *reigns* head over all things to the church, King of kings and Lord of lords, having all power in heaven and on earth at his disposal. Surely then the church is safe. The religion of Christ will triumph. The interests of humanity are secure. Mankind will yet be one in Christ and God. The golden rule will yet regulate the hearts and lives of men, for it governed the life of the Son of man. The will of God shall yet be done on earth as in heaven, for that is the *Lord's* prayer. Men and angels shall unite in singing the song: On earth, peace, good will to men, glory to God in the highest. That will be heaven begun on earth. And then to be with Christ where he is, in the bosom of the Father; to see him as he is in his mysterious person, absolute man, yet perfect God; to behold

his glory, the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, Light of light, God of God, the perfect image of the Invisible, the Eternal, the Infinite One; to be like him, the purified and perfected children of men, and also the adopted and glorified sons of God; to be *in* him even as he is in the Father — that will be the perfect blessedness of heaven.

ARTICLE V.

FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE.

BY REV. J. M. HOPPIN, PROFESSOR IN YALE COLLEGE.

Frederick Denison Maurice was born in the year 1805. He was educated at Cambridge University, entering Trinity College, but ending his course in the smaller college of Trinity Hall, which he joined in 1823, together with his future brother-in-law, John Sterling. Being at that time a dissenter he did not take a degree, although he had a fellowship offered him. Two years after leaving Cambridge, having then become a member of the Established church, he took a degree at Oxford. He was for a short time editor of the "Athenaeum," and since that period has been almost constantly before the public eye. He has written largely upon theological and practical subjects; has originated charitable and educational institutions for the working-classes; and for three years he held the chair of divinity at King's College, London, which he was compelled to resign for alleged heterodox views upon the doctrine of eternal punishment. At the present moment Mr. Maurice is rector of the church at Lincoln-in-fields, London, which is a peculiar ecclesiastical organization, holding a somewhat anomalous relationship to the Established church. As a preacher he is without action or any of the graces of delivery, and has a decidedly sing-song tone. He has nothing to

commend him in the pulpit but a spirit of simple earnestness, and now and then the flashing out of a striking thought, showing the scholar and thinker.

To describe Mr. Maurice's real position in the English church and world of thought is more difficult. To do this we will glance at the state of religion and of church parties in England. There is much of a pleasant social aspect in the religion of England. At Christmas-time especially, when the wind howls and the snow falls, there is a universal kind-hearted entertainment of the poor, and abounding hospitality. The benevolence of English Christians, although often dispensed in a perfunctory way, handing down from the steps instead of coming down into the street to the poor, is an indisputable fact. A vast deal of the ample wealth of England flows in philanthropic channels, so that one's eye can turn in no direction without seeing the visible signs of this. There is also a marked reverence paid to religion. It has its recognized and supreme place in society and in the state. Mr. Gladstone, chancellor of the exchequer, addresses a meeting in the senate-house at Oxford on the duty of establishing a missionary college in Central Asia; and the lord mayor of London opens the Mansion-house to the Evangelical Alliance. Even the more devotional and spiritual duties of religion are engaged in with an apparent interest and sincerity by all classes. The duke of Wellington was a scrupulous communicant. Judges, leading members of the bar, and men in high official station, may be seen teaching in the Sabbath-schools, taking part in the prayer-meetings, and joining with the humblest and most ignorant in the services of the sanctuary. And in the sanctuary itself there is not wanting the delightful warmth of true worship, that spirit of common feeling and earnestness which is doubtless aided by the moving and majestic cultus of the church of England. There is also in English Christianity, or in its best aspects, a social refinement, a mixture of the free enjoyment of all that is truly good in nature and art with piety or the love of God, which is rarely found outside of the highest

Christian civilization, and which betokens the absence of cant and confined views of God and his truth.

There are nevertheless, it cannot be denied, inevitable evils connected with a great national religious establishment. The working of the huge machinery of the church consumes and grinds out its religious life. Where two archbishops, twenty-five bishops, and some ten thousand inferior clergy are to be sustained at the public expense, by taxes laid in part upon dissatisfied and dissentient communities, the bitter controversies, the ecclesiastical oppression, the destruction of Christian feeling and spiritual life, are sad and fearful.

Whatever the style and character of the clergyman may be, the simple fact that he is placed arbitrarily over a religious society that must bear with him whether they sympathize with him or no, cannot but be productive of pride and exclusiveness on the one side, and moodiness and actual hostility on the other. The cause of a pure faith suffers. The connection of church and state now, as of old, in more as well as less enlightened countries, necessarily in the end enfeebles and degrades the church. It compromises the loyal Christianity of the nation to follow slavishly the moral and social standards of the secular headship of the church. The national current of piety and opinion cannot under such a state of things rise above the level of the piety of the governing or aristocratic class. The English church, as some one has said, is in danger of dying of gentility. The clerical profession is particularly affected by this. The church which affords a place of refuge for "the younger sons of illustrious houses," cannot have the vigor and the spirit of self-sacrifice that churches drawing their ministry more directly from the people, and looking solely to moral and spiritual fitness, possess. "Plenty of causes have been assigned for this drying up of the clerical marrow; and the worst of it is, that any one of them is enough to account for the phenomenon, and therefore to insure its continuance. We incline to place among the foremost the wretched

distribution of public, and especially of ecclesiastical patronage, of which the last few years have furnished some flagrant instances. Under it, it has been publicly asserted that some dozens of first-class men who went into orders ten or more years ago are curates still, while people of inferior capacity, but of better connection or more pliable churchmanship, rise to wealth *per saltum;* and it seems to be an accepted axiom that unless a man is related to a bishop, or a minister, or a borough member of the right sort of politics, his only chance is to become a violent theological partisan — of the right sort again. Be the cause, moreover, what it may, there is, *de facto,* a secular tone about the universities which greatly astonishes clerical parents. Clergymen's sons do not incline to be clergymen; and the result of it all is, that whereas twenty years ago you took for granted that every man you met there was going into orders unless you knew he was not, now you take for granted that he is not unless you know that he is."[1] The education of an English clergyman in the university serves to make him too exclusively an accomplished ritualistic leader, rather than a sound and earnest teacher of truth. Indeed some have thought that the looser tendency of English theology at the present is owing more to the lack of that broad and profound comprehension of the fundamental truths of Christian philosophy which a full and thorough preparatory course of study in scientific theology gives, and which it is always difficult to make up in the after years of active professional life, than to any other cause. Certainly the course of theological training at neither of the English universities can be called a thorough one. At Cambridge the lectures and reading are chiefly confined to the examination of the Fathers, the history and polity of the English church, and the merely official duties of the parish priest. With some illustrious exceptions, the preaching in the English church is what might be expected from such an inadequate training — rambling, without solid thought, and, above

[1] Saturday Review.

all, lacking greatly in spiritual unction. The rigid stratification of society makes it difficult for faithful preaching, where it does occur, to be widely and deeply felt, and for religious feelings to be spontaneously communicated from class to class; so that anything like a general religious movement, or what we term "a revival of religion," is, humanly speaking, practically impossible.

Notwithstanding the formalistic and unspiritual character of so great a portion of English Christianity, we would gladly recognize the noble aspect of the English church as a whole, and we believe that there are no truer and more devoted Christian men and women in the world than may be found in all sections of the English church. Perhaps in England Christianity has reached, in individual instances, its most beautiful development. And there can be no doubt, likewise, that there is a deep substantial piety in the common people of England. Yet, as a general thing, after freely and gratefully admitting all this, in the Evangelical or Low church party, where this piety has its home, it is too often accompanied with excessive narrowness of view. Even though it constitute a staunch loyalty to revealed truth, in opposition to High church formalism and traditionalism, this piety is mingled with dogmatism in matters of belief and in ecclesiastical opinions. In contrast to Low church illiberality, as well as to the Romanizing tendencies of the Tractarian party, the Broad church party sprung up. Viewed in every light it was a deeply interesting movement. There can be no doubt of the original purity and earnestness of those young scholars of Oxford and Cambridge who began it. It was at its inception a grand protest for learning, light, and mental freedom. Such men as Julius Charles Hare, Dr. Arnold, Benjamin Jowett, J. N. Newman, F. D. Maurice, Archbishop Whately, Dean Trench, Canon Stanley, and their coadjutors, whatever may have been their after errors, and deflections from the truth, were undoubtedly the champions of spiritual liberty; and they were men of too large minds to yield a passive obedience to mere eccle-

siastical authority over the conscience. They contended for the full rights of reason and the rational interpretation of revealed truth. While holding faith to be supreme, they claimed the privilege of bringing all purely critical, historical, and scientific questions having reference to Christian faith and the scriptures, fairly into the sphere of intellectual jurisdiction. They thought that truth could not suffer from the broadest light thrown upon it. Said archdeacon Hare, speaking of the Bible: "We do not wrap it up in wool and lay it in a dark, unapproachable sanctuary. We know that it is the volume of God's word, and that therefore it has light in itself; yea, that it is full of light, and that this its light it is to manifest by holding its course openly in the eyes of all mankind, like that of the sun through the sky. Did we deem it a candle or a lamp we should screen it from the winds, and should fear it would burn out; but we cannot fear that either winds or clouds will ever blow out or blot out the sun."[1] They insisted upon the liberty of carrying out in their personal investigations of truth that individual reformation which is part of the great general Protestant Reformation, long ago begun, but never perhaps thoroughly completed, in the church of England. How temperate and yet bold is the language of Dr. Arnold in regard to the church of England. He says in a letter to justice Coleridge: "It seems to me that all, absolutely all, of our religious affections and veneration should go to Christ himself, and that Protestantism, Catholicism, and every other name which expresses Christianity and some *differentia* or *proprium* besides is so far an evil, and when made an object of attachment leads to superstition and error. The feeling of entire love and admiration is one which we cannot safely part with, and there are provided by God's goodness worthy and perfect objects of it, but these can never be human institutions, which, being necessarily full of imperfection, require to be viewed

[1] Vindications of Luther, p. 213.

with an impartial judgment, not idolized by an uncritical affection. And that common metaphor about our 'mother the church' is unscriptural and mischievous; because the feelings of entire filial reverence and love which we owe to a parent we do not owe to our fellow Christians; we owe them brotherly love, meekness, readiness to bear, etc., but not filial reverence. 'To them I gave place by subjection, no not for an hour!'" In his independent yet reverent search for truth, Dr. Arnold defends himself against the easy charge of rationalism, "in full faith that no truth can ever separate from the God of truth."[1]

What has been thus said in praise of the Broad church movement in its beginnings, belongs equally to the praise of Mr. Maurice, as one of its earliest originators and most persistent advocates. He has nevertheless peculiarities of his own which distinguish him from all others of his own party. While he is one of the most suspiciously regarded of all the leading men of the Broad church in respect to his theology, and is hardly considered by the great body of the Established church as belonging to them; and while he may naturally lay some claim to Unitarian and dissenting sympathies,[2] he is nevertheless a more than ordinarily tenacious partisan of the church of England.

Where others have gone out from her fold, he stoutly remains. He argues his right to do so from the original church articles and confessions. He shares with the Oxford High church party in their admiration of ecclesiastical formulas, sacramental virtues, priestly offices, and the visible unity and catholicity of the English church, giving them his "hearty assent and consent." He reasons as earnestly from the Prayer-book and Thirty-nine Articles as from the Bible. He claims to be "a Hebrew of the Hebrews." He teaches what the church of England does believe, or ought to believe. He interprets her ancient oracles. He calls back her erring children to the primitive faith. He is

[1] Essays on the Right Interpretation and Understanding of the Scriptures.
[2] Mr. Maurice's father was a Unitarian minister.

saying nothing new, but is ever laboring for the confirmation and establishment of what is contained in the church's creeds, rubrics, and prayer-book.

Other intellectual peculiarities give to Mr. Maurice an independent individuality of position and influence among the leaders of the Broad church. Without the thorough scholarship and fiery genius of Arnold, without the profound spirituality of Hare, without the masculine force of Jowett, without the solid reasoning powers of Whately, without the crystal style and reverent faith of Trench, he possesses a subtile intuition, a genius for generalization, and a breadth of Christian sympathy, which have made him a confessed power, have won to him such spirits as Tennyson and Kingsley, and are now exerting an important influence on the rising theological mind of the age. As another has said: "Mr. Maurice has enjoyed popularity beyond his school; public expectation has hovered about him." Men have asked, Who is this Daniel come to judgment? Who is this man who promises to teach us higher views of divine truth? Who is this unselfish and patient spirit that, in spite of persecutions, urges all to Christian love and unity? Who is this sympathizer with my doubts, my inward conflicts, my spiritual darknesses? Can he prove those glorious hints, those far-reaching and joyful promises which have sprung from him, attracting the ardent gaze of those who have become wearied with the old stereotyped theologies? Is he a true interpreter of God's word, or a false prophet?

It is not easy to answer these questions. Mr. Maurice's opinions must be derived from a great variety and multiplicity of writings on a vast many subjects, difficult now to collect, and enough of themselves to compose a small library. It is true, however, that in the spirit of the homely adage, one need not go through the whole to get at its flavor; and he is so peculiar a writer, that one can obtain a pretty good notion of the real significance or gist of his theological system without having read every line

of his works. He repeats in substance the same ideas endlessly.

But in the second place, and this is a more serious obstacle, his style baffles a satisfactory investigation of the positive results of his labors and his absolute additions to theological science. He is wanting in clear analysis and methodical development. As a writer his arguments rarely possess that firm and accumulative logical force which grasps and holds the mind like a vice. They are oftener nothing better than mere suggestions, or the more obscure relations of ideas. His connections of thought are concealed and even fanciful. He falls too suddenly from the main idea to the secondary or accidental. His preparations are large and imposing, but his result indecisive. Before you are aware that he has fairly entered into the heart of an important discussion you are surprised to find that he has brought it to a conclusion, and proceeds to make his generalizations as if such and such things were already proved. Thus he passes from one subject to another as if he had established his propositions by the most conclusive reasoning. He often raises questions that he does not even profess to answer. He trusts to the bare allusion to some new and valuable thought, and seems to take it for granted that all must see the idea as clearly as he does, and is too delicate and courteous to press the point further. He is a master of what a recent critic calls "the parenthetic allusive style," where it is assumed that the reader is in entire harmony with the writer, and therefore it is unnecessary to make the thought plain, but a hint is enough.

In his aversion to "technical theological language" he loses scientific accuracy. Thought springs from the spontaneous kindlings of his mind, rather than from a deep and concentrated fire. The vivider and more logical style of one of the distinguished pupils of his school, F. W. Robertson of Brighton, has translated to us many of the ideas of Mr. Maurice with far greater sharpness, beauty, and power than he himself has presented them. His obscure vagueness

is especially marked in scriptural interpretation, where he is forced to something like positive statement. There is constant tendency to refining and idealizing interpretation, which however, it must be said, if one analyzes it, will be found in almost every instance to take its consistent shape and bearing from the general system of truth which he has adopted.

Mr. Maurice has his merits as a commentator. He seeks to *explain* the Bible, to show that it is everywhere reasonable and consistent, and to develop its unity. His spiritualizing tendency springs often from his desire to retain the moral force of certain facts; to remove them from the outward to the inward world; or, as he would say, "to save them to faith." With a constitutional inclination himself to doubt, he freely admits and patiently weighs all manner of honest doubts. He takes as it were a stand outside of truth, and feels himself called upon to harmonize to minds outside all the difficulties of Christian theology. His tone is apologetic and charitable. He is anxious for the credit of Christianity with all men. This gives him, as an interpreter, a certain magnanimousness and large-hearted sympathy, which is doubtless his chief source of attraction to the best youthful mind. He has, moreover, a keen insight into the spirit of the author, and often shows true eloquence, or a power of bringing the reader into vital sympathy with the past. As to his use of critical scholarship in interpretation, we do not see much of it. He thinks more of bringing out the ideas that underlie scripture, than of the accuracies or niceties of philological discussion. He conceives that there may be even a danger in a critical method of studying scripture, and of accepting too unhesitatingly the dicta of scholars. His views on this point are expressed in the introduction to his work on the Unity of the New Testament. He says: "The modern Tübingen school, which has carried its speculations respecting the contradictions of apostles and evangelists further than any other; which assumes a direct contrast between the spir-

itual school of Paul and the Judaical school of James, Peter, and John; which limits the genuine epistles of St. Paul to four or five; which affirms the book of Revelation to be really the work of St. John *because* it is in direct opposition to St. Paul's doctrine; which takes the fourth Gospel to be a work of the second century, one that for the first time established Christian theology upon an Alexandrian basis, — this school has brought its erudition and its modern philosophy to explain those discrepancies in the character and primary objects of the books of the New Testament, which it supposes us all tacitly to admit, though we may express ourselves in ambiguous language respecting them. Now I do not say that if the notions of our commentators, our apologists, and our harmonists have sanctioned those which have crept into our schools, and are more and more pervading all our minds, are admitted, there is *no* refuge except in the conclusions of Bauer and his disciples, or in some others which may grow out of them. But I must confess my opinion, that the conflict with the learning of these teachers will be a very hard one, and ultimately a very useless one, if we are not prepared to reconsider the grounds which we and they have in common. We may now and then defeat them in a war of posts; they may be detected in perversions of ecclesiastical history, or in abuses of their critical skill; but the onlookers will regard it as a question for critics to settle among themselves."[1] He takes higher ground. Sceptics as well as Christians have to account for the great power of Christianity in the world, for the new divine life which Christ has introduced into human consciousness. Some ground respecting Christ must be taken. The Straussian view acknowledges this universal demand, but it does not satisfactorily explain the phenomena of Christianity. He would then approach the scriptures in a more reverent spirit, assuming that in the scriptures the truth of Christ is plainly revealed; and that Christ is revealed just as personally, just as livingly in the Epistles as he is in

[1] The Unity of the New Testament, p. 5.

the Gospels, and in the Acts of the Apostles as in the Gospel of John, though it may be under different aspects. In a word, he would interpret the scriptures in the spirit of Christian faith, in the humble acknowledgment of the real manifestation of God in Christ, and the truth of the existence of Christ's kingdom already in the world,—the greatest fact of the world's history.

Although conscious of our inability to give anything like a true delineation, we shall endeavor, as far as we have been able to arrive at definite conclusions, to present a brief survey of Mr. Maurice's theological views where they have anything peculiar in them, without attempting to pronounce upon their truth or error. We shall enter into no labored arguments to refute or defend them. They will find their commendation or reprobation in every intelligent Christian mind. We shall strive, however, to bring them out fairly, and shall make the author, as far as possible, speak for himself.

Maurice's Theology.

Never was the familiar saying truer of any one than of this author, that "the style is the man." The marked illogical character of his writing is an essential part of his religious philosophy. Although his treatises on ancient, patristic, and medieval philosophy show learning, comprehensive reading, and we must conclude considerable power of rapid and penetrating discrimination; yet that he has a truly philosophic mind we should doubt. With Luther, he despises logic in theology. He quotes Luther's saying, that "it is a vain phantasy to speak of a logic of belief. No syllogistic form harmonizes with divine things." In commenting upon Luther's denunciation of logic as an organ of faith, he says: "the syllogism was as little to be borne in the realm of faith as the notion that a succession of good acts come from a good habit, and so a good man."[1]

In opposition to the dialectical form of reasoning upon

[1] Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, p. 113.

divine truth adopted by Calvin, and derived from the scholastic philosophy, Mr. Maurice belongs essentially to the new Coleridgian school, recognizing the distinction between the reason and the logical understanding; elevating the office of the reason; assigning the true province of divine things to that spiritual faculty in man, that "verifying faculty," which grasps truth intuitively, and is able to know God without the intellectual demonstration. This power he does not confine to the educated and thinking class, but sees in it the ground of religion, or the original capacity of man to receive divine truth. Here in fact is his strong point. He joins issue with those who would confine the knowledge of spiritual things to a particular class whose minds are specially or even supernaturally enlightened. He says: "where, then, do we differ? Only when you would make the mystery not an eternal, universal reality, but some apprehension of particular men. Only when you would make the initiated a pecular set of wise or spiritual men, and not those who are content to see what is true for them and for all. Only when you make the spiritual organ not an open eye to receive God's light which flows forth for all, but a peculiar organ in which peculiar men may glory. Only when the spiritual man in fact becomes the carnal, the natural, physical man; for that he does become when he glorifies his individual soul — his separate wisdom above *the* wisdom, the divine wisdom, which is for *man*."[1]

He does not, however, allow himself to be led by his philosophy of the ideal into the barren and profane conclusions of Newman, that confer upon man, simply through his reason, perfect power over divine truth, and sets him face to face with God. Mr. Maurice claims to be an earnest believer in the divinity and redemptive work of Christ, — in supernatural and historical Christianity. Through Christ he holds that man, that every man, may truly know God, and may comprehend eternal things. God has descended

[1] The Unity of the New Testament, p. 408.

into humanity, enlightening it, and lighting it up to the apprehension and enjoyment of divine truth.

The starting-point of Mr. Maurice's theological system, if system he has, is charity. He says: "It seems to me that if we start from the belief, 'charity is the ground and centre of the universe — God is charity,' we restore that distinctness which our theology is said to have lost, we reconcile it with the comprehension we are all in search of. So long as we are busy with our theories, notions, feelings about God — so long as these constitute our divinity — we must be vague, we must be exclusive."[1] Again he says: "This love was to be the ground of all calls to repentance, conversion, humiliation, self-restraint; this was to unfold, gradually, the mystery of the passion and of the resurrection, the mystery of justification by faith, of the new life, of Christ's ascension and priesthood, of the descent of the Spirit, of the unity of the church; this was to be the induction into the deepest mystery of all, the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."[2] Still again: "I have learned to say to myself: 'Take away the love of God, and you take away everything.' The Bible sets forth the revelation of that love, or it is good for nothing."[3] It is on this love, or on the living God himself revealed by Christ in love, that Mr. Maurice builds his theology. "They may build their theology upon certain deductions of the intellect, or upon certain individual consciousnesses; mine rests on the eternal love which overlooks all distinctions, which embraces the universe."[4] This resting immediately on the love of God, on God as revealed in Christ, and not on any human speculations about God, takes his theology, he holds, entirely out of the region of speculative theology, and makes it a *practical* matter with every man. The reasonings and abstractions of scientific theology are rendered unnecessary. "This faith is not notional, but practical; not for this and that man, but for mankind."[5] He loves John's Gospel above all, because it

[1] Theological Essays (Redfield's Am. ed.), p. 7. [2] Ibid., p. 5.
[3] Ibid., p. 9. [4] Ibid., p. 115. [5] Ibid., p. 320.

is thus practical, and delivers us from systematic theology. "If theology is a collection of dry husks, the granaries which contain those husks will be set on fire, and nothing will quench the fire till they be consumed. It is just because I find in St. John the grain which those husks sometimes conceal, for which they are sometimes a substitute; it is just because theology in his Gospel offers itself to us as a living root, out of which all living powers, living thoughts, living acts may develop themselves; it is just because there is nothing in him that is abstract, because that which is deep and eternal proves itself to be deep and eternal, by entering into all the relations of time, by manifesting itself in all the common doings of men; it is therefore, I believe, that he makes his appeal, not to the man of technicalities, not to the school doctor, but to the simple wayfarer, and at the same time to the man of science who does not forget that he is a man, and who expects to ascertain principles only by the honest method of experiment."[1]

"I conceive that Gospel [John's] is nothing more nor less than the setting forth how Jesus Christ proved himself, in human flesh, to be that Word of God in whom was life, and whose life was the light of men, who had been in the world, and by whom the world was made, and whom the world knew not; how in that flesh he manifested forth the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father; how he manifested the fulness of grace and truth. It is because the theology of St. John comes forth in these human facts, that I affirmed it to be a theology not merely different from the systematic school theology, but the great deliverance from it."[2]

This Johannean theology, so pure and simple, which he considers to be the last and highest expression of Christian truth, beyond the sphere of analysis or speculation, he heartily adopts. His own view of it, which forms the keynote to all his theological teachings, may perhaps be thus succinctly stated: God has truly revealed himself in Christ,

[1] Commentary on St. John's Gospel, p. 3. [2] Ibid., p. 25.

so that he may be really known and loved. The divine love, or in other words, the living and loving God, was actually manifested in Christ as the light and life of all men. He did actually descend into all humanity, and does form the real ground of every man's sonship with God the Father, redeeming our human nature from its godlessness, selfishness, sin, and death. The Christian life is only a true recognition of, or awakening unto, this great fact, that God is united to us in Christ to redeem us. The church is the brotherhood of those who have already made the glad discovery of this truth, who have opened their eyes to see this Light which is come into the world and into their own souls.

This gives but a general and imperfect idea of Mr. Maurice's scheme of theology. We cannot now notice the numberless modifications, varied expressions, and careful shadings and guardings whereby his views are defended from the charge of heretical breadth and novelty, or of being a new gospel, and especially of being another form of Unitarianism. But we proceed to a more particular statement of our author's theological opinions.

Christ and the Atonement.

Maurice recognizes the fact that the world's faith is more and more settling around Christ as the central object of faith, as personal God and Redeemer. Neander, the greatest theologian of this century, has taught us to see that faith in the incarnate God is the life-seed of religion; and that God was not only "manifest in the flesh" as an outer historic fact, but that through all ages, God is constantly manifesting and revealing himself as one with man's spirit in the inner Christian consciousness. The union of divinity with humanity in Christ is the essential truth of faith. This truth — this marvellous fact of the real union of God with man in the human and divine personality of Christ — is where Mr. Maurice plants himself. He looks upon it as a fact accomplished, ever present, ever efficient, and eternal.

Christ *has taken* the nature of every man.[1] Christ the Son is the express image of God the Father, and after this image of Christ man has been formed; so that every man's nature possesses, in some true sense, a divine likeness and sonship.[2] "Do we not really believe that Christ was, before he took human flesh and dwelt among us? Do we not suppose that he actually conversed with prophets and patriarchs, and made them aware of his presence? Or is this a mere arid dogma, which we prove out of Pearson, and which has nothing to do with our inmost convictions, with our very life? How has it become so? Is it not because we do not accept the New Testament explanation of these appearances and manifestations; because we do not believe *that Christ is in every man* the source of all light that ever visits him, the root of all the righteous thoughts and acts that he is ever able to conceive or do?"[3]

"I conceive that we have the highest warrant for believing that St. Paul's special work was to carry this message to the nations, to tell men that the Son of God was *in* them; that he was the real head and root of their humanity; that apart from him they had no life or righteousness or unity at all; to bring out this fact in relation to the experiences of their own minds, to the facts of history, to the calling of the chosen people, to their law, to the order of society, to the past, present, future condition of the world. He was to show how our Lord's incarnation, his death, resurrection, ascension, bore upon and explained his relation to human beings, expounded the riddle of their own existence, confuted the innumerable evidences which outward and inward facts seemed to oppose to a belief in his actual fellowship with them and dominion over them."[4]

By such passages, and multitudes that might be quoted, it is evident that Mr. Maurice lays peculiar stress upon the general truth of the incarnation, of the manifestation through Christ, of divinity in humanity, of Christ's common headship

[1] Theological Essays, p. 96.
[2] Ibid., p. 96.
[3] Ibid., p. 49.
[4] The Unity of the New Testament, p. 353.

of the race — making this by far more prominent than the special truth of the atonement. Christ is regarded by him as the type of human nature, as expressing its normal state, as revealing its true life, duty, death, and resurrection. Indeed, he assails many of the orthodox views of the atonement, charging them with being artificial and scholastic, instead of evangelical.[1] He inveighs especially against the idea that the atonement was for the purpose of reconciling, propitiating, or changing the will of God; but holds, on the contrary, that Christ was the most perfect expression of that divine will.

Mr. Maurice's own idea of the atonement is very obscurely stated, and seems to grow out of his general view of Christ's relations to humanity. Christ having thus joined himself to our nature, and being in every man, then it follows that the atonement for man's sin, which brings man to stand complete in Christ's righteousness, is simply the fact that Christ as man, as one with humanity, as thus completely representing humanity, has lived a perfectly righteous life, and above all, has manifested that spirit of perfect *self-sacrifice* to do the will of God, which found its culmination in the cross. "The broad and simple gospel, that God hath set forth his Son as the propitiation for sin, that he has offered himself for the sins of the world, meets all the desires of these heart-stricken sinners. It declares to them the fulness of God's love, sets forth the Mediator *in whom they are at one* with the Father. It brings divine love and human suffering into direct and actual union. It shows him who is one with God and one with man, *perfectly giving up that self-will* which has been the cause of all men's crimes and all their misery."[2]

In Christ humanity has conquered sin, and manifested a perfect obedience of, or union with, the will of God. This, he thinks, constitutes the true or essential atonement. As to the literal sacrifice and death of our Lord, Mr. Maurice speaks thus: "It was *the* divine death and *the* human death,

[1] Theological Essays, p. 107. [2] Ibid., p. 108.

the death which manifested the mind and will of the Father; it was the death in which all men were to see their own."[1] And again: "As the conscience was awakened by God's teaching more and more clearly to perceive that all resistance to God lies in the setting up of self; that this is the great barrier between him and his revolted creatures; it began to be understood that the atonement of man with man must have its basis in an atonement of God with man, and that the same sacrifice was needed for both. One thing yet remained to be learned, the most wonderful lesson of all; and yet of which God had been giving the elements, line upon line, precept upon precept, from the beginning. Could sacrifice originate in God? Could it be made, not first *to* him, but first *by* him? Could the sacrifices of men be the effect, not the cause, of his love and free grace to them? All our Lord's discourses concerning himself and his father, concerning his own acts as being merely the fulfilment of his Father's will, concerning the love which the Father had to him because he laid down his life for the sheep, — had been bringing these mysteries to light; had been preparing the humble and meek to confess, with wonder and contrition, that in every selfish act they had been fighting against the unselfish God, — that in every self-sacrificing act they had been merely yielding to him, — merely submitting to die, according to the law of his eternal being, which he had created men to show forth."[2] And yet again: "I have maintained that his death alone could take away the sin of the world, because it alone could satisfy the perfectly loving mind of God; because it alone could unite mankind to God in the person of his Son and our Lord, who was known before the foundation of the world, but who was manifested in the latter day on Calvary; because it alone could draw the minds of all men, each wandering in his own way, seeking his own ends, to the one centre."[3]

[1] St. John's Gospel, Dis. XXVII. p. 426.
[2] St. John's Gospel, Dis. XXI. p. 333.
[3] Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament, p. xii.

Quotations might be multiplied on this point, but they would make the general idea no plainer — that, according to this view, the atonement, in the place of being a sacrifice for sin, satisfying the claim of the divine law of holiness, and removing its condemnation, consisted in Christ's manifestation for all humanity represented in him, of the holy and perfect will of the Father, to the entire sacrifice or giving up of his own will. The solemn testimony to this, the last indubitable sealing of its truth, was the shedding of his blood on the cross. Hence it was in essence wholly a moral or spiritual act in Christ's mind. It was, for once, the expression of an entire compliance with the divine will on the part of man, and of a perfectly fulfilled righteousness. This restored man, in Christ, to the love of God — this really brought him once more in union and fellowship with the divine heart. It requires very little penetration to see that this view, whether true or false, differs substantially from the prevailing creed of the Christian church on the subject of the atonement. Christ dying for the sins of the whole world, however variously and as yet ineffectually explained, and however perhaps inexplicable, is not, in point of simple fact, Christ leading a perfectly righteous life even unto death, and thus bringing humanity in himself into oneness with God.

Faith.

The act of faith, whereby the atonement is appropriated or made effectual to the soul of the believer, is thus stated, we will not say clearly, in Mr. Maurice's own words. In a sermon on "The Perfect Sacrifice," he says: "But what if this wrong in every man was *his own self*, how could this be given up? How could this be got rid of? The text answers: "Christ, through the Eternal Spirit, offered *himself* to God." He made that wonderful sacrifice; he gave up, not something else, but himself. And this was not done by some mighty effort of his own. "By the Eternal Spirit he offered himself up to God"; he merely yielded himself

to God's will; God himself prepared the sacrifice. And how does that benefit us? How can we give up ourselves the more for knowing this? *We give up ourselves when we acknowledge that we have no power to give up ourselves; that it is Christ alone who could make the sacrifice for us all.* Each one of us does not try to do something in himself; he does not try to draw near to God in himself; he is content to own that he has no life except in Christ, and that he can draw nigh to God only in him; and he owns that even this he cannot do by any effort of his own will; he can only do it by the eternal Spirit which is in Christ, and by which he moves the members of his body. Now, brethren, this faith does not merely take away particular sins, it takes away the root of sin; it takes away that conscience of sin of which the apostle speaks. For the root of sin is our self-will; the conscience of it is finding out this self-will in ourselves. When we approach God as our reconciled Father in Christ, who accepts us for his sake, and bestows his Spirit upon us for his sake, *we give up our self-will, we acknowledge that our life is not in ourselves, but in him*, and that from him must come forth the power which enables us to enjoy the new life that we have in him. It is thus that the life-blood which is in Christ purges our consciences from dead works to serve the living God. For separate from God all our works must be dead; but this blood of Christ testifies that we are united to him. Where the will of God does not inspire our wills all our works must be dead. But this blood of Christ is a stream of life coming forth from God himself to quicken the spirits and souls and bodies of his creatures."[1] He says again, more definitely: "Finally, learn that faith is the giving up of your own will to God's will; resting in him because you cannot rest in yourselves; living in him because you have no life of your own."[2] Even Christ surrenders his will to God. Faith, by this view, is doing the same, through his power in us, and is thus an appropriation of the benefits of the redeeming work, by

[1] Christmas-day and other Sermons, p, 111. [2] Ibid., p. 184.

resting in the Spirit of Christ or in the will of God. It is an act of self-surrender, or rather suffering Christ as our representative to make this self-surrender for us. "Christ is in us, and we may know him if we will give up ourselves." [1]

Justification and Regeneration.

It follows, according to Mr. Maurice's theory, that the saving results of the atonement consist simply in man's coming to see or to realize, or by giving up his selfish, sensual, and unbelieving blindness of heart, to know in what near and filial relations he stands to God in Christ. No new relation is created or needed, but the eternal relation of man to God in Christ becomes practically apprehended. When this is done, the man stands righteous in Christ before God, and born into his kingdom, taking hold with joy and freedom of his full rights as a child of God. Then, like Job, he discovers with delight the real righteousness of Christ within him, and is at peace. "You have such a righteousness. It is deeper than all the iniquity which is in you. It lies at the very ground of your existence. And this righteousness dwells not merely in a law which is condemning you, it dwells in a Person in whom you may trust. The righteous Lord of man is with you, not in some heaven to which you must ascend that you may bring him down; in some hell to which you must dive that you may raise him up; but nigh you, at your heart." [2] The justified and renewed life is considered to be the actual coming into the conscious possession of that which is every man's right, but which is shut up and obscured by an ignorant unbelief. Our author says to all men, all sinners: "Claim your portion in the eternal truth and love and righteousness which he has manifested to you, and of which he has made you heirs; for you are members of Christ's body, and Christ is at the right hand of God." [3] Regeneration is an awakening

[1] The Unity of the New Testament, p. 409.
[2] Theological Essays, p. 51.
[3] Ibid., p. 205.

to this divine Life that has already come, a heartfelt reception of this divine Light that has already risen.[1] He who thus opens his eyes to the Light, who discovers that Christ is in him to redeem him, is new-born. He lives from that moment the new life of Christ. He is delivered from the old, separate, and selfish life, and shares the divine life of Christ, which is in the holy will of God.

Sin and the Fall.

From what has preceded we may see that our author's view of sin would diverge, perhaps radically, from the current evangelical belief. Looking at man more in the light of a child of God, or a partaker of God's sonship in Christ, than in the light of a subject of God as a moral governor, his estimate of sin becomes modified. Instead of being regarded as a violation of the express law of God, as an actual crime committed against an infinite Ruler, and punishable with an infinite condemnation, sin is held to be a a state of spiritual separation from God, through wilful ignorance of our relations to him, or through absorption in worldly and sensual things. It is, at all events, a state rather than an act. It does not belong to man's nature or being. It is not part of his substance; it is an accident and an anomaly of his human condition. Sin is a state of not knowing or loving God, whose love is the great law of our being; and men's burden of sin consists in "a sense of separation from a being to whom they ought to be united, apart from whom they could not live."[2] As to the origin of sin, or the fall, Mr. Maurice combats the common ideas of it. He considers "the great error and denial of our time to be the denial that man continued to be in the image of God after the fall; and following this, the denial that man was originally created in the divine Word, and that apart from him Adam, or any other man, could have any righteousness."[3] He supposes that man never originally possessed an independent

[1] St. John's Gospel, Dis. vii.
[2] St. John's Gospel, Dis. iv. p. 48.
[3] Patriarchs and Lawgivers, p. ix.

innocency or righteousness, but was holy only as reflecting the holiness of God, as being made "in his likeness," as standing in true relations to God. The fall itself, he thinks, consisted simply in man's ceasing to acknowledge that he *was* made in the image of God, that he did possess his righteousness, and not any of his own.[1] It was breaking the law of fellowship with God, and setting up a selfish claim and life. It was separating from God, and thus falling under the dominion of nature. A selfish existence away from God is the fall of man. And every man's sin now, he holds, is precisely the same as that of Adam's. The restoration from the fall is the renovation of our selfish and natural will to acknowledge God's likeness and will within us.

Resurrection and Judgment.

Linking man's resurrection with that of Christ, who has made himself one with man in life and death and all things, Mr. Maurice holds that the New Testament resurrection by virtue of Christ's resurrection, takes place at the time of death.[2] But death must be distinguished from all ideas of the grave. The mortal body of flesh and blood laid down in the grave, the prey of corruption, is not to be the raised body. The immortal body is the soul in its proper state, a "spiritual body," an incorruptible essence, the real man himself raised or delivered altogether from mortality, death, and sin, and having now nothing more to do with the body of sinful flesh, left altogether and forever behind.[3] It is like Christ's raised body, that was made entirely free from the bondage of death, by the victory of the spirit over the flesh.[4] This deliverance of the soul at death from a fleshly body, to assume its own proper body, relieves Mr. Maurice from the necessity of holding to the actual separation of soul from body at death, so that they must continue apart until the resurrection, or to any general future resurrection. The

[1] Patriarchs and Lawgivers, p. 55.
[2] Theological Essays, p. 129.
[3] Ibid., p. 129.
[4] St. John's Gospel, Dis. xxviii. p. 446.

scriptural resurrection is considered to be an impressive representation of the moment when man experiences his immortality, or the full revelation of God and of eternal things, above all at the moment of death. "And everything which warned a man that such a day was at hand, which roused him to seek for light, and to fly from darkness, was a note of the archangel's trumpet; a voice bidding him awake, that Christ the Lord of his spirit might give him light. And in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, by a fit of apoplexy, by the dagger of an assassin, the vesture of mortality which hides the light from it, might drop off from him, and he might be changed. What had merely seemed to him as some common earthly note of preparation for death, would then be recognized as the archangel's trumpet calling him to account, asking him whether the light that had been vouchsafed to him, while shadows were still about him, had been faithfully used, or whether he had loved darkness rather than light, because his deeds were evil?"[1]

Connected also vitally with Christ, the judgment is, in our author's estimation, an inward and spiritual, rather than an outward and formal transaction. The Spirit of Christ, ever present in men, reproves and judges them; presenting to them a perfect standard of life, and disciplining their moral sense, by arousing in them the love and fear of God.[2] The judgment of God does not demand, he thinks, any literal trial, any general day of solemn adjudication, but is something even now taking place, something eternal in its nature. At the close of the chapter on judgment, in his Theological Essays, he says: "Do we not require a redemption of all that is human from its chargeable accidents: *a judgment and separation which shall come from the revelation of him who has redeemed and glorified our whole humanity, between that in us which is his, and that which we have contracted by turning away from him?* Do we not ask for a day in which light and darkness, life and death, shall never be mingled or confounded again? Is their any one who seri-

[1] Theological Essays, p. 134.

[2] Gospel of St. John, Dis. XII.

ously believes that it is a day of twenty-four hours in duration which we are thus expecting? Is it not one which has dawned on the world already, which our consciences tell us we may dwell in now, which therefore scripture and reason both affirm must wax clearer and fuller till he who is the Sun of Righteousness is felt to be shining everywhere, and till there is no corner of the universe into which his beams have not entered?"[1]

In the italicised passage we have Mr. Maurice's idea of the judgment — that it is the full revelation of Christ in his relations to us, showing how truly he is made one with us, and showing us how far we have unbelievingly closed our hearts against him, and live a Christless and worldly life. It may be seen how faithful our author is in all his views to this theory of religion, consisting in a revelation or discovery. The judgment is a *manifestation*. It is the full and perfect indwelling of Christ, and of ourselves likewise, in our eternal relations to him. This idea is brought out in the following passage: "For we must all [not appear, but] BE MADE MANIFEST before the tribunal of Christ." A time must come when it will be clearly discovered to all men what their state was while they were pilgrims in this world; that they were in a spiritual relation, just as much as they were to those visible things of which their senses took cognizance. That which has been hidden will be made known; the darkness will no longer be able to quench the light which has been shining in the midst of it, and seeking to penetrate it; each man will be revealed as that which he actually is, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad."[2] The full discovery, probably at death, to their shame or joy, of men's actual relations to Christ, wherein they have, or wherein they have not, rightfully *recognized* these relations, and lived in them, constitutes, according to our author's idea, the real judgment.

[1] Theological Essays, p. 235.

[2] Ibid., p. 227.

Eternal Life and Death.

Mr. Maurice complains that there is a universal disposition to dogmatize upon the word "eternal," and to connect it invariably, in some way, with the idea of time. This was, he asserts, precisely the Judaic tendency in Christ's day, and which Christ reproved. "The sense of eternity — of a relation to the eternal God, to a Father of spirits — had almost forsaken these Jews. The sense of time — of a series or succession of years — had displaced every other in their minds; they could contemplate nothing, except under conditions of time."[1] Mr. Maurice holds that the idea of eternity excludes, especially and altogether, any idea of time, or of a continuation, succession, or duration of time.[2] He distinguishes, generically, the word "eternal" from the words "endless" and "everlasting." In his correspondence with Dr. Jelf, principal of King's College, he says: "I did not like, you perceived, the word "everlasting" as well as the word "eternal"; I could bear the one; I stumbled at the other. I am sorry you spent so much time in seeking for this test. I could have told you at once, if you had asked me, that the word "eternal" seemed to me a better equivalent for the word *αἰώνιος* than everlasting. Since aetas is the obvious translation for *αἰών*, the cognate Latin adjective seems peculiarly suitable to express the cognate Greek adjective Since there is nothing that apparently corresponds to the Greek substantive in the Saxon adjective, it must, I should conceive, offer a less adequate substitute. The passages which you have collected to show how closely the use of *αἰών* is connected in the New Testament, with the use of *αἰώνιος* greatly favors this conclusion. I was so convinced, on this ground, of the superiority of the Latin derivation, that I ventured to complain of our translators for joining with it the word everlasting in Matt. xxv. 46. My main objection, indeed, was to the ambiguity

[1] St. John's Gospel, Dis. xvii. p. 256.
[2] Theological Essays, p. 325.

which arises from the use of the two words for one; still I had no doubt which ought to have been chosen, which thrown aside." He says afterwards, if everlasting had been used strictly in the sense of eternity, he would have made no objection; and he thinks, moreover, the translators of our English version did use it in that sense. "They were too well acquainted with the controversies of the fourth century and with the history of theology not to know how important it is that there should be a word expressing a permanent fixed state, not a succession of moments. The word *αἰών*, or aetas, served this purpose. Like our own word "period," it does not convey so much the impression of a line as of a circle. It does not suggest perpetual progress, but fixedness and completeness. The word *αἰώνιος*, or aeternus, derived from these, seemed to have been divinely contrived to raise us out of our time-notions — to suggest the thought of One who is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; to express those spiritual or heavenly things which are subject to no change or succession. The king James translators, therefore, hailed the word with which Tyndale or some one else had provided them, as a generous addition to the resources and powers of the language. And they wished, I conceive, to raise their own Saxon word "everlasting" to its level. By using them indiscriminately, often together, they effected, to a great extent their object. Even in colloquial language, much more in considerate books of human and divine science, everlasting has acquired that impression of permanence which belongs to eternal, in virtue of its derivation."[1] The import which Mr. Maurice gives to the words "eternal" and "eternity" is, that they denote, primarily, a permanent, fixed state of relationship to God; which state is not a mere negation of time, nor is it, in any possible way, subject to time, but altogether excludes the idea of time; and is a state into which the soul may enter as soon as it comes into the true knowledge of God and union with his Eternal Spirit; even

[1] Letter to Dr. Jelf, p. 15.

as it is said in the Gospel of John (xvii. 3), and as John speaks of it in his Epistles. Eternal life, therefore, is, he thinks, in its full and perfect sense, something real and absolute, something like the nature of God. It has reference solely to the infinite things and nature of God. It is "the righteousness, truth, love, which cannot be measured by time, which do not belong to time, but may be brought within the apprehension of the meek and lowly."[1] "The eternal life is the righteousness and truth and love of God which are manifested in Jesus Christ; manifested to men that they may be partakers of them, that they may have fellowship with the Father and with the Son. This is held out as the eternal blessedness of those who seek God and love him."[2] And what, then, is eternal death but the exact converse of this? It is the absence of this true knowledge of God. "What is perdition but a loss? What is eternal damnation, but the loss of a good which God had revealed to his creatures, of which he had put them in possession?"[3] "Men are in eternal misery because they are still covetous, proud, loveless."[4] Hell is the state of unrighteousness; heaven is the state of righteousness. Eternal death is no more connected with time than eternal life, but is essentially that *state* of darkness and sin, whether in this world or the future, which results from the total loss of the knowledge and love of God.

In regard to the character of the punishment of the future life, Mr. Maurice thinks that it is punishment enough to be without the knowledge and love of God. "I believe wickedness, impenitence, and unbelief to be the worst tortures to which men can be subjected; that, as the possession of righteousness, love, and truth constitute eternal blessedness, these constitute eternal damnation and misery."[5]

"There is a sense of wrath abiding on the spirit which has

[1] Letter to Dr. Jelf, p. 18.
[2] Concluding Essay and Preface to 2d ed. of Mr. Maurice's Essays, p. 34.
[3] Ibid., p. 39.
[4] Ibid., p. 40.
[5] Letters to Dr. Jelf, p. 25.

refused the yoke of love. This is one part of the misery. There is a sense of loneliness and atheism. This is another. And surely this, this is the bottomless pit which men see before them, and to which they feel they are hurrying, when they have led selfish lives, and are growing harder, and colder and darker every hour. Can we not tell them that it is even so, that this is the abyss of death, that second death, of which all material images offer only the faintest picture?"[1]

As to the limits or extent of that death and condemnation, he says: "I ask no one to pronounce, for I dare not pronounce myself, what are the possibilities of resistance in a human will to the loving will of God. There are times when they seem to me — thinking of myself more than of others — almost infinite. But I know that there is something which must be infinite. I am obliged to believe in an abyss of love which is deeper than the abyss of death. I dare not lose faith in that love. I sink into death, eternal death, if I do. I must feel that this love is compassing the universe. More about it, I cannot know. But God knows. I leave myself and all to him."[2]

He defends himself from the charge of being a Universalist: "I have said distinctly that I am not a Universalist; that I have deliberately rejected the theory of Universalism, knowing what it is; and that I should as much refuse an article which dogmatized in favor of that theory as one that dogmatizes in favor of the opposite. I object to the Universalists because they seem to me to stand on the very ground upon which you stood. The word *αἰώνιος* is with them a word of time. Far from saying, as I have, that the substantive *αἰών*, by its very limitation, serves to suggest the thought of a fixed state out of time, they eagerly dwell on the fact that an age must consist of a certain number of years; it is terminable, they say, by its very nature. Therefore, at the end of a certain term, say thirty or forty thou-

[1] Concluding Essay to 2d ed. of Essays, p. 59.

[2] Preface to concluding Essay of 2d ed. of Essays, p. 61.

sand years, we may believe that God's punishment of wicked men may be over, and they may be restored to favor. I have an utter want of sympathy with statements of this kind; they clash with all my convictions."[1] "You asked me in one of your earlier letters to tell you what I thought of the cases of Judas and Voltaire; you complain in your final letter that I avoided the question. I certainly passed it by, because I wished to speak only of what is revealed. Nothing has been revealed to me about the state of Voltaire. I know a little about my own sin, about my own resistance to God's will; nothing at all about the length and breadth of his. Something *is* said about Judas: "It were [or had been] good for that man if he had not been born." This is our version of our Lord's words in Matt. xxvi. 24, and in Mark xiv. 21; the construing of them is difficult, but I have no other to offer. I receive them with awe and reverence, as the words of him who knows what is in man, and who died for man. Nor do I find them merely terrible, though they are so terrible. I think the inference of those who walk the streets of Christian London, from their observation of what is passing there, might naturally be, that it would be good for ninety-nine hundredths of its people, and of all the people in the world, if they had never been born. This natural opinion is immensely strengthened by the current doctrine among religious men respecting the fixed doom awaiting those hereafter who are sunk so low here."[2] Viewing this doctrine practically, in reference to preaching, Mr. Maurice says: "But, be that as it may, I do not find these everlasting torments, upon which you dwell, are brought home in our sermons to the consciences of particular evil doers. They float vaguely about in the rhetoric of preachers; the individual drunkard, adulterer, gambler, parasite, oppressor, does not in the least perceive they are intended for him. In his study he may have settled that they must apply to such and such persons; when he is brought face to face with them, he begins to think of all the influences

[1] Letter to Dr. Jelf, p. 24. [2] Ibid., p. 27.

which may have acted upon them from childhood upwards to tempt them into evils to which *he* has never been tempted; he stammers, mutters dangerous encouragements, and leaves them to think that they may go on in their destructive habits and find some "uncovenanted mercies" to help them at last. If they had been told plainly that the state of body and of mind which they have brought themselves into, or in which they have become fixed, is an accursed, damnable state; that from this they need a present deliverance; that God offers them one; do you think that they would have nothing in their daily experience, or in their inmost conscience, to confirm the words?[1] This is important and instructive; but if we omit distinct scriptural enunciations of the infinite evil and consequences of sin we lessen our hold of the conscience, we sap the foundations of morality, and make void the need and the reality of the infinite work of Christ.

The Church.

Mr. Maurice looks upon the church as the living witness and revelation of the love of God.[2] It is that portion of the human race who, being baptized unto Christ, have come truly to know God, that he is their Father. It is they in whom he is revealed. They do acknowledge that God is in them, and has redeemed them in Christ. All men are thus redeemed; but the church consists of those who duly acknowledge this blessed fact, and live accordingly. In them the light that is come into the world really shines. As to the true foundation of the church, he says: "I believe that this universal church is founded on the union established between manhood and Godhead in the person of Jesus Christ, and upon all those acts of birth, death, burial, descent into hell, resurrection, and ascension, in which his union with our race was realized, and his union with God manifested. I believe that as this union of Godhead and manhood rests, so the church itself rests, ulti-

[1] Letters to Dr. Jelf, p. 37.

[2] Theological Essays, p. 10.

mately upon the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, wherein is expressed that highest, deepest, most perfect unity which the spirit of men in all ages has been seeking after and longing to find."[1] As to the peculiar work of the church in this world, he says: "The church, it seems to me, exists in the world as a witness to mankind that there is a continual, divine, gracious government over it; as a witness to each nation that God is not less king over it than he was over the Jews; that there has been a more complete revelation of his government, of the mode in which it is carried on, of the purposes which it designs to accomplish, than that which was made in the old time, but one which does not in the least set that revelation aside or make it obsolete for us. The church is to tell men that the more completely divine any government is, the more human it is; that it belongs to all circumstances, ordinary interests, actual business. The church is to tell men, that if God was a Redeemer of old, he is a Redeemer now; that if he was the judge of kings, priests, nobles, in old times, — if he called them to account for their cruelties, punished them for their superstitions, reproved them for their exactions, — he does so still. The church is to tell men, that if God in other days took cognizance of the bag of deceitful weights and of the sins of the employer who kept back by fraud the wages of the laborer, he does so still. The church is to teach men that society exists for the sake of the human beings who compose it, not to further the accumulation of the capital, which is only one of its instruments. The church is to declare that any civilization which is not based upon this godly principle will come utterly to nought; that all the real blessings which have flowed from it have proceeded from the acknowledgment of this principle; all the curses which have accompanied the growth of wealth and luxury, from the forgetfulness of it. The church is to declare that the spiritual and eternal kingdom which God has prepared for them that love him is about men now,

[1] Letters to Rev. W. Palmer. p. 7.

and that they may enter into it; and that his government of this spiritual and eternal world does not make him less interested for the earth which he has formed for the habitation of man, in which he watches over him and blesses him."[1] In a word, the church is to strive not only for the spiritual, but physical and social regeneration of the world. This is the principle of that strenuous and generous activity of Maurice and his school, in all matters of educational and civil reform. He would seek to improve men as men, and to bring out in free and joyful action all their powers of being. He recognizes all the laws of man's nature as God's laws. He would call forth a large and noble type of Christian manhood. He has, we believe, proved himself a friend of freedom, in these days when the principle of freedom is undergoing a trying test. He would bring men up far above worldly ideas of living, of legislation, of morals, to the full realization and perfect development of his functions, rights, and enjoyments as a child of God, in that righteous and universal kingdom of God which is even now come among men. He considers this kingdom to be given to all men, or to be one in which, by baptism, we may all register our names and those of our children, and Christ will welcome us.[1] He looks upon Christ as the *personal centre* of the church, infinitely above human opinions and ecclesiastical systems, and in whom there is a real unity and headship of the whole church, or rather of the whole race. It must be added, that these broad views are often lamentably obscured in Mr. Maurice's writings, by much that is bred of a prouder and more exclusive spirit of high-church Anglicanism.

Concluding Remarks.

We may have failed to give a correct delineation of the theological system of our author, but it appears to us, through all its eloquent obscurity and haze, to be quite a simple one. It has, in truth, but one main idea, viz. that all religion, all truth, all living Christianity, is but the *revela-*

[1] Patriarchs and Lawgivers, p. xx. [2] Christmas and other Sermons, p. 80.

tion of that which is already accomplished for and in us. No new thing is to be done. There is no new act to be performed on the part of God, and no actual new birth or total change of the nature to be done or effected on the part of man. We are but to discover and to yield ourselves unto what is true and eternal in us. Our highest duty and our supreme attainment is simply knowledge. God is love; and we may and should all know this loving God. God has verily joined himself to us and wrought out our redemption in Christ, and we may and should all partake of and enjoy this divine life into which Christ has brought us. Christ is in us; our responsibility consists in not extinguishing this revelation of Christ within our souls by a separate, selfish, and sensual life, and in thus failing to find it. Our author inclines evidently to the belief that this life of God is so truly come within us, within the nature of every man, that it cannot be altogether and entirely extinguished. There is a depth of divine love in and toward man, below and beyond all the possible sin in man, so at least he hopes. Our impression is that he seeks to show what is the real essence of eternal misery, that it consists in a moral and spiritual separation from God. He would make this truth clear and operative to the conscience; and then he would leave it on this ground, for the present and the future.

But if a man were thus exposed to remain indefinitely, and perhaps everlastingly, in a state of ignorance and separation from God through sin, what would this redemption of every man in Christ, this actual union of every man to Christ, be worth to him? If the true knowledge of it never came to man, what would be the benefit of it to him? This is the practical difficulty with Mr. Maurice's whole theory, which he has never fairly met.

The personal, rather than the abstract view of God, prevails in Mr. Maurice's theology. The greatest work he has done as a theologian, is, we think, in bringing out the absolutely amiable, good, ineffable, and inexaustible loving nature of God, in opposition to many lamentably false views

of this. It is God really present with us, brought down into the life and daily needs of our nature, into our intimate and tender relations to him as his children. But has Mr. Maurice, after all, sounded the deeps of theology? Those great spiritual truths of divine sovereignty, law, vicarious sacrifice, pardon, reward and punishment, and their correlative truths of probation, free-will, sin, justification, which have tried the strength of the most profound minds in all ages, and which spring from God's infinite government over our spirits and prove the foundations of moral truth, laying their strong hands upon the conscience, and leading the soul, convinced and humbled, before the throne of the divine holiness, — these certainly do not stand out clear in his theology, although he uses all these terms, and discusses these doctrines. We fear that a soul under his teaching would never wake from its sleep of sin to *see* the glorious things of which he tells. His system wants power to reach the entrenched heart of apathetic pride and sinful rebellion. It is, in fact, superficial.

Yet our hearts gladly acknowledge the love and penetration of a mind that sees much of God in every man; and that believes that there is in every man a certain instinctive yearning for the divine goodness, for that beautiful and divine perfection of humanity which Christ himself manifested. He gives scope to the feelings and affections, to those profound sympathies which prove that a true theology has its seat in the heart even more than in the head.

We cannot but recognize in Mr. Maurice much that is noble, affectionate, and true. He is undeniably one of the leaders of that new and attractive phase of belief which is coming over the theological opinions of the age, softening some of the sterner features of the Calvinistic theology, making it less abstract and metaphysical, and more human, practical, and free. Whether this be a healthful change or no, Mr. Maurice, in the English world at least, is one of its most persevering exponents, and he derives his influence from this fact, rather than from any extraordinary original

genius. His views are silently permeating the theology of our day. Is it not well that they should be generally understood, and that we should strive to ascertain whether they be true or false?

He has, without question, said many quickening things, for which personally we would be forever grateful to him; and he has suggested, rather than developed or clearly established, what would seem to be some important truths; but we do not think him able to construct a new theology, or to reconstruct the old. He has not the patient strength, nor the philosophic grasp of thought, for such a work. His kindly and earnest spirit cannot but be loved. But he has a method of putting old truths in such new lights, and so much of his writing on religious subjects has such a strange look, that we prefer to examine further before pronouncing it to be, in all respects, "the truth as it in Jesus."

Whatever, let us say in conclusion, affects the religion and the religious mind of England, powerfully affects us. Her great thinkers think for us. Such a man as Mr. Maurice, with his earnest, loving spirit, and his constant devotion to the higher supernatural truth, we cannot but listen to with an affectionate regard, even when he boldly goes against our fixed opinions and habits of thought; while at the same time we reject those thinkers springing from his own soil and school who reason from the low level of naturalism and human science solely, and who exhibit unmistakably the spirit of virulent hostility to the revealed word. And even in respect to him, whenever our religious instincts tell us that he has, in indefinable ways, emptied the gospel of its old, immutable precious, and saving power, of its very essence as the "word of life" and salvation to our souls, we will say, though sorrowfully, to him: "we must leave you and take the plain, obvious meaning of scripture, without equivocation, without refining upon it too much, without at times being able wholly to comprehend it, and rest our souls in peace and hope on the simple word of God.

ARTICLE VI.

EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

I. The Egyptian Museum of Berlin, Prussia.

Extract of a letter from Mr. Charles M. Mead, Professor elect in Andover Theological Seminary.

Every one has heard of the bricks in this museum, the larger part of which are shown by the inscriptions to be more than three thousand years old. They are in general about one and one third feet long, six inches wide, and four inches thick. They are made of clay and *straw*, the latter article being used to bind the clay together, somewhat as hair is now used in mortar. It is undoubtedly just such bricks that the children of Israel were compelled to make; and these specimens bring vividly before the fancy the times when Pharaoh said to the taskmasters: "Ye shall no more give the people straw to make brick as heretofore; let them go and gather straw for themselves" (Ex. v. 7).

The tombstones, monuments, and sarcophagi in the museum form a prominent part of the objects that meet the eye. The extreme pains taken by the ancient Egyptians to honor the dead, and the great prominence given by them to the doctrine of a future life, contrast strikingly with the almost total neglect with which the Jews, according to the Old Testament account, seem to have treated the same subject. Here are preserved a large number of papyrus rolls which were taken from tombs in Egypt. It was an Egyptian custom to commit one of these to the tomb of each deceased person as a sort of guide for him in the wanderings which he had to make through the dark regions of the lower world. Prominent on these rolls is a representation of the subterranean *judgment* of the dead. The most conspicuous figure is that of Osiris, sitting on his judgment throne. He bears an inscription: "Osiris, lord of the Tattu region; Osiris, the great god of Amenti [the Egyptian lower world], lord of Abydos, ruler of eternity, etc." Besides him are forty-two small figures representing (if we may use the expression) Osiris's associate justices. Each one of these is charged with the punishment of a particular sin. The deceased is represented as introduced by *Ma*, the goddess of truth. He holds his right hand on his heart and elevates the other as if making an attestation. Before him is a pair of scales, on one scale a heart, on the other an ostrich feather, a symbol of truth. Not to describe in detail the remaining figures in the group, I will transcribe some of the writings found on these rolls, according to the translation given by Prof. Brugsch.

The writings constitute what might be called a sacred drama, the general design of which is to repesent the reception of the deceased into the abode of Osiris. This can be effected only by a trial in which the deceased is defended from the charges of his enemies and secures a full acquittal. There is generally given what has been called the negative catalogue of sins. As before remarked, the number is forty-two. Among them are the following: "I have done no shameful deed. . . . . I have not been a drunkard. . . . . I have not practised usury. . . . . I have not taken off the bandages from mummies. . . . . I have not been a hypocrite. . . . . I have not let my praying be seen. . . . . I have let no one hunger. . . . . I have forced tears from no one. . . . . I have not turned my ears away from the words of truth." The following cannot but remind one forcibly of the decalogue: "I have not despised God in my heart. . . . . I have not cursed the king, nor my father, nor God. . . . . I have never intentionally killed any one. I have never commanded any one to be murdered. . . . . I have not stolen. . . . . I have not committed adultery. . . . . I have not lied. . . . . I have not slandered." Prof. Brugsch remarks that these commands "may have served as a pattern for those of Moses." If so, it is all the more remarkable that in the Pentateuch the commandments are given in such a different connection and for a different purpose.

It is noteworthy that the deceased is himself called Osiris. He himself takes no part in the drama until after the result of the trial is announced by a chorus, as follows: "He is not turned away; he has not gone back; he enters in approved, and makes his appearance beloved; he is acquitted, and his command is executed in the abode of Osiris," etc. Then the deceased himself speaks: "I too stand before the lord of the gods; I too tread the land of truth; I too appear like the living God; I too beam like the other gods in heaven; I am like one of you; My course is assigned me in the land of Char; I behold how the exalted Orion moves along, how he passes the celestial sea.

This brings the deceased to the beginning of a perilous way, through which, however, he is protected by nineteen different gods and goddesses, to each of whom the care of a particular part of his body is entrusted. Sunrise and sunset were to the Egyptian emblems of birth and death. The sun was looked on as the most perfect revelation of the absolute deity. It was itself worshipped as a god. Prof. Brugsch gives a translation of a hymn to the sun, found on the gravestone of an Egyptian noble. In style and structure it resembles the poetry of the Hebrews. I subjoin a few lines, translated from the German of Prof. Brugsch:

"Thou God, the only living one,
Thou hast created all that is; thou mad'st
The universe of beings, man and beast.
In thine eye, the Sun, thou revealest thyself,
Thou Lord of heaven and Lord of the earth.

" Oh, grant that my soul may be there with them,
And let thy pure light shine upon me,
And let me behold the resplendence of the sun's disk,
When the wise spirits of the west behold him,
Who dwell sitting before the god Onnofer."

II. A Visit to Elkoosh, the Home of Nahum the Prophet.

Extract from a letter of Rev. Justin Perkins, D.D., Missionary at Oroomiah, describing a journey which he took in 1849 through scenes of rare interest to the biblical student.

In the new and revised edition of Dr. Joseph Angus's Bible Hand-book, p. 550, we read: "Of Nahum himself nothing is known, except that he belongs to Elkoosh, a place now unrecognized, but which Jerome (who lived a thousand years afterwards) asserts to have belonged to Galilee (Pref. to Com.)." But Dr. Perkins writes: May 23. We crossed the Tigris from Mosul, a little after noon, and were obliged to wait in the hot sun on its eastern side several hours for our muleteers; but we were the more content to do so, being near the ruins of old Nineveh; we thus started late. Passing up the left or river side of the ruins, we observed that the wall at the north end turned at right angles, having a regular appearance; and that there are gaps in the ridges marking the ancient walls, probably indicating the sites of ancient gateways, through which roads from the east to Mosul now run, doubtless right along the great streets of the ancient city. Our course was a little to the west of north, and twelve miles brought us to the village of Tilkeepa. Our road lay over a slightly undulating section of the great Plain of Nineveh, which, like other parts of it, is extensively cultivated with wheat. We saw several stags in one of the wheat fields, and they are common all over the plain. Tilkeepa, the village where we stopped for the night, contains about five hundred families of Papal Nestorians, being much the largest village of that people in this region. Stony Hill is its name, from the hills around it, which furnish ample material of that kind for the houses. It was here and in the neighboring villages that Niebuhr long ago heard the Modern Syriac spoken, which he pronounced Chaldee, and which indeed is nearly allied to that ancient language.

May 24. We rose before the sun, and travelled about twenty miles to the ancient town or village of Elkoosh. We rode many miles over similar undulations of the vast plain, which, as those of yesterday, were clothed with rich fields of wheat; but there were no trees nor streams; and in the villages stagnant pools and wells in low hollows — their only dependence — can furnish no good water. Their crops are all brought forward by the rains of spring, and the plain must be parched and dreary indeed later in the season. Our course was still north by west. We passed another

Papal Nestorian village six miles from Tilkeepa, the name of which is Butnai, containing one hundred and thirty families; and six or eight miles still further on we passed the village of Tiskopee (high hill), inhabited also by Papal Nestorians, containing one hundred and twenty families. We passed over extensive sections of soft limestone, the protruding strata of alabaster often glistening in the sun, the material being the same as that now found in the ruins of Nineveh and Nimroud.

Two miles distant on our left, at this point on our stage, appeared three white-pointed domes of the Yezedees — the Sheikhs, as they are called; viz. Sheikh Shemes (the sun), and Sheikh Haddee, and Melek Fâhirdin — situated at the base of a range of low limestone hills. The place is regarded as very sacred by the Yezedees.

Winding our way through these hills we came to a sluggish brook, a rare object in this region. Advancing still two miles, we rose upon the level plain of Elkoosh, the village now being in sight, three or four miles distant on the northern side of the plain. On our right was a Yezedee village, the name of which is Sharafeea. We passed directly north across the well-cultivated plain to Elkoosh, which is located on a stony broken declivity, right under the first range of the Koordish mountains, which bound the great Assyrian plains in this direction. This range consists of naked limestone rock, stretching far to the east and the west, a continuation of the same bold rampart which we had observed on our way to Mosul by another route, as hiding from our view the higher and more varied Koordish ranges beyond.

On our stage to-day we must somewhere have crossed the track of Alexander, in his advance toward the camp of Darius. "On his right hand," says the historian, "lay the Tigris; and on his left, the mountains called the Cordycei."

The situation of Elkoosh is very hot, lying directly under the Koordish mountains, on the northern extremity of the great Assyrian plain. A few pomegranates and figs were growing in small gardens in the village, the only trees to be seen. It contains three hundred families of Papal Nestorians. Three hundred of its men were slaughtered thirty years ago (in 1833) by the bloody Koordish Meer of Ravendooz, who sacked the village and nearly ruined it; his vandal hands not even sparing the books in the churches. The people speak Modern Syriac and the Koordish.

I hardly need say that Elkoosh is a very ancient town, the home of Nahum the prophet, whose grave is with the Elkooshites unto this day. It is in a small Jewish synagogue; an oblong box, twice as long as a common seat, covered with green cotton cloth, is placed over what purports to be his grave. The synagogue and tomb are now kept by a Christian, there being no Jews resident in Elkoosh. Many Israelites make the pilgrimage, and spend the feast of Tabernacles in this ancient and venerated place, even from Bussorah, Constantinople, and Jerusalem.

We visited the ancient Nestorian church of Elkoosh, and were pained to see the venerable walls dishonored by the tawdry pictures placed on them by the modern emissaries of Rome.

In the afternoon we rode up to Rabbau Hormezd, the Papal monastery, which bears the name of a Nestorian saint which the Papists detest; but by substituting a Papal martyr of the same name as that of the presiding spirit of the place, these not over scrupulous plunderers in that line find no difficulty in appropriating the establishment to their own use.

The monastery is situated about two miles northeast from Elkoosh, in a deep, wild, rocky ravine, under a bold, lofty cliff, some five or six hundred feet above the level of the plain. The place is very romantic, and well chosen for so unworthy an object. Perched on the side of the cliff is a very fine stone-arched church, that has come down from ancient times, and cells for the monks are built separately along the clefts of the rocks; the whole like bird's nests hanging high in the air on the almost perpendicular face of the cliff.

The path up to the monastery is formed by stairs cut in the rock. The wild glen smiled with a few small pomegranate and fig trees. We found at the church an abbott, an aged man — priest Emmanuel — who is more than seventy years old, and two younger priests, his associates. Under them are thirty monks. The abbott showed us the different apartments of their church, and the tomb of Rabbau Hormezd, which gives sanctity to the place. We inquired for their library, and were told that there is none, the Ravendooz and Amadia chiefs having sacked the monastery and destroyed the books.

From the monastery, the broad plains of Assyria and Mesopotamia are seen to a great distance. The town itself of Elkoosh also, being a little higher than those vast plains, commands a similar prospect, grand in its immensity, to the east, the west, and the south.

From Elkoosh many villages of the Yezedees (devil worshippers) are seen on the plain, twelve or fifteen miles toward the southeast, near two small isolated mountains, the highest of which is called Makloob, and the other Sheikh Mattie (Matthew). On the latter is a Jacobite monastery, called Mar Mattie. Legend says that three days in a year so many cockroaches fill the place that the monks are compelled to leave it, and the peasants of the region hasten to the spot and collect the sacred visitors, carry them home, and keep them in their houses, and even in their flour bins. A very religious neighborhood is the region of Elkoosh, alike in the estimation of Jews, Jacobites, Papal Nestorians, and Yezedees.

The mountains back of Elkoosh are singularly contorted, the strata being tilted and twisted in every direction, and into the wildest intricacies, though the general dip is toward the east, as in all these regions. Limestone is the prevailing rock.

May 25. After a refreshing night's rest, under our tents, we rose and

started a little after sunrise. We followed the base of the mountain westward, about two miles, over low, broken hills. On the way we came in sight of the Tigris, sweeping its course with its wonted rapidity, about three miles beyond us. We halted near the small village of Beeboozee, inhabited by Papal Nestorians, and waited for our muleteers to come up with us; here our road changed its direction toward the northwest, and led us over the rocky ridge by a cow pass, and down upon a fine grassy plain, about three miles broad, which runs up from the shores of the Tigris directly east between two parallel mountain ranges. This district, which is called Kayid, is mostly inhabited by Yezedees. Crossing a large brook at the foot of the ridge, we soon came to the village of Tilbash (hill of Kush, the name of a king). The peasants were planting rice near the village. A few rods east of it is the ancient Nestorian church of Mar Melus, which is deserted, there being no Nestorians now in this district.

ARTICLE VII.

EGYPTOLOGY, ORIENTAL ARCHAEOLOGY AND TRAVEL.

BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., NEW YORK.

It is hopeful for the future of Egyptology that the leading scholars in this department are combining their labors for a common end. The *Zeitschrift fur Aegyptische Sprach-und Alterthumskunde*, which was commenced in July, 1863, by Dr. Heinrich Brugsch, as an independent publication, is now issued under the joint editorship of Lepsius and Brugsch (the latter being Prussian consul at Cairo), and with the special co-operation of Messrs. Birch, Chabas, and other well-known Egyptologists. Mons. Chabas has lately published a second series of his *Mélanges Égyptologiques*,[1] containing articles from Drs. Birch and Hincks, and Mr. C. W. Goodwin. This co-operation gives assurance of important results in the interpretation of hieroglyphic texts. Already there are indications that the monuments of Egypt are about to yield up the mystery of the Hebrew bondage and exodus. The Bibliotheca Sacra has reported the supposed identification of the Hebrews by Mons. Chabas in the hieroglyphic group *Aperiu = Hiberim*;[2] and also the confirmation of this reading by Dr. Brugsch.[3] As the result of more recent investigation, Mons. Chabas believes that documentary evi-

[1] Chalon-sur-saone: Imprimerie de J. Dejussieu.
[2] Bib. Sac., Vol. XX. p. 881.
[3] Bib. Sac., Vol. XXI. p. 666.

dence points to Ramsès II. as the Pharaoh who received Moses into his court, and to his son and successor *Meï-en-Ptah* (perhaps the same with Amenophis) as the king under whose reign the events of the exodus took place. The argument on this is presented in an essay upon Ramsès and Pithom, in the Mélanges Égyptologiques, of which the following is a summary.

The sacred historian concentrates his attention upon the Hebrew people, without caring to introduce the contemporaneous history of other nations. Had Moses given us the names of the Egyptian kings from Joseph to the exodus, we should have had several important synchronisms; but he uniformly designates the sovereign by the generic title of Pharaoh. In the whole history of Israel in Egypt there is nothing so specific with regard to Egypt itself as the mention made of Pithom and Ramses, in Exodus i. 11: "Therefore they did set over them task-masters, to afflict them with their burdens. And they built for Pharaoh treasure-cities (עָרֵי מִסְכְּנוֹת), Pithom and Raamses."

That the Egyptians thus utilized their captives is evident from numerous hieroglyphic records. The familiar picture in the funeral chapel of Abd-el-Qurna at Thebes, representing captives engaged in the various details of building, hauling stone, making brick, carrying burdens, etc., each detachment of laborers having an overseer armed with a stick for punishment — has over it this explanatory legend: "captives employed by his majesty in building the temple of his father Ammon."[1] Dr. Brugsch gives also an inscription which describes the building of magazines for Ammon, which appear to have been depots for the various stores and animals needed in the service of the temple. M. Chabas finds in this an analogy to the *Miskenoth* of Ex. i. 11, where for "treasure-cities" he would read "magazines," in the comprehensive sense in which the same term is used in 2 Chron. xxxii. 28: "Hezekiah built storehouses [*miskenoth*] for the increase of corn, and wine, and oil; and stalls for all manner of beasts, and cotes for flocks." Here, then, are two correspondences established between the hieroglyphic record and the Hebrew text. It was customary for Egyptian monarchs to build great storehouses in connection with their temples, and to employ captives as their drudges under taskmasters.

M. Chabas finds also a third coincidence in a fragment of the papyrus Anastasi III., which he interprets as the report of a scribe, that twelve workmen who had been employed in the field at brickmaking, having failed to render their appointed tale, were set at harder tasks upon a building. This is a curious illustration of the story in Exodus v. 6 – 20, of the harder tasks laid upon the Israelites, when for lack of straw, they failed to return the required tale of brick. Such analogies serve to verify the biblical narratives from customs known to have existed at the era of Moses.

[1] Brugsch Histoire d'Egypte, Tom. I. p. 106. See also Wilkinson's Ancient Egyptians, Vol. II. p. 99.

The name Ramsès, which signifies "begotten of the sun," belonged to a numerous line of kings of the nineteenth and twentieth dynasties. It was customary to attach the name of the reigning monarch to cities, temples, fortresses, palaces, reservoirs, etc., built by his authority; and there are numerous examples of this during the epoch of Seti I. and of the Ramsès. With Seti I. began the fortification of Lower Egypt, as a defence against incursions from Asia[1]; but the great builder of that era was Ramsès II., who being involved in long wars with Asiatic powers, multiplied cities and fortresses in the Delta, to consolidate his empire in Lower Egypt. The papyrus Anastasi III. contains a brilliant description of the city and temple of Ramsès Meiamon, written by a scribe who attended the king in one of his visits to that favored place. The writer pronounces the city perfect: its public buildings surpass those of Thebes; the fields in its vicinage are of marvellous fertility; its market abounds in fruits, fish, flowers, and in delicacies of all sorts, daily brought from the surrounding country, and also by water, to its doors. From this allusion to conveyance by water, it is inferred that the city was in the vicinity either of the Red Sea or of the Mediterranean, or of a navigable branch or canal of the Nile. The fertility of the district in which Ramsès was situated, accords perfectly with the statement that Joseph gave his brethren a possession "in the *best* of the land, in the land of Rameses." Another papyrus places the citadel of Ramsès Meiamon in the vicinity of Ijor or Zor, the capital of the fourteenth Nome in Lower Egypt, which Dr. Brugsch locates near lake Timsah, bordering upon the canal that connected the Nile with the Red Sea.[2] From all this, Mons. Chabas infers the existence of an important city founded by Ramsès II. in the eastern part of the Delta, where the Bible places the city of Rameses. Add to this evidence the report of the scribes touching the foreigners called *Aperi-u-* [=*Hiberi-m*], who were employed in building a palace-temple for Ramsès II., and there is a strong presumption that the Goshen of the Exodus is substantially identified from Egyptian sources.

Concerning Pithom, less is known. The evidence points towards a seaboard city upon the eastern frontier. The British Museum contains a mutilated papyrus which records the fact that certain chiefs of wandering tribes that dwelt in the deserts of Arabia Petrea and of Syria, were authorized to settle in Egypt, in the vicinity of Pithom, with their flocks, in order that their cattle might not perish. This was the very reason assigned by Joseph's brethren for coming to sojourn in the land of Egypt: "thy servants have no pasture for their flocks, for the famine is sore in the land of Canaan." We would be careful against fanciful analogies between the scriptures and early Egyptian records, and also against hasty inferences from established correspondences. But, on the other hand, we must agree with M. Chabas that the Christian believer has nothing to fear from Egyp-

[1] See Papyrus of Berlin, pp. 38 and 81.

[2] Geographische Inschriften, Vol I. pp. 260–266.

tology, even though it should compel him to modify somewhat the received chronology of the Hebrew scriptures.

Dr. Brugsch has prepared a valuable help for the determination of Egyptian chronology in a study upon the calendar.[1] The materials for this study are :

(1) The Coptic calendar, which dates from the era of Diocletian or of the Martyrs, August, A. D. 284. The Coptic year commences on the 10th of September, and consists of twelve months of thirty days each, with the addition of five complementary days at the close of the last month, and of a sixth day every fourth year.

(2) The Alexandrine calendar, of Greek origin, dating from 30 B.C. In the division of months and the arrangement of complementary days this corresponds with the Coptic.

(3) The ancient Egyptian calendar, as inscribed upon monuments at Guertassi, Esneh, Dendera, etc. After an elaborate comparison of these several data, Dr. Brugsch reaches the following conclusions: the Egyptians had two or more distinct years; the monumental datation is based upon a civil year, which began forty days after the rising of Sirius; in addition to this year, which regulated all dates in civil life, the Egyptians had a sacred year, whose beginning was marked by the rising of Sirius; and there was also a scale of special eponyms for harmonizing the sacred with the civil year. Dr. Brugsch promises, in a second volume, several inscriptions which will furnish the elements of a certain epoch of Egyptian history; and also a reduction of the monumental dates and calendars to the Julian year. One such reduction, clearly verified, will lay a sure foundation amid the chaos of Egyptian dates.

The date supposed to have been won by M. de Rougé,[2] from a monolith discovered in the Delta by Mr. Mariette, is not accepted by Mr. Chabas as belonging to any known era. M. Mariette, an indefatigable and most successful explorer, found at Tanis, in a confused mass of ruins that mark the site of the great temple, a monolith of red granite, with a distinct inscription, of the era of Mëiamon Ramsès. The monarch is described as king of Upper and Lower Egypt, the most powerful of conquerors, who takes care of Egypt and chastises foreign nations, and who possesses the earth through the monuments erected to his name. This accords perfectly with the character of Ramsès the Great. The monolith records the date 400. But of what era? Some suppose it to refer to the Hyksos invasion, and thus to identify the great dynasty of the Ramsès with those foreign conquerors.

[1] Matériaux pour servir a la reconstruction du Calendrier des anciens Egyptiens Par Henri Brugsch. Leipzig : 1864.

[2] Rev. Arch., Fevrier et Mars, 1865.

But M. Chabas shows that this theory lacks proof from the monuments; and, moreover, that "the debris of information which has survived the shipwreck of ancient science," has not yet yielded sufficient data for a chronological system. If Dr. Brugsch shall establish his new construction of the calendar, we may recover the lost thread of this labyrinth of ages.

A curious incident brings the name of the youngest of modern emperors into direct association with the eldest of the Pharaohs: When Maximilian I. of Mexico visited Egypt in 1855, he obtained, through the favor of the viceroy, the privilege of selecting a few antiquities from the museum at Cairo, as souvenirs of his visit, to adorn his own palace of Miramar, near Trieste. These, with kindred articles previously purchased, at the instance of Maximilian, by the Austrian consul-general in Egypt, form quite a respectable museum. The specimens, consisting of monoliths, statuettes, amulets, mummies, and sarcophagi, are remarkably perfect, and many of them show great beauty of execution. Dr. S. Reinisch of Vienna has made this collection a special study, and has published his results in an elegant royal octavo, richly illustrated, and appropriately dedicated to his majesty the emperor Maximilian I.[1] Without design on the part of its imperial founder, this museum proves to have a peculiar character, in that nearly all its treasures serve to illustrate, in some way, the religious belief of the Egyptians; and it was with a view to the elucidation of this still obscure department of Egyptology, that Dr. Reinisch addressed himself to their interpretation. His readings of the Miramar monuments confirm the evidence from the "Book of the Dead," and from other sources, that the Egyptians believed in the existence of the soul after death, in the rewarding of the good and the punishing of the bad in the hereafter, and also in the reunion of the deified soul with the transfigured body. This last is beautifully symbolized by a bird with a human face and with the symbols of life gently settling down upon the bosom of a mummy as it reposes upon a bier.

In keeping with this belief was the formula inscribed upon the sepulchral figures — little images of porcelain, clay, terra-cotta, etc. — which were profusely scattered in the Egyptian tombs. These figures, according to the normal type, represent a person equipped with a hoe and a pickaxe, and with a basket for the purpose of removing sand. They were called "respondents," and were supposed to respond to the wishes of the deceased for whatever service he might be required to perform in hades. The formula reads: "Should I call upon you, get ye ready at once to do what is

[1] Die Aegyptischen Denkmaeler in Miramar, Beschrieben, erläutert und herausgegeben von S. Reinisch, Doctor der Philosophie, Privatdocent an der K. K. Universität in Wien, etc. Wien: Wilhelm Braumuller. 1865.

to he done in hades, to dig the fields, to water the trenches, to carry the sand of the west to the east."[1]

It is with a feeling of melancholy that we examine the solitary fragment of Dr. E. Robinson's Geography of the Bible, which seems to stand as a monument over the cherished but unfinished work of his life. We remember how many years his studies were directed to the elucidation of biblical geography; at what cost and risk his painstaking explorations were made: and again, with what assiduity he labored, with impaired eyesight and failing health, to systematize the results of these travels and studies in one work, that should embrace all existing knowledge of the physical, the historical, and the topographical geography of the Holy Land. Yet of this noble plan, for the execution of which the author possessed such admirable qualifications, we have only the Memoir upon the Physical Geography of Palestine Proper, with a fragmentary outline of the physical geography of the Syrian Coast.[2] True, the materials and references for the whole work are largely contained in the Biblical Researches; but only the author could have digested and arranged these in harmony with his general plan. Had he been willing to avail himself of collaborators, Dr. Robinson might have accomplished his original design; but his conscientious accuracy forbade him to depend upon an amanuensis for citations and references. Happily this trait has secured the completeness, so far as it goes, of that portion of the work which remains to us from his hand. This is divided into four parts: the first treats of the mountains, hills, vallies, and plains of Palestine; the second, of rivers, streams, lakes, and fountains; the third, of climate; the fourth, of geological features. The chapters on the flora and fauna of Palestine were not completed by the author; but the substance of them is given in the Appendix on Syria. We should have prized an essay from Dr. Robinson upon the changes of climate and of feature in Palestine caused by the destruction of the forests. But even in its unfinished state, this volume will be accepted as an authority, and will prove of great value to the student of the Bible. The style is clear and compact; the arrangement is scientific; the marginal references are copious and trustworthy. The work was published under the careful supervision of Mrs. Robinson, who was aided in the proof-reading and in preparing the Index, by W. H. Thomson, M.D., an accomplished scholar in the Arabic language and in the geography of his native Syria.

[1] This formula is interpreted, by Dr. S. Birch, in the Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprache, for March, 1865.

[2] Physical Geography of the Holy Land. By Edward Robinson, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Crocker and Brewster.

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT GERMAN PUBLICATIONS.

Substitutionary Suffering.

Der Begriff des Stellvertretenden Leidens entwickelt. Von Dr. H. Schultz. Basel: Bahnmaier's Verlag; London: Asher and Co. 1864. — In the first part of this very interesting and suggestive inaugural discourse, Dr. Schultz shows that substitutionary suffering is a *law of nature;* a *law of humanity;* that it is *rooted in sin;* and that it is not punishment, because none but the relatively innocent can be substitutes for the guilty. In the second part, he shows that though God cannot suffer in the vulgar sense of the term, he does suffer for his creatures in general, when by infusing his life into them he preserves them from destruction; and for sinners especially, when he sorrows over their conduct, sympathizes with their misery, and hates their sin. "His spirit of life and love communicates itself healingly and quickeningly to sick humanity, in the suffering of love. Accordingly substitutionary suffering is the grand thought of redemption. And this is the key to the mystery." We do not think the full depths of the question are sounded by Dr. Schultz; but still no one will read the discourse without profit, and its ideas would help to mellow our own views.

Infant Baptism.

Ist die Kindertaufe schrift-und rechtmässig? Von Adolf Stöber, Pfarrer. Basel: Bahnmaier's Verlag; London: Asher and Co. 1864. — This is a clever discussion of the question of infant baptism from the Lutheran point of view. Many of the arguments, particularly in the chapters on the early testimonies respecting infant baptism and on the mode of baptism, will commend themselves to all Pedobaptists. All Pedobaptists, however, will of course not agree with the views set forth, so far as they issue in baptismal regeneration. The treatise is in the form of dialogues, and is clear, popular, and cheap.

Jesus and the Parties of His Age.

Jesus im Verhältniss zu den Parteien seiner Zeit und zu Johannes dem Täufer. Von Lic. Dr. Kleinert. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — An excellent apologetic lecture on a subject of great importance at the present time. The parties touched on are the Sadducees, Pharisees, Galileans, and Essenes: and the sketch given of them contains so many new hints, that we should be glad to hear that Dr.

Kleinert was bringing out a larger book on the subject. Of the Sadducees he adopts the view expounded by Dr. Geiger of Frankfort on the Main, who regards them as the descendants of Zadok the high priest, and as forming a kind of hereditary aristocracy. The Pharisees, on the contrary, were the popular religious party; the Galileans were fiery zealots, ever ready for revolution; and the Essenes were the quiet in the land, of whom, however, Christ said reprovingly: "No man lighteth a candle and putteth it under a bushel." We wish the little book a large sale.

Judaism and its History.

Das Judenthum und seine Geschichte bis zum Ende des zwölften Jahrhunderts. Von Dr. A. Geiger. 2 vols. Breslau: Schlettersche Buchhandlung; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — This is not a connected history of the Jews, but a series of lectures on the significance of Judaism in the history of the world. Dr. Geiger belongs to the Reformed Jewish party; and is a man of great learning and ability. With the tendency of his work we are not at all agreed; but we must at the same time say, that it thoroughly deserves attentive perusal. It contains many hints which throw light on the rise of Christianity, and which a skilful advocate may use well for its defence. We can conscientiously promise discriminating readers a great treat.

How far Dr. Geiger is from being an Old Testament Jew the following thoughts will indicate: "The consciousness of sinfulness, that is, the consciousness of being naturally finite and limited as to purity." "Our sensuous nature is the mother of sin." "The Jewish nation had a genius for religion. There dwelt in it an original power, which enabled it to look deeper into the higher life of spirit, to recognize the close relationship between the spirit of man and the spirit of the universe, and so forth. And this was revelation." In other words, the Jews were religious geniuses, as Shakespeare was a dramatic genius. The peculiarity of Jesus was that instead of foretelling, he preached: "The kingdom of heaven is come"; "The time is fulfilled." Whatever he taught had been also taught by Hillel; so that one can only wonder that Hillel did not become the founder of the Christian church. In short, to our taste Dr. Geiger is more a Gentile than a Jew in his judgments and modes of thought. There are two appendices, one directed against Renan and Strauss, the other against Prof. Hultzmann of Heidelberg.

But notwithstanding our total disagreement with Dr. Geiger's positive views, we cannot but commend his book to the notice of our readers as remarkably interesting and instructive. One chapter — that comparing the religion of the Jews with that of heathens — has considerable apologetic value, even for us Christians.

A Defence of the Principal Doctrines of Christianity.

Jesus der Christ. Apologetische Vorträge über die Grundlehren des Christenthums. Von Professor Dr. Ileld. Zürich: Meyer; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — The above sixteen lectures on the fundamental doctrines of Christianity were delivered by Dr. Held, before mixed audiences, in Zürich, where for some years he held the position of "Christian Advocate." The subjects are as follows: "The Fundamental Fact of Christianity"; "Development of the Church"; "Jesus, the Messiah of the Prophets and the Christ of the Apostles"; "History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ"; "The Atonement"; "Faith"; "Justification"; "Sanctification"; "Difference between Christian Life and Rationalism"; "Holy Scriptures"; "The Church"; "The Sacraments"; "Christian Hope."

The soundness of Dr. Held's point of view will be clear from the following brief extract: "Two words, which express not a doctrine, but a fact, contain the entire secret of Christianity, — the two words, *Jesus* is the *Christ*. The circumstance that Christianity has this person, who as Jesus is altogether ours, altogether humanity's, and as Christ is altogether God's, altogether Deity's, constitutes it superior to all other religions, and will ensure it the victory over the world. Heathen religions yearned for atonement and fellowship with God, even the most degraded; for humanity cannot rid itself of the need of and hunger after God. The Old Testament possessed the firm hope and certain prospect of atonement. But as a fact accomplished, realized, Christianity alone is in possession of full atonement."

"These lectures," says the author, "seek to show that the present age, as truly as former ages, stands in need of the entire, full, biblical Christ; that it damages and disgraces itself when it allows him to be diminished and put into the shade; and that the innermost and best elements of man's nature yearn for the Christ of the prophets and the apostles."

We can unhesitatingly recommend these lectures as the very readable and stirring production of a warm-hearted, earnest Christian theologian.

Evidences of the Truth of Christianity incidentally supplied by Universal History.

Thaten und Lehren Jesu mit ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Beglaubigung. Von Dr. Sepp, Professor of History at the University of Munich. Schaffhausen: Hurter; London: Asher and Co. 1864. — Dr. Sepp, a Roman Catholic, is the author of a large Life of Jesus, which contains a mass of curious information, and of a work on Palestine. The work whose title is given above has special reference to Strauss and Renan; and comprises some sixty short chapters on as many different points connected with the history of Jesus. The following titles will give our readers some idea of the

contents: "The Family of David"; "The Star of the Messiah"; "The Year of Christ's Birth"; "Christ's Temptation"; "Jesus and the Woman of Samaria"; "Abolition of State and National Religions"; "The Miracles of Jesus"; etc. Dr. Sepp has collected a vast number of interesting facts from general history bearing upon, illustrating, and analogically confirming the life of Jesus. The first chapter, on the "Family of David," is of very considerable weight. The example of Hillel the younger is adduced, who traced his descent on his mother's side from David, and partly on that account was raised to the position of Nasi in Israel. Renan supposes that the idea of Jesus having descended from David was a later invention, for the purpose of vindicating his right to the title of Messiah; but Dr. Sepp asks: "If this were the case, how came the Jews not to protest against such an assumption? How came some of the Talmudists to call Mary a daughter of Eli; words on which Raschi remarks: "Jesus sanguine regio cognatione conjunctus erat." That it is fair to meet such notions by such questions is surely clear from the words of Josephus cont. Apion. I. 7: "Whoso wishes to become a priest must be married to a wife from his own people, and must bring proof of his ancestry from our archives. The same rule is observed wherever any of our nation dwell, for they all send lists of their fathers and forefathers, with the names of witnesses to Jerusalem. Our high priests keep written family registers, which contain the names of their ancestors for two thousand years back." R. Jochanan is reported to have once exclaimed, referring to this practice: "By the temple! it is in our power to expose those who are not of pure blood in Israel." And R. Levi says: "They found in Jerusalem a book of family registers, in which Hillel was shown to be descended from David."

But these specimens must suffice. Readers who like a curious and instructive, though somewhat unconnected book, will find Dr. Sepp to their taste.

The Life and Labors of Jerome.

Hieronymus. Sein Leben und Werken aus seinen Schriften dargestellt. Von Prof. Dr. Zöckler, Giessen. Gotha: F. A. Perthes; London: Asher and Co. 1865. — A life of Jerome, one of the most learned men of his day, the most learned of the early Fathers of the church, the man whom Erasmus styles the Christian Cicero, and who did more than any other churchman, to establish the principle of monasticism, must command the interest of every theologian. Dr. Zöckler has supplied a life deserving, in every sense, of attention. We have seldom read a German historical work at once so thorough and unpretending, so clear and profound as this on Jerome. It has been remarkably well received, too, by all the principal critical organs of Germany; even by such as deviate widely from Dr. Zöckler's orthodox point of view.

The work has the following divisions; Introduction, giving notices of

the principal editions of Jerome's works; of previous lives of the saint; and the plan of the present biography. First Division: 1. Birth and youth till his complete conversion to an ascetic life; 2. Ascetical and literary labors till his second journey to the East; 3. Jerome during the last twenty years of his residence at Bethlehem; 4. During the last fifteen years of his life. Second Division: 1. As a Christian writer in general; 2. As a translator and interpreter of scripture; 3. As a literary historian and biographer; 4. As a polemical and dogmatical theologian; 5. As an ascetical and practical theologian; 6. Estimate formed of Jerome by Christian writers in his own and subsequent ages.

Some perhaps may wish that Dr. Zöckler had given us more general pictures of Jerome's time, for example of the state of theology, of the preachers, of the practical characteristics of the church, etc.; he does, however, afford us many glimpses of the men and things of the age. The extracts from his letters are of great interest in this respect. If the space allotted to these notices allowed it, we should have been glad to introduce our readers not merely to the skeleton, but to the rich variety of substance gathered around it. The more such detail works are studied the clearer will be our conception of the early ages of the Christian church, and consequently the greater our ability to understand primitive Christianity. No one will lay down this Life of Jerome without thankfulness to its author. We may mention here that Dr. Zöckler is also the writer of a History of Asceticism, which is the fruit of long and careful study of the original sources; and that in conjunction with Lic. Grau, whose work on the Semitic and Indo-Germanic Nations we noticed in our April Number, he is about to edit a Journal whose aim will be to meet current objections to revealed religion in general, and Christianity in particular.

The Resurrection of Christ.

Die Auferstehung Christi und ihre neueste Bestreitung. Von Prof. Dr. Beyschlag, Halle. Berlin: L. Rank. London: Asher and Co. 1865. — A small, popular, clear, but able little book on a great subject. The argument is directed chiefly against the views set forth by Strauss in his last Life of Jesus; and are, to our mind, most convincing. We should, indeed, like to see a good translation circulated by thousands throughout the land. But to all who read German we warmly commend the original.

The Prophecy of Isaiah.

Die Weissagungen des Propheten Jesaia. Prolegomena zu einem neuen Handbuch der Auslegung. Von Dr. Fried. Hosse. Berlin: Verlag von Wiegandt und Grieben. 1865. — The author announces in this introductory work his intention to issue a Commentary on Isaiah, in which, more

than in the numerous commentaries already published, the prophet's utterances shall be interpreted in the light of their connection with the New Testament. A secondary object is to furnish a work in which the errors of Luther's translation shall be noticed, and new translations be adequately defended. As to the Prolegomena themselves, they consist of a condensed discussion of five topics: (1) The composite parts of the book of Isaiah. It is divided into two parts, viz. chh. i.–xxxix. and chh. xl.–lxvi.; the first subdivided into five collections: chh. i.–xii., xiii.–xxiii., xxiv.–xxvii., xxviii.–xxxv., xxxvi.–xxxix., and a brief summary of the contents given. (2) The critical question concerning the genuineness of the whole book. The author, contrary to the assumption of the great majority of German scholars, defends the unity of the book. He not only shows that the objection, that in the second part the prophet speaks of exile and desolation as already real, applies equally to passages in the first part, such, e.g. as i. 7–9, xi. 11–16, where a condition of exile seems to be assumed, and is inapplicable to passages in the second part, such as lvi. 9–12, lvii. 1, 2, where the exile is represented as still future. This reply the objectors easily obviate, in their way, by saying that the passages in question are interpolations. But he goes further, and adduces positive internal evidence of a unity of authorship. This he finds in several expressions common to both parts of the book, but peculiar to Isaiah; e.g. "The Holy One of Israel"; "The Mighty One of Jacob"; "standard for the people"; "the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it," etc. This section contains many suggestions which may well make one, even from a merely critical point of view, question whether an adherence to the oneness of Isaiah is any proof of superficiality. (3) A sketch is given of the historical relations of the prophet, and an attempt made to fix the date of the different oracles. (4) The fundamental ideas that characterize Isaiah's prophecies. These are: The designation of God as "the Holy One of Israel"; the term "servant of God" as applied to the Jewish people and to God's messenger; the revelation of God's glory as the final cause of his ways. (5) Prophecy and fulfilment. Here are given some general remarks about the principles to be observed in considering the relation of Old Testament prophecies to New Testament history. The work gives evidence of careful scholarship, and the promised commentary will, we trust, prove to be a useful accession to exegetical literature.

The Life of Bengel.

Johann Albrecht Bengel. Lebensabriss, Character, Briefe und Aussprüche. Nebst einem Anhang aus seinen Predigten und Erbaunngsstunden. Nach handschriftlichen Mittheilungen dargestellt von Dr. Oscar Wächter. Stuttgart: S. G. Liesching. 1865. — The Life of such a man as Bengel must be welcomed by all Christians. Dr. Wächter says in the preface: "My work is that of a compiler, on whom fidelity, even to the old-fashioned

expressions, was specially incumbent." Accordingly, a large part of the book consists of extracts from Bengel's letters and other writings. These, however, are so arranged as to present a very readable sketch of the life and characteristics of Bengel. The outward incidents of his life are few; the chief interest of the biography consists in the picture it gives us of the inner life, the social and religious character of one whose labors have already become the heritage of all Christendom, but whose piety, though reflected in his works, deserves to be, as it here is, exhibited in a still stronger light. If it is true that the biographical literature of Germany is comparatively meager, the deficiency cannot be owing to the lack of interesting subjects and of suitable materials. Of this the work before us is one proof, and we hope it will be followed by others.

ARTICLE IX.

RECENT ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

Life of Marcus Tullius Cicero. By William Forsyth, M.A., Q.C. New York: Charles Scribner and Co.

The best modern life of Cicero hitherto, has been that of Middleton, first published more than a century ago. But Middleton's work was an almost indiscriminate panegyric, and he hardly goes beyond the public and political life of the orator. If Middleton erred on the side of over praise, certain later writers, especially among the Germans, of whom Drumann and Mommsen may be particularly noticed, have indulged in what can hardly be considered as anything but studied detraction. Even Mr. Long, who with care and ample scholarship has edited an admirable edition of Cicero's speeches, speaks of him sometimes in a tone of cold severity, as one who "as a man does not command admiration or respect"; who "falls far below the measure of a generous, sincere, and noble character." These words, not to be cruel and unjust to a great reputation, should be based on a broad foundation of facts, and this basis we believe cannot be found. That Cicero was sometimes vacillating, undecided in great emergencies, constitutionally vain, and sometimes weak, must be allowed. He was not a soldier; he was not Caesar; he may have been wanting in physical courage; but he knew — none better — the corruption and dishonor of the times, the craft, duplicity and violence everywhere prevalent, the small trust to be placed in public men, and the constant danger to the state from the unscrupulous and unprincipled. If he had personal foibles and faults, as a statesman and patriot he was noble-minded, true, and sagacious. He en-

tered on no mean or unworthy courses, and he seldom failed to foresee the result of state policy. The conspirators against Caesar would not admit Cicero to their counsels, because they feared his caution and timidity; but if he had joined them he never would have suffered the political blunders which led to their destruction. The spirit of Niebuhr and Erasmus will enable us to judge more fairly of so great a man as Cicero than the narrower and colder criticism of some of the moderns. Niebuhr says: "I love Cicero as if I had known him, and I judge of him as I would judge of a near relation who had committed a folly;" and Erasmus, in the preface to the Tusc. Quaest., says: "I can never read the works of Cicero on Old Age, or Friendship, or Duties, or his Tusculan Disputations, without fervently pressing them to my lips, without being penetrated with the profoundest veneration for a mind little short of inspired by God himself. I would rather that Scotus and all that set should perish than be deprived of the works of Cicero. I feel a better man for reading Cicero; whereas reading the Schoolmen is as ice to my soul."

Mr. Forsyth avoids the faults of indiscriminate eulogy on the one side, and of unsympathizing criticism on the other. He sees and allows the foibles and errors of the great orator, but he sees also the virtues, and endeavors fairly to strike the balance. He gives us, as far as possible, his private life, interweaving his familiar letters so as to make the man live again, and we see him, not only contending against Catiline, or defending Milo, but travelling to Terracina and Brandusium, enjoying for the first time the splendors of Athens, or entertaining Caesar on the 20th of December, B.C. 44, at his villa near Puteoli, and, notwithstanding the trouble of taking care of a thousand guests, "acquitting himself, as he says, like a man."

This work of Mr. Forsyth is of real value, because of its sound learning and its honest judgment of a very great Roman, and because it brings the source of knowledge within the easy reach of us all.

"What a blank there would have been," says Mr. Forsyth, "in the annals of Rome and the history of the world if Cicero had never lived..... The more we think of all we owe him, — of all he did, and wrote, and spoke, — the more shall we be disposed to agree with the prophetic judgment of the historian[1] who says: 'Vivit vivetque per omnem saeculorum memoriam..... Citiusque e mundo genus hominum quam Ciceronis gloria e memoriâ hominum unquam cedet.'"

The style of Mr. Forsyth is plain and direct, if not especially picturesque. He gives us what we most desire, a clear and intelligible idea of the man, Cicero, and the turbulent times in which he lived.

[1] Vell. Paterculus.

Discussions on the Gospels, in two Parts. Part I. On the Language Employed by our Lord and his Disciples. Part II. On the Original Language of St. Matthew's Gospel, and on the Origin and Authenticity of the Gospels. By Alexander Roberts, D.D. Second edition, revised and enlarged. 8vo. pp. 571. Cambridge and London: Macmillan and Co. 1864.

"The object of the First Part of this Treatise is to prove directly from the New Testament itself that Greek was widely diffused, well understood, and commonly employed for all public purposes in Palestine during the period spent on earth by our Lord and his apostles" (p. 1). "That Greek was in several important respects the then *prevailing* language of Palestine; that it was in particular the language generally employed in public intercourse; the language which a religious teacher would have no hesitation in selecting and making use of, for the most part, as the vehicle of conveying his instructions, whether orally or in writing, and the language, accordingly, which was thus employed both by our Saviour and his apostles" (p. 5). "While it is now generally said that our Lord spoke *for the most part* in Hebrew, and only *sometimes* in Greek, what I venture to maintain is, that he spoke *for the most part* in Greek, and only *sometimes* in Hebrew" (p. 16).

In his Second Part Dr. Roberts contends against the supposition that Matthew's Gospel was originally written in Hebrew and Greek, also against the supposition that it was written in Hebrew alone. His reasoning in his First Part must *incline*, if not *necessitate*, him to adopt the opinion, which he defends very decidedly, that Matthew's Gospel was written in the language in which it has been transmitted to us. In accounting for the origin of the Gospels, Dr. Roberts rejects the theory of the Ur-Evangelium, also the theory that one evangelist copied from another; and contends that "our Lord Jesus Christ spoke in Greek, and the evangelists independently narrated his actions, and reported his discourses in the same language which he had himself employed" (p. 486).

Thus we see that the theory pervading the entire volume, and subjecting other speculations to it, is, that the Greek language was generally used by our Lord in his religious instructions, and therefore we have not merely his ideas, but his identical words, preserved in the Gospels. This theory, so contrary to that generally maintained, needs to be supported by very strong arguments. We think that Dr. Roberts has not established his theory, althought he has evinced much ingenuity and an excellent spirit in defending it. This Treatise abounds with good and useful thoughts.

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

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